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Abstract 
The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) government has made remarkable 
economic progress over the past two decades. During this time, the RPF 
government’s policies have demonstrated similarities with the policies followed by 
East Asian developmental states. The government has intervened in the economy to 
promote diversification while also opening its economy to international competition. 
It has also made strategic investments, which have led to the adoption of new 
production techniques. Conditions of ‘systemic vulnerability’ have also applied in 
Rwanda (Doner et al. 2005). However, the RPF government’s strategy is also 
strikingly different since it has liberalised its financial sector and has only 
experienced limited manufacturing sector growth. It has also embraced governance 
reforms to a greater degree than most other developmental states. The RPF’s 
development strategy has been shaped by the competing demands of “three 
constituencies” – donors, domestic elites and the population. To manage capital and 
organise labour to appropriate systems of accumulation, the government has 
developed narratives as one way to retain legitimacy among three constituencies. 
Evidence of continued economic success and progress in three sectors (coffee, tea 
and mining) show that ruling elites are committed to economic development. 
However, vulnerabilities resulting from the need to appease “three constituencies” 
have inhibited economic development.  
This thesis highlights the evolution of elite politics, details RPF ideology and 
develops a historical study of three sectors (coffee, tea and mining). Though previous 
governments invested in increasing the production of primary commodity exports, 
very little was done to reduce the vulnerability of the economy to global commodity 
price fluctuations. In contrast, the RPF’s strategy has targeted reducing vulnerability 
to international price fluctuations through increasing productivity and embracing 
value-addition. Such goals work in line with achieving self-reliance.  
A better understanding of the developmental challenge facing the RPF 
government is developed through showcasing how vulnerability both motivates and 
inhibits economic development.  
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PTA    Potential Target Area 
RANU    Rwanda Alliance for National Unity 
RCA    Rwanda Cooperative Agency 
RCD-G   Rassemblement Congolaise pour la Démocratie-Goma  
RDB    Rwanda Development Board 
RDF    Rwanda Defence Forces 
REDEMI   Régie d’Exploitation et de Développement des Mines 
RGB    Rwanda Governance Board 
RIEPA    Rwanda Investment and Export Promotion Agency 
RIG    Rwanda Investment Group 
RM    Rwanda Metals 
RMA    Rwanda Mining Association 
RMT    Rwanda Mountain Tea 
RNC    Rwanda National Congress 
RNEC    Rwanda National Ethics Committee 
RNRA    Rwanda National Resources Authority 
RPA    Rwandan Patriotic Army 
RPF    Rwandan Patriotic Front 
RSE    Rwandan Stock Exchange 
RSSB    Rwanda Social Security Board 
RTC    Rwanda Trading Company 
RTI    Rwanda Tea Investments 
RTP    Rwanda Tea Packers 
RwF    Rwandan Franc 
SACCOs   Savings and Credit Cooperatives 
SEC    Securities and Exchange Commission 
SGB    Société Générale de Belgique  
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SLTB    Sri Lanka Tea Board 
SME    Small and Medium Enterprise 
Sn    Stannum (Tin) 
SOMIGL   Société Minière des Grands Lacs 
SOMIRWA    Société Minière de Rwanda 
SOMUKI   Société Minière de Muhinga et de Kigali 
SORWATHE   Société Rwandaise du Thé 
SPREAD Sustaining Partnerships to Enhance Rural Enterprise 
and Agribusiness Development 
SPU    Special Policy Unit 
STABEX   Stabilisation of Export Earnings Scheme 
SWC    Semi Washed Coffee 
TATEPA   Tanzania Tea Packers 
Thaisarco-AMC  Thailand Smelting and Refining Co Ltd. 
TPD    Tous Pour la paix et le Developpement  
TRAFIPRO   Travail, Fidélité, Progrès 
TV    Thé Villageois 
TVET    Technical and Vocational Education and Training 
UK    United Kingdom 
UMHK   Union Minière du Haut Katanga 
UN    United Nations 
UNAR    Union Nationale Rwandaise 
UNECA   United Nations Economic Commission for Africa  
UNSC    United Nations Security Council 
UPDF    Uganda People’s Defence Force 
USAID   United States Agency for International Development 
USD    United States Dollars 
UTC    Union Trade Centre 
WDA    Workforce Development Authority 
WGI    Worldwide Governance Indicators 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
The contrast between where Rwanda is today and where most people would have 
guessed it would be in the wake of the 1994 genocide is astonishing. Kagame is the 
man of the hour in modern Africa. No other leader has made so much out of so little, 
and none offers such encouraging hope for the continent’s future.1 
 
Paul Kagame, judged by the number of his victims and by the nature of the crimes 
committed, is probably the worst war criminal in ofﬁce today.2 
  
The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) government’s achievements over the past 
two decades have divided opinion, causing Rwanda to be depicted in contrasting 
ways. Rwanda’s portrayed obedience to mainstream reforms has enlisted a prominent 
international support base, including the likes of Tony Blair, Bill Clinton and Bill 
Gates.3 Rwanda is often cited as a ‘donor darling’ (Marysse et al. 2007) and 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs), including The World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), often laud the RPF government’s 
achievements.4 Progress has been made towards achieving Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs).5 Performances have also been consistently impressive in most 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), with the exception of those pertaining to 
political space.6 This has coincided with Rwanda’s impressive performances in the 
Doing Business rankings.7 The government invests in supporting such positive 
portrayals, dedicating its resources to improving performances in governance 
indices.8 The government publicly prioritises embracing market-led reforms and 
building a ‘facilitating’ environment for the private sector to lead development.  
                                                          
1 Kinzer (2008, 337) 
2 Reyntjens (2013, 98) 
3 See Grant (2010), Sundaram (2014). 
4 In 2015, IMF President Christine Lagarde (2015) visited Kigali and celebrated Rwanda’s “dynamic 
economy with governance standards” and argued such achievements were an “upshot of strong and 
concerted policies and a deliberate focus on inclusiveness.” World Bank President Jim Kim (2012, 
2013) singled out Rwanda for showing that land-locked countries could grow sustainably, while also 
developing innovative, inclusive projects, including reintegrating former enemy combatants into 
society and assisting victims of gender-based violence. 
5 Rwanda ranked first among 48 African countries, according to ONE’s 2013 Continental Data report 
(Kanyesigye 2013). In 2012, Rwanda reached the MDG target on child mortality, reducing the death 
of children under the age of five, from 156 deaths/1,000 children to 54 deaths/1,000 children annually. 
6 The government responds to criticisms of poor performances in ‘Voice and Accountability’ by 
emphasising the importance of security and stability (Swedlund 2013).   
7 In 2014, Rwanda ranked 32nd in the world and second in Africa after Mauritius.  
8 The Rwanda Governance Board (RGB) is tasked with ensuring Rwanda continues to improve in 
relevant governance indicators. The Doing Business Unit at the Rwanda Development Board (RDB) 
is responsible for improving the country’s position in the Doing Business Index. 
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“When we are making policies, one of our primary concerns is how 
to make our private sector environment easy for business. We are 
open to competition. We don’t need to protect the private sector for 
the sake of protecting them.”9 
Prominent mainstream scholars also promote this image. Paul Collier claimed 
that Rwanda achieved a ‘rare hat-trick’ of rapid growth, sharp poverty reduction and 
reduced inequality (Terrill 2012). However, such claims ignore that severe inequality 
persists in Rwanda. Though inequality (using the GINI index) decreased from 53.09 
in 2006 to 50.82 in 2011, Rwanda is still the most unequal country in East Africa.10 
This is true for both the GINI index and the Palma ratio (SID 2014).11  
Many heterodox scholars also promote positive images of a ‘Developing’ 
Rwanda. However, heterodox scholars differ from mainstream observers in their 
interpretations of the sources of Rwanda’s economic progress. Under heterodox 
approaches, Rwanda is likened to East Asian developmental states of the past. It is 
termed as an “incipiently developmental state” (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2014a, 
Booth 2015a), a neopatrimonial developer (Kelsall 2012, 2013) or a rare exception to 
failed development experiences across Africa (Henley 2013, Booth et al. 2014). 
Conflicting academic schools of thought compete to interpret the secrets of Rwandan 
economic progress but agree that Rwanda is a success. These positive depictions 
operate in direct opposition to the second, more negative depiction of the country. 
However, there are also many negative portrayals of Rwanda. Such 
depictions are advanced by prominent scholars and transnational advocacy networks, 
including Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the Enough Project.12 Kagame’s 
government is portrayed as “an army with a state, rather than a state with an army” 
(Reyntjens 2011, 2). James Scott’s (1998) principles of “high modernism” have been 
used by some of these scholars (Newbury 2011, Huggins 2013a) to emphasise the 
dangers of the RPF’s consolidation of political and economic power.13 These critics 
                                                          
9 Interview, Ministry of Trade and Industry (MINICOM) official, March 2012. 
10 World Bank statistics indicate that the GINI was only 28.9 in 1985. 
11 The wealthiest 10 per cent of the population held 43.42 per cent of the national wealth in 2000 
(Munyemana 2013). In 2011, this share reduced to 43.2 per cent. The income share of the poorest 10 
per cent of the population was a mere 1.88 per cent in 2000 but increased to 2.13 per cent in 2011. 
12 Most prominent among these scholars are Filip Reyntjens, Rene Lemarchand and Gerard Prunier. 
Others include writers who contributed to the edited volume by Straus and Waldorf (2011). Others 
disagree with this narrative, including Phil Clark and William Schabas (who work on transitional 
justice) and David Booth and Frederick Golooba-Mutebi (who work on political economy). 
13 Scott used ‘high modernism’ to highlight repression associated with state dirigisme in the Soviet 
Union, Tanzania and other countries. High modernist ideology is “a strong version of the self-
confidence about scientific and technical progress, the expansion of production, the growing 
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argue that a small group of elites concentrate benefits accrued from government 
policies.14 They also highlight the RPF’s exclusionary policies against the population, 
which have resulted in horizontal inequalities between ethnic groups (the ruling, 
minority Tutsis and the ‘powerless’, majority Hutus).15  
The contradictions of Rwanda’s development– the growth and increased 
productivity on the one hand and the increasing inequality and the government’s 
association with violence on the other – are rarely acknowledged in the work of 
individual observers. Rhetorical commonplaces – words and phrases that have a 
shared meaning among groups (Jackson 2006) – have been used by observers to 
strengthen contrasting narratives about Rwanda. Each set of speakers, audiences and 
issues is characterised by different groups of rhetorical commonplaces, which 
speakers draw on to convey a shared meaning of their arguments to audiences 
(Jackson 2006).16 Observers who view Rwanda positively equate ‘development’ with 
exemplary leadership, political stability and the rare condition of ruling elites 
committing to economic development. The violence committed by the RPF is either 
ignored or perceived as necessary for national security. The short-term costs suffered 
by the population are also similarly ignored. Those who are critical of the RPF stress 
the government’s negative aspects while arguing that any economic progress only 
benefits a small group of elites (at the cost of the population). Critical scholars 
suggest that the government will eventually be a victim of ‘high modernist’ social 
engineering. These polarised depictions are not perfectly represented in the work of 
any author or a particular group. Individuals present their own nuances. The 
reactions individuals receive fit them into opposing camps. Every narrative 
                                                                                                                                                                    
satisfaction of human needs, the mastery of nature and the rational design of social order 
commensurate with the scientific understanding of natural laws” (Scott 1998, 4). Scott (ibid) predicts 
that tragic episodes of state-initiated social engineering occur when four circumstances coincide: (i) an 
authoritarian state; (ii) an administrative ordering of nature and society; (iii) high modernist ideology; 
(iv) a prostrate civil society. High modernist representations fail to acknowledge that “improvisation 
permits impracticable central plans to survive” (Tilly 1999, 350). 
14 Examples of social and environmental re-ordering in Rwanda include the ‘villagisation’ of 
thousands of people between 1996 and 2000 and similar attempts after 2007, which aimed at ensuring 
70 per cent of the population live in villages by 2020 (Huggins 2013a). Other examples of social 
engineering include the establishment of new systems of civil ‘re-education’, a systematic land 
registration programme implemented between 2008 and 2012 and an ambitious redevelopment of 
Kigali (Newbury 2011, Huggins 2013a). 
15 Horizontal inequalities refer to “inequalities in economic, social or political dimensions or cultural 
status between culturally defined groups” (Stewart 2008, 3). It is likely that inequality between ethnic 
groups has increased (McDoom 2011). However, there is insufficient evidence.  
16 The meaning of specific rhetorical commonplaces differs between groups and individuals. The 
notion of strong sharing “disregards the deeply interactive character of language itself, its location in 
constantly negotiated conversations rather than individual minds” (Tilly in Jackson 2006, 29). 
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developed by an observer presents a normative representation of the RPF regime. 
Supporting either narrative legitimises or threatens the RPF’s moral authority. 
Rwanda scholars tend to perceive this divide within the academic community as 
relatively rare compared to the academic literature of other countries.17  
Late development has never been produced through “all good things going 
together” i.e. embracing market-led reforms, democracy, peace and human rights.18 
Most East Asian governments were authoritarian and achieved ‘catch up’ through 
state intervention (Amsden 1989, Wade 1990). Rather than protecting property 
rights, these governments (and many other late developing countries) chose to ‘get 
property rights wrong.’ Shaky property rights were essential in the construction of 
policy rights where governments restricted the use of foreign property in the name of 
nationalism (Amsden 2013). Heterodox scholars who write about Rwanda recognise 
that Rwandan economic success (as in East Asia) has not followed a market-friendly 
path to achieve economic development (Booth 2015a). However, these scholars have 
largely focused on positive aspects – the use of investment groups to promote 
diversification, the emphasis on facilitating ‘smallholder’ farming and the promotion 
of health and education (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2012a, 2014b). Very little space 
is devoted to how the RPF government deals with the inequality that has 
characterised its rule or how it has negotiated challenges from rival elites.19  
Capitalist accumulation is rooted in unequal outcomes associated with 
processes of primitive accumulation. Primitive accumulation refers to a phase of the 
appropriation of wealth (or surpluses) through largely non-economic or coercive 
means during which others are displaced from ownership and access. Elites compete 
with each other to claim assets during this process.20 Such processes occur through 
the direct exploitation of the peasantry. Land and assets are taken away from 
individuals and many are forced into wage labour. As Marx (1976, 874) writes, 
primitive accumulation “is a process, which operates two transformations whereby 
                                                          
17 Recent literature has identified this divide among Rwanda scholars (Hintjens 2014, Fisher 2015). 
18 The World Bank’s (1993) reflections on East Asian success acknowledge the important role of the 
state. However, it emphasises the importance of embracing market-led reforms and ‘getting prices 
right’. In reality, East Asian states “got prices wrong” –subsidised strategic sectors and distorted the 
prices of foreign exchange rates and long-term rates (Amsden 1989).  
19 For example, Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2014b) use the same statistics as Collier and World Bank 
(2013) in emphasising that inequality has reduced between 2006 and 2011. They (Booth and Golooba-
Mutebi 2014b, S183) focus on “improved policies for agriculture and social protection” as reasons for 
reduced inequality but do not recognise that Rwanda is the most unequal country in East Africa. 
20 These processes involve the creation of rents, empowering recipients of rents and excluding others. 
“Rents refer to ‘excess incomes’, which should not exist in efficient markets” (Khan 2000a, 21). 
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the social means of subsistence and production are turned into capital, and the 
immediate producers are turned into wage labourers.” Marx recognises primitive 
accumulation as “anything but idyllic.” However, these processes are essential if 
structural transformation is to be achieved. East Asian states did not achieve equal 
gains for elites and the people. They were violent, corrupt (Khan 1998) and acted 
viciously against labour unions (Deyo 1987; Chang 2009).21 In developmental states, 
rural populations were stripped of their capacity to form independent associations. 
Even ‘private’ associations like cooperatives and producer associations were 
supervised by state agencies (Moore 1988).  
Each country must chart its own path to achieve and sustain economic 
development. Ruling elites in Rwanda (like their European predecessors) sustain 
control of centralising means of capital and coercion during this process. Tilly (1992) 
illustrated how European states were constructed through developing a state 
apparatus that administered centralised means of capital and coercion. States “relied 
heavily on capital and capitalists as they reorganised coercion”, building up coercive 
means of their own while depriving citizens of access to those means (Tilly 1992, 68-
9). European ruling elites embarked on wars, which compelled states to become 
efficient in revenue collection by forcing them to improve administrative capabilities 
and tax collection. Ruling elites were forced to simultaneously find ways to finance 
war and administer their coercive power. This led to varied patterns of bargains 
between elites and different interest groups, including merchants, landlords and the 
peasantry. The competition that drives ruling elites to centralise the means of 
coercion and capital have altered today through “a ‘drift’ towards external state-
making” (Leander 2004, 79). Such arguments imply that less ‘legitimacy’ is derived 
from a ‘tax-mediated social contract’ with the population (Moore and Putzel 1999), 
as compared to others who provide finance (through aid or foreign investments).  
In this thesis, ‘legitimacy’ does not “depend on conformity to an abstract 
principle or on the assent of the governed” (Tilly 1985, 171). Instead, Tilly’s (1985, 
171) definition of legitimacy is used - “the probability that other authorities will act 
to confirm the decisions of a given authority.” In Rwanda, one way of deriving 
legitimacy is to construct narratives, which make the processes of economic 
                                                          
21 East Asian development is assumed to be associated with investments in health and education and 
associated with income equality. Seguino (2000) contests these claims, arguing that women’s 
disadvantaged status lowered their relative wages and thereby worked as a stimulus to investment, 
exports and economic growth. 
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development acceptable, at least, to ‘other authorities’ – including mainstream 
observers, donors and others positive about the country (some of whom provide 
money and recognition to the RPF’s development project) and elites (who share 
collective memories of vulnerability and shared experiences through the liberation 
effort). The population is ‘another constituency’, since tax collection comprises 
around 40 per cent of the national budget.22 For legitimacy to be maintained, threats 
from these constituencies have to be countered. Threats take the form of withdrawal 
of moral and economic support from donors, political challenges from rival elites and 
resistance from the population (especially to accumulation strategies that are 
necessary for economic development).  
This thesis will explore how the RPF government has achieved substantial 
economic progress – encouraging capitalist accumulation and diversification 
(specifically, upgrading primary commodities). The RPF government has constructed 
and protected narratives (backed up by the threat of violence) as one way of 
legitimising its economic policies. Narratives (and delivering tangible developmental 
results) are aimed at quelling vulnerabilities that arise from “three constituencies” – 
donors, rival elites and the population.23 
1.1 Regime Change in Rwanda 
 
Violence in Rwanda has usually been portrayed as a struggle between two 
ethnic groups: minority Tutsis and majority Hutus. However, regime change has only 
occurred when disenchanted elites capitalised on popular grievances. Frictions 
between groups of elites have always contributed to regime change in Rwanda. 
Though not every regime change occurred through the mobilisation of large-scale 
violence, all instances were preceded by economic downturn and widespread 
discontentment among the population. 
The primary threat to the first independent government – Grégoire 
Kayibanda’s First Republic (1962-1973) – took a regional form (Lemarchand 1995). 
Ethnicity was used as a political instrument to bind the Hutu elite in ‘us-them’ 
                                                          
22 See Figure 5.3 
23 The term - two constituencies – was used (Mkandawire 1999) to show how “choiceless 
democracies” in Africa maintained the support of domestic citizenries and donors. The “third 
constituency” used here focuses on domestic elites who have the potential to threaten political 
stability. This thesis argues against Mkandawire (1999), who writes that dictators do not need to 
maintain the support of domestic citizenries. All “three constituencies” are relevant because successful 
capitalist accumulation requires labour to be mobilised in service of it.  
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rhetoric against the threat of Tutsis (who had formerly occupied positions of power 
but left Rwanda after the 1959 revolution) (Tilly 2003). However, once the salience 
of the Tutsi threat had subsided, so too did the potency of ethnicity as a political 
instrument. Eventually, Kayibanda’s Southern support base was challenged by 
Habyarimana’s Northern support base in 1973 (Prunier 1995, Kamola 2008). Juvénal 
Habyarimana’s Second Republic (1973-1994) was reliant on different groups of 
Northern elites. In the late 1980s, Habyarimana became increasingly reliant on a 
group of elites from Gisenyi, who allied with other extremists and used ethnicity as a 
political instrument to mobilise support against Tutsis in the 1990s (Lemarchand 
1995, Des Forges 1999, Mamdani 2001). Since the threat of the invading Tutsi-led 
RPF was salient, Hutu power elites mobilised enough support to conduct violence on 
a large scale. Observers who depict such violence as a product of inequality between 
two ethnic groups ignore the power relations between elites who led the violence and 
the population whose grievances were mobilised in service of that violence.24  
Most of the academic literature paints the RPF as a group of Tutsi elites from 
Uganda who have similar interests.25 RPF officials usually argue that elites work 
through consensus and prioritise pro-poor economic development.  
“This government focuses on making full potential of development 
for its people. The RPF is sensitive to the need to harness the 
capacity of people. The former government concentrated on 
prosperity for the haves and poverty for the have-nots. Our 
government is pro-people. Everyone’s focus is on how to reduce 
poverty.”26 
 “This is the best Rwanda has even been. We are really touching 
people on the ground now. For me, the untold story is that an 
ordinary Rwandan – a young woman in the rural areas – has been 
able to access land. She can trade it, she can have it as collateral 
and she’s more incentivised to protect the land. It is easy for some 
critics to say we have a small elite or that Rwanda is a dictatorship. 
But which government protects its smallholders like us and 
sacrifices so much?”27 
                                                          
24 Explanations of how the greedy manipulate the grievances of others in the context of historical 
social relations within a particular context contribute to better understandings of large-scale violence 
than an emphasis on greed or grievances alone (Keen 2008). See also Cramer (2003). 
25 Scholars who are critical of the RPF often acknowledge the existence of friction within Tutsi elites 
(Reyntjens 2013). However, these scholars rarely consider such threats to be of primary significance. 
Instead, they stress the threats of an increasingly alienated population. 
26 Interview, Michel Rugema, Senator, April 2012. 
27 Interview, Serge Kamuhinda, Office of the President, May 2012. 
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However, RPF officials also acknowledge that consensus is rarely achieved 
without angering some cadres.  
“Consensus has its own problems and benefits. Things don’t move 
quickly but we gradually learn to listen to new ideas. The RPF’s 
tradition is to debate, to encourage people to come together. We 
always look for the unity of Rwanda. Sometimes, people may 
disagree but we don’t take our problems outside.”28 
Critics apply ‘high modernism’ to characterise the RPF government but such 
fatalistic depictions do not explain why regime change has not occurred. During the 
RPF’s reign, ruling elites have countered any threats to mobilise popular grievances 
along ethnic lines (through fighting Hutu opponents internally and abroad and 
locking up rival Hutu leaders – Victoire Ingabire). Frictions between Tutsi elites are 
the most potent threats to Kagame’s leadership. No Hutu political leaders have 
emerged (or been allowed to emerge) who could mobilise support on the basis of 
ethnic differences.  
1.2 Comparing Past and Present Economic Strategies in 
Rwanda 
 
Existing academic literature has not engaged in comparisons between the 
RPF government and its predecessors.29 Some authors (Ingelaere 2011, Purdekova 
2011) argue that this government displays continuities with previous governments. 
Top-down policymaking, high levels of state control and the consolidation of power 
among a narrow group of elites are some of these continuities. Successive 
governments have attempted “rural social engineering”, using policies such as 
imihigo and umuganda.30 Verwimp (2013) applies “high modernism” to characterise 
the Habyarimana government in the same way many critical scholars characterise the 
RPF government. However, there are also differences between the RPF government 
and the Habyarimana government. In particular, this government legitimises itself on 
contesting its economic vulnerability – reducing its reliance on primary commodities, 
promoting the services sector and aiming to reduce its dependence on foreign aid. 
                                                          
28 Interview, Tito Rutaremara, Senator, January 2015. 
29 Many books (Prunier 1995, Mamdani 2001) written about the genocide explore its historical roots. 
However, no existing literature details a comparison of the political economy of the RPF government 
and its predecessors. 
30 Imihigo refers to performance contracts. Their use makes local authorities directly responsible for 
achieving targets set by their superiors. Umuganda refers to a collective form of labour performed by 
one person per household. 
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Additionally, The RPF government legitimises its rule through distancing itself from 
the Habyarimana government.  
“What we have done is create an enabling environment for the 
private sector. The last government had no enabling environment. 
In the past, there were monopolies. It is not the role of the 
government to be in business. The government’s role is to focus on 
other things and let people drive our economy.”31 
 
A central contribution of this thesis is to place the RPF achievements in 
historical context. Preceding governments established the foundations for Rwanda’s 
economic success in some sectors. However, ruling elites who dominated preceding 
governments did not maintain their commitment to development. These governments 
eventually favoured short-term individual enrichment over the prioritisation of long-
term development goals because of pressures emanating from international 
commodity prices, grievances among the population and frictions among elites.  
The RPF government has outperformed its predecessors when annual growth 
rates are compared (Figure 1.1).32 However, both preceding governments presided 
over periods of impressive growth. The Second Republic was even lauded as an 
example for others on the continent as a ‘development dictatorship.’33  
 
Source: World Bank 
In the 1970s, Rwanda had a better Gross National Product (GNP) per capita 
than other countries in the East African Community (EAC) (Reyntjens 1994). For 
                                                          
31 Interview, James Gatera, Bank of Kigali, April 2012. 
32 The Habyarimana government averaged a growth rate of 3.35 between 1973 and 1993 while the 
RPF government averaged a growth rate of 8.71 between 1996 and 2012. 
33 Keiner, quoted in Verwimp (2000, 334).  
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
19
61
19
63
19
65
19
67
19
69
19
71
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
20
09
20
11
20
13
Pe
r c
en
t
Year
Figure 1.1: Rwanda Annual Growth Rates: 1961-2014
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most years between 1975 and 1981, growth rates were above regional and 
continental averages (Figure 1.2).34 After 1981, the Second Republic’s growth rates 
were close to the EAC’s average but higher than the continental average (for most 
years) (Figure 1.2). The RPF government has outperformed previous governments 
and also achieved better growth rates than the regional and continental average for all 
but three years (Figure 1.3). The current government has achieved more than six per 
cent growth every year since 1994, except in 2003 and 2013. 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
Source: World Bank 
Previous governments depended heavily on coffee as their primary source of 
foreign exchange, which proved to be a dangerous choice for these governments 
(particularly for the Second Republic). In contrast, the RPF government has reduced 
                                                          
34 The EAC average includes data for Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. Data for 
Uganda is only available from 1983, while data for Tanzania is only available from 1989. 
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its dependence on coffee (Figure 1.4).35 This has largely been a result of increased 
revenues from the tea and minerals sectors. Other exports have also brought in 
foreign exchange for the government. Tourism is counted among the top sources of 
foreign exchange. “Starting from a base of less than $5 million in 2002, it was 
expected to reach $100 million in revenues by 2012, representing a compounded 
annual growth rate of over 40 per cent. An estimated 280,000 jobs were created in 
the process” (GoR 2007, 37).36 Hides and skins have become an increasingly 
prominent export, bringing in over 16 million USD in exports in 2013. The dairy 
sector has also shown promising signs, bringing in the most foreign exchange 
between October and December 2013 (Gahiji 2014a). The government has also 
invested in recording re-exports and cross-border trade by gathering trade statistics at 
border checkpoints. Re-exports, including petroleum products, machines, engines, 
vehicles and minerals, comprised over 44 per cent of exports in the fiscal year 
2013/14 (BNR 2014). Cross-border trade increased from 49 million USD in 2012 to 
108 million USD in 2014 (ibid). The EAC is a promising market for non-traditional 
food exports (e.g. rice, cassava, wheat and maize).37 Over 39 million USD worth of 
maize, wheat and cassava was exported in 2012 and 2013.  
 
Source: MINECOFIN  
Unlike previous governments, the RPF government has also prioritised value-
addition of primary commodities to reduce vulnerability to global commodity price 
fluctuations. This entails, as elucidated in the National Export Strategy (NES), both 
                                                          
35 Between 1976 and 1991, coffee exports comprised between 65 per cent and 82 per cent of total 
export earnings (Chandra et al. 2007). 
36 In 2012, the government received $108 million in revenues. 
37 Interview, Bill Kayonga, NAEB, January 2015. 
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tapping into niche markets for high-quality production and moving up the supply 
chain through packaging finished products (MINICOM 2011).  
“The only way we can compete is by increasing quality and 
making the most of the value-chain. This is what will make 
Rwanda competitive in the long-run and ensure benefits will reach 
the population.”38 
In 2000, the government launched its VISION 2020, which aimed at 
transforming Rwanda from a “subsistence agriculture economy to a knowledge-
based society, with high levels of savings and private investment, thereby reducing 
the country’s dependence on aid” (GoR 2000, 4). By 2020, the government intends 
for services to contribute 42 per cent, industry 26 per cent and agriculture 32 per cent 
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Figure 1.5 shows the gradually increasing 
prominence of the services sector, while indicating a stagnant industrial sector. 
Agriculture as a share of GDP has reduced. Food crops contribute the most to GDP 
within the agriculture sector (Figure 1.6). In recent years, food crops and the 
livestock sector have shown steady signs of growth (Figure 1.7). Employment grew 
most rapidly in the mining and quarrying, utilities and construction sectors between 
2006 and 2010 (UNECA 2013). 
 
 
Source: World Bank 
                                                          
38 Interview, Claver Gatete, then Governor, National Bank of Rwanda (BNR), December 2011. 
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Source: MINECOFIN 
 
Source: MINECOFIN 
Industry (and in particular, manufacturing) has not grown at the rate that was 
expected (Figure 1.5). This growth looks even more ordinary once it is recognised 
that government data includes the mining and quarrying sector within the industrial 
sector. Both the First Republic and the Second Republic invested in the 
manufacturing sector (although primarily to serve the domestic market). During the 
First Republic, foreign investors funded growth in the industrial sector.39 
Habyarimana’s government reaped rewards from investments made during 
Kayibanda’s reign.40 As is expected of governments, the RPF government ignores the 
foundations that were built by preceding governments. The current government is 
                                                          
39 These included: Belgian-owned Manumetal (furniture), Dutch-owned Heineken subsidiary Bralirwa 
(brewery), Indian-owned Sulfo (soaps) (Gathani and Stoelinga 2013) and Chinese investments in a 
sugar factory in Kabuye and a rice processing factory in Bugarama (IBRD 1957). 
40 In the late 1980s, the share of sales from exports for firms in the manufacturing sector was 
approximately 3.6 per cent. The share of exports of non-commodity exporting firms in 2010 was 4.5 
per cent (Gathani and Stoelinga 2012, 2013).  
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right to blame previous governments for failing to build domestic industries when 
donors allowed more space for such experiments.41 The construction sector is among 
the few promising sub-sectors within the industrial sector. However, growth in this 
sector is geared to create a vision of development, rather than being a reliable source 
of long-term employment. Government officials and private sector respondents argue 
that manufacturing growth was not prioritised because there was little space to 
promote industrial policy, limited access to electricity and difficulty in accessing 
regional markets.42  
 
 
Source: MINECOFIN 
 
Source: MINECOFIN 
                                                          
41 Interview, Thomas Kigabo, National Bank of Rwanda, May 2013. 
42 Interviews, Rutaremara, Robert Bayigamba and Kamuhinda, January 2015. 
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The services sector has grown rapidly over the last few years. Between 2011 
and 2012, the services sector grew 12.2 per cent (UNECA 2013).43 Within the 
services sector, finance, real estate, hotels and restaurants and trading and transport 
have shown promising growth. The government has also launched a Meetings, 
Incentives, Conferences and Events (MICE) strategy to augment revenues from the 
services sector. RDB officials claim that revenues from MICE could reach 150 
million USD by 2015. Government officials also hope that growth in the tourism and 
ICT sectors will generate employment opportunities for educated youth.44  
The construction of Rwanda’s knowledge-based economy requires Kigali to 
become a hub for financial services, ICT and tourism.45 Kigali’s growth as a modern 
city is integral to Rwanda’s development strategy. The city has grown rapidly and is 
almost three times its size in the 1980s (Goodfellow and Smyth 2013, 3188). Kigali’s 
population has grown more than 48 per cent between 2002 and 2012 (NISR 2012a). 
Kigali is characterised by a ‘youth bulge’ and nearly 64 per cent of the youth in 
Kigali and other urban areas are migrants (Nabalamba and Sennoga 2014).  
Targeting an ambitious services-led structural transformation (with little 
manufacturing) may have deleterious effects. If services are prioritised before 
workers can procure necessary skills, it can produce a dangerous imbalance between 
an economy’s productive structure and its workforce (Rodrik 2011). Prioritising anti-
poverty programmes that improve quality of life (through providing health and 
education services) must be accompanied by the creation of jobs to meet the 
aspirations of recipients of social services. Policies echoing Say’s Law (that supply 
will create its own demand) are unlikely to work in this regard (Amsden 2010). The 
government has fostered the identity of “entrepreneurial citizens” among its 
population, with citizens expected to forego their sense of entitlement and acquire 
liberal values of independence and autonomy (Kamat 2004). Increased financial 
inclusion is part of this strategy, with individuals expected to create their own jobs, 
rather than having to rely on the government.46 More than 72 per cent of Rwandans 
accessed financial services in 2012, as compared to 48 per cent in 2008 (Andrews et 
                                                          
43 Interview, Jean Louis Uwitonze, Director General (DG) – MINICOM, May 2013; Interview, 
Emmanuel Hategeka, MINICOM, January 2015. 
44 Interview, Clare Akamanzi, RDB, November 2011. 
45 Jessop (2005, 33) argues that developmental states will create upgraded cities as a “territorial ‘fix’ 
for financial capital and international producer services.”  
46 Interview, Innocent Bulindi, Business Development Fund (BDF), January 2015. 
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al. 2012). It is very unclear whether these strategies will succeed. Even those who 
manage to start businesses struggle to stay afloat.47 
 
Source: MINECOFIN 
 
Source: MINECOFIN 
Unlike previous governments, this government has privatised state-owned 
assets in traditional export sectors and liberalised the trade-and-export environment 
in these sectors. Privatisation reforms have also been embraced in other sectors. In 
1997, the Privatisation Secretariat was established with the mandate to privatise 94 
state-owned enterprises. By 2011, 57 of these enterprises were privatised.48 The 
privatisation process began with the sale of Kabuye Sugar Works to the Madhvani 
Group in 1997.49 Privatised companies were located in sectors including coffee, tea, 
mining, fishing, cement, dairy, tourism, brickery, telecom and pyrethrum. 
Government officials acknowledge that privatisation was imposed on them but note 
                                                          
47 Interview, Private Sector Federation (PSF), January 2015. 
48 Internal RDB report. 
49 See Ansoms (2009a) for a detailed description. 
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that it was also the best option available in some sectors. Pro-privatisation narratives 
were constructed in some cases.  
“Privatisation is the ideology of the government. If a sector is 
profitable, it should be in the hands of the private sector. If it is not, 
then the government can keep control of it.”50 
Privatisation reforms were associated with difficulties. Reports indicated that 
choices of which enterprises would be privatised were made “at the political level” 
while at “the technical level”, it was difficult to manage the demands of the 
privatisation process.51 Some privatisation processes resembled the modalities of 
Hibou’s (2006) ‘privatisation of the state.’ The official narrative centred on the 
primacy of private actors, individuals and the market.  However, there has been 
blurring and fluidity between the ‘private’ and the ‘public’. Privatisation and 
liberalisation, rather than being neutral processes, favour those who have more 
‘voice’ than others, in terms of relative wealth or power (Castel-Branco et al. 2003). 
The distance between the ‘private’ and ‘public’ was managed closely and private 
intermediaries based their power on their proximity to the President.52 Despite 
managing privatisation processes, they have rarely been associated with positive 
outcomes. A government study indicated that only five out of 42 enterprises that 
were privatised through the Privatisation Secretariat were fully operational and 
complying with their business plans.53 
Outcomes of the privatisation process were instructive for government 
officials who promoted an image of embracing market-led reforms but found it 
difficult to discipline many private actors. 
“Privatisation has not always been associated with results for us. 
But Rwanda has always been dynamic in its thinking. We learn 
from these events and our philosophy changes. We are always 
reacting to results and thinking about how to make things work 
better.”54 
 
                                                          
50 Interview, Leonard Rugwabiza, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN), 
February 2012. 
51 Internal government reports. 
52 Hibou (2006) highlighted similar patterns during Ben Ali’s Presidency in Tunisia. Buur et al. (2011, 
252) show that the privatisation of the sugar industry in Mozambique was used by the state “to shape 
economic development according to its own priorities.” 
53 Internal RDB report. 
54 Interview, Ernest Rwamucyo, High Commissioner to India, December 2014. 
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Liberalisation creates the image of broad political participation but actually 
provides room for manoeuvre in meeting the demands of donors (Cramer 2001). In 
Rwanda, liberalisation was undertaken to meet the demands of donors. In some 
cases, foreign investors established control over sectors. In others, investment groups 
dominated sectors. The RPF government has challenged existing monopolies other 
than those under its authority.55 This may partly be viewed as the government’s 
attempt to reduce the possibility of power centres (with financial capacity) emerging 
among rival domestic elites. However, government officials also promote 
competition in certain sectors, believing that such activity will enhance productivity. 
“For us, competition is strongly linked to innovation. As 
government, we see foreign companies coming in as an advantage. 
It is then our job to make sure smaller local companies are learning 
from them. Slowly, our companies can grow and we will also force 
others to innovate.”56 
 
In contrast, the previous government concentrated power in state-owned tea 
factories, coffee marketing boards and monopoly export agencies and state-owned 
mining companies.57 Donors did not push Habyarimana’s government to embrace 
market-led reforms until the early 1990s and in very few sectors (Storey 1999). 
Developing pro-privatisation narratives and embracing market-led reforms have been 
a product of meeting donor demands while also finding ways to make sure reforms 
work in line with national priorities. The effective management of capital requires 
the government to retain the capacity and expertise to discipline and monitor 
businesses while building reciprocal control mechanisms with firms. East Asian 
developmental states retained such mechanisms where incentives were tied to results 
and contributed to prevent wasteful rent seeking behaviour (Amsden 2001).  
 
 
                                                          
55 These groups are explored in the thesis. They have been previously studied by Booth and Golooba-
Mutebi (2011, 2012a) and Gokgur (2011, 2012). 
56 Interview, Kigabo, BNR, January 2015. 
57 The government has liberalised the alcohol market by bringing in Belgian-owned Skol to compete 
with Bralirwa. Bralirwa representatives recognise that liberalising the beverages market has forced the 
company to engage in marketing campaigns. Bralirwa now offer deals and promotions to avoid losing 
market share (Interview, Freddy Biniga, Bralirwa, May 2012).  
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1.3 Research Question: Is Post-1994 Rwanda a developmental 
state? 
 
Secondary Question: How has vulnerability affected Rwanda’s development 
process? 
 
 Rwanda shares several characteristics with East Asian developmental states. 
Rwanda has enjoyed successful economic development through upgrading several 
economic activities. However, like the East Asian experiences of late development, 
the Rwandan experience has also been violent and exploitative. There are two clear 
differences between Rwanda and East Asian developmental states. Rwanda has not 
retained control over the financial sector and it has not developed an industrial base. 
Instead, growth in Rwanda has heavily depended on growth in services sectors. The 
acquisition of higher capabilities in manufacturing, where productivity tends to grow 
faster than in agriculture or services, has been central to most stories of successful 
latecomer development (Chang 2007). The neglect of manufacturing has inhibited 
growth across the African continent (Page 2012). Manufacturing growth was also 
often associated with giving workers a political voice and ensuring a degree of 
redistribution (Evans 2012). Strategies “built around the transition from an industrial 
to a service economy seems likely to be marked by the expansion of inequality and 
the stagnation of wages for the majority of the population” (Evans 2012, 36). Donor 
preferences and domestic constraints (including market size and insufficient energy) 
influenced the Rwandan government’s choice to neglect the manufacturing sector.58 
In 2012, the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy 2 (EDPRS 2) 
highlighted the government’s choice to refocus on the manufacturing sector. 
However, despite this attempt, growth in the sector has been disappointing.59  
Chalmers Johnson (1982) coined the term – developmental state – to 
characterise the role that the Japanese state played in the post-war transformation of 
its economy. Johnson described how Japan’s Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI), supported by an autonomous elite 
bureaucracy, created and facilitated infant industries. Initially, he (1999, 34) aimed to 
                                                          
58 Interview, Rutaremara, January 2015. Recently, the relevance of industrial policy has been 
acknowledged by “mainstream economists and political leaders from all sides of the ideological 
spectrum” (Stiglitz et al. 2013, 2). 
59 Interview, Hategeka, MINICOM, January 2015. 
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highlight “the failures of Soviet-type socialist displacement of the market.” However, 
he (ibid) was surprised that his book “was an ideological red flag to the bull of 
Anglo-American cold war orthodoxy.” The success of East Asian late developers 
presented a challenge to dominant neoclassical scholarship (Little 1979, Ranis 1979), 
which preferred to emphasise the contributions of self-regulating markets in East 
Asian success. East Asian success also threatened claims made by dependency 
theorists who argued that increasing foreign trade and arrival of foreign capital from 
the ‘core’ was the root cause for underdevelopment in the periphery (Amsden 1979).  
The newly created Developmental State Paradigm (DSP) worked against the 
opposing currents of dominant neoclassical scholarship and dependency theorists. 
Ideas presented within the DSP were not new. Alexander Hamilton and Friedrich 
List were among the first to argue that in order to ‘catch up’, late developing 
countries must promote infant industries through active state intervention (Chang 
2002a). Gerschenkron (1962) developed arguments along similar lines, emphasising 
that state involvement in industrial financing was necessary to match the rate of 
modern technological progress. Baran (1957) argued that the absence of a nationalist 
ideology (which drove development in early capitalist Europe and 19th century 
Japan) explained the underdevelopment of many poor countries. Through developing 
detailed case studies, a new group of scholars (Amsden 1989, Wade 1990, Woo-
Cumings 1991) argued that latecomers in East Asia, including South Korea and 
Taiwan, embraced state intervention and ‘governed the market’ as they caught up 
with the industrialised West. Successful examples in East Asia showed that there 
could be several “pathways from the periphery” (Haggard 1990) but that 
developmental states shared characteristics as they tackled late development. These 
measures included redistributive land reforms, state control over finance, 
macroeconomic stability to foster long-term investment, industrial policy fostering 
import substitution and export promotion, attention to agriculture and rural 
livelihoods and policies that raised living standards while suppressing social 
organisations (Wade 1990, Putzel 2002).60 
 Efforts were also made to include Southeast Asian economies (Thailand, 
Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines) and Vietnam within the DSP, in addition to 
                                                          
60 Kohli (1994) argued that prior colonial experience of industrialisation contributed to Korea’s 
success. 
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the four ‘Tigers’ (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong).61 Some also 
included China within the DSP (White and Wade 1988; White 1988). Others 
disagreed with collectively characterising these countries as Developmental States.62  
‘Transformative’ states of Northeast Asia were perceived as different from the 
‘pilotless states’ of Southeast Asia (Weiss 1998, Johnson 1998). Though these states 
shared some characteristics, they all had specific trajectories of late development. 
 The application of the DSP became increasingly widespread and a variety of 
definitions proliferated among scholars (Leftwich 1995, 2000; Routley 2012, 2014).  
Fine (2005, 2013) questioned the coherence of the concept and argued that 
proponents of the DSP had split into two separate schools. The economics school 
reasoned that markets did not work perfectly in late developing countries. Thus, the 
state was required to coordinate investments within and across sectors to harness 
positive externalities and eliminate negative externalities. The political school largely 
ignored economic concerns and focused on the nature of the state and whether it 
could be free from particular interests that would impede the application of 
appropriate policies. Both schools agreed on some aspects. Most scholars set up a 
clear dichotomy between the state and market (Fine 2006) and the role of class in the 
analysis was largely ignored (Radice 2008, Fine 2006).  
Within the DSP, developmental states were understood as those states that 
were capable of remaining independent of class interests. Mann’s (1984) concept of 
“infrastructural power” (the capacity of the state to penetrate civil society and 
implement political decisions across territorially defined entities) was built on Max 
Weber’s minimalist definition of the state, which focused on legitimate control over 
territory. Political power was understood as becoming “progressively depersonalised 
and formalised” (Fritz and Menochal 2007, 532). States were characterised by 
“embedded autonomy”, where well-developed bureaucracies worked closely with 
state and non-state actors to redefine and implement development goals (Evans 
1995). These scholars argued against Marxist interpretations where the capitalist 
                                                          
61 Singapore and Hong Kong are usually analysed separately because they are city-states. Huff (1995) 
explores the Singaporean example. Doner et al. (2005) analysed the development experience of seven 
of these countries (excluding Hong Kong). Vietnam has been included in recent analyses of the East 
Asian developmental state experience (Berendsen et al. 2013). 
62 See Stubbs (2009). 
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state was merely the “executive committee of the bourgeoisie (Evans 1989).63 By 
characterising the state, workers and capitalists as separate actors, these scholars 
“effectively released the state from capital relations” (Chang 2013, 92). The DSP 
neglected that the state is primarily a set of social relations that legitimised and 
facilitated systems of exploitation within its territory. Organising surpluses extracted 
from workers is an essential function of the state. Instead, developmental states 
should be understood through examining how relationships between classes and the 
state evolve and how such relationships sustain a system of accumulation, the role 
that ideological forces (both international and national) have in motivating economic 
development and how financial and industrial systems facilitate processes of 
accumulation. Most importantly, development must be understood in the context of 
class, power and conflict (Fine 2006). 
Examples of African ‘developmentalism’ were largely ignored within the 
DSP paradigm. There were several reasons for this. The DSP paradigm primarily 
focused on the role of state intervention in facilitating industrialisation in late 
developing countries. There have been relatively few examples of structural 
transformation (and the growth of the industrial sector) in African countries over the 
last few decades. However, there is evidence of African ‘developmentalism’ 
historically and this has been ignored because of “an excessive levelling of African 
political and economic landscapes” (Mkandawire 2001, 310). Some economic 
studies (Ndulu et al. 2008) even showed that African economies grew at a 
respectable rate between 1960 and 1974. Jerven (2015) argued that economists have 
used erroneous statistics to show that African development has failed.64 Kelsall 
(2013) argues that some African states (Cote d’Ivoire 1960-75, Kenya 1965-75, 
Malawi 1964-78; 2004-09) were late developers that centralised rents and pursued 
successful industrial policies. Elsewhere, Mkandawire (2010) argued that 
development ideology failed because of years of crisis and adjustment and the 
lowering of expectations of individual Africans. A national project of economic 
development could no longer be legitimised through the mobilisation of domestic 
resources and the population. Nationalism no longer created the awareness that 
                                                          
63 Marx also described the “completely autonomous position of the state” in France under Louis 
Bonaparte (Leftwich 1995). 
64 Jerven (2010) argues that sustained growth failures were rare in Africa until the 1980s, with only 
Benin, Tanzania and Morocco experiencing sustained periods of stagnation and negative growth. 
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“we’re all in the same boat” (Pempel 1999, 168-9). The absence of “flying geese”, 
which could be used as role models in the region, has also inhibited the appearance 
of African developmentalism (Akamatsu 1962). Role models were especially 
important to guide countries through property rights regime changes. The choice of 
Filipino leaders to avoid ‘learning’ from Japanese examples contributed to the 
country’s economic failure, just as the failure of many African countries to identify 
the right role models thwarted them from diversifying away from exporting raw 
materials (Amsden unpublished). The most important point to emphasise is that 
developmental states of the past did not experience the same kind of pressure from 
donors in imposing the economic and non-economic conditions that are currently 
forced on African countries (Chang 2002b, 2007).65  
Discussions regarding the developmental state have reappeared in policy 
circles (Fritz and Menochal 2007, Shaw 2012). Ethiopia’s former Prime Minister 
Meles Zenawi (2012) and South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) stressed 
how the lessons from ‘developmental states’ should be used within their own 
countries (Edigheji 2010a).66 The term – developmental state – has been used 
previously when studying several African countries.67 Even the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) (UNECA 2011) pushed for support to 
‘developmental states’, which built on the lessons of East Asian successes.  
It must be stressed that many East Asian states were repressive regimes, 
which achieved progressive outcomes while excluding certain groups (Leftwich 
1995) and growth was never “automatically or necessarily inclusive” (Leftwich 
2008, 4). Heterodox scholars have also argued that patrimonialism and clientelism 
characterised East Asian developmental regimes (Woo-Cumings 1999, Hayashi 
2010, Khan 1998). Corruption was not necessarily inimical to development and was 
often harnessed for developmental ends (Kelsall 2011, 2012). Nonetheless, it is very 
                                                          
65 Amsden (2007) identified similar differences between the First American Empire (1950-1980) in 
which East Asian developmental states prospered and the Second American Empire (1980 onwards) 
where similar developmental ambitions were constrained. 
66 An edited collection (Edigheji 2010b) included several chapters dedicated to the construction of a 
South African developmental state.  
67 See Meisenhelder (1997) on Mauritius, Lodge (2009) on South Africa, Hillbom (2012) and Taylor 
(2014) on Botswana, Lefort (2012) and Gagliardone (2014) on Ethiopia, Dadzie (2013) and Ayee 
(2013) on Ghana, Bellin (1994) on Tunisia, Mbabazi and Taylor (2005) for a comparative study on 
Uganda and Botswana. 
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difficult to assess when positive, long-term intentions give way to short-term 
individualistic actions.  
1.4 Judging Developmentalism in Rwanda 
 
The challenge of studying ‘Developmental States’ ‘in process’ is very 
different to studying them in retrospect. There is a tendency to view any state that is 
developing as an example of a developmental state (Fine 2013). Interpretations of 
Rwanda’s development have mirrored this tendency. Like East Asian developmental 
states, Rwanda has attempted to “upgrade from lower value to higher value economic 
activities” (Doner et al. 2005, 328). However, Rwanda’s manufacturing sector has 
experienced limited growth, while services sectors (tourism, real estate and financial 
services) have grown the fastest. The government has not addressed the massive 
inequality that has accompanied the pursuit of its economic strategy. Labour has also 
not been mobilised effectively in support of economic development. 
“Things move quickly in Rwanda. This is good because it shows 
strong leadership and a commitment to development… Yes, it is 
true. Many employers complain about not having skilled people. 
But we are still changing and adapting.”68 
Sections 1.4A and 1.4B show that Rwanda has similarities with East Asian 
developmental states. First, it shows that the RPF government shares three common 
characteristics with East Asian developmental states, which were identified by Wade 
(1990). Second, the RPF government has experienced conditions of ‘systemic 
vulnerability’ (Doner et al. 2005). After detailing these similarities, this section 
emphasises that the RPF government constructs narratives as one way to retain 
legitimacy among three constituencies while also maintaining a Developmental 
Political Settlement (a political settlement where ruling elites sustain systems of 
accumulation necessary to achieve ideological goals while negotiating challenges 
from rival constituencies). Since most developmental states have only been 
recognised after achieving sustained economic growth and structural transformation, 
Rwanda’s status as a developmental state remains open and unpredictable. 
Maintaining a Developmental Political Settlement and retaining legitimacy among 
three constituencies are central to building a developmental state in Rwanda. 
                                                          
68 Interview, Workforce Development Authority (WDA) representative, February 2012. 
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1.4A Wade’s (1990) Characterisation of a Developmental State 
 
Characteristic 1: Very high levels of productive investment, ensuring new 
techniques were transferred quickly into actual production. 
 
 Clark and Arnason (2013) argue that “what sets Rwanda apart from many 
other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa is its already relatively high level of public 
investment.” They (2013) argue that the RPF has pursued this strategy to address the 
possibility that aid will be reduced. Figure 1.12 shows evidence that Rwanda’s public 
investment (along with Ethiopia) as a share of GDP has been more than the average 
of most African countries. The government has prioritised public investment in 
recent years “to undertake strategic investments to boost productivity and increase 
access to resources in priority sectors” (MINECOFIN 2013, v).  
 
Source: World Bank 
In 1996, the Privatisation and Public Investment Law was drafted. It gave the 
new administration the authority to liquidate, restructure, disinvest from or lease out 
public enterprises. Starting in 2003, public investment was increasingly prioritised. 
Between 2003 and 2004, public investment increased by almost 50 per cent (AfDB 
2006, Figure 1.13). By 2006, Rwanda’s public investment (8.6 per cent) as a share of 
GDP exceeded that of several other African countries, including Uganda, Zambia 
and Mauritius.69 In 2009, a National Public Investment Policy was established. It 
focused on creating wealth and investing in the economy to support growth of the 
private sector (MINECOFIN 2009). This policy was developed after the government 
                                                          
69 Internal Rwanda Investment and Export Promotion Agency (RIEPA) Presentation. 
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had increased fiscal space, with capital spending increasing from 11.9 per cent in 
2003 to 40 per cent in 2008 (ibid). Maximising the efficiency of public investments 
was prioritised (ibid) and Rwanda was ranked 12th out of 71 countries worldwide in 
public investment management worldwide and fourth in Africa (Dabla-Norris et al. 
2011). In 2013 and 2014, public investment contributed more to gross capital 
formation than private investment (World Bank 2014, 2015).  
 
Source: MINECOFIN 
 This thesis shows that the RPF government has invested to ensure labour 
adopt new production techniques in line with achieving targets. Public investments in 
agriculture have been effective, with high linkage and multiplier effects: 1 USD of 
investment in agricultural staples generated almost 4 USD of increased GDP (Diao et 
al. 2010). Other effective public investments are discussed in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, 
which detail the examples of the coffee, mining and tea sectors. In the coffee and tea 
sectors, the government has invested in infrastructure and the distribution of inputs, 
as well as subsidising fertilizer and training farmers to adopt appropriate production 
techniques. In the mining sector, the government has invested in research, organising 
cooperatives and supporting artisanal mining. 
Characteristic 2: Investment in certain key industries that would not have 
occurred without government intervention. 
 
 The RPF’s interventions have been crucial in ensuring the growth of key 
industries. Chapter 5 lists some examples in tourism and telecom where the initial 
investments of investment groups spurred growth in these sectors. Investments by 
Horizon Group (a military-owned investment group) also contributed to value-
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addition and increased production in the pyrethrum sector. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 show 
how government interventions contributed to growth in the coffee, tea and mining 
sectors. The government’s initial investments in constructing washing stations and 
investments made in establishing coffee shops and roasting plants have contributed 
to value-addition in the coffee sector. In the mining sector, the government invested 
in embracing tagging systems. Such investments have contributed to encouraging 
private investments in the minerals sector. In the tea sector, the government has 
invested in expanding tea plantations. It has also partnered with an informal 
investment group (Rwanda Mountain Tea) to sell packaged tea in foreign markets. 
Characteristic 3: Exposure of many industries to international competition. 
 
 In interviews, government officials regularly stressed the importance of 
exposing sectors to international markets to induce learning and technology 
acquisition among national firms.70 Chapters 6, 7 and 8 demonstrate that the coffee, 
mining and tea sectors have been exposed to international competition. However, the 
government has struggled to build national champions and induce learning among 
domestic firms (other than investment groups). Future growth is inhibited by the 
government’s failure to build reciprocal control mechanisms with capitalist actors 
(other than investment groups). 
1.4B Systemic Vulnerability 
 
Rwanda exhibits conditions of ‘systemic vulnerability’, which were common 
among East Asian developmental states.71 Doner et al. (2005, 329) argued that “the 
political origins of developmental states can be located in the simultaneous interplay 
of three separate constraints” – broad coalitional commitments, severe security 
threats and scarce resource endowments.72 Doner et al. (2005, 340) argued that 
“broad coalitions and external security needs constitute two critical claims on scarce 
revenues that press ruling elites to become revenue maximisers.” ‘Systemic 
vulnerability’ motivated political leaders to recognise that coherent bureaucracies 
and public-private linkages sustained coalitions, state survival and maximised their 
                                                          
70 Interviews, BNR and MINECOFIN officials. 
71 Others (Campos and Root 1996) made similar arguments.  
72 Chemouni (2014) previously used ‘systemic vulnerability’ to describe how external and internal 
threats have motivated ruling elites to design local institutions to assist implementation of the RPF’s 
development agenda, while guarding against rival political entrepreneurship at the local level. 
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time in office (Doner et al. 2005, 356). ‘Systemic vulnerability’ is usually a 
necessary condition for ruling elites to commit to economic development. However, 
the existence of these conditions is not sufficient to achieve economic development. 
The Habyarimana government also exhibited conditions of ‘systemic vulnerability’ 
in the late 1980s, with limited access to revenue sources, external threats from Tutsi 
refugees and the population holding genuine grievances against the government, 
regardless of ethnic differences (De Lame 2005). 
The application of the ‘systemic vulnerability’ thesis to East Asian 
development has been criticised for ignoring details of empirical examples.73 Instead, 
Henley (2015) argued that ruling elites in East Asia developed an autonomous 
‘intent’ to deliver economic development. He argued that Vietnamese leaders were 
holding themselves to account, rather than to any ‘systemic vulnerability.’ He argued 
that policies and the ‘developmental intent’ of leaders in Southeast Asia were 
influenced by culture and the histories of individuals, movements and political 
parties. He made direct comparisons with experiences in Africa, arguing that a 
“culturally ingrained association between agriculture and nationalism predisposed 
Southeast Asian elites to believe in development strategies based on peasant farming. 
African elites looked forward impatiently to structural transformation where peasant 
farming would disappear to make way for more modern ways of life” (Henley 2013, 
10). However, Henley’s arguments do not explain how elites sustained 
‘developmental intent’ and how pressure from rival elites, donors or the population 
can influence policymaking.  
Doner et al.’s (2005) analysis implies that most East Asian developmental 
states were effective in their pursuit of rigid long-term plans. East Asian states are 
often wrongly assumed to have administered good, effective policies.74 This thesis 
illustrates that ruling elites in Rwanda react to the vulnerabilities that they have 
encountered. Policies are ‘reactive’, rather than following a pre-determined long-
term plan. Though the goals are clear, policies react to conflicting demands from 
different actors and inevitable roadblocks (including fluctuating international prices 
and the withdrawal of foreign aid). Andrews et al. (2013) propose that a Problem-
                                                          
73 Stubbs (2005, 2009) argues that Singapore and Malaysia did not suffer from resource constraints. 
They were the recipients of large amounts of American military aid and benefited from spikes in 
commodity prices. South Korea also benefited from huge amounts of American aid (Kang 2002).  
74 See Haggard and Moon (1990), Moon and Prasad (1998), Biggs and Levy (1991) and Wong (2004). 
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Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA) approach is usually central to making 
developmental reforms a success. PDIA approaches hold that locally identified 
problems must be a starting point to reform processes and viable solutions must be 
found through a learning process.75 The RPF’s philosophy acknowledges the 
importance of experimentation and learning from failure.  
“Even in the 1980s, we thought about problem-solving by 
identifying our objective conditions. We are still working to 
address those conditions. But as our movement got bigger, we 
learned from others and heard what they said. Every problem we 
faced taught us and made our movement stronger.”76 
“Think of where we were in 1994. What has happened between 
then and now has not happened without problems. We adapted and 
we were flexible. That is why we reached where we are today.”77 
Desires to experiment are constrained by a scarcity of resources. The need to 
appease “three constituencies” also makes ruling elites vulnerable to failures when 
gambles are made. 
 “Yes, we make bets. MICE is a big bet. We have to keep 
encouraging people to visit us and leverage the positive image 
people have of us and keep improving the facilities that we 
provide. The bets we made are not traditional bets but we believe 
they will work. Manufacturing is not easy. It has been an issue for 
us and energy has been a big challenge.”78 
 “It is easy to criticise us and say we are not doing manufacturing. 
But we have to make choices. We wish we could do manufacturing 
but there are trade-offs. It will take much longer to build the 
manufacturing sector. Long-term investments are required. The 
tourism sector is also absorbing labour.”79 
This thesis acknowledges that conditions of ‘systemic vulnerability’ are 
important factors that may motivate ruling elites to commit to creating 
developmental states and to forego the exclusive pursuit of their own individual 
short-term needs. Conditions of ‘systemic vulnerability’ continue to apply to Rwanda 
today. They are explored below.  
 
                                                          
75 Decentralisation reforms in Rwanda are an example of a PDIA process (Andrews 2013). 
76 Interview, Rutaremara, January 2015. 
77 Interview, Senator, April 2012. 
78 Interview, Clare Akamanzi, RDB, January 2015. 
79 Interview, Office of the President, January 2015. 
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Condition 1: Maintaining Broad Coalitions and Combating Internal Threat 
 
RPF leadership has prioritised countering dangers posed by internal threats, 
with one scholar (Beswick 2013) considering it to be the RPF’s primary concern. 
The government prosecuted around 400,000 genocide suspects through a system of 
11,000 community based (gacaca) courts (Clark 2014a). Gacaca courts aimed at 
delivering justice to families of victims but it also directly countered enemies of the 
government (since suspects were effectively fighting against the RPF). In 1998, 
Kagame said that most perpetrators did not admit guilt and had become politicised 
within jails (Gourevitch and Kagame 1996). Donors recognised the dangers of 
renewed ethnic conflict and avoided making aid conditional on opening up political 
space. Since Hutus comprised the majority of the population, this was initially down 
to a realpolitik assessment (Uvin 2001). The RPF has publicly prioritised pro-poor 
economic strategies, focusing its redistributive efforts on providing health and 
education services to the population. The Mutuelle de Sante (mutual health 
insurance) system is one of the most extensive community-based health insurance 
schemes across the continent and extends coverage to over 90 per cent of the 
population (Binagwaho et al. 2012). Progress has been made in implementing the 
‘Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme’ (VUP) (Devereux 2012). This programme 
assists the poorest segments of the population. Under VUP, extremely poor 
households, where no adult was able to work, were entitled to cash transfers. 
Households in which adults could work were employed in public works projects. 
Such policies (while admirable) were insufficient to meet redistributive needs. 
Providing access to wages for an educated, young population remains a 
concern (Somers 2012). More than 42 per cent of youth (16-35) were either 
unemployed or underemployed in the subsistence sector (AfDB 2012).80 The 
problem of youth unemployment is severe, with more than half of the population 
under 19-years-old in 2014.81 67 per cent of Rwanda’s unemployed population was 
between 16 and 34-years-old (Mugabo 2015). Government officials admit that 
matching skills acquired through university education with jobs has been difficult.82 
                                                          
80 In 2013, The National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda (NISR) reported that 0.8 per cent of youth 
were unemployed, while 64 per cent were underemployed. National newspapers reported that these 
figures underreported unemployment in Rwanda (Nsanzimana 2013, Ngarambe 2013).  
81 Internal government document. 
82 Interview, Fabien Majoro, Office of the Prime Minister, May 2013. 
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In 2015, 45 per cent of Masters degree holders were underemployed (Asaba 2015). 
Skills training has not matched the pace of growth in certain sectors (AfDB 2012). 
Government officials are acutely aware of these dangers, with many emphasising 
that creating jobs was a pressing concern.83  
“Our number one priority is to think about these young people 
coming to the city and leaving school. We have nowhere to put 
them. We are prioritising this everywhere.”84  
In recent years, the government has reacted to the difficulties associated with 
their earlier choices of embracing mainstream grassroots approaches to solving 
poverty, which aimed “only at improving the supply side of the labour market, 
making job-seekers more capable, and not the demand side, making new jobs 
available for them” (Amsden 2010, 64). This shift is a reaction to findings in national 
surveys (Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey 3 – EICV 3 and the 2012 
Population and Housing Census), which highlighted severe inequality and 
unemployment. The EDPRS 2 promised to create a million jobs – 200,000 off-farm 
jobs annually – to absorb unemployed youth (MINECOFIN 2013). The National 
Employment Programme (NEP) was established to coordinate employment 
programmes by equipping the workforce with vital skills, creating sufficient and 
sustainable jobs and providing a national framework for coordinating all job creation 
initiatives.85 The NEP also aims to end gender discrimination in access to jobs and 
supports the inclusion of youth.86 The government continues to publicly promote 
mainstream poverty alleviation policies, arguing that youth will create jobs for 
themselves, rather than relying on the government to provide employment.  
“It is a priority for the government to promote SME development. 
With the NEP, we work right down to the grassroots to create and 
maintain employment. Our key objective is to promote the creation 
of businesses and in that way, more people will be employed.”87 
                                                          
83 Interviews, Office of the Prime Minister; Interviews, Ministry of Finance,  
84 Interview, Majoro, May 2013. 
85 Interview, Office of the President, January 2015. 
86 In 2014, the One UN programme invested 19 billion RwF in the NEP. The 2012 census reported 
that 60.6 per cent of the 5.89 million Rwandans of working age are between 14-35 years old, 65 per 
cent of all Rwandans of working age are listed as under-employed while four per cent are unemployed 
(Tumwebaze 2014). 
87 Interview, Bulindi, BDF, January 2015. In 2011, SMEs accounted for 95 per cent of all registered 
businesses and accounted for 84 per cent of private sector employment (AfDB 2014). 
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The government has also increased enrolment at Technical and Vocational 
Education and Training (TVET) institutions by nearly 50 per cent between 2010 and 
2013 (ADF 2014). Enrolment increased from 15,354 students in 2010 to 74,320 
students in 2013 (AfDB 2014). The number of TVET institutions increased from 64 
in 2010 to 365 in 2015 (Mwai 2015). In 2015, a new minimum wage law (with the 
minimum wage set at 750 Rwf per day) was close to approval. It was an 
improvement on the previous minimum wage, which was set at 100 Rwf in the 1973 
labour law (Ntirenganya 2015). However, this minimum wage is still extremely low 
– under 1 USD. Refocusing policies in line with creating jobs shows evidence of 
‘reactive’ policymaking.  
“We had challenges in not prioritising industry. But in order to 
have industry, we needed technicians. However, we had to focus 
on other kinds of education first. Now, we are changing. We are 
building technical schools in every sector.”88 
To counter internal threats, ruling elites have distributed power to local elites 
on the basis of loyalty. The government has empowered loyal, technocratic local 
elites to implement rural policies (Chemouni 2014). Pervasive state control and the 
presence of security forces assist the government in maintaining its reach into rural 
society (Ansoms 2009b, Ingelaere 2011, Purdekova 2011). Cooperatives are arenas 
where ‘control grabs’ empower elites (Huggins 2014).89 Incentives (including 
maintaining high farmgate prices and providing free inputs such as seeds and 
fertilizer) are combined with coercion to facilitate accumulation strategies and 
counter internal threats and resistance.90 
Condition 2: Severe Security Threats or External Threat 
 
 Doner et al. (2005) draw on Tilly’s (1975) famous dictum that “war made the 
state, and the state made war” to emphasise that external threats compelled leaders to 
create strong institutions that promoted growth. The applicability of the war-
making/state-making connection in the contemporary developing world has been a 
source of disagreement among scholars.91 Migdal (1988) is among those who accept 
                                                          
88 Interview, Rutaremara, January 2015. 
89 Huggins (2014) defines control grabs as the power to control land and other associated resources 
such as water to derive beneﬁt from such control. 
90 Segments of the population also appreciate the security that accompanies such state control 
(Ingelaere 2014). 
91 See Taylor and Botea (2008) for a detailed discussion. 
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Tilly’s arguments. He suggests that the absence of warfare explains the presence of 
weak states in the developing world. He also argues that ‘strong’ states (e.g. South 
Korea and Israel) have achieved their strength because of past warfare. Other 
scholars, including Tilly (1992) himself, contest such claims. Reno (1998, 2003) 
argues that some African leaders rely increasingly on international capital and non-
state coercive groups, rather than on the mobilisation of resources from their 
population, to combat the threat of local strongmen. Jackson (1990) argues that a 
different international environment operates today where national sovereignty is 
guaranteed. Other reasons include the decentralisation of control over coercion, the 
increased presence of irregular armed forces and the blurring of lines between legal 
and illegal violence in contemporary conflicts (Leander 2004).  
Ruling elites use external threats to build perceptions of common enemies 
among other elites, including internal rivals. Collective memories and shared 
histories of warfare against other groups contribute to the salience of the threats of 
those groups. For ruling elites in Rwanda, external threats contributed to uniting 
elites (or the Tutsi population) against a common enemy. Rivals give up their 
differences to protect collective interests against external threats.  
“The military in Rwanda must always contribute to help our 
people. Most importantly, we must make sure our soldiers are 
disciplined and that they feel they are taken care of. Security is not 
simply about fighting an enemy. We can’t keep waiting for an 
enemy. By addressing economic needs, the Rwanda Defence 
Forces (RDF) confronts another enemy of our country.”92 
Immediately after 1994, RPF cadres had a clear enemy: the retreating 
Interahamwe (and its allies, including Mobutu’s Congolese government, which 
harboured genocidaires). During the Congo Wars that followed and for much of the 
2000s, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) became the 
primary enemy of the Rwandan government. At different stages, donors (who 
withdraw aid) or the Belgian and French governments have also been regarded as 
enemies. Such perceptions rely upon collective memories of the genocide when the 
international community was perceived to have aided the Habyarimana government 
(in the case of France) or ignored the plight of Tutsis. The FDLR’s presence in the 
DRC is repeatedly highlighted in interviews with government and military officials, 
                                                          
92 Interview, Joseph Nzabamwita, RDF Spokeperson, January 2015. 
55 
 
as well as in Kagame’s speeches. After foreign aid was cut in 2012, donors were also 
cast as common enemies. Links were drawn with the international community’s 
refusal to intervene to stop the genocide. 
“Donors have done this before. They are not interested in the facts. 
What will happen to the Congolese population who rely on 
exporting minerals? For us, we just remember that once again, we 
have to do things on our own. Rwanda has always known that.”93  
 “These problems were created by the international community, our 
partners. In the end, they don’t listen. They are so arrogant… They 
don’t listen like they didn’t listen when genocide took place in 
Rwanda. In fact, the ICTR should have tried some members of the 
international community instead... They have the power to screw 
up and blame somebody else. They’ve screwed up in the case of 
the Congo and they’ve blamed it on us.”94 
Condition 3: Scarce Resource Endowments or Scarce Revenue Sources  
 
 Doner et al. (2005) argue that East Asian developmental states operated in an 
environment of significant resource constraints and security threats, which created an 
urgent need for ruling elites to upgrade economic activities. Although the RPF 
government has enjoyed large amounts of foreign aid, it does not have sufficient 
export revenues or internal resources to enable it to run a trade surplus. One way for 
late developers to tackle this challenge was to ensure that the government controlled 
the financial sector and retained access to credit. Retaining access to credit and 
avoiding financial market liberalisation were basic prerequisites for growth 
accelerations in East Asian developmental states (Wade 1990, Putzel 2002). 
Gerschenkron (1962) showed how Britain and late developers – Germany and 
Russia – addressed resource constraints in creative and varied ways. Britain used the 
stock market to fund large industrial projects. Germany adopted a ‘functional 
substitute’ by using investment banks because its financial sector was not as 
developed. Russia used a state development bank to fund industrial projects since it 
had a large peasant economy. Many African governments have been caught between 
the contradictory requirements of capital account liberalisation (imposed by donors 
in some contexts) and retaining control over financial instruments. Ethiopia is among 
the very few African countries where state-owned banks dominate the financial 
                                                          
93 Interview, Alfred Ndabarasa, RDF Officer and High Commission of Rwanda in India, May 2013. 
94 Kagame (2012a). 
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sector (Allen et al. 2011). In 2013, the state-owned Commercial Bank of Ethiopia 
(CBE) retained control of over 70 per cent of assets in the banking sector (IMF 
2013). The Ethiopian financial sector comprises other state-owned banks, a 
development bank and permits some private ownership of banks.  
 In contrast, Rwanda achieved full capital account liberalisation in 2010 – a 
striking difference from developmental states of the past. Rwanda’s commercial 
banking sector is liberalised. Regional banks have recently flooded the sector. 
Rwanda now has 10 commercial banks and several smaller rural credit saving 
societies. Government officials stress that financial inclusion contributes to fostering 
inclusive growth. Formal financial inclusion is targeted to reach 80 per cent of the 
adult population by 2016, and 90 per cent by 2020 (BNR 2015). Bank of Kigali (BK) 
remains the largest bank in Rwanda. It retains a market share of above 30 per cent in 
almost all parameters, including assets, liabilities and profits. In 2012, BK officials 
said the government had begun selling its shares on the stock market and that the 
government only held a minority share in BK.95 In 2015, the government directly 
owned only 29 per cent of BK. However, the Rwanda Social Security Board (RSSB) 
owned 25 per cent, taking the government’s total shareholding to 54 per cent.96 The 
government also had shares in I&M Bank (20 per cent), while 65 per cent of Banque 
Populaire du Rwanda (BPR) is officially owned by domestic cooperatives (although 
many representatives on the Board of Governors are closely linked to the 
government).97 BPR made a loss of over 5 billion Rwf in 2013 and struggled to raise 
funds, with the Board insisting that Rwandans must retain 51 per cent of the bank’s 
shareholding (BPR 2014). Collectively, local banks (BK, BPR and Cogebanque) 
retained more than 50 per cent of financial sector assets between 2008 (51.7 per cent) 
and 2014 (55 per cent).98 BK was the most efficient bank, with efficiency measured 
in terms of expenses as a percentage of loans and advances (Ernst and Young 
                                                          
95 Interview, James Gatera, BK, April 2012. 
96 Internal government documents. 
97 The government has one representative on the Board of Directors of I&M Bank – Rwanda. BPR’s 
Board of Directors is primarily comprised by Rwandans, with many of the current board currently or 
previously employed by the government. The Board includes Diane Karusisi (Office of the President 
and NISR), Afrique Ramba (RSSB), Jean-Philippe Kayobotsi (previously Office of the President, 
Désiré Rumanyika (formerly BDF), Peter Ruyumbu (RRA) and Emmanuel Habineza (RCA). The 
CEO of BPR is Ephraim Turahirwa, who was previously Vice Governor of BNR). 
98 Cogebanque was established in 1999 by 42 Rwandan investors. COGEAR, a leading private 
insurance company, was the lead investor and held over 20 per cent shares of the bank in 2014. As of 
2014, over 40 domestic institutions and private individuals held over 40 per cent of shares, while 
Tunisian, American and Belgian investors collectively controlled less than 40 per cent.  
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2013).99 BK finances many large construction projects and other strategic 
investments.100 Investment groups also use BK to access loans.101 Since domestic 
banks operate in a competitive environment, the government only retains limited 
control over financial instruments compared to East Asian developmental states. 
Also, the government’s developmental ambitions are often curbed by donor demands 
to embrace market-led reforms. However, there is often a genuine interest in such 
reforms. 
“It is a level playing field in the banking sector. You could say BK 
enjoys an advantage but the government also uses them for a lot of 
strategic projects, which can be a hindrance. The other banks are 
working competitively. The government actually wants faster 
liberalisation. But Rwanda is not at a stage of development where 
the banking sector can stand on its feet. The government should 
continue to regulate.”102 
 The government also uses a number of other ‘functional substitutes’ to obtain 
access to cheap credit for large, strategic projects. The Rwanda Development Bank 
(BRD) remains active. BRD was initially established in 1968. Between 1974 and 
1987, the Habyarimana government used BRD to advance loans worth over 6 billion 
Rwf to 501 operations. The BRD held equity shares in 23 companies and made an 
investment impact of more than 12 billion Rwf, creating employment opportunities 
for 8,400 people.103 Between 1987 and 1994, the BRD focused on investments in the 
tea and manufacturing sectors. After 1994, the BRD suffered with more than 50 per 
cent of its portfolio comprising non-performing loans.  
“In the early years, it was a challenge. We didn’t have a lot of 
capacity. In the end, every institution is about governance and 
capabilities. BRD was not different.”104 
In 2002, BRD began focusing on traditional export sectors. In 2005, the 
Rwandan government labelled BRD as the chief ‘financier’ of Rwanda’s 
development. Since then, BRD has retained its position (40 per cent of market share) 
as the primary financier for medium- and long-term loans. Since 2008, it has been 
mandated to facilitate private sector activities aimed at poverty reduction. The BRD 
                                                          
99 The BRD and CSS Zigama were rated as the next most efficient banks after BK. 
100 Interviews, BK and other commercial banks, January 2015. 
101 Ibid.  
102 Interview, Commercial Bank representative, January 2015. 
103 Internal BRD documents. 
104 Interview, Jack Kayonga – BRD, April 2012. 
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focused its resources on increasing efficiency across value-chains in the agriculture 
sector. By 2012, BRD was named the third-best managed development bank by the 
Association of African Development Finance Institutions. CNBC Africa named 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Jack Kayonga as Africa’s Young Business Leader of 
the Year in the same year. 
“In the last few years, we have expanded our operations by 
launching new products like mortgage financing and retail 
banking. However, our main responsibilities continue to be in the 
agriculture sector, which most commercial banks see as risky. We 
are now (in 2012) investing more than four times what we were in 
2008 in the sector.”105 
Alex Kanyankole, the former Director General of the National Agriculture 
Export Board (NAEB) replaced Jack Kayonga, now Chairman of Crystal Ventures 
Ltd., as the CEO of BRD in 2013. BRD recently financed the establishment of a 
coffee-roasting factory, jointly funded by the Clinton Hunter Initiative. In 2014, the 
BRD’s agriculture and agribusiness loan portfolio was 33.3 billion RwF, with most 
agricultural loans restricted to coffee and tea production and processing and the 
import of fertilizer.106 BRD also finances work in agriculture and livestock, 
manufacturing, hotels and tourism, mining, water and energy, mortgage and real 
estate, and health and education. BRD financed the expansion of tea plantations and 
tea factories, as well as investing nearly 10 million USD in coffee washing stations 
annually over the past few years.107 Several hotels, including the Gorilla Hotel and 
Radisson’s new investments, totalling approximately 30 million USD have also been 
financed in line with the country’s MICE strategy.108 BRD is also involved in 
financing projects in the industrial sector, worth up to 50 million USD.109 In 2013, 
nonperforming loans comprised only six per cent of its portfolio. BRD also increased 
its profits between 2012 and 2013 from 3 billion Rwf to over 5 billion Rwf (Gasore 
2014a). BRD also previously operated a commercial banking subsidiary, which was 
sold to Atlas Mara in 2014.  
“When we separated the bank, the idea was to play more of a 
technical role to development – concentrate on agriculture, 
                                                          
105 Ibid. 
106 Internal World Bank document. 
107 Interview, Alex Kanyankole, BRD, January 2015. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid. 
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affordable housing, manufacturing and exports. We have also 
embarked on an intensive campaign to mobilise resources from 
various other sources to make the bank double in size by 2019.”110 
Though BRD has gradually increased its developmental role, it has been 
unable to meet the needs of financing Rwanda’s development strategy. The RSSB 
also partners with party-owned companies and military-owned companies on 
strategic projects. For example, it shared ownership with Crystal Ventures Ltd. in 
Building Materials Industries Ltd. (Ruliba Clays and East African Granite 
Industries). The RSSB also funded several construction projects in Kigali including 
the Pension Plaza and Vision City. In 2015, real estate projects comprised 21 per 
cent of its portfolio.111 The Rwandan Stock Exchange (RSE) was launched in 2012. 
Six companies are currently listed on the RSE. The government also issued a $400 
million 10-year Eurobond in 2013, with an interest rate of 6.6 per cent (Mugisha 
2013). The money was injected into large-scale strategic projects: clearing the debt 
of the national airline (Rwandair) and unfavourable government loans for the Kigali 
Convention Centre (approximately $200 million), the completion of the Kigali 
Convention Centre and five-star hotel ($150 million), and the 28 MW Nyabarongo 
Hydropower project ($50 million).112 In 2015, an additional five government bonds 
and two corporate bonds were also being traded on the RSE (Gasore 2015). 
Despite the creation of these ‘functional substitutes’, the government is 
heavily reliant on donor funding to meet its economic targets. The reforms that are 
required to achieve structural transformation are now recognised to contradict the 
policies that have been recommended by donors over the last 30 years through the 
Structural Adjustment and Good Governance eras (Booth and Cammack 2013, Khan 
2012, Kelsall 2013). Enacting market-led reforms has left the government with 
limited capacity to direct scarce resources (and credit) to strategic sectors.  
 
 
                                                          
110 Ibid. 
111 Interview, RSSB Official, January 2015. 
112 The Nyabarongo project was initially funded through an $80 million loan from the Export-Import 
Bank of India (Interview, Angelique representative, October 2011). The government contribute 
approximately $17 million (Kwibuka 2015). 
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1.4C Dealing with Donors, Countering threats and Building a 
21st Century Developmental State  
 
 This thesis focuses on two ways ruling elites in Rwanda have targeted self-
reliance while dealing with the demands and threats of three constituencies. This is 
detailed briefly below and developed in Chapter 2. 
Constructing narratives to retain legitimacy while masking accumulation 
 
 Anti-statist policies of donors gathered steam with the publication of the 
World Bank’s (1981) Berg Report, which claimed that excessive and inefficient state 
intervention caused the litany of problems faced by African countries. Since then, 
neoliberalism has aimed to forge free markets across the African continent, changing 
the way development is conceptualised and realigning the balance of power between 
the capitalist classes and African working classes (Harrison 2010).113  It has become 
increasingly difficult for African governments to retain policy space – the space “to 
use instruments and tools that industrialised nations took advantage of to reach their 
current levels of development” (Gallagher 2005, 1). Amsden (2007, 40) argued that 
room for experimentation contributed to the success of East Asian developmental 
states, with “real freedom to decide on policies crucial for the commencement of 
economic growth.” Rwanda has been relatively successful in forging policy space 
(Hayman 2008). However, the withdrawal of foreign aid by donors in 2012 showed 
that such space was not guaranteed.  
“This money – maybe there will be some hurt. But when we were 
in the bush, we had much less. When things go wrong like this and 
when our so-called ‘partners’ betray us, it reminds us of our duty. 
We have achieved so much on our own. We will keep doing it.”114 
 Though donor demands may have increased for late developers, navigating 
this environment to make progress is still possible. Such demands often force states 
into “isomorphic mimicry” – “adopting the camouflage of organisational forms that 
are deemed successful elsewhere to hide their actual dysfunction” (Pritchett et al. 
2013). Governments also use deception – extraversion (Bayart 2000) or “politics of 
                                                          
113 Neoliberalism is defined as “a project to expand and universalise free market social relations” 
(Harrison 2005, 1306). 
114 Interview, David Kabuye, RPF Cadre, May 2013. 
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the mirror” – to exert control over policy reforms.115 Deception can both be used to 
contribute to the self-serving needs of elites and also to mask policies that are 
essential to achieving strategic goals. Ruling elites in Rwanda appease donors to 
create policy space to pursue independent policymaking. Narratives of embracing 
market-led reforms, empowering cooperatives and smallholder farming help the 
government mask the facilitation of accumulation processes that are necessary for 
late development. Embracing market-led reforms has been inhibited by the 
weakening (and often, the shrinking) of the bureaucracy, which has led to ‘capability 
traps’ (where governments adopt reforms to ensure continued flows of external 
financing but does not retain the institutions to ensure the functioning of those 
reforms) (Andrews et al. 2013). In liberalised sectors, the government struggles to 
retain the capacity to discipline and monitor foreign investors and build reciprocal 
control mechanisms with such investors.  
The government constructs narratives that appeal to popular assumptions 
about what is ‘good’ in liberal conceptions of development. Pro-privatisation and 
liberalisation narratives are developed. Narratives are developed about empowering 
smallholder cooperatives that assume mutual benefits are received by all cooperative 
members. Officials claimed that by joining cooperatives, farmers easily accessed 
inputs including fertilizers and enjoyed better access to finance. They also argued 
that the bargaining power of farmers increased and cooperative members had the 
opportunity to work and learn from each other.116 These narratives fit with 
ideologically driven assumptions that efficient and egalitarian family-operated small 
farms provided an escape from poverty for the poorest rural Africans (Sender and 
Johnston 2004). These narratives fail to acknowledge that small farmers and small 
miners comprise a diverse group of individuals of varying age, sex, land holding, 
expertise, skill sets and political contacts. The RPF uses the ‘mutual benefits’ 
narrative to mask accumulation processes or ‘control grabs’ in some cooperatives. 
Huggins (2014) suggests such ‘control grabs’ are engineered by domestic elites to 
acquire wealth at the cost of vulnerable workers. This thesis argues that while 
domestic elites and actors may acquire wealth and profit from their participation in 
such ‘control grabs’, those elites who are given such benefits are expected to work in 
                                                          
115 Chabal and Daloz (1999) use “politics of the mirror” to denote how political elites in Africa 
address foreign actors in adopting the language donors want to hear. 
116 Interview, Damien Mugabo, RCA, December 2011. 
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line with national goals.117 Expansion of production in traditional sectors has also 
been associated with increased access to wage work. Empowering local elites and 
facilitating ‘control grabs’ are ways the government works to counter ‘resistance to 
proletarianisation’ (Sender and Smith 1990). While such processes are likely to be 
associated with negative effects, the resistance of workers is often romanticised (Van 
Damme et al. 2014). The protection of ‘smallholders’ is often associated with 
increased exploitation at the intra-household level (Sender and Smith 1990). The 
Rwandan government has enacted policies to counter existing patriarchy (Nabalamba 
and Sennoga 2014) by guaranteeing that women will receive their share of 
employment (and access to wage work) in the agriculture sector.  
Masking exploitation is not uncommon among other late developing 
countries or indeed among many other actors involved in development. Through 
research in Uganda and Ethiopia, Cramer et al. (2015) show that the Fairtrade lobby 
ignores that the poorest rural people depend on wage labour incomes and pretend that 
‘smallholder’ producers and members of cooperatives are homogeneous groups. 
Maintaining such deceptive images is essential to break into specialty consumption 
markets (particularly in specialty coffee and tea).  
  The government has retained some capacity to steer the economy in line with 
its national goals. However, there are several threats to this capacity. RPF officials 
describe the party as “flexible”, constantly reacting to the requirements of the 
economy and the desires of its members. Senior party officials lament the difficulties 
in retaining original party ideals while having to adhere to donor demands.118 There 
are debates among RPF cadres regarding the degree of privatisation that should be 
undertaken in certain sectors. The creation of a “governance state” impedes the 
strength of nationalist preferences against the power of neoliberalism.119 In recent 
years, the government has also chosen to reduce its personnel in certain ministries to 
reduce expenditure and cut red tape.120 This further reduces the strength and capacity 
of the government in its relationship with private firms. This thesis describes how 
                                                          
117 There is evidence of such discipline occurring in the pyrethrum sector (Huggins 2014). 
118 Interview, Tito Rutaremara, January 2015. 
119 The “governance state” refers to the retooling of the state through administrative reforms and 
management techniques (Harrison 2004). It embeds neoliberalism and constitutes “a clustering of 
actions and interpellations, which render the notion of national sovereignty problematic” (Harrison 
2004, 5). 
120 Interview, RDB and MINECOFIN officials, May 2013 and January 2015. 
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donors have opened up spaces for capitalist accumulation, which the Rwandan 
government has exploited in creative ways (with mixed success). 
Maintaining a Developmental Political Settlement 
 
 The political settlement is “a combination of power and institutions that is 
mutually compatible and also sustainable in terms of economic and political 
viability” (Khan 2010, 4). It is an on-going process, rather than a one-off event. Any 
developmental state must be based on a political settlement, which is legitimised by a 
commitment to economic development. Elite bargains – the distribution of rights and 
settlements between individuals across a dominant group in society – underpin 
political settlements (Putzel and Di John 2012).121 These terms should not be 
understood as fixed compromises among groups. Rather, they should be understood 
as continuing bargaining processes among contending elites (Di John and Putzel 
2009). Tensions and bargaining positions between elites determine the terms around 
which they commit to economic development. Power and interests within the elite 
bargain change as the distribution of rents, strength of ideology and salience of 
external and internal threats are altered.  
 Recent research (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2014a, Booth 2015b) has 
incorporated work on the political settlement into the concept of the developmental 
state. They suggest that policy content, PDIA approaches of policymaking and 
certain kinds of political settlements would need to characterise developmental 
states. These kinds of political settlements are those where ruling elites have 
committed to economic development. Whifield and Buur’s (2014) ‘political survival 
of ruling elites’ approach focus on similar developmental political settlements. In 
fact, all developmental states have been led by ruling elites who perceive economic 
development as a source of their legitimacy (Castells 1992, Kelsall 2013, Whitfield 
et al. 2015). This thesis details the political settlement in Rwanda, showcasing how 
competing demands of donors, rival elites and the population can sometimes inhibit 
and (at other times) motivate ruling elites to deliver economic development.   
                                                          
121 See Laws (2012) for a literature review. The elite bargain in Rwanda specifically focuses on the 
distribution of power between military, civilian and economic elites (who hold the potential for 
violence). This ‘potential’ comes from shared experiences with other members of this group of people. 
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1.5 The Argument 
 
 Though the RPF government shares similarities with East Asian 
developmental states, it has also embraced governance reforms (to a greater 
degree) and followed a development strategy that contrasts with most 
developmental states. The RPF government has diversified away from the export of 
low-quality coffee, prioritising new exports (Figure 1.4) and has made progress in 
value-addition in coffee, tea and mining (Chapters 6, 7, 8). A developmental state is 
often recognised as such after it has achieved structural transformation (Fine 2013). 
Until the RPF government achieves similar goals, its status as a developmental state 
remains open and unpredictable.  
Rwanda shares many characteristics with East Asian developmental states. It 
meets Wade’s (1990) basic characterisation of a Developmental State. Conditions of 
‘systemic vulnerability’ continue to be relevant in Rwanda. However, prioritising the 
services sector at the cost of the manufacturing sector, as well as liberalising its 
financial sector, sets it apart from most successful late developers.122 The RPF has 
retained a developmental political settlement, with the goal of achieving self-reliance 
(not an ‘autarchic’ kind but one that reduces its dependence on foreign aid and 
reduces vulnerability to fluctuations in international commodity prices). To sustain 
economic development, the government has to retain legitimacy among three 
constituencies and counter any threat posed by these groups. Conditions of ‘systemic 
vulnerability’ motivate ruling elites to achieve self-reliance. However, the conflicting 
demands of three constituencies threaten the Developmental Political Settlement. 
Resulting vulnerability takes several forms. First, narratives (that are one way of 
deriving legitimacy from three constituencies) may be contested. Second, there are 
difficulties associated with organising labour to adopt new production techniques. 
Third, building reciprocal control mechanisms with capitalist partners (other than 
investment groups) has proven difficult. Fourth, embracing governance reforms has 
made it difficult to discipline and monitor private enterprises.   
                                                          
122 Even Switzerland and Singapore, often depicted as having developed by emphasising the services 
sector, are actually among the most industrialised countries in the world (Chang 2007). Chang (2007) 
argues that Switzerland is not dependent on “black money” and “gullible tourists.” In 2002, it had the 
highest per capita manufacturing output in the world – 24 per cent more than that of Japan and 2.2 
times that of the United States. Similarly, Singapore produces 35 per cent more manufacturing output 
per head than Korea and 18 per cent more than the United States (Chang 2007, 215). 
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1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
 
Chapter 2 details a theoretical framework, highlighting the vulnerabilities 
facing Rwanda’s Developmental Political Settlement. Chapter 3 describes the 
methods used to obtain empirical evidence necessary to answer the research 
questions. Chapter 4 details the historical trajectory of elite politics in Rwanda, 
describing how the RPF government has countered threats from rivals. Chapter 5 
describes Economic Nationalism (the RPF economic ideology). This chapter also 
discusses the use of formal and informal investment groups. An example of the 
pyrethrum sector is also detailed to highlight how investment groups have been used 
to achieve progress in priority sectors. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 illustrate the development 
of the coffee, tea and mining sectors respectively. Each chapter provides a 
comparison between the policies pursued by previous governments and the current 
RPF government. They also show how the RPF government has made progress in 
achieving ideological goals of self-reliance, while negotiating the conflicting 
demands of three constituencies. The RPF government’s strategies are analysed in 
terms of how capital has been managed and labour has been organised, while 
pursuing value-addition and increasing productivity in these sectors. Chapter 9 
presents a conclusion highlighting the central empirical findings of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 This chapter details a theoretical framework for the Developmental Political 
Settlement in Rwanda. Conditions of ‘systemic vulnerability’ motivate ruling elites 
to commit to economic development but pressure to meet demands from three 
constituencies narrows the space in which elites can facilitate accumulation strategies 
necessary for economic development. The existing literature on the political 
settlement has largely focused on how rents are distributed by elites to manage the 
threat of violence. This chapter shows how ruling elites use narratives and ideology, 
violence (and the threat of violence) and rents to maintain political stability (a 
version of Tilly’s focus on capital, coercion, and legitimacy in the early modern 
European state formation process). Albert Hirschman’s (1970) Exit, Voice and 
Loyalty framework is used to illustrate how ruling elites retain the loyalty of 
domestic elites and persuade workers to adopt appropriate production strategies. 
Constraining voice of those who oppose such strategies or those who are excluded 
from benefits is essential to maintaining political stability. A Developmental Political 
Settlement depends on sustaining systems of accumulation necessary to achieve self-
reliance while retaining legitimacy among three constituencies and negotiating 
challenges from actors who voice and exit systems of accumulation.   
The empirical details in this chapter have been taken from existing academic 
literature and policy work. Interviews and documents obtained during fieldwork have 
provided some of the information presented in this chapter.  
2.1: Ideology 
 
 The concept of ideology has been used in two fundamentally different ways 
in the social sciences (Thompson 1984). The first is a neutral conception of ideology 
– described as ‘a system of beliefs’ or ‘symbolic practices’, which refer to social 
actions or political projects.123 The second conception links ideology to the process 
of sustaining asymmetrical relations of power or maintaining systems of domination. 
Within this conception, ideology is not restrictively understood as a ‘set of beliefs.’ 
Instead, as Marx views it, ideology works as an inversion of reality (Cramer and 
                                                          
123 This definition has “remained constant in political science over time” (Knight 2006, 625).  
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Richards 2011). In this thesis, ideologies are “maps of problematic social reality and 
matrices for the creation of collective conscience” (Geertz 1973, 220). 
There was no uniform theory of ideology within Marx’s writing (Larrain 
1979). Althusser (1971) built on Marx’s work to argue that ideology represented the 
imaginary relationship of individuals with their real conditions of existence. Ideology 
does not represent the real relations, which govern the existence of individuals. For 
Althusser, ideology is a ‘lived experience’ where subjects are constituted in and 
through ideology (Purvis and Hunt 1993). He uses the concept of ‘interpellation’ to 
show how ideology constitutes people as subjects and situates subjects within 
specific discursive contexts. Human beings relate to their material conditions through 
ideology. Ideology legitimises the exploitation and unfairness associated with ‘real’ 
conditions of capitalist accumulation. The exploited accept such conditions as 
opportunities for their advancement whereas exploiters mask their domination by 
justifying exploitation through the attainment of collective achievements. To 
legitimise inequality, exploitation should not be perceived as negative but as “a 
directly relational factor that is at the same time a form of inclusion in a given social 
system” (Cramer 2006, 112). Thus, ideology is the means by which human beings 
relate to their world, making that world agreeable. It does not simply distort real 
relations but connects the individual with material conditions.  
Althusser (1971) argues that ideology organises the behaviour of individuals 
in society. However, ruling elites can develop narratives that contribute to 
transforming ideologies. Maps of social realities are challenged through the 
contestation of memories and the roles of individuals who occupy positions within 
those memories. The dominant ruling class constantly transforms ideologies to 
ensure their interests are secured.124 Workers or those who support dominant classes 
(in political causes, rebellion or war) are not simply obedient followers. Those who 
resist dominant ideologies may create their own ideologies. Hirschman (1971) argues 
that such social formations require ideologies even more than dominant classes. 
However, even these ideologies have a materialist relationship – since those involved 
have either been excluded from controlling systems of exploitation or are exploited 
within them or were never included in the first place. Gaining support among those 
who resist dominant ideologies is essential for rival ideologies to be relevant. For 
                                                          
124 See Hall (1985). 
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example, nationalist military officers in Guatemala adapted their ideology to the 
desires of peasants and rural labourers to win their support (Paige 1983). 
The concept of ideology is used to detail the contradictory nature of social 
reality, namely that “the division of labour can only manifest itself as a division of 
contradictory classes, as the exclusion of the majority from any development” 
(Larrain 1979, 45).  The dominant class cannot solve problems associated with such 
unequal outcomes without ideology. Ideology hides the true relations between 
classes and explains the relations of domination and subordination as harmonious so 
labour acquiesces to the needs of the dominant class. Thus, ideology legitimises the 
class structure and becomes indispensable for reproduction (Larrain 1979). Dominant 
classes in the industrialised West often highlight the capitalist market as a symbol of 
human choice and freedom, rather than acknowledging its imperatives and 
compulsions (Wood 1994). Any dominant class must: 
“Represent its interest as the common interest of all the members 
of society that is, expressed in ideal form: it has to give its ideas 
the form of universality, and represent them as the only rational, 
universally valid ones.”125 
The historical roots of any society provide the basis of legitimacy for its 
rulers. In El Salvador, the ideology of the dominant class is rooted in the agro-export 
economy and the agrarian order of the late nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries 
(Paige 1993). The creation of capital through the extraction of surplus value forces 
elites to develop an ideology to mystify or divert attention from how that surplus 
value was created. The capacity of dominant classes to shape ideologies depends on 
their capacity to repress what Jameson called the “political unconscious.”126 Denial 
or repression of the political unconscious is “a means of survival” for those working 
in systems of exploitation (Dowling 1984, 118). 
Ideology makes an “autonomous politics possible by providing the 
authoritative concepts that render it meaningful” (Geertz 1973, 218). Ideology 
                                                          
125 Marx and Engels (1970). 
126 Jameson applied the “political unconscious” to literary texts. He (1981, 9-10) identified that “texts 
come before us as the always-already-read; we apprehend them through sedimented layers of previous 
interpretations”. He emphasised that the “interpretive codes” that are usually used to interpret literary 
texts create “strategies of containment” that give the illusion that such interpretations are complete. 
Jameson gives us an “idea of History, intolerable to the collective mind, a mind that denies underlying 
conditions of exploitation and oppression much as the individual consciousness denies the dark and 
primal instinctuality of the unconscious” (Dowling in Paige 1997, 343).  
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provides a ‘moral explanation’, which can sustain individuals during chronic strain, 
either by denying it outright or legitimising pain through the goal of achieving a 
higher end. It can also provide a “solidarity explanation” in order to knit a social 
group or class together. It also “claims complete and exclusive possession of political 
truth” and “works towards a utopian culmination of history” (Geertz 1973, 198). 
Ideological goals make ideological action attractive to loyal actors and force these 
actors to work in line with achieving a common purpose (March 2003, Anselmi 
2013). Ideology is also strengthened in direct opposition to opposing ideologies 
developed by rivals (Geertz 1973). It promotes “human dignity and clear conscience 
of a given class” and discredits adversaries (Jameson 1971, 380). For newly formed 
governments, ideologies of previous governments have to be transformed, destroyed 
or totally discredited to consolidate the legitimacy of new ideologies. Elite narratives 
(that shape and reflect ideology) hide the ways “in which history is denied or 
repressed” and act as the “work of political repression” (Paige 1997, 343). 
2.2: Narratives  
 
Ideologies are sustained, developed and communicated through the 
construction and repeated invocation of narratives. Paige (1997) used the concepts of 
ideological mystification, narratives and Jameson’s idea of the ‘political 
unconscious’ to explain the political and economic transformation of Nicaragua, 
Costa Rica and El Salvador. He studied coffee elites in these countries and found that 
their narratives distorted the reality of the lived experiences of most of the 
population. The narratives of coffee elites were cast with clear goals in terms of 
“progress” (in El Salvador), “democracy” (in Costa Rica) and “liberty” (in 
Nicaragua). However, these narratives were all based on the same “organising 
principle” – elites in these three countries depended on an unskilled labour force of 
coffee pickers and the displacement of the rural population into informal and semi-
proletarian sectors depending on agriculture exports (Paige 1997, 370). All political 
movements are historical products of a shifting political economy – defined by 
processes of accumulation, production, and class relations – with which leaders and 
followers engage in a process of mutual (yet unequal) influence (Harrison 2001a). 
Though elites cast their narratives in appealing terms, the histories of lived 
experiences of the population reveal ideological distortions. The discrepancy 
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between elite narratives and empirical investigations of history and the current lived 
experiences of elites and the population reveal the “fundamental contradictions” in 
elite-led ideologies. These ‘contradictions’ are the same as those identified by Marx 
in the relationship of the primary producer to the extractors of surplus. The “realm of 
‘exchange’ presents the freedom of the market and also conceal the subordination of 
workers to capital” (Hossfeld 2005, 10).  
The concept of narrative was developed in literary studies but has also been 
applied within the social sciences, with some describing a ‘narrative turn’ in the 
social sciences (Atkinson and Delamont 2006). Narratives include stories that have a 
beginning, middle and end. However, they are not restricted to such stories since 
narratives are rarely organised by respondents in a clear sequence (Hernstein-Smith 
1980). Instead, a narrative is a “mode of reasoning and a mode of representation” 
(Richardson 1990, 118), as well as a way “to conceive of and also tell about the 
world” and “make sense of life” (Adams 2008, 176). Narratives are social 
interactions with “someone telling someone else that something happened” 
(Hernstein-Smith 1980, 232), but also justifying why something happened or telling 
us why others were justified or wrong in letting it happen. Narratives justify the 
“exercise of power by those who possess it – situating them within tales that recount 
the past and anticipate the future” (Thompson, quoted in Paige 1997, 341). 
Narratives differ from ordinary discourse because they detail the stories of narrators 
or the stories they tell about their social groups. All narratives involve moral 
comments “about the way things are, the way things ought to be, and the kind of 
person the speaker claims to be” (Linde 1993, 81).   
Narratives include individual narratives, which refer to the narrator’s personal 
story. They also include “social narratives”, which refer to situations when speakers 
tell stories about their social groups (Steinmetz 1992). The construction of narratives 
is strongly influenced by the “collective memories” of social groups (Halbwachs 
1950). All narratives and the ideologies they support are historically specific to 
particular systems of exploitation. “As a tool of legitimisation and of sophisticated 
long-term management of collective action, ideology needs a specialised carrier, a 
political organisation” (Giustozzi 2011, 32). These political organisations consolidate 
and disseminate dominant narratives across society.  
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Dominant narratives cast particular individuals (usually leading figures) as 
heroes, rival groups as enemies and describe certain versions of history (usually 
discrediting rivals or previous governments). Through their individual and social 
narratives, individuals may challenge the narratives of dominant classes. Individuals 
challenge the power of leaders by denying their heroism within narratives or casting 
doubts over their adherence to values that are prized among their social group. At the 
cost of losing the support of their own social groups, individuals may choose to ally 
with enemies or offer versions of history that contradict the dominant narrative. 
Thus, challenging dominant narratives can discredit the authority of leadership or 
question the moral authority of the movement as a whole.  
Box 2.1 details a framework of ideology as a system of domination. The 
figure shows that individual elites create narratives to construct ideology, which is 
usually carried by a political organisation with a leader. Political parties become 
carriers of the ideology and can use narratives to transform some aspects of the 
ideology, as changes occur within society or there is increased interaction with other 
narratives, which reflect other ideologies (e.g. those that donors may represent).  
Ruling elites use narratives to mystify class relations to gain the acquiescence 
of the population. Exploitation associated with capitalist accumulation strategies is 
masked as opportunity through dominant social narratives. Elites who are excluded 
from benefits of capitalist accumulation (or those that may disagree with the 
ideology) may have individual narratives that conflict with dominant narratives. 
Through their narratives, rival elites show their dissatisfaction with the current 
system of domination developed by political parties (and leaders). The population 
may also use their own narratives to connect with their ‘political unconscious’. The 
central task for ruling elites is to retain the ‘legitimacy’ of their ideology by ensuring 
no “constituency” or alliance of constituencies threatens systems of accumulation.  
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Box 2.1: A Framework of Ideology as a system of Domination 
 
2.3: Political Settlements and Elite Bargains  
 
 The political settlements literature has become popular among donors and 
policymakers (AusAid 2011, DfiD 2010). This literature was developed as a 
response to the popularity of New Institutional Economics (NIE). NIE (and the Good 
Governance paradigm that followed) focused on how institutions – sets of rules that 
structure the interactions of agents – were necessary to ensure social interaction was 
possible (North 1990). NIE recognised that the market did not function optimally in 
late developing countries. However, the state’s role was restricted to creating a 
facilitating environment for the private sector. Mushtaq Khan (1995) used the 
concept of the political settlement to argue that the impact of institutions depends on 
the balance of power between classes and groups affected by that institution. 
Creating new institutions was likely to face a political cost (or “transition cost”) from 
groups that disagreed with such change (Khan 1995). Thus, NIE failed to recognise 
that institutions embodied power relations (Di John 2009a). 
NIE’s popularity allowed donors to ignore that politics and industrial policy 
were central to previous successful experiences of late development. Though 
industrial policy has re-entered policy discussions (Rodrik 2008), there is still some 
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way to go before politics assumes a prominent role in such discussions.127 Khan 
(2010) argued for such a role, finding that informally organised political power was 
necessary to generate a distribution of benefits to classes and elites. The limited size 
of the formal productive economy meant that “formal institutions” and rules could 
not generate rents in a way that guaranteed a minimum level of stability. Instead, 
informally distributing such benefits was necessary to create an asset-owning 
capitalist class and for this class to expand its interests with the help of the state. 
Industrial policy processes entail the negotiation of power between agrarian elites 
and industrial elites or other capitalists, with most actors having competing interests. 
For example, Hirschman (1968) explains that the lack of political power of 
industrialists can often be explained by the lack of industrial exports. Governments 
may continue to depend on agrarian elites because they contribute to a larger share of 
exports (required to import products). 
Khan’s (2010) analysis argues that the distribution of rents contributed to 
stabilising the political settlement and promoting industrial policy. Financial 
instruments and ‘first-mover advantages’ are ways to provide such rents.128 Giving 
certain groups rents antagonises those who miss out. The excluded group is a threat 
to the existing regime and may resort to violence to protect its interests. Thus, 
outcomes of such choices depend on leadership’s ability to withstand these threats. 
Each group’s decision to impose changes is determined by their acquisition of 
“holding power” – “the capability of an individual or group to engage and survive in 
conflicts” (Khan 2010, 6). Governments must retain more “relative holding power” 
than rival groups to maintain political stability. If political settlements are to be 
‘developmental’, ruling elites must allocate rents efficiently. Outcomes of industrial 
policy depend on the ‘fit’ between the particular policy, the rent allocation and its 
management as well as the political settlement. In South Korea, rents were allocated 
to large conglomerates with credible performance conditions. Failure to perform 
resulted in a withdrawal of rents. Such actions were critical to disciplining 
enterprises that were not producing competitive industries (Khan 2013). Conversely, 
                                                          
127 Industrial policy does not refer to industries (e.g. textiles) alone. It also includes policies targeted at 
non-traditional agriculture or services. Recent successes include cut flowers in Ethiopia, mangoes in 
Mali, cotton in Burkina Faso and gorilla tourism in Rwanda (Lin 2012, 68)  
128 This includes tariff protection to raise domestic prices of some products, thereby providing rents to 
domestic firms in protected sectors, export subsidies, tax breaks, low interest credit and subsidized 
input prices, including utilities and infrastructure (Khan 2013a). 
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many countries that failed to withdraw rents could not do so because it was not 
politically viable. After initial successes, rational capitalists in Pakistan formed 
mutually beneficial alliances with political factions. These factions protected the 
rents of capitalists despite stagnation in learning and productivity growth (Khan and 
Blankenburg 2009). Varied performances of institutions can be explained through 
recognising differences in the organisation of the ruling coalition and the 
technological capabilities of productive entrepreneurs and their relationship with the 
ruling coalition (Khan 2010). 
 Khan (2010) differentiated between capitalist political settlements (occurring 
in developed countries and largely governed by formal institutions) and clientelist 
political settlements (occurring in late developing countries, with a substantial role 
for patron-client relationships).129 North et al. (2009) similarly differentiated between 
Limited Access Order (LAO) societies and Open Access Order (OAO) societies.130 
North et al. (2009) assume that the struggle for development in LAO societies begins 
with the problem of endemic violence. To solve that problem, LAOs are developed 
by organising powerful members of society into a coalition of military, political, 
religious and economic elites. These elites limit access to valuable political and 
economic functions as a way to generate rents. In this situation, the powerful 
individuals who receive rents are motivated to cooperate with the ruling coalition and 
be peaceful. These individuals choose not to resort to violence because this would 
threaten their access to rents. Rents are created to “enable elites to credibly commit 
to each other to limit violence” (North et al. 2009, 274). This forms the basis of a 
stable elite bargain. LAOs had to meet ‘doorstep conditions’ to be considered OAO 
societies.131 Instead, Khan (2010) argues that clientelist political settlements could 
only be ‘capitalist’ if productive ‘capitalist’ organisations were dispersed across 
society in such a way that formal institutions governed their interactions. 
                                                          
129 He also includes two other categories of political settlements: pre-capitalist political settlements 
and political settlements in crisis. 
130 Khan (2010) argues that “the broad clientelist political settlement” includes a greater degree of 
variation than categories of LAOs in North et al.’s (2009) analysis.  
131 OAOs satisfy the basic Weberian assumption that states possess a monopoly on the legitimate use 
of violence. OAOs are described to believe in the inclusion and equality of all citizens and entry 
without restraint into all aspects of economic and political life, as well as being characterised by 
“impersonal exchange” (North et al. 2009, 114). Doorstep conditions included: (i) the rule of law for 
elites; (ii) perpetually lived organisations in the public and private arenas; (iii) consolidated civilian 
control of the military and other organisations, which had the potential to enact violence.  
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The political settlements literature has made important contributions. Along 
with other studies of long-run economic growth in recent years (Fukuyama 2011, 
Acemoglu and Robinson 2012), the political settlements literature has emphasised 
the important role politics (and the distribution of rents) plays in the early stages of 
development. Such studies showed that models of state building have neglected how 
the state, rather than being a single actor, is a product of a historically determined 
balance of power between contending interests (Di John and Putzel 2009). These 
models also argue that political settlements are always dynamic and reflect the 
demands made on the state by different groups. A wide range of literature has 
developed along these lines, including studies of specific cases, such as Ghana 
(Whitfield 2011), Rwanda (Golooba-Mutebi 2013), Tanzania (Gray 2013), Uganda 
(Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey 2013), South Africa (Levy et al. 2014), Bangladesh 
(Khan 2013b, Hassan 2013) and Cambodia (Kelsall and Sieha 2014). This literature 
is also used to explain politics surrounding different topics including sector 
productivity (Whitfield and Therkildsen 2011; Whitfield and Buur 2014; Whitfield et 
al. 2015; Kjaer 2015), public services provision (Hirvi and Whitfield 2015) and 
urban transition (Goodfellow 2014).  
Dominant works in this literature (Khan 2010, North et al. 2009) have been 
accused of retaining an economistic version of political analysis with institutional 
frames (Hickey 2013, Hudson and Leftwich 2014). Hickey (2013) argues that these 
dominant works focus on political elites, who are assumed to be utility-maximising 
rational actors. However, these dominant works have some differences. North and 
his colleagues (2009) retain a different conception of rents than Khan (2010).132 
North et al. (2009) argue that rents are necessary in the early stages of development 
but can be minimised in OAO societies. North and his colleagues are guilty of 
neglecting that the private sector can also engage in forms of rent seeking in 
advanced countries. Influence buying and rent seeking can be prevalent in advanced 
countries e.g. lobbying or political contributions (Khan 2006). Such forms of rent 
seeking are legal but are not necessarily productive. North and his colleagues 
perceive ‘market economies’ as emblems of inclusiveness. In reality, rent seeking 
takes different forms to empower the interests of capitalists at the cost of the ‘social 
impulse’ of the state. North et al. (2009) focuses primarily on elites. Khan (2010, 56) 
                                                          
132 See Khan (2006) for a detailed discussion of a typology of rents. 
76 
 
includes “intermediate classes” in his analysis - elites who organize clients and use 
them in political confrontations.   
These dominant works also retain similarities. They focus on the role of rents 
in determining political stability and economic transformation. In doing so, they 
ignore how ruling elites use ideology and violence to influence the behaviour of rival 
groups. These works mistakenly treat motivations to capture rents as the most 
important source of conflict between individuals in society. In reality, the 
motivations of individuals to resort to conflict depend on a complex set of factors 
rather than a single economic kind, with specific histories, social patterns and politics 
all contributing to actions (Cramer 2002, 2006). Dominant works account for this by 
including rents other than simply economic ones. They then argue that elites are 
motivated by a drive for political power. Individual elites may be motivated to 
violence against the dominant coalition because of material realities. However, their 
decisions must be justified through individual narratives in relation to values 
represented within ideologies if individual elites are to retain their holding power. 
For leaders and dominant political parties, decisions to discipline individuals must be 
made in line with ideological values if such decisions are to retain moral authority.  
Violence and the Political Settlement 
 
The political settlements literature has retained a very simplistic conception 
of violence despite recognising that the potential for violence is present through 
society, rather than being concentrated in the state (North et al. 2009). The literature 
does not directly acknowledge the effects of state-sponsored violence, while violence 
against the state (whether by elites or popular resistance) is regarded as inimical to 
development. Instead, violence should be seen as constitutive to the process of 
capitalist development (Cramer 2006). The political settlements literature primarily 
considers how ruling elites consolidate control over the monopoly of violence, which 
is the “ultimate claim to power” (Giustozzi 2011, 15). Thus, governments must 
consider how to control threats posed by political entrepreneurs and violence 
specialists (people who control means of inflicting damage on persons and objects) 
(Tilly 2003). Violence specialists do not derive their power from their use of 
violence. Instead, they “specialise in the strategic non-use of their control over 
violent means” (Tilly 2003, 38). In this thesis, it is argued that the use of violence 
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against rival elites in Rwanda can signal that things are not going as planned or that 
‘legitimacy’ is being threatened. This is similar to Gambetta’s (1993) description of 
the use of violence by mafiosos in Sicily.133 
Any definition of elites must include violence specialists, political 
entrepreneurs and economic elites (who provide much-needed rents to fund 
violence). Hickey’s (2013) broad definition of political elites encompasses all those 
who are violence specialists themselves or can coordinate the activities of violence 
specialists. This group includes all those “who have organised capacity to make real 
political trouble” (Burton and Higley 2001).134 For this study, political elites 
comprise RPF cadres who led the liberation effort or those who have gained power 
since 1994 and have the potential to threaten Kagame’s leadership. 
Giustozzi (2011) argues that controlling the monopoly of violence occurs 
through two very different processes. The first is the primitive accumulation of 
coercive power, which is often characterised by untamed, indiscriminate violence. 
Such violence tends to characterise the initial establishment of the monopoly. The 
second process is the consolidation of the monopoly of large-scale violence, which is 
threatened at various stages by rivals within and outside the ruling elite. Such claims 
directly question those (Khan 2010, North et al. 2009, Kelsall et al. 2010) who 
suggest that stability is a prerequisite for long-term development planning or for 
economic development. Hassan (2013) argues against Khan (2011), showing that 
investments continued to be initiated in Bangladesh despite regime change. A large 
number of power plants were fully operational and no contracts had been cancelled 
or disrupted by changes in government. There are also several historical episodes 
when war contributed to building a national identity (or at least retaining a collective 
purpose among elites) and fostering primitive accumulation in a society’s push to 
achieve industrialization (Tilly 1992, Cramer 2006). While the monopoly of violence 
is being consolidated, several threats may emerge that could weaken the authority of 
ruling elites but these threats also discipline them to deliver ideological goals. 
                                                          
133 Gambetta (1993) finds that the more stable and organised the mafia family, the less the likelihood 
of violence.  
134 This includes those holding valued assets, those who adjudicate over the distribution, allocation 
and regulation of property rights, those who are authorised to bargain on behalf of social groups, those 
who establish dominant ideas, local and national government, military and economic elites who 
interact and organise labour. 
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While the monopoly of violence is consolidated, governments may establish 
control over the distribution of rents by establishing centralised patronage systems 
(Putzel and Di John 2012). The existence of such structures reduces the possibility of 
substantial capital accumulation and political power outside formalised channels. 
The choice of centralised patronage also results in the exclusion of elites and private 
investors from establishing control over portions of the economy. Creating such 
systems is a political choice and may cause increased vulnerability, divorcing many 
excluded elites from material benefits. Ruling elites must ensure that rival threats 
cannot legitimise their challenges on the basis of popular grievances that accompany 
processes of capitalist accumulation.  
2.4: Exploitation, Coercion and Accumulation in the Agriculture 
Sector 
 
This section highlights how ruling elites use ideology to legitimise systems of 
accumulation and minimise resistance among the population. Any awakening of the 
“political unconscious” of exploited or excluded actors represents a dangerous 
challenge to ruling elites. Above all, the capacity of disenchanted ruling elites (with 
potential to challenge the monopoly of violence) to capitalise on the awakening of 
the “political unconscious” of the population must be negotiated. Such alliances have 
consistently proven to be the downfall of several governments (when greedy elites 
mobilise collective violence through capitalising on popular grievances among the 
population) (Keen 2012). This section reviews the existing literature on the 
agriculture sector in Rwanda, emphasising that dislocation and rural differentiation 
has accompanied successful capitalist accumulation. This review of the agrarian 
literature in Rwanda provides a basis for discussions in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, which 
discuss the historical transformation of the coffee, mining and tea sectors. 
The unequal effects of capitalist accumulation are at odds with neoliberal 
norms, which support a capitalist worldview of socially harmonious progress 
(Harrison 2010). Harvey’s (2003) recent discussions of “accumulation by 
dispossession” show that the deleterious effects of capitalist accumulation projects 
are not restricted to early stages of the creation of the proletariat in industrialised 
countries (Glassman 2006). Negative outcomes for segments of the population 
always accompany capitalist accumulation. Polanyi (1944) perceived the institution 
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of the self-regulating market as a movement to commodify land, labour and money. 
The protectionist movement that followed worked as a counter movement to regulate 
the unequal effects of the market. Polanyi’s analysis was criticised for being state-
focused and for discounting the significance of imperialism and globalisation 
(Munck 2004, McMichael 2006). However, many scholars have argued against 
dependency theorists who equate the spread of globalisation with repressed potential 
for late development. Warren (1980) was influential in showing that the on-going 
expansion of wage labour in late developing countries signalled the deepening of the 
capitalist mode of production within late developing countries. Violent, unequal 
outcomes associated with capitalism may also be harnessed by national elites for 
productive processes in the long-term.  
Violence is directly associated with “accumulation by dispossession” in late 
developing countries, as elites consolidate control over property.135 Property 
institutions assign ownership and “organise the social relations of production and 
surplus appropriation” (Boone 2014, 307). Claims over property rights and resistance 
to them reflect struggles over surplus that are produced on land and how these 
surpluses are generated and allocated (Cramer 2006).136 Controlling such conflict 
(and the potential for mobilising collective violence on the basis of such grievances) 
is essential to maintain a Developmental Political Settlement.  
 Legitimising systems of capitalist accumulation begins in the agriculture 
sector, given that large proportions of domestic populations usually depend on 
agriculture for subsistence and as a source of income.  Governments in late 
developing countries concern themselves with how the social relations associated 
with land, labour and capital in rural areas are transformed in line with their 
economic goals. Kautsky (1966) coined the term – agrarian question – to analyse 
how the productive forces in agriculture could be developed. Lenin (1956) had also 
argued that the formation of classes in the countryside was achieved through a 
process of rural differentiation. Building on these works, Byres (1991) argued that 
any successful agrarian transition would result in dynamic national capitalist 
development through the investment of agriculture surpluses in the industrial sector. 
                                                          
135 See Springer (2013) on Cambodia, Huggins (2013a) on Rwanda,  
136 Boone (2014) provides a comprehensive account of the effects of conflicts over land rights for 
national politics across African countries. 
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Lerche (2013) identifies two groups who pose serious challenges to Byres’ 
arguments. These groups stress that the consolidation of neoliberalism and 
globalisation forced the agrarian question to be rethought. One group argues that the 
main agrarian issue is the struggle by the peasantry against the international 
corporate food regime (McMichael 2008). The other group includes Bernstein 
(2006), who questions the relevance of the agrarian question today, given that the 
‘agrarian question of capital’ has been bypassed.137 The agrarian question continues 
to be debated within agrarian studies, with other questions added (Akram-Lodhi and 
Kay 2010) and case studies explored.138  
 The literature on the agrarian question has operated separately from donor 
understandings with regard to ‘empowerment’, ‘participation’ and sustainability’. 
Rural development has been broadly conceived across the African continent as an 
NGO-supported project to facilitate improvements in the security and productive 
base of smallholder farmers (Harrison 2001b). These policies are based around 
empowering cooperatives, which are perceived to result in mutual benefits for all 
members. This line of reasoning assumed smallholder farmers were a homogeneous 
group and acted like small businesses as efficient units of production, ready to take 
advantage of changing prices. Michael Lipton (1982) was among those who 
popularised such logic, which assumed that there was an inverse relationship 
between farm size and productivity. Similarly, Chayanov (1986) argued that under 
pre-capitalist conditions, small peasants resorted to self-exploitation where family 
farms did not count the costs of their own labour and farmed their own plots more 
intensively than capitalist farmers despite their lower labour productivity.  
Arguments to promote smallholder farming and strengthening cooperatives 
have been criticised on a variety of counts. The categories of ‘small farmers’ and 
‘cooperative members’ are not homogeneous groups (Cramer and Pontara 1998, 
Sender and Johnston 2004, Cramer et al. 2015). Cooperatives are often controlled by 
elites and prone to corruption.139 Rather than falling within the category of ‘small 
                                                          
137 The ‘agrarian question of capital’ refers to how pre-capitalist agrarian classes and social formations 
are transformed by emerging capitalist social relations of production. Bernstein (1996) argues that all 
pre-capitalist agrarian classes (peasant and landlord classes) have been transformed into capitalist 
farmers, petty commodity producers and ‘classes of labour’ within capitalist social relations. 
138 Examples include Lerche (2011) on India and Mueller (2011) on Tanzania.  
139 Examples include coffee cooperatives in Kenya (Mude 2007) and cooperatives in Ghana and 
Uganda (Young et al. 1981) and in Tanzania (Cooksey 2011).  
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farmers’, the poorest rural people depend on wage work to meet subsistence (Cramer 
et al. 2008, Oya 2013). Chayanov’s argument and neopopulist arguments are 
ahistorical in their interpretation of capitalist transformations around the world 
(Byres 2004). Those who assume a homogeneous collection of economically similar 
farms deny the basis of class differentiation, which holds that the unequal 
distribution of means of production generates exploitative production relations 
(Patnaik 1979). There is also evidence in India that large-scale farms were more 
productive than small farms and that the correlation between productivity and 
agrarian classes is better defined by the capacity to hire in and hire out labour 
(Rakshit 2011). Studies in Africa have also questioned the inverse farm-
size/productivity relationship.140 The persistence of a peasantry is also often 
described in romantic anti-capitalist terms. However, in a study on the West 
Usambaras in Tanzania, Sender and Smith (1986) found that married men were 
actually resisting the proletarianisation of their wives and ensuring the labour of their 
wives and children were expended on the ‘family farm.’ These authors (1986, 1990) 
argued that a rapid increase in access to wage employment would be a better policy 
option for governments choosing to tackle rural poverty. Policies that are geared to 
improving the conditions of smallholder farmers do not always result in improving 
the livelihoods of the most vulnerable groups in society. 
 These debates are extremely relevant for the agriculture sector in Rwanda. 
For most of Rwanda’s history, more than 80 per cent of the population has been 
employed in agriculture. In 2012, this figure declined to 72.6 per cent (NISR 
2012b).141 The previous Habyarimana-led government had a peasant-centred 
ideology, with public rhetoric geared to increasing incomes of peasants and 
achieving food security (Verwimp 2000). Since policies were actually geared to 
increasing production of agricultural exports at the cost of food production and little 
was done to avert the 1989 famine in southern Rwanda, there is reason to doubt 
whether such policies had a ‘pro-poor’ motive (Verwimp 2013). Some argued that 
the RPF government intended “to get more people off the land” (Ansoms 2009b, 
300; 2013) and pioneer a short cut to development that would bypass peasant 
agriculture (Henley 2013). However, such arguments equate an emphasis on 
                                                          
140 See Zaibet and Dunn (1998) on Tunisia and Kevane (1996) on Sudan. 
141 Most Rwandans employed in agriculture have more than two sources of income and it is difficult 
to interpret the data. See Huggins (2013b) for details. 
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agriculture with attaching importance to smallholder farming. In reality, agriculture 
was always a priority sector although RPF officials initially reasoned that low 
productivity was because of the small size of holdings, dispersed settlement patterns 
and the scattered nature of cultivation (Des Forges 2006, GoR 2000). Today, 
Rwandan policymakers are targeting the transformation of agriculture from a 
subsistence sector to a market-oriented, value-creating sector (MINAGRI 2013).   
 To achieve such goals, the Rwandan government chose to develop a National 
Land Policy (NLP) in 2004 and instituted the 2005 Land Law. Before this decision, 
population increases had exacerbated land fragmentation and reduced the average 
size of holdings. Increasing fragmentation of land holdings led to conflict over land 
and a growing landless class (Musahara 2006, Bigagaza et al. 2002). In 2000, three-
quarters of all households had an average landholding size of 0.71 hectares (Jayne et 
al., 2003). In 2006, more than 70 per cent of Rwandans owned less than 1 ha of land 
(Musahara 2006). By 2007, the average land parcel size reached 0.35 ha (down from 
2 ha in 1960) (Sagashya and English 2009). Publicly, the RPF claimed that 
establishing a formal system of land rights was a way to avoid conflict and promote 
structural transformation.142 Such decisions were based on the reasoning that 
decreasing agricultural output was because of informal land tenure systems and 
subsistence production (Pritchard 2013). The government abolished every form of 
customary tenure through the Land Law, encouraged families to cultivate land in 
common rather than through inheritance, and retained the right to confiscate land if 
subsistence farmers were not exploiting it efficiently (Pottier 2006).143 The 
government also established a Land Tenure Regularisation (LTR) system in 2009, 
which was among the most low-cost and ambitious interventions of its kind 
worldwide (Ali et al. 2014). By 2014, 10.6 million parcels had been demarcated (85 
per cent with full information); only 1.6 million parcels had not been assigned.144 
These processes have also resulted in conflicts (Pritchard 2013, Takeuchi and Marara 
2014, Ansoms and Murison 2012, Ansoms et al. 2014). For a period, elites were able 
                                                          
142 Rwanda was the first East African country to address gender inequality in land inheritance but this 
has not yet achieved desired results (Daley et al. 2010, Isaksson 2015). Poor male-headed households 
ensured rights of unmarried women and daughters were not documented or secured (Ali et al. 2014, 
Santos et al. 2014). Patriarchal values held by district authorities that implemented the LTR system 
also worked against gender inequality in land rights (Bayisenge et al. 2015). 
143 The Land Law allows the state to temporarily confiscate land only if land has been unused for three 
years or if certain procedures are not followed (Huggins 2009).  
144 Interview, DfiD official, January 2015. 
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to develop control over large pieces of land (Mutabazi 2011, Musahara and Huggins 
2005). However, even critics (Ansoms et al. 2014) acknowledge that such practices 
have been monitored. The government argues that interventions in land policies have 
contributed to increasing agricultural productivity and modernising the agriculture 
sector (MINAGRI 2013).  
In 2008, land consolidation was introduced to prevent the further 
fragmentation of land (Takeuchi and Marara 2014).  Land consolidation was 
designed to ensure farmers received benefits of scale “in conservation measures, 
input utilisation and harvesting without undermining the principles of family land 
ownership and individual cultivation” (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2014b, S187). 
Under this programme, farmers retained ownership over their land but joined 
cooperatives and undertook synchronised planting and harvesting of certain crops. 
The land consolidation programme was also undertaken to tackle the government’s 
objective in achieving food security. Concerns over food security were confirmed 
when Rwanda’s 2006 Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis 
listed 52 per cent of households (43 per cent rural; 9 per cent urban) as food insecure 
or vulnerable. The Crop Intensification Programme (CIP) was introduced to address 
such concerns. Farmers, who opted to join, worked on consolidated plots and were 
organised into cooperatives. The government provided agriculture inputs, with 
extension services organised through cooperatives. Seven priority food crops were 
identified (maize, wheat, rice, irish potato, cassava, soybean and beans). There is 
some disagreement about whether farmers could join voluntarily (Kathiresan 2012) 
or whether they were forced to join cooperatives (Ansoms et al. 2014, Huggins 
2013b). Not unexpectedly, CIP and land consolidation programmes were unpopular 
among farmers initially (Kathiresan 2012, Ansoms 2010). Cooperatives became a 
centre of power in rural areas since membership came with benefits in accessing 
inputs and extension services (Huggins 2014). Government officials argued that they 
challenged such control: “when many people unite together, we need to see what 
they are doing. This avoids the misuse of cooperatives by leadership.”145 
“The influence some cooperative leaders have over cooperatives 
can tilt things in their favour. Sometimes, these people can keep 
the profits for themselves. Other times, they help farmers in seeing 
                                                          
145 Ibid. 
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benefits. We want to edge out the corrupt managers and make sure 
cooperatives work for all members.”146 
Cooperatives were grouped under the Rwanda Cooperative Agency (RCA), 
which was established in 2008. By 2012, 4,600 cooperatives had officially registered. 
The area of land consolidated increased by 18 times between 2008 and 2012 from 
28,016 ha to 602,000 ha (Mbonigaba and Dusengemungu 2013). There were 
immense productivity gains. Yield of maize increased five times between 2008 and 
2012, wheat and cassava increased three times in the same period, while Irish 
potatoes, soybeans and beans increased two times, and rice yield increased by 30 per 
cent (Musahara et al. 2013). Gradually, the government developed surpluses in 
production of these crops, built post-harvest facilities and exported these crops and 
others within the region (Figure 2.1). Despite such improvements, food security 
remained an issue, especially in terms of retaining access to nutrients and the dangers 
associated with monocropping (Pritchard 2013, Ansoms and Rostagno 2012). The 
2012 Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis and Nutrition Survey 
indicated steady improvement since 2006 in achieving food security. However, 21 
per cent of households were still considered food insecure (WFP 2012). 
 
Source: MINECOFIN 
The RPF focused on reorganising the agricultural sector (in common with 
East Asian developmental states). The government invested in organising production 
and facilitating access to fertilizers and insecticides. Fertilizer application has 
increased from 4Kg/Ha in 2006 to 30Kg/Ha in 2013, while annual quantities of 
                                                          
146 Interview, Magnifique Nzaramba, NAEB, March 2012. 
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available fertilizer have increased from 8,000 Mt to 35,000 Mt in the same period 
(GoR 2014). Fertilizer import and distribution has been privatised, with five 
importing companies operating in Rwanda. Investments were made in irrigation 
equipment. In 2014, a 50 per cent subsidy was announced on irrigation equipment as 
a way to transform subsistence farming into export-oriented agriculture (Tumwebaze 
2014). The past two decades of RPF rule have been fraught with incidents where 
adverse weather, pests and diseases have affected production. In 2014, Cassava 
Brown Streak Disease struck cassava farms and pets damaged maize and banana 
crops (Bucyensenge 2014). Risks to the agriculture sector, including fluctuations in 
commodity and input prices and production-related shocks lost Rwanda $1.2 billion 
– the equivalent of 2.2 per cent of annual agricultural production (Agatumba 2015). 
Acting to mitigate these risks contributed to guarding against internal threats (and 
grievances among the population). 
Similar to the broader scholarly debate on Rwanda, the debate regarding 
Rwandan agriculture is divided between those who view the government’s 
interventions as progressive (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2012b, 2014b) and those 
who view such interventions as an example of “rural social engineering” (Newbury 
2011, Ansoms 2008, Huggins 2014, Ingelaere 2010, Van Damme et al. 2014). Both 
sides of the debate favour the protection and empowerment of small farmers. Critics 
romanticise farmer resistance against RPF reforms (Van Damme et al. 2014, Huggins 
2013a, Ansoms et al. 2014). Critics have even embarked on studies (Ansoms et al. 
2008) that show that inverse farm size has been correlated with increased 
productivity in Rwanda. They argue that the RPF uses cooperatives to engineer 
control grabs and institutionalise control through top-down policymaking. Those 
who are more positive about policies emphasise that cooperative policies have 
benefits of “retaining family land rights and production incentives” (Booth and 
Golooba-Mutebi 2012b, 9). Recently, there has been some convergence between the 
two sides of the debate. Van Damme et al. (2014) have tempered criticisms, noticing 
that the government has adapted its policymaking after farmers resisted certain 
policies. Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2014b) similarly argue that the government has 
learned-by-doing and adapts its policies. However, existing literature continues to 
86 
 
equate good policies with favouring smallholder farmers, rather than focusing on 
whether the government has created opportunities to access wage labour.147  
While the empirical evidence regarding the relationship between farm size 
and productivity is ambiguous, the government’s preference to portray itself as 
favouring ‘smallholders’ (while masking the existence of ‘control grabs’) is 
understandable. To tap into high-end value-chains, perceptions must be maintained 
to retain ‘coffee karma’ (Zizek 2014) and produce specialty fair trade coffee. Such 
perceptions rely on consumers believing that their consumption habits are benefiting 
vulnerable ‘smallholders’ (Richey and Ponte 2008, Cramer et al. 2015). The 
government also uses assumptions associated with ‘cooperatives’ and ‘smallholders’ 
to speed up processes of rural class differentiation to facilitate capitalist 
accumulation. However, a more striking area of concern is the condition of the most 
vulnerable people who rely on wages to meet subsistence. 
The existence of a landless population (or a population that requires access to 
wage work to meet subsistence) has been recognised within the academic literature 
on Rwanda (De Lame 2005, Clay et al. 1997). Rural differentiation was a source of 
conflict for much of Rwandan history and contributed to tensions leading up to the 
genocide (André and Platteau 1998, Verwimp 2005, Verpoorten 2012). In Kanama 
during the genocide, land conflicts were the primary source of tensions when the 
Hutu landless fought against relatively land-rich Hutus (Lemarchand 2013). 
Government documents (MINECOFIN 2002, MINALOC 2006) and scholarly work 
(Ingelaere 2007, Ansoms 2010, Somers 2012, Thomson 2013a) have detailed 
differentiation in the rural areas, particularly in terms of how individuals are viewed 
by others in relation to their control over means of production and how individuals 
may rise through such hierarchy. Table 2.1 highlights six categories of 
socioeconomic groups in rural Rwanda. The three poorest categories all depend on 
wage work to meet subsistence.148 Similar categorisation was used by district 
                                                          
147 Some government documents (GoR 2004), heterodox supporters (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 
2014b) and critics (Van Damme et al. 2014) share a focus on ‘smallholders’. 
148 Howe and McKay (2007) describe the participatory approach through which such categories were 
devised. Many regions reported different ways of categorising groups. Table 2.1 details six key 
categories that were mentioned by participants across all provinces surveyed. Recently, there have 
been discussions to remove the usage of terms such as abatindi and number categories instead 
(Kwibuka 2014, Mbonyinshuti and Kwibuka 2015). In 2010, internal government documents showed 
that the top-2 rich segments comprised 16 per cent of the population, the next two segments 
comprised 58 per cent and the last two segments comprised 26 per cent. There was variation across 
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officials in deciding who would fall into the most vulnerable segment of the 
population as part of ubudehe public works programmes. 
Table 2.1: Socioeconomic Profiles in Rwanda 
Abakire (The Money Rich) They have fields, a lot of cattle and money. 
They sell a part of their production. 
Abakungu (The Food Rich) They have a lot of fields and cattle. They 
have a big house but no salaried job. 
Abakene Bifashilje (The Poor with 
means) 
They have a house with a minimum of one 
or two cows. They do not work for others. 
Abakene (The Poor) They have some land, but it is insufficient. 
They may have some small cattle but may 
occasionally need wage work. 
Abatindi (The Very Poor) They have a small field but it is not 
productive. They rely on wages to survive. 
Abatindi Nyakujya (Abject Poverty) They do not have fields or a land. They are 
destitute and rely on wages to survive. 
Source: Adapted from Howe and McKay (2007), Ingelaere (2007) 
 
In 2002, national surveys indicated that 11 per cent of all households were 
landless, while another 70 per cent of households owned plots less than 1 ha 
(Musahara 2006). Women, widows and children probably headed around 43 per cent 
of vulnerable households (MINECOFIN 2007). In 2012, the government recognised 
that poverty was highest (76.6 per cent) among households that obtained half their 
income from farm wage work, followed by those with diversified livelihoods who 
obtained more than 30 per cent of their income from farm wage work (MINECOFIN 
2013). A large number of Batwas (the third ethnicity in Rwanda) are also landless 
(Beswick 2011). Increased differentiation across the rural population was also 
evident. 83 per cent of households cultivated less than 0.9 ha of land, while only 1.9 
per cent of households cultivated more than 3 ha of land (NISR 2012b).149 The 
percentage of small cultivators who relied on wage labour as their primary source of 
income increased from 22 per cent in 2006 to 35 per cent in 2011; there has been a 
corresponding decrease in the percentage of independent farmers from 68 per cent to 
54 per cent in the same period (NISR 2012b). Surveys conducted between 2000 and 
2011 reveal that there was a significant move out of subsistence farming among the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
districts in 2012. In Nyaruguru, the top-2 rich segments comprised less than one per cent, the next two 
segments comprised 70 per cent and the last two segments comprised 29 per cent (MINALOC 2013a). 
In Nyamasheke, the top-2 rich segments comprised less than 1 per cent, the next two segments 
comprised 61 per cent and the last two segments comprised 38 per cent (MINALOC 2013b). 
149 0.9 ha was considered the minimum to meet subsistence (NISR 2012b). This meant a large share of 
this group would have relied on access to wage work to meet subsistence. 
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youth (84.9 per cent to 61.3 per cent) and a large increase in the share of youth (3.7 
per cent to 9.9 per cent) who relied on waged farm employment or waged non-farm 
employment (7.4 per cent to 16.9 per cent) as their primary source of income 
(Malunda 2011).  
In addition to the VUP programme, which was discussed in Chapter 1, the 
government has made other provisions for vulnerable segments of the population. 
The One Cow per family (Girinka) programme was established in 2006. By June 
2012, 134,548 cows had been distributed to poor families and 40,352 cows have 
been “passed on to other families” (GoR 2013). Nationwide savings schemes have 
been created through the establishment of Umurenge Savings and Credit 
Cooperatives (SACCOs). The government pledged to make contributions to 
Umurenge SACCOs if locals reached a certain threshold of savings. Investments 
would then be dedicated to the district’s productive activities (Golooba-Mutebi 
2013). The spread of SACCOs has contributed to doubling the percentage of the 
population that enjoys access to formal financial services from 21 per cent in 2008 to 
42 per cent in 2012. Despite these provisions, there is a clear failure to address the 
severe inequality in Rwanda. Worryingly, the government continues to pursue ‘Say’s 
Law’ reasoning in arguing that individuals should create their own jobs after 
receiving the benefits of education (MINECOFIN 2013).  
The academic literature focuses on empowering smallholder farmers. Some 
romanticise their resistance to reforms (Ansoms et al. 2014, Huggins 2010) while 
others claim that cooperatives continue to show signs of equal benefits for farmers 
(Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2014b). The most pressing challenge facing the 
government is the provision of wage work. Very few scholarly articles (Ansoms and 
Rostagno 2012) acknowledge this problem. Though poverty is concentrated in rural 
areas, the government must also repress the ‘political unconscious’ of younger, 
educated youth, who cannot find work in urban areas. Kigali has the highest 
unemployment rate (14 per cent) in Rwanda (Mugabo 2015). Legitimising systems 
of accumulation depends on reacting to the needs of the population – either by 
providing access to wage work and committing more resources to redistribution or 
by coercing the population to work against active resistance. 
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2.5: Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Maintaining a Developmental 
Political Settlement through Retaining Legitimacy and 
Sustaining Systems of Accumulation  
 
This section illustrates a relational framework for a Developmental Political 
Settlement in Rwanda. A variation of Hirschman’s (1970) Exit-Voice-Loyalty 
framework depicts the dynamism of the political settlement and the options available 
to various actors. For the Developmental Political Settlement to remain intact, ruling 
elites use ideology, violence and rents to retain the loyalty of workers and other 
elites. Ruling elites must minimise resistance to systems of accumulation by 
restricting any opportunities for voice or exit. Box 2.2 illustrates this framework. 
Hirschman’s (1970) Exit-Voice-Loyalty framework is based on the two 
contrasting responses by consumers or members of organisations to deterioration in 
the quality of products they buy or to the benefits they receive. Exit refers to the act 
of leaving, generally because a better product is offered. It is also primarily a private 
action (a decision taken by an individual). Voice refers to the act of complaining or 
organising with others to protest. Voice becomes stronger when groups adopt it 
collectively. 
Hirschman (1970) emphasises that the greater availability and use of exit 
options could weaken the development of voice. However, arguably he romanticises 
the space voice enjoys, with silence often being a more rational choice for the 
dominated than voice (Barry 1974). Scott’s (1990) study of domination and 
resistance similarly shows that the oppressed in these societies end up being more 
subjects than citizens. Hirschman also does not consider that opponents who are 
‘locked in’ within native countries might also be locked up (Birch 1975). Voice, 
rather than taking the form of political participation or irrational quarrels, may take 
lesser forms of more silent resistance from elites who fear anything more may 
jeopardize their survival. Hirschman’s framework initially perceived exit and voice 
as clear alternatives, without noting that it is only through exit that some may be able 
to exercise their voice (Birch 1975).150 As such, it is important to clarify that the 
                                                          
150 Hirschman later recognised that the relationship between Exit and Voice takes many forms. He 
(1993) studied the events that led up to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. He noticed that these 
events began with individuals making independent decisions to Exit. When the state chose to close 
down opportunities to Exit, the result was public Voice (through mass protest). “In some momentous 
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choices of exit and voice are not clear-cut. It is more useful to analyse these choices 
as avenues through which power is derived and negotiated, as alliances are formed. 
 Box 2.2 shows that capitalist accumulation within Rwanda would progress 
unhindered if all actors (elites and the population) were loyal to RPF ideology. In 
such a situation, elites collectively commit to economic development and the 
promise of realising their long-term collective goals (or the promise of rents in the 
long-term). Given that the benefits of capitalist accumulation are not distributed 
evenly, excluded elites may choose to voice their dissatisfaction or remain silent. If 
excluded elites are threatened with violence by ruling elites or given rents, they may 
take the option of silence or exit the country and work against Kagame’s RPF. 
Alternatively, they may also receive rents in exchange for their silence. If 
disenchanted elites choose to exit, exit may work as a pathway for voice. Section 4.6 
illustrates that former RPF cadres have exited and continued to threaten Kagame’s 
legitimacy abroad. 
 The population may resist exploitation or exclusion from opportunities by 
voicing their concerns through resistance. However, the RPF’s use of violence (and 
the threat of violence) would force some to choose silence. Alternatively, the RPF’s 
distribution of benefits may convince the population to choose loyalty or silence. 
However, silence may also be an option if voice and exit are not feasible. Though 
silence is not a form of loyalty, it is a common option taken by those who do not 
have the option to voice or exit. Such silence does not threaten systems of 
accumulation and ruling elites would prefer it to active resistance. Coercion and the 
appeasement of the population (with redistributive benefits) are ways to minimise 
resistance. RPF rule would be threatened if popular grievances are mobilised by 
disenchanted elites who attack the legitimacy of RPF ideology and challenge the 
authority of the RPF government.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
constellations, Exit can cooperate with Voice, Voice can emerge from Exit, and Exit can reinforce 
Voice” (Hirschman 1993, 202). 
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Box 2.2: The Developmental Political Settlement in Rwanda 
 
 The theoretical framework developed in this chapter illustrates the 
instruments used by elites in legitimising accumulation strategies. This chapter 
details the dislocation and inequality that has accompanied Rwandan development, 
including increasing rural differentiation among the population. The chapters that 
follow will show how the RPF government has successfully upgraded its economic 
activities. However, such achievements have taken place in an environment where 
inequality persists. Ruling elites have been able to centralise the capacity for 
coercion while managing capital and retaining legitimacy through developing 
narratives, delivering tangible results and protecting the ideology that legitimises 
their rule.  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 This thesis examines RPF narratives pertaining to economic development (in 
general and in the three sectors studied: coffee, tea and minerals) and the strategies 
pursued to maintain political stability and secure economic progress. Examining RPF 
narratives shows how ruling elites have made sense of their actions and how they 
legitimise their continued rule. These narratives operate in line with achieving the 
utopian goals of ideology. The RPF’s ‘utopian goal’ is the achievement of self-
reliance. Such goals are utopian in the sense that they appear as fantastic but that 
they can, in principle, be realised.151 These narratives are legitimised by 
understandings and values that were developed through the collective memories of 
shared experiences of RPF elites. Varied narratives are developed to legitimise the 
policy choices of the government, with representatives (particularly, government and 
military officials) cognisant of the importance of tapping into the preferences of 
different audiences. Critics challenge the authority of the dominant coalition by 
contesting the RPF’s collective memories of shared experiences, debating whether 
the RPF represents liberal values (market-led reforms, zero tolerance for corruption, 
‘inclusive’ societies) and questioning whether narratives translate into actions. This 
thesis develops an understanding of RPF narratives and compares these narratives to 
evidence that has been collected (in the form of government statistics, other 
information gathered through interviews and detailing the evolution of policies and 
the composition of different sectors).  
This thesis largely depends on qualitative methods, including structured and 
semi-structured interviews, informal exchanges outside the official interview setting, 
archival work in ministry offices, statistical data from government sources and public 
databases such as the World Bank database, existing academic literature and other 
documentation that was obtained through interviews in Kigali. Interviews (on their 
own) were viewed as insufficient to obtain information necessary to develop an 
understanding of the elite bargain or to develop a critical assessment of RPF 
narratives. It was initially assumed that “it is taboo among Rwandans to talk about 
politics in general” (Thomson 2013a, 140). Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2011, 
2012a, 2013) used interviews as their primary method to study similar issues. 
                                                          
151 This understanding of utopia is derived from Mannheim. See Kumar (2006).  
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However, their arguments rarely recognise negative outcomes that have been 
associated with the RPF’s development strategy. Though this thesis takes a similar 
line, arguing that Rwanda exhibits similarities with East Asian developmental states, 
it also highlights the vulnerability and unequal outcomes that have accompanied this 
process. All respondents – whether Rwandan or not – shared ‘social narratives’, 
which detailed how they viewed different actions pertaining to their experiences in 
Rwanda. RPF elites were also asked to share their individual narratives. This was 
true both of many senior RPF elites interviewed officially and others with whom 
‘informal exchanges’ were sought outside the official interview setting. Field notes 
were maintained during fieldwork and observations were recorded daily.  
Studying narratives shows how legitimacy is derived by individual 
respondents and by dominant coalitions. Individuals create narratives to portray the 
morality of decisions that they (or the organisations they represent) have taken. 
Contrastingly, narratives are also used to attack the credibility of rivals or a dominant 
class.  Studying narratives in this way emphasises that “there is no single verifiable 
truth”, “that knowledge is socially and politically produced” and that “methods of 
social science have the capacity to undermine the illusion of an objective, naturalised 
world which so often sustains inequality and powerlessness” (Ewick and Silbey 
1995, 199). Ultimately, the narrative presented in this thesis is one narration, which 
is the result of the many narratives that respondents presented. To minimise the bias 
that has accompanied such methods, narratives are judged in relation to results and 
data (which often contradicts narratives).  
The cross-disciplinary methods used have helped develop an explanation of 
the sources of vulnerability that threaten the legitimacy of the Rwandan government 
(either through dissent from its own support base or by highlighting the 
“fundamental contradictions” within elite narratives).152 Critical studies claiming to 
have accessed the ‘hidden transcript’ in Rwanda (Ingelaere 2010, Reyntjens 2011) 
invariably end in ‘fatalistic’ high modernist predictions. Given that the thesis is 
focused on a top-down narrative, the arguments made are vulnerable to speculation. 
To guard against such problems, the thesis only uses information obtained from 
formal methods – interviews, economic data and archival work. Any information 
                                                          
152 “The case for cross-disciplinary work in international development is a strong one because research 
priorities should be set by the practical problems that development involves, more than the puzzles 
that are generated out of theoretical speculation” (Harriss 2002, 494). 
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obtained from ‘informal exchanges’ (which are not verifiable elsewhere) is not used 
directly in the thesis. Informal exchanges were used in addition to interviews and 
other data to develop an understanding of the context in which elites operated. They 
were also used to understand responses to rumours that were rife in Kigali and served 
as signals to the biases and loyalties of certain individuals. Informal exchanges were 
important sources to understand how RPF elites viewed their history. Most names 
and specific details about companies were first mentioned during informal exchanges 
and then triangulated using other sources (e.g. newspaper articles and interviews). 
The evidence presented could not have been extracted either by simply obtaining 
data from government sources or by relying on interviews in official settings.  
‘Social narratives’ were analysed while developing an understanding of the 
chronology of formal positions occupied by respondents. In the early phases of 
fieldwork, this was difficult. However, in fieldwork undertaken in 2013 and 2015, 
some understanding of the past history of respondents was already gauged prior to 
most interviews. When interviewing respondents, it was important to judge why they 
chose to argue for the government line or against it. For private sector respondents, 
understanding their relationship with the government in the past helped to explain 
why they chose to criticise or support the government. Understanding the bias of 
donors (and their attitudes to market reforms and their concern for achieving 
democracy) was equally important. No one group can monopolise control over how 
different actors perceive policies. Through comparing narratives with competing 
narratives and other data collected, it is possible to develop a more balanced 
understanding of what may constitute reality.  
There has been very little academic work undertaken in the three sectors that 
have been studied or the political economy of Rwanda in general. Historical records 
represent a “thoroughly selective account of what happened” (Cobley 2001, 30). 
Pottier (1995) previously described how one could choose which historian to read 
when writing about Rwanda to suit a particular purpose. Eltringham (2004) goes 
further, stressing that the meaning of history and the ability to construct a narrative 
(even a personal one) is a source of power in Rwanda. This thesis has used a variety 
of sources to obtain historical data including other academic work (Lemarchand 
1970, Prunier 1995, Pottier 2002, Mamdani 2001), autobiographies (Carr 1999, 
Gasana 2002, Voigt 2004), policy documents (from international organisations), 
government documents, EIU reports, newspaper articles and interviews.  
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Fieldwork in Rwanda was conducted for 12 months between October 2011 
and January 2015. Research was primarily conducted in Kigali. Visits were also 
made to mining sites, tea factories, coffee farms and other towns. Interviews were 
also conducted abroad with embassy officials and other relevant respondents. A total 
of 458 interviews have been conducted: 178 interviews with government and military 
officials; 78 interviews with respondents working in Rwandan companies (of which, 
23 interviews were conducted with representatives from investment groups) and 71 
interviews with respondents working in foreign companies in Rwanda; 91 interviews 
with donors and consultants; 18 interviews with local and foreign academics and 
journalists; 12 interviews with members of local think tanks and Non-governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) and 10 interviews were conducted with local Rwandans 
(including former child soldiers and genocide survivors). Of the 149 private sector 
interviews, 36 were undertaken in the coffee sector, 29 in the mining sector, 18 in the 
tea sector (representatives of every company) and 66 were undertaken with other 
respondents, including with PSF representatives. Government and military 
respondents included ministers and high-ranking generals, as well as junior 
government officials. In most cases, access was obtained relatively easily.153 Many 
government officials and some owners of companies (foreign and domestic) never 
responded to interview requests.154 Some foreign investors (in the mining sector) 
refused interview requests.155 There has been very little engagement with individual 
farmers or miners although many respondents were cooperative leaders or ‘straddled’ 
as government officials. When farms and mines were visited, farmers and miners 
were often asked questions through others. These opportunities were not used 
effectively (and are not counted as interviews). Most claims made about such groups 
are derived from existing academic work or through interviews with cooperatives 
and private sector representatives and government officials.  
                                                          
153 Studies of the Rwandan economy have been less popular among researchers. The story was also 
perceived to be a ‘good’ story (such feelings were expressed by several government officials). 
154 The choice to avoid an interview request was interpreted as an individual preference, rather than 
being ‘government-directed.’ No trends were identified among those who ignored or rejected 
interview requests.  
155 This may have been because of the negative publicity around ‘conflict minerals’ in periods when 
interviews were requested. On a later visit, some of these individuals were open to be interviewed.  
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This research was conducted with the permission of the Rwandan 
government. Research permits were obtained during the course of fieldwork.156 The 
Institute for Policy Analysis and Research – Rwanda (IPAR) was the host institution 
for this research. Permits were obtained without difficulty. Ministry officials were 
extremely helpful in granting access. Very few respondents enquired about research 
permits. Such experiences with research permits tally with the experiences of other 
researchers who study Rwanda from a ‘top-down’ perspective.157 
In the very early stages of fieldwork, interviews were structured and 
questions were set prior to the interview. However, interviews later became less 
structured and more fluid. Most interviews took place within formal office 
environments. More than 90 per cent of interviews took the form of semi-structured 
interviews, with the stated aims of accessing the ‘social narratives’ of individuals. 
Semi-structured interviews are commonly used across the social sciences to achieve 
such purposes (Sarantakos 2005), primarily through creating a ‘conversational space’ 
for narratives to be told (Elliott 2005). Some interviews were undertaken in 
‘informal’ environments e.g. some military officials preferred to meet in bars and 
coffee shops, rather than in offices. Building rapport with informants contributed to 
accessing individual narratives, rather than hearing the RPF narrative repeatedly. 
Some respondents were interviewed several times and over several years.  
The narratives of individual elites showed agreement with the ideals of RPF 
narratives. Individual elites stressed that the liberation effort was fought as a reaction 
to the vulnerability they experienced. All elites claimed they were fighting for 
democracy and freedom. They often highlighted the corruption and exclusionary 
policies of the Habyarimana regime. Most elites (especially RPF cadres who led the 
liberation effort) expressed dissatisfaction with the Kagame-led dominant coalition. 
Some of these elites justified their disenchantment by claiming that the dominant 
coalition was working to further individual interests. However, the government 
argued that some senior RPF cadres who faded from prominence were punished 
because of corruption charges or some form of indiscipline (Chapter 4).  
                                                          
156 Permit procedures were the same as described in Jessee (2012). However, it was not necessary to 
go through Rwanda’s National Ethics Committee (RNEC) since research methodologies did not 
involve biomedical investigation. 
157 Many young researchers have had similar experiences. 
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RPF narratives appeal to the ‘collective memory’ of vulnerability experienced 
by cadres who fought in the liberation effort.158 Narrative scholars have highlighted 
that “memory embodied in narrative made a significant contribution to the formation 
and maintenance of the self-image of people” (Cobley 2001, 38). Appeals to this 
collective memory emphasise the importance of solidarity within RPF ranks.  
“When we came back, we had almost nothing. We had to start up 
fresh. At that point, leadership was crucial. It was not the time for 
us to think about ourselves. We had to think about how to work 
together for what was good for Rwanda. Whenever there is 
corruption now, it hurts us. With the little bit that is taken away, we 
can do so much.”159 
The narratives of individual elites (with whom relationships were developed 
and even those who were interviewed in formal settings) were not accepted directly. 
Instead, their individual histories were explored and their relationships with the 
dominant coalition were analysed (through interviews with other people about these 
elites and through learning about their trajectory through RPF hierarchy). Rumour, 
suspicion and envy played a part in these narratives. Different elites viewed each 
other with a mixture of rivalry and loyalty. However, there was a strong sense that 
their group shared a common past against distinct ‘others’ (as enemies) or that their 
group (those who liberated the country) was ‘special’ within Rwanda, compared to 
others in the country. Following a meeting with one senior RPF cadre before 
reaching Rwanda, field notes indicated: 
A new Prime Minister was appointed a few days ago. It seems 
(name withheld) was as surprised as anyone. He doubted the new 
Prime Minister’s competence and said that no one expected it. 
However, he did say they wouldn’t have appointed someone from 
‘his’ group.160 
The Kayumba-Kagame split is very interesting. (Name withheld) 
said Kagame and Kayumba ruled the country for years together. 
However, some people think that Kayumba was corrupt or that he 
was getting too powerful. Eventually, many people fell out with 
Kagame during this time. (Name withheld) seemed against both 
                                                          
158 Collective memories of vulnerability are powerful because they shape the identity of particular 
groups. In Cambodia, the Khmer used the memories of Vietnamese southward expansion and the 
continued influx of Vietnamese settlers to build a sense of vulnerability that enforced a collective 
Khmer identity (Takei 1998). The fear that such threats could reappear highlight the importance of 
solidarity within groups. 
159 Interview, Nzabamwita, RDF, May 2013. 
160 Field notes (after interview with senior RPF cadre), October 2011. 
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Kayumba and Kagame but was generally quite unhappy that ‘a 
new group’ is taking over.161 
Expectedly, when individual elites portrayed the dominant coalition within 
their social narrative as negative, they detached themselves from blame.  
(Name withheld) seems to be very angry about everyone. He 
romanticises the old days and the liberation effort and is quite 
angry at how people have fallen apart. He says that most people are 
greedy and have forgotten what they were fighting for.162 
These exchanges are important to show that the dynamics of ‘consensus’ 
assumed in the academic literature are not harmonious. None of these notes are facts. 
They are simply perspectives that were developed about how respondents viewed 
their environments. Most interactions (and evidence that included the exclusion of 
senior RPF cadres) showed that elites grappled for power within an established 
hierarchy. Ideology – founded on collective memories of shared experiences of 
vulnerability and strengthened because of the salience of external and internal threats 
– held the elite bargain together and forced elites to commit to ideological goals.  
3.1: Narratives, Information and Rumours 
 
The dominant narratives of a society are the narratives of its ruling class.163 
  
Narratives are not a method. They are “resources with which to investigate 
the phenomena of which the narratives make an account” (Hyvarinen 2008, 447). 
RPF narratives were easily accessible and constantly repeated through interviews 
with government officials. There were some dominant features of these narratives, 
which had hardened over time through the identification of common opponents. At 
various stages, opponents were identified as retreating Hutu elites (after the genocide 
in 1994), the Congolese government (since Rwanda became involved in the Congo 
Wars since 1997), the international community (periodically when donors threatened 
to withdraw foreign aid) and former RPF elites (who fell out with the government 
and became rivals abroad). As is expected of any government, the RPF government 
actively ignored the achievements made by preceding governments. The RPF 
demonised the agricultural dependence of previous governments, stressing that a 
                                                          
161 Field notes (after interview with prominent but younger RDF officer – involved in liberation effort 
but not very senior), December 2011. 
162 Field notes (after interview with excluded RPF cadre), May 2013. 
163 Paige (1997, 341). 
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focus on agriculture alone was backward (ignoring that preceding governments 
invested in the industrial sector despite focusing primarily on cash crop 
cultivation).164 RPF narratives presented the image of a unified party. RPF officials 
and other elites regularly identified common goals as self-reliance, pro-poor 
development and ethnic inclusion. There was a common understanding that liberty 
and freedom would be achieved through economic development. Value-addition was 
portrayed to address vulnerability to fluctuations in international prices and provide 
benefits for the population.165 RPF narratives also acknowledged that Rwandan 
nationals were most likely to take strategic economic risks.166  
Table 3.1 shows the variety of methods that were used to access different 
narratives and evidence. Social narratives were accessed through interviews, 
informal exchanges and rumours (to some extent). Though there were clearly 
differences between the social narratives of many RPF elites and the dominant RPF 
narrative, there were some similarities. After the genocide, the RPF’s legitimacy was 
based on retaining support among its elites. All elite respondents positioned the RPF 
as a progressive movement. Most respondents said that the RPF prioritised security 
and providing basic needs to the population during the 1990s. Individuals 
emphasised the values of their struggle, highlighting the importance of self-sacrifice, 
as well as their commitment to democracy and inclusive development (and directly 
opposed it to the corrupt values of preceding governments). A valuable ideal was a 
commitment to self-sacrifice in the name of solidarity and allegiance to national 
goals.167 Corruption attacked the core ideals of the RPF, which “prided itself on 
history and incorruptibility” (Verhoeven 2012, 275). As expected, individual elites 
did not admit their own indiscipline. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
164 Narratives hide the ways “in which history is denied or repressed” and act as the “work of political 
repression” (Paige 1997, 343).  
165 Kagame (2008) said, “value-addition at different stages in the production chain is already leading 
to significant results – one of which is the tripling of coffee farmers’ incomes in the last six years.” 
166 “No big company has done anything. It is all done by Rwandans themselves” (Interview, Rose 
Kabuye, May 2013). 
167 The New Times (2014). 
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Table 3.1: Methods and their uses 
Methodology What was obtained? Uses 
Structured Interviews Specific details; ‘social 
narratives’; RPF 
narrative 
Some evidence; 
narratives 
Semi-structured 
Interviews 
Social narratives; 
individual narratives; 
specific details; 
RPF narrative 
Some evidence; 
narratives; triangulation 
Informal Exchanges Individual narratives; 
Social narratives; 
RPF narrative 
Triangulation; Signals to 
obtain further 
information; narratives 
Archival Work, 
Documentation 
Statistics; Official 
narratives 
Evidence; histories; 
economic data 
Rumours Social narratives Signals about loyalties; 
understanding the 
importance of issues to 
different groups 
 
The narratives of individual elites justified their own decisions through 
history, often engaging directly with how these elites sacrificed their own interests 
and worked for the nation’s advancement. Often, individual narratives reflected 
“self-aggrandizing motives”, as respondents told stories in which their roles were 
exaggerated or entirely recast (Wood 2003, 35).168 Individual RPF elites romanticised 
their roles in the reconstruction of Rwanda. For example, three senior military 
officials expressed regret that they did not leave the RPF to pursue jobs abroad. 
These officials said they gave up such opportunities to work for Rwanda. However, 
they now regretted making such choices (especially since they no longer felt they 
were given the positions they deserved). Individual elites departed from RPF 
narratives in other ways. Within the first few months, semi-structured interviews and 
informal exchanges with elites revealed resentment towards Kagame and 
disagreement with many of the government’s policies. Many elites criticised Kagame 
during informal exchanges. Field notes indicated: 
I met with (name withheld) today. Generally, people don’t seem to 
like Kagame and are pretty scared of him. He said that Kagame is 
now the only person with real authority. People are suddenly 
charged with corruption and he said that often these charges are 
                                                          
168 Such narratives were sources of confusion. In depicting a picture of power relations between elites, 
additional verification was sought from other sources. 
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wrong. Kagame also makes money himself but nobody can say 
anything about that.169  
These feelings were expressed for a political purpose – to challenge 
Kagame’s moral authority without challenging RPF ideology (and the party’s 
values). These narratives neglected why elites themselves had been ‘disciplined’ by 
the RPF.170 The strengthening of RPF narratives has coincided with needing to prove 
leaders represented certain values.171 Kagame (2012a) highlights how RPF cadres 
sacrificed individual benefits in the 1990s. Such speeches appeal to collective 
memories of shared experiences among cadres who fought in the liberation effort. 
“When the war was over, RPF fighters spent two years without 
getting a salary, not because they didn’t need it but because there 
was nowhere to draw it from… I proposed an idea; since you 
survived two years without salary and 4 years before that, why 
don’t we use this money to buy things that will help us fight the 
insurgency, and everybody agreed.” 
 
Ideology forced individuals to show that their actions were in line with values 
that were important through their shared experiences. If individuals were perceived 
as corrupt or favouring the views of opponents or betraying collective memories, it 
affected their legitimacy within the community. Adhering to collective memories and 
the values that were central to the RPF ideology was crucial if elites were to maintain 
their legitimacy. It was also essential that the dominant coalition be perceived to 
represent such values and strengthen collective memories (by appealing to them or 
highlighting the threats of opponents).  
Government officials skilfully navigated how they communicated with their 
audiences. They often spoke of the value of embracing market-led reforms. 
However, it must be noted that some officials were committed to such values. Such 
responses were true for most junior officers and in initial meetings. In such 
interviews, government officials repeatedly spoke of their commitment to 
privatisation and the values of market competitiveness  
                                                          
169 Field notes, May 2012. 
170 For example, one individual never acknowledged that he had been disciplined for ‘grabbing land’ 
in the Eastern Province. 
171 These values included placing the interests of the nation ahead of that of the individual, and zero 
tolerance for corruption within RPF ranks. 
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“We will have no future without a private sector. There is an 
understanding that when the private sector grows up, our country 
will also grow up.”172 
“Market competition is part of our philosophy. The private sector 
has to lead development. It is not the government’s job to be in 
business. That was what the last government did.”173 
 
At other times, narratives that argued for state interventionist policies were 
developed (usually by senior government officials). Some social narratives reflected 
beliefs in market competitiveness and private sector-led development, showing that 
government policies are often a product of two simultaneous needs: of appeasing 
donors and using state intervention to develop strategic sectors or take big risks. 
“Engaging with the market will make the Rwandan economy more 
competitive. We don’t control any traditional sectors. We go into a 
sector, build it and then let the private sector take care of the 
rest.”174 
 
Some RPF cadres and other private sector respondents also questioned 
policies such as the use of investment groups. Respondents often attempted to tap 
into what they believed were shared biases towards the values of market-led reforms. 
Statements below (one interview and field notes after a discussion with one senior 
military officer) highlight this trend: 
“It is not like a free market. The RPF has companies, which is 
known about. Government also helps us but not in the same way. It 
is okay. Museveni did the same thing in Uganda. It is frustrating 
for us – the small guys – that we don’t get the same help.”175 
“It is surprising that some of these military officers don’t agree 
with Horizon and Crystal Ventures Limited (CVL).176 He said he 
thinks these companies, especially Crystal Ventures, were pretty 
inefficient. He said they should just liberalise and let individual 
Rwandans lead the way.”177  
                                                          
172 Interview, MINICOM junior official, March 2012. 
173 Interview, MINECOFIN official, March 2012. 
174 Interview, Rwangombwa, MINECOFIN, May 2012. 
175 Interview, Domestic Private Sector, February 2012. 
176 These investment groups will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
177 This senior cadre often spoke of his preference for competition and market-led reforms and 
assumed that such biases were shared. Field notes, February 2012. 
103 
 
 In two later research trips in 2013 and 2015, respondents often adjusted their 
narratives during interviews. They adjusted to biases that were presented by the 
interviewer, closer to heterodox readings of Rwanda’s economic success.  
 
The Place of Rumour in Rwandan Narratives 
 
 Rumours are forms of news that are disseminated outside the auspices of 
formal media or formal organisational authority (Donovan 2007). Rumours are 
colloquially understood as metaphors of falsity or distortion but such understandings 
reduce our capacity to analyse rumours as a social practice (ibid). Creating rumours 
is common social practice in societies where information is withheld or when gaps 
exist within official narratives.178 Rumour creation is often represented as benign or 
even as a survival mechanism.179 However, rumours exist in direct opposition to the 
information expressed in dominant narratives. Rumours threaten the legitimacy of 
dominant narratives and creating and spreading rumours are political acts. Rumours 
“reveal the power and uncertainty in which Africans have lived in this century” and 
“encourage a reassessment of everyday experience to address the workings of power 
and knowledge and how regimes use them” (White 2000, 43).  Information contained 
in rumours is not used as evidence in this thesis. Rumours were only a signal to 
understand frictions among elites.  
 Governments often perceive rumours as threats to the authority of their own 
narrative. Central and Eastern African leaders understood that what made rumours 
powerful were that people believed them (White 2000). In 1984, after several coup 
attempts in Cameroon, rumours became a source of worry for the government. 
President Paul Biya publicly addressed the threat of rumours: 
“As for the truth, many of you confuse it with rumours. But rumour 
is not the truth. Truth comes from above; rumour comes from 
below. Rumour is created in unknown places, then spread by 
thoughtless and often malicious people, people who want to give 
                                                          
178 Rumours are important sources of information when free press is non-existent. “In a repressive 
political environment, oral networks often provide the best source of news and evidence of resistance 
to dominant groups or organisations” (Duffy 2002, 177). 
179 Such benign representations perceive those who create rumours as helpless. People simply use 
rumours to “make sense of the situation” or “stand in for knowledge” (Fujii 2009, 149). Nordstrom 
(2004) argues that rumours were used during the Mozambican civil war to shape understandings about 
the environment. “When the truth is too dangerous to tell, people don’t stop talking. Instead, they 
shape truth into stories” (Nordstrom 2004, 143). 
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themselves a spurious importance. Cameroonians, pay no heed to 
the rumours, which are spreading through the country”180  
In India, the rumours spread by similar ‘malicious people’ were viewed by 
the Indian colonial administration as a “necessary instrument of rebel transmission in 
popular peasant uprisings” (Guha 1983, 256). While officials viewed peasant 
insurgencies fuelled by rumour as evidence of peasant irrationality, peasant 
insurgents used rumours to spread the message of revolt (Das 1998).  
Rumours are used to challenge the moral authority of leaders. “Rumour is the 
officials’ term for information they have not engendered, shaped or controlled” and 
the recognition of rumours “declares the weakness of official channels of 
information” (White 2000, 210). In the Philippines, rumours spread by mobile 
phones eroded the legitimacy of President Joseph Estrada and contributed to the 
civilian-backed coup in 2001 (Rafael 2003). Spreading false rumours were a 
“traditional technique for discouraging the enemy and for rallying faithful followers” 
in Central Africa (Vansina in Pottier 2007, 840). Ellis (1989) argued that all African 
politicians were aware of the power of rumours.181 He described President of Gabon 
Omar Bongo’s use of a daily newspaper column. The column criticised individual 
ministers and publicly accused them of corruption or incompetence.182 Bongo 
succeeded in “reducing the power of popular rumour and in keeping government 
ministers in a semi-permanent fear of denunciation by the press” (Ellis 1989, 328). 
Rwanda scholarship is characterised by “unnecessary secrecy and its 
inevitable counterpart, unrestrained rumour mongering” (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 
2012a, 384). Some Rwanda scholars (often those with privileged access and those 
who accept the RPF narrative) criticise those who use rumours for “rumour-based 
guesswork” (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2013).183 When such scholars dismiss the 
importance of rumours, they side with dominant narratives and question the 
legitimacy of voices outside those narratives. A number of Rwanda scholars admit to 
using rumours, including information within rumours (Beswick 2010, Reyntjens 
2013). This thesis demonstrates that rumours should only be understood as signals 
about politics and are best analysed depending “on those who recount them and in 
                                                          
180 Biya quoted in Ellis (1989, 325). 
181 Ellis (1989) highlights the widespread prevalence of “pavement radio” – the popular and unofficial 
discussion of current affairs in African towns.   
182 The ‘anonymous’ senior journalist who wrote the column worked for the Presidency (Ellis 1989). 
183 Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2013, 19) refer to this as “the new Kremlinology of rumour-based 
guesswork in the Rwandan context.” 
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what context” (Ellis 1989, 323). During informal exchanges and semi-structured 
interviews, rumours were often discussed or were introduced by respondents. 
Understanding why certain individuals chose to accept rumours or spread rumours 
themselves (trying to make rumours legitimate) is important to understand how 
power is contested through social narratives.  
One rumour spread by rival Tutsi elites (who were once Kagame’s allies) 
accused Kagame of buying two executive jets worth $100 million with government 
funds (Nyamwasa 2010). Other loyalists, including Nshuti Manasseh and Hatari 
Sekoko, are often mentioned to be involved in this acquisition. This story has been 
discussed with respondents.184 The government denied these allegations. These 
rumours have been accepted by Reyntjens (2013) as facts. Scholars who agree with 
RPF narratives ignore them. This rumour was recognised as true by some senior RPF 
cadres and other Rwandans interviewed. For some donors (who rarely disregard 
rumours), this was a fact.  Since corruption allegations tarnished Kagame’s 
legitimacy as an upholder of RPF values (zero-tolerance of corruption), this rumour 
held some resonance with excluded RPF cadres (who were interviewed). The 
recognition of rumours is indicative of political inclinations. However, it does not 
mean that information contained in the rumour is true.  
Another rumour attacked the government’s image of embracing market-led 
reforms. In July 2011, Tom Gutjahr, the foreign CEO of telecom firm Tigo, was 
given 24 hours to leave Rwanda.185 It was rumoured that Tigo was asked to roll out 
network coverage in the Muhazi sector where Kagame owned a lake house. Gutjahr 
refused. The party-owned newspaper, The New Times, later accused Gutjahr of 
embezzling funds. This story was popular among donors and foreigners who worked 
in the private sector. However, Rwandans showed little interest in this rumour. The 
political purpose of spreading this rumour would have reduced the credibility of the 
RPF’s ‘market-led reforms’ narrative. Elite respondents and senior RPF officials 
discredited this rumour. This rumour only related to the ‘public image’ of the RPF 
and not its internal values. 
“Many foreigners talk about the manager who got fired from Tigo. 
I talked to some Rwandans about it and no one cared. But it is still 
                                                          
184 Some respondents agreed with Kayumba’s claims that Kagame is often guilty of hypocrisy when 
charging elites with corruption.  
185 Interview, Tigo Representative, March 2012. 
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pretty shocking that Kagame would do this to an important investor 
like Tigo.”186   
 
 One rumour was almost universally discredited. In May 2012, there were 
rumours in Kigali that a man had set himself on fire after government officials in 
Rubavu (Western Province) confiscated his shop. These stories had similarities to the 
story of Mohammed Bouazizi, whose possessions were confiscated by government 
authorities in Tunisia in 2011. Bouazizi later became a symbol of the Tunisian 
revolution. A story appeared on a Rwandan newspaper website before being taken 
down. A rumour spread that the government ordered the newspaper to take the story 
off its website.  
“He set himself on fire after being beaten up by local defence 
forces near Rubavu last week. His name was Mutabazi Sadic. The 
RDF confiscated peanuts that he was selling as part of his business. 
(Name withheld) said the government had nothing to do it. Instead, 
he said Sadic was known to be taking drugs. I wonder how he 
could possibly know this. But nobody is talking about it and no 
expatriates have heard anything about this.”187   
 On reflection, it was strange that such rumours had reached Kigali. However, 
it was not surprising that the rumour faded from relevance relatively quickly. 
Disenchanted Tutsi elites lacked the motivation to spread such rumours because 
these elites had little interest in popular mobilisation. Many elites that were excluded 
were tarred by corruption charges themselves. These elites simply desired better 
treatment or a replacement of the dominant coalition with one that was more 
favourable to their interests. The choices of why some elites spread one rumour 
while ignoring other rumours were indicative of their grievances and their political 
loyalties. Rumours are only relevant for analysis in terms of who is telling them and 
why they are being told.  
3.2 The Academic Narratives about Fieldwork in Rwanda 
 
The extent to which Rwanda scholars have been cast in opposition to each 
other is relatively rare among scholarship that pertains to specific countries. There 
are debates about how to view the reign of certain controversial leaders such as 
                                                          
186 Field notes, March 2012. Tigo was the first foreign investor to be allowed to invest in the domestic 
telecom sector.  
187 Field notes, May 2012. 
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Ethiopia’s Meles Zenawi (De Waal 2013, Lefort 2013).188 However, there is rarely 
such sustained disagreement between groups of academics. Filip Reyntjens (2011, 2) 
outlined “a broad consensus” within the international scholarly community (who 
study Rwanda). Some exceptions were also highlighted.189 The ‘consensus’ criticised 
the RPF for its authoritarian leadership. This group perceived most government 
initiatives to be aimed at extended state control and limiting political space. 
Reyntjens (2013) criticised donors and ‘exceptions’ for being fooled by the RPF.190 
Others in ‘the consensus’ argued that the RPF government controlled the information 
that was accessed by researchers (Braeckman 2003, King 2009). The ‘exceptions’ 
differed from the consensus in arguing that the government’s policies were aimed at 
delivering benefits to the wider population.191  
These divisions are complicated further since most influential academics no 
longer undertake fieldwork in Rwanda. This creates a danger, as Clark (2013a) 
writes, “of armchair critics who prefer to denounce Rwandan authoritarianism from 
afar but without deep empirical knowledge of conditions there.” However, these 
‘armchair critics’ are still important voices to be heard within academic debates. 
Many of these academics retain large networks of contacts in Rwanda. Many no 
longer do research in Rwanda because they have been declared persona non grata by 
the RPF government.192 Some are not actually ‘banned’ but fear for their safety if 
they return to Rwanda. Others ‘within the academic consensus’ such as Bert 
Ingelaere and An Ansoms continue to conduct fieldwork in Rwanda. In reality, there 
is no neat correlation between choosing a side and being allowed to do fieldwork in 
Rwanda.193 Those who are perceived as pro-RPF are accused by those within the 
‘consensus’ of engaging in self-censorship to maintain access.  
 New researchers must contend with the sharp divide within the scholarly 
community (who study Rwanda). In a recent debate, Clark (2013a) questioned 
                                                          
188 De Waal lauds Meles’ developmental strategy. Lefort criticises Meles for never being able to put 
that strategy into practice.  
189 Clark and Schabas were highlighted as exceptions.  
190 Fergal Keane and Stephen Kinzer (journalists who wrote books about Rwanda) have admitted that 
they were ‘wrong’ about the RPF after writing their pro-RPF books.  
191 Most academics retain some nuance in their arguments. However, leading Rwanda scholars frame 
the academic debate in an extreme way. As such, most researchers are usually pulled towards the 
extreme ends of this continuum.  
192 Clark (2013a) identifies three senior academics among the very few who have been officially 
declared persona non grata: Filip Reyntjens, Gerard Prunier and Rene Lemarchand. Many other 
academics claim to have been blacklisted in this way. 
193 Such observations have been made after attending several conferences and speaking with many 
Rwanda scholars (especially younger scholars). 
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whether some researchers have exaggerated the difficulties of doing research (and 
the surveillance they endure) in Rwanda to draw attention to their own research.194 
He recounts an incident where one student mentioned that she was being followed 
everywhere she went by the RPF. Rwanda scholars often claim that they are being 
watched. Researchers and expatriates (in general) who work in Kigali operate in an 
environment of mystery and secrecy.195 Such treatment is perceived as the norm 
(when it is actually an exception).196 Rumours about the fieldwork environment have 
had a political effect on the academic environment. Such outcomes may not have 
been intended (by older academics) but many researchers tend to assume (whether 
rightly or wrongly) that they are under surveillance when they arrive in Rwanda. 
 There is a diversity of research being undertaken in Rwanda by a varied 
group of researchers. Researchers have had varied success in gaining access, 
obtaining permits and retaining independent control of their research. Some 
researchers have accused the government of using the research permit procedure to 
obstruct access for foreign researchers.197 Some applications for research permits take 
six to eight months, some take a few weeks. Regardless of nationality or origin of 
institution, researchers have had varying experiences in obtaining these permits.198 
Most researchers who have had difficulty gaining research permits study local 
communities or ‘sensitive’ topics. Many permits are delayed because their host 
institution in Rwanda may have their own procedures. There are delays during ‘rush’ 
periods at the Ministry of Education or in holding Ethics Review Board meetings in 
Rwanda (if fieldwork requires ethical clearance).199  
Doing research in Rwanda poses difficulties. The government is sensitive 
about protecting its reputation and chooses to be protective given past experiences 
with other researchers. Researchers must be aware of the politicised environment – 
                                                          
194 See Clark (2013a, 2014b), De Lame et al. (2013), Jessee (2013). 
195 Many expatriates said that their emails were monitored. Some claim that their phones are tapped. 
There is very little evidence for either of these claims. Harsh treatment of researchers by local officials 
is common in other settings. FTEPR (2014) describes how a group of researchers were accused of 
being ‘land grabbers’ by locals in Uganda and had to leave the research site because of a threat to their 
lives. In Ethiopia, FTEPR (2014) cites an example of researchers being held by local police. 
196 Thomson (2011, 331) had her passport confiscated and was sent to a “re-education camp.” 
197 See Jessee (2013), Thomson (2013b). Clark (2014b) claims that the research permit procedure is 
similar to other East African countries e.g. Uganda.  
198 Nationality and other factors play a role in determining perceptions about researchers. Researchers 
are a “plurality of selves – being male or female, gay or heterosexual, married or unmarried, western 
or not, young or old and so on” (Mollinga 2008, 7). However, perceptions of identity are constantly 
reshaped in the eyes of respondents. 
199 Ethical reviews are only required for medical research or research that involves a psychological 
study of subjects. 
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both in Rwanda and within academia – when they are collecting and analysing their 
findings. Many researchers must choose whether to self-censor their work not only to 
gain future access to sources in Rwanda but also to protect their sources.200 When 
researchers return home and begin publishing their work, they are confronted with 
facing the strength of the ‘consensus’ within the scholarly community. Fisher (2015) 
argues that articles submitted to journals are inevitably judged by reviewers on the 
basis of which side they take and editors have done little to avoid such occurrences. 
Thus, researchers are faced with the choice of staying within the ‘consensus’, 
attacking the ‘consensus’ or avoiding any activist stance. Researchers should also be 
wary of fitting activist stances in the same way they should avoid giving into 
temptations to self-censor their work to retain access. 
 The narrative presented in this thesis will inevitably anger some group. 
Choices have been made with full awareness of the politicised environment within 
Rwanda and the international scholarly community. Self-censorship has been 
undertaken only to ensure that the security of sources remains protected.  
3.3: Interview Strategies 
 
 Every interview began with a brief verbal introduction of the research project. 
Very few respondents requested that interviews be anonymised although some 
interviews have been anonymised to protect the safety of respondents. Most 
interviews began with a request made to respondents to detail their past work history. 
Such questions helped determine how individuals had risen up in hierarchies and 
assisted in building a ‘basic’ chronology of respondents’ life histories.  
 Given the sensitive nature of doing research in Rwanda, care was taken about 
using certain words (e.g. regime, dictatorship, Hutu, Tutsi) during the course of 
interviews.201 There were some tense moments in interviews when the government’s 
                                                          
200 The impulse to self-censor research findings is prevalent in other contexts. In Ethiopia, Hammond 
(2011) was held in detention by government authorities. Later, she was reluctant to write publicly 
about the full story, fearing that she would be forced to leave Ethiopia or that she would be arrested 
again. Brun (2013) describes her experiences in Sri Lanka where silence was a survival strategy for 
continuing research after a Sri Lankan colleague was kidnapped. In Rwanda, Somers (2012) described 
the urge to self-censor his writing after ‘internalising’ the restrictive environment of field research.  
201 Public mention of ethnicity was outlawed in 2002 (Clark and Kaufman 2009, 9). Such stringent 
rules do not hold today. Since 2013, ethnicity has been mentioned in interviews and informal 
exchanges regularly. Initially, ethnicity was only discussed once respondents introduced the subject. 
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narrative was challenged (e.g. by detailing the achievements of past governments).202 
On one occasion, the term ‘developmental state’ was used to compare Rwanda with 
East Asian countries. The senior government official replied: 
“We’re not a developmental state. Those were authoritarian 
governments. Rwanda is a democracy that puts its people first.”203  
 Gradually, it became clear that words should be chosen carefully during 
interviews. Respondents were also careful in their communication during their 
interviews, trying to ensure that a shared understanding developed. It was equally 
crucial to show how terms such as ‘developmental state’ and ‘neopatrimonialism’ 
were understood when they were used in interviews. 
Many respondents treated interviews with scepticism, at first. Respondents 
justified this by saying most researchers did not undertake detailed fieldwork and 
criticised Rwanda without understanding how things have changed since the 
genocide. Thus, there was a need to convince respondents that there was empathy for 
RPF narratives. However, this ‘empathy’ was not false. RPF narratives were often 
convincing. In other moments, such narratives were treated with scepticism. 
Different beliefs were maintained about certain topics during the course of fieldwork. 
Sometimes, the government’s reasoning made sense, often the private sector’s 
accusations made equal sense and other times, the suspicions of donors reappeared in 
findings. Respondents’ perceptions of the researcher changed over time, just as the 
researcher’s view of his environment transformed.204 More important than ‘siding’ 
with the government narrative was the need to show an understanding of the 
government narrative and the willingness to engage with it. 
  It is likely that respondents treat researchers as ‘useful idiots.’205 However, an 
effort has been made to critically assess the narratives that were presented during 
interviews. Attempts by respondents at exaggerating their own contributions and 
                                                          
202 In negotiating these tense moments, a choice was made to empathise with the respondents’ view to 
calm the interview environment. Interview strategies developed through experience and never 
achieved a ‘perfect’ formula. 
203 This moment was handled by showing empathy with the respondent’s view. Interview, Office of 
the President, May 2012. 
204 “The researcher as a human subject is in flux, dealing constantly with shifting realities and 
contradictions” (Nilan 2002, 368-9). 
205 This term, attributed to Lenin by Judt (2006), was used by Soviet leaders to identify foreigners who 
had chosen to support the Soviet cause in their own countries or in general. ‘Useful idiots’ for the 
Rwandan government would be those who support the government in foreign countries.  
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importance were critically assessed and rechecked with other sources. Nevertheless, 
some respondents may have been more convincing than others. 
3.4: Obtaining Access 
 
 Gaining access to respondents depends on serendipity, social networks and 
specific circumstances (McDowell 1998). Introductions from others contributed to 
developing new contacts during the course of fieldwork. Before beginning research, 
four entry points were established within the government, private sector and the 
military. Eight signed letters from different individuals (including dignitaries at 
Rwandan High Commissions in India and the United Kingdom (UK) and academic 
supervisors) were presented at every interview (during the first stage of research in 
2011 and 2012). After every interview, respondents were asked if they could suggest 
other possible sources. The use of snowballing techniques contributed to success in 
gaining access. Equally, “getting close to some people often precluded the possibility 
of getting close to others” (Duneier 2011, 3). Four individuals were entry points – 
providing introductions to several respondents. However, introductions from 
research institutions, chance meetings and official interview requests often led to 
other interviews. Many different avenues were pursued and respondents were 
approached in a polite yet persistent manner (Yeung 1995). 
 Efforts were made to develop a variety of alternative entry points to protect 
those who initially assisted in finding sources.206 Because the research environment 
in Rwanda was understood to be enveloped in suspicion, observers (outside Rwanda) 
are quick to make judgments that are both damaging to other researchers’ reputations 
and these researchers’ contacts.207 Many introductions actually developed on a 
sector-specific basis or within particular government and military circles. Though 
original entry points helped in gaining access to certain institutions and political 
circles, many contacts were made outside their influence.  
Fieldwork began with ‘casting a wide net.’208 The first two months were spent 
learning more about the environment, attending meetings about the economy and 
understanding the organisation of the government and the private sector. Sector 
                                                          
206 These entry points were all elites with power and prominence within Rwanda. However, given the 
friction between elites in Rwanda, protecting such sources is also important. 
207 For example, one ‘pro-RPF’ Rwanda scholar has been accused of being related to President 
Kagame. Such claims have no factual basis. 
208 Emerson et al. (1995, 29) emphasise that when “first venturing into a setting, field researchers 
should ‘cast their nets broadly’.” 
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studies began during this time but gathered pace only after the first two months of 
fieldwork. It was understood that accessing elites would be difficult because “they 
establish barriers that set their members apart from the rest of society” (Hertz and 
Imber 1993, 3). Often, interviews were requested weeks in advance and sought 
repeatedly (Gokah 2006). Obtaining new sources and making headway during 
research was not easy. There were days with several interviews and some days with 
repeated cancellations. Safety of informants and personal safety were prioritised 
above the receipt of information.209 Careful choices were made in choosing what 
questions to ask during interviews. Topics such as the genocide were never brought 
up unless introduced by respondents. Gradually, confidence grew and relationships 
developed. Building trust with the respondent was essential. Patience was just as 
important. Many interview appointments were cancelled or delayed regularly.  
 Luck contributed to success during fieldwork. A Rwandan military official 
(who became an ‘entry point’) was a PhD classmate at the same university. Some 
contacts in the minerals sector were developed while waiting outside government 
offices. Several contacts in the tea sector were introduced by a prior contact in the 
Indian tea sector. The discovery of one military investment group (a military-owned 
investment group not covered in the existing academic literature) was made because 
a friendship was developed with a relative of the company’s CEO.  
3.5: The Politics of Data Collection 
 
Data is usually obtained in most African countries despite scarce resources at 
individual statistical offices (Jerven 2011). The Rwandan government has prioritised 
the need to collect data. However, an increase in data collection does not mean that 
reliable data is being captured. The government may direct bureaucrats to manipulate 
data to meet certain targets, necessary to achieve certain governance indicators. 
Simultaneously, bureaucrats are pressurised to achieve performance targets.210 Such 
pressure may force bureaucrats to manipulate data. Many respondents were sceptical 
of the accuracy of data.211  
                                                          
209 Pottier et al. (2011) prioritise the need for researchers to adopt such strategies.  
210 “We all have performance targets broken down by departments and broken down by individuals. 
Each individual here focuses on a specific sector. I have to register a number of investments in the 
energy sector every year. At times, quantifying them is a problem” – Interview, RDB Investment 
Officer, May 2012. 
211 Interviews with several coffee exporters and tea factory managers. 
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The data used in this research has been obtained from a variety of sources. 
Most historical data is used from existing academic work, data from international 
organisations or archival data at NAEB or Ministry of Natural Resources 
(MINIRENA). For data since 1994, statistics were obtained directly from 
government offices. Most macro-data was either received from BNR, Rwanda 
Development Board (RDB) or MINECOFIN. It was difficult to access the NISR. 
However, the data that was required was either publicly available or was accessed 
through other government offices. Sector-specific data was also collected from 
NAEB, MINIRENA, RDB and other government departments.  Planning documents 
were shared by government departments and by former consultants.   
3.6 Bias 
 
Attempts were made to develop a range of contacts that held different views. 
In relation to the sectors, a variety of government officials, donors, consultants, 
cooperative representatives and representatives from the private sector were 
interviewed. An attempt has been made to recognise biases. Writings and field notes 
from an earlier period indicate a personal stance much closer to RPF narratives. 
While the government view was not accepted uncritically, it was only a year after the 
first fieldwork stay ended that a more detailed critical view was formed. Distance 
helped in reducing susceptibility to bias while also “devising workable 
accommodations between the need to protect subjects and the needs of external 
audiences” (Wacaster and Firestone 1978, 274). Bias came to the fore most clearly in 
‘informal exchanges’ where some senior RPF cadres complained about the dominant 
coalition. This influenced the narrative to be against Kagame’s position but not 
against the RPF’s achievements. However, care has been taken to overcome this bias. 
Equal criticism is reserved for those who criticise Kagame for his individual 
practices while noting that the government also accuses them of similar activities. 
3.7: Conclusion 
 
Ethical standards that depoliticise the research process are themselves guilty 
of prescribing to a particular political motivation. Bourgois (1990) criticised North 
American anthropological research ethic codes for refusing to acknowledge concerns 
about injustice. He (1990, 43) wrote: “the eminently political orientation of a 
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supposed apolitical commitment to empirical research must be appreciated for its 
internal consistencies and ultimate ethical poverty.” In choosing research methods, 
procuring data and presenting findings, attempts were made to recognise the 
politicised environment in the context that was studied. Attempts were made to 
understand the politicised academic environment (studying Rwanda) in which the 
research will be placed. There is no attempt at making a political statement regarding 
the nature of regime.  
Protecting respondents was of paramount importance and an attempt was 
made to anticipate the consequences of this research (Pottier et al. 2011). Creating an 
effective research dynamic required asking people to reflect on personal beliefs, 
behaviours and experiences (Webster et al. 2014). This led to proximity in 
relationship with participants (Bryman 2008). While this proximity was created, 
attempts were later made to establish a ‘distance’ between the researcher and the 
‘researched’ (Sumner and Tribe 2008). This was achieved by ensuring that there was 
limited dependence on individual gatekeepers. Relationships continued during the 
course of research but favours, apart from introductions to others, were never sought 
from respondents. Despite these attempts, it has been difficult to manage the 
perceptions of others regarding relationships with respondents. However, an 
expectation of reciprocity or ‘giving something back’ among respondents has never 
been expressed (apart from an expectation that publications will be shared) (Harrison 
et al. 2011). It is understood that findings could be used as political instruments (May 
2011). However, it is hoped that research findings and their analysis highlight the 
ways that unequal power relations, ideology and (the threat of) violence have 
determined both developmental and regressive outcomes.  
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CHAPTER 4: ELITE POLITICS IN RWANDA  
This chapter shows that regime change in Rwanda has only occurred when 
rival elites have legitimised their challenges by mobilising the grievances of the 
population against the presiding government. The current government has achieved 
economic progress and retained a Developmental Political Settlement while 
combating political challenges from rival elites. It has retained legitimacy by 
navigating the conflicting demands of three constituencies by developing and 
protecting narratives (backed up by the threat of violence), as well as enacting 
reforms and delivering results in line with those narratives. These narratives 
contribute to legitimising systems of accumulation (and economic development). 
These dominant narratives, showcased in the publication of VISION 2020 in 2000, 
help the government vocalise its commitment to achieve its ideological goal (self-
reliance). To achieve this goal, the RPF expects its cadres to abide by certain values 
(discipline, self-sacrifice and anti-corruption). Appeals to self-reliance are used as 
‘moral’ instruments to contain discontent among elites.  
Frictions between RPF elites threaten the Developmental Political Settlement.  
Rather than focusing on the transient alliances developed by elites, scholarship 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, Khan 2010) and policy work (DfiD 2010, OECD 
2011) have argued that developmental outcomes are usually associated with 
‘inclusive’ elite bargains or political settlements rather than exclusive ones. The 
language is now “shifting to achieving an ‘inclusive enough’ settlement or coalition” 
(Ingram 2014, 10). Ljiphart’s (1977) ‘consociational theory’ was influential in 
promoting reasoning, which favoured ‘inclusive’ political bargains over 
‘exclusionary’ ones. He argued that power-sharing structures could achieve stable 
democratic governments in plural societies where political alignments were 
fragmented through ethnic or religious divisions. Lindemann (2008) built on such 
reasoning, arguing that political stability across Sub-Saharan Africa is determined by 
the capacity of ruling political parties to overcome historical levels of high social 
fragmentation and maintain ‘inclusive’ elite bargains. He suggests this occurred in 
Zambia where the presence of an ethnically inclusive coalition explained the absence 
of civil war in the post-independence period. In Uganda, exclusionary elite bargains 
“produced enduring antagonism between the country’s major tribal groups and 
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thereby become a key driving force behind the various insurgencies since 1962” 
(Lindemann 2010, 59). However, these arguments have not always proven true. Elite 
polarisation was associated with developmental outcomes across East Asia (Vu 
2007). Also, ‘inclusive elite coalitions’ in Botswana were associated with structural 
inequality and destitution in some marginal groups (Hickey 2013). 
Rather than propose ‘inclusive’, ‘inclusive enough’ or ‘exclusionary’ 
coalitions, it is better to argue for a more dynamic understanding of bargains between 
elites. Instead, “countries might oscillate, Albert Hirschman style, between more 
exclusionary and more inclusive arrangements for assuring stability” (Levy 2013).212 
Highlighting the dynamism of political alliances in this way goes beyond existing 
scholarship on Rwanda. Those who are positive about the RPF government, argue 
that it is “more inclusive than at any other time after independence” (Golooba-
Mutebi 2008, 29). However, critics (Reyntjens 2004, 2006, 2011; Gokgur 2012; 
Ansoms 2009b; Beswick 2010) argue that an increasingly narrow coalition of RPF 
elites has consolidated control over politics and the economy.  
Immediately after 1994, the RPF was still concerned with possibilities of 
renewed ethnic conflict, with an insurgency in the Northwest. By the early 2000s, 
security threats in the Northwest and in the DRC were contained. Many former Hutu 
RPF leaders were also either in exile or had died, eliminating any possibility of those 
individuals mobilising segments of the population on the basis of ethnic differences. 
Other Hutu elites chose loyalty to the RPF government. Since the early 2000s, elite 
politics has largely been contested between senior Tutsi RPF cadres who led the 
liberation effort. During this process, the RPF gradually empowered younger cadres 
within the party and the military, who did not play a prominent role in the liberation 
effort. “For the RPF, there is always 30 per cent youth in every activity. The youth 
represents 35 per cent of the executive. In all levels, we are ready for the youth to 
take over.”213 This chapter will show how threats from rivals have been negotiated, 
while the party is being regenerated– with young cadres and evolving support bases.  
Historical details have been collected based on available sources and 
interviews. Specific dynamics of elite politics (and the facts) are developed using 
secondary literature, newspaper articles and interviews. Informal exchanges helped 
                                                          
212 See Hirschman (1979). 
213 Interview, Rutaremara, January 2015. 
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in developing an understanding of the sources of friction among elites and 
contributed to understanding the way respondents viewed their environment. They 
also helped in highlighting the significance of issues and in triangulation.  
4.1: Ethnicity, Politics and Regime Change in Hutu-led Rwanda 
 
Ethnic identities were contextually and socially created in Rwanda.214 They 
were not “rigid, unchanging or universal” but “fluid and individual” (Newbury 1998, 
83). Ethnic distinctions were rooted in labour arrangements, including ubuhake – an 
unequal clientship contract where a Tutsi patron would give a cow to a Hutu client, 
and in return the Hutu would be tied to his patron.215 Prior to the 1959 revolution, 
ethnic groups were not easily defined across Rwanda. While many of the rich may 
have been Tutsi, there were also poor Tutsis. There were also rich Hutus. In pre-
colonial Rwanda, regions such as the Northwest were never under Tutsi rule. 
European settlers avoided the complexity and diversity of experiences that determine 
ethnic distinctions. Today, these settlers are blamed by RPF elites for 
institutionalising ethnicity through the introduction of identity cards.216 The RPF’s 
own revised ‘ethnicity’ narrative focuses on the “social mobility” and “mutual 
benefits” of ubuhake cattle clientship.217 Patron-client relationships of various kinds 
may have provided benefits for some Hutus but such relationships were largely 
exploitative. In reality, social mobility was not pervasive and was an exception, 
rather than the norm.  
 Waves of violence occur because of a switching in coordination or salience 
when political enterprises successfully link violence specialists around politically 
fractious distinctions (Tilly 2003). The Bahutu Manifesto was the “first open 
revelation of fundamental social disharmony in Rwandan society” where a Hutu 
counter-elite led by Grégoire Kayibanda agitated against a political monopoly held 
by the Tutsi (Lemarchand 1970, 114). Kayibanda’s Mouvement Social Muhutu 
                                                          
214 The Twa is the third ethnic group in Rwanda. 
215 Some (Maquet 1961, Prunier 1995) perceive ubuhake to have been the most widespread form of 
labour arrangements in pre-colonial Rwanda. Actually, ubuhake was neither universal nor exclusively 
hierarchical (Newbury 2001). Other labour arrangements such as ubureetwa were much more widely 
prevalent. These patron-client relationships had varied outcomes: it took the form of quasi-slavery, it 
developed an alliance structure or even provided opportunities for social mobility for Hutu clients. 
216 Pottier (2002) claims it was actually during the reign of King Rwabugiri that ethnicity was 
institutionalised through the bonded labour service of ubureetwa. 
217 The 10 cows thesis suggests that there was social mobility within the ethnic groups.  
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(MSM) had taken a strong anti-Tutsi stance. L’Association pour la Promotion 
Sociale de La Masse (APROSOMA) called for freedom of oppressed groups in 
general, applying to both Hutu and Tutsi (Newbury 1988). By 1958, conservative 
Tutsi elements around the monarchy had created an atmosphere of anxiety among the 
Tutsi elite, hardening the group’s own position on race relations. Tutsi solidarity 
included references to their Hima descent and as a by-product, included references to 
their status as conquerors.218 Tutsi solidarity was a consequence of paranoia 
surrounding the Belgian administration’s tacit support for Hutus (Lemarchand 1970, 
155). However, as with “the very nature of dyadic relationships, based on reciprocal 
obligations between patron and client, the Hutu masses had little consciousness of 
themselves as a group” (Lemarchand 1970, 96). The 1959 Hutu revolution began 
sporadically as groups collectivised to mount struggles against local chiefs. 
Kayibanda led the charge. He converted MSM into a tightly knit party – Mouvement 
Démocratique Rwandais-PARMEHUTU (MDR-PARMEHUTU). His party was able 
to build networks of violence specialists around ethnic distinctions, while 
APROSOMA’s moderate claims lost support.  
Rwanda gained independence from Belgian rule in 1962. Kayibanda became 
President of the First Republic (1962-1973). In independent Rwanda, elite politics 
was usually contested between regional Hutu alliances, rather than on the basis of 
ethnic differences (Uvin 1998). Ethnic differences were only used to highlight the 
dangers posed by an external Tutsi threat. Fear bound Hutu elites together in 
opposing such threats when the salience of such threats was recognised. Kayibanda’s 
new Southern Hutu elite simply replaced the Tutsi elite. The MDR-PARMEHUTU 
abolished the monarchy and patron-client relationships.219 However, little was done 
to address social inequality, including the provision of education and job 
opportunities to the Hutu population (Mamdani 2001).   
Initially, Kayibanda’s opponents were APROSOMA stalwarts who were 
slowly eased out of administrative responsibilities (Prunier 1995). Northern Hutus 
presented a more dangerous threat to his rule. Ethnic distinctions were used to bind 
Hutus politically, as was done during two episodes of inyenzi attacks in 1962 and 
                                                          
218 This rhetoric was later seized upon by MDR-PARMEHUTU, who interpreted Tutsi and Hutu as 
two different races and reasoned that Tutsis had no right to political participation. 
219 The revolution abolished ubureetwa in 1959 and appropriated igikingi (the land of the Tutsi 
notables) for redistribution to the landless (Mamdani 2001, 134) 
119 
 
1963-64 when Tutsi refugees attempted to return to Rwanda.220 The widespread 
Tutsi massacres in 1963/4 were “the culmination of intermittent violence directed at 
Tutsi” (Eltringham 2004, 42). Kayibanda’s power was later weakened by accusations 
of political paralysis, elite discontent and a faltering economy. The interests of 
Northern elites were preserved by the Hutu revolution but Kayibanda restricted their 
access to lucrative business opportunities and political power (Verwimp 2003). After 
the 1972 massacre of Hutus in Burundi, Kayibanda stressed the threat posed by 
inyenzi Tutsis. In January 1973, Kayibanda’s government led purges against Tutsis in 
schools and universities and later in the public and private sector. Government 
officials justified the purge in the name of creating “ethnic proportionality” (Straus 
2006). This later developed into an opportunity for expressing political and regional 
frustration (ibid). Instead of binding the population against a common enemy, 
Kayibanda’s gamble eroded his legitimacy. Peasants were more concerned with local 
grievances while elites were divided by regional distinctions (Prunier 1995). Homes 
and businesses of Hutu officials in the Kayibanda regime were attacked and Northern 
elites took the opportunity to mount a coup, with the stated objectives of ending 
ethnic division and regional favouritism while restoring national unity (Reyntjens 
1985, Straus 2006). 
Box 4.1 illustrates how Kayibanda’s ideology of ‘racial egalitarianism’ was 
used to develop common enemies in Tutsi opponents (both through the memory of 
former monarchist rule and as external threats at the time). Frictions were motivated 
by the increasing consolidation of power among Southern elites at the cost of 
Northern elites. Recruitment of civil servants and economic benefits was geared to 
empower Southern and central elites (Lemarchand 1970). However, the army largely 
recruited from the North (De Lame 2005). Box 4.1 shows that Northern elites, whose 
rents were threatened by Southern elites, moved against Kayibanda. In 1973, 
Habyarimana successfully mounted a bloodless coup against Kayibanda. He then 
became the President of the Second Republic (1973-1994). In Butare in 1973, 
Habyarimana said, “the coup d’état we did, was above all a moral coup d’état. And 
what we want… is to ban once and for all, the spirit of intrigue and feudal mentality. 
What we want is to give back labour and individual yield its real value” 
                                                          
220 Inyenzi is the Kinyarwandan word for cockroach. It was a word used by Hutu radicals for Tutsis, 
who were seen as an ‘alien’ race in Kayibanda’s Rwanda. 
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(Habyarimana, quoted in Verwimp 2000, 335). The coup was ‘popular’ among large 
segments of the population because of the corruption that was associated with the 
Kayibanda regime and because Habyarimana promised to reduce ethnic violence 
(Reyntjens 1994, Jefremovas 1997).  
Box 4.1: Illustration of Threats during the First Republic (1962-1973) 
 
 Kayibanda cast the differences between Hutus and Tutsis as a racial issue. 
Habyarimana recast the difference as an ‘ethnic’ issue (Mamdani 2001). During 
Habyarimana’s reign, Tutsis were recognised as indigenous to Rwanda, rather than 
being perceived as invaders as they were during Kayibanda’s reign. Gasana (2002) 
claims that Habyarimana’s decision to portray ‘reconciliation’ as forward thinking 
and Hutu extremism as backward (and associated with the past) was part of his 
strategy to gradually exclude Alexis Kanyarengwe from power.221 Kanyarengwe 
tried to gain the support of other Hutu elites on the basis of Hutu power but he was 
unable to muster enough support (Gasana 2002). Habyarimana marked ethnic unity 
symbolically by declaring the day of the coup as “a day of peace and reconciliation” 
(Verwimp 2004). However, Tutsis were actually excluded from power during 
Habyarimana’s reign. Throughout Habyarimana’s reign, there were almost no Tutsi 
bourgmestres or préfets (Prunier 1995, 75). A quota system remained. Allocation 
                                                          
221 Kanyarengwe (part of a group of Hutu elites from Ruhengeri) was among the group of officers 
who mounted a coup against Kayibanda. Kanyarengwe was perceived as a threat to both Kayibanda 
and Habyarimana (Prunier 1995, Gasana 2002).  
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took place first on a regional basis (60 per cent of posts to Northerners; 40 per cent to 
Southerners) and then on an ethnic basis (within each region, 90 per cent of posts 
were reserved for Hutus) (Mamdani 2001). Tutsi participation in politics (one Tutsi 
minister in the cabinet till 1979) and in the formal economy was regulated, although 
this was loosely enforced (Prunier 1995). Tutsis were safer during the 1970s but their 
power, as an ethnic group, was regulated (Mamdani 2001).  
In 1975, Habyarimana renamed his party, the Mouvement Révolutionaire 
National pour le Développement (MRND), and effectively centralised power. During 
the 1970s, he successfully played off groups of Northern Hutu elites from Ruhengeri 
(Bagoyi clan) and Gisenyi (Bashiru clan) against each other.222 Box 4.2 illustrates 
how Habyarimana developed a ‘peasant’ ideology, which romanticised the position 
of Hutus as real peasants of Rwanda and cast clear enemies in Tutsi refugees (and the 
Tutsi population) (Verwimp 2000, 2013). A strong economy and high coffee prices 
in the 1970s assisted Habyarimana in organising labour to coffee production. When 
the economy suffered because of fall in coffee prices, some Ruhengeri elites (led by 
Theoneste Lizinde and Stanislas Biseruka) attempted a coup in 1980. However, the 
coup failed and Habyarimana later relied increasingly on the Gisenyi group.  
Box 4.2: Illustration of Threats during the Second Republic (1973-1980) 
 
                                                          
222 Clan differences may be a basis for intra-elite rivalry in Rwanda today. However, detailed 
information has proven difficult to find. 
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Some within the Gisenyi group later championed Hutu power – an ideology 
that cut across party lines and embodied Hutu solidarity (Des Forges 1999). This 
came to the fore when the economy was under stress after tea, tin and coffee prices 
had fallen by 1984. Towards the end of the 1980s, Habyarimana was forced to 
increasingly rely on foreign aid. Aid was made conditional on opening up political 
space and Hutu Power elements later used such space to mobilise support for their 
groups by identifying a common enemy – the Tutsi.223 There were genuine 
revolutionary pressures in Rwanda at the time. Basic socio-economic inequality was 
crosscutting among ethnic groups – Hutu, Tutsi and Twa (De Lame 2005). 
Grievances brought about by economic inequality were easily mobilised through 
highlighting ethnic differences. To maintain his own power, Habyarimana was 
forced to side with, and increasingly empower a Hutu Power militia that “left a 
deadly retaliatory force in readiness after his sudden death” (Tilly 2003, 110). 
Habyarimana was “captive – and possibly the victim – of a civilian/military 
oligarchy determined to hang on to its privileges” (Lemarchand 1994, 602).  
Kayibanda’s political discourse was racial egalitarianism. Habyarimana had 
previously organised political discourse on an economic basis – focusing on 
empowering the population through an emphasis on agriculture. As political space 
opened and political discourse focused on ethnic distinctions, Habyarimana struggled 
to impose his power within an increasingly contested political space. The akazu (who 
were also Hutu Power advocates) were the winners.224 They mobilised individuals to 
violence in the name of ethnicity. The state (led by Habyarimana but in name only) 
coordinated massacres directly against Tutsis.225 Hutu Power succeeded and ensured 
that a new ‘wave of violence’ snowballed into genocide.  
4.2 The Birth of the RPF 
 
 The RPF was formed as a response to the vulnerability experienced by 
refugees and a collective desire among Tutsi refugees for security. Following the 
                                                          
223 Many genocidaires may have been personally motivated by other reasons, including promises of 
houses, land and vehicles (Des Forges 1999).  
224 Akazu referred to “the inner group close to President Habyarimana with the connotation of abuse of 
power and privileges; since the group was made up largely of family members of Habyarimana’s wife 
who controlled most of the big enterprises in the country and influenced internal and external policy; 
it was also nicknamed Clan de Madame” (Adelman and Suhrke 2000, 367). 
225 While Tutsis and Tutsi sympathisers were primary targets, Hutus and Twas were also victims. 
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mass exodus of Tutsis beginning in 1959, the presence of Rwandan Tutsi refugees 
led to tensions at the local level in their adopted countries. Often, tensions emanated 
from competing claims over land (Mushemeza 2007). New ‘home’ governments of 
Rwandan refugees manipulated local anti-Rwandan sentiments and mobilised 
support against refugees. The Amin and Obote governments in Uganda and the 
Mobutu regime in the Congo both singled out these refugees for political advantage. 
In Tanzania, promises to bestow citizenship status on Rwandan refugees had been 
plagued by “implementational ineptitude” (Reed 1996, 483). Meanwhile, 
Habyarimana was reluctant to allow these refugees to return given the scarcity of 
land within Rwanda. When refugees were allowed to return, they were quarantined 
in bad conditions, as in Nasho in Eastern Province in 1982 (Rudasingwa 2013). 
Banyarwanda refugees from Uganda formed the Rwanda Alliance for National Unity 
(RANU) in 1979, with a clear political programme of returning to Rwanda.226  
At RANU’s meetings, members identified themselves as the oldest refugees 
in Africa and directed their actions to tackling problems associated with this status. 
‘Objective conditions’ were identified for which RANU members sought solutions. 
These included Habyarimana’s exclusionary dictatorship, which was run on the basis 
of sectarianism and provided few freedoms for Rwandan people.227  
“These were the debates we looked at. We wanted to solve poverty 
in Rwanda. To address sectarianism as a problem since that 
government discriminated against people. Welfare of all the people 
of Rwanda was the most important.”228  
RANU called for a broad-based inclusive Rwanda where refugees would be 
allowed to return.229 Initially, RANU was inspired by a radical leftist ideology and 
advocated the abolition of the monarchy and replacement of capitalism through the 
creation of a socialist state (Reed 1996). RANU’s establishment represented the 
beginnings of the creation of a vanguard movement, with individuals devoting 
themselves to the struggle for the liberation of Rwanda. Hutu elites in Rwanda 
highlighted similarities between RANU and the inyenzi who had attempted to 
                                                          
226 The founders were not among the most discriminated segments of the refugee community but they 
played on discrimination within countries of exile to “motivate other less fortunate Banyarwanda 
refugees to join RANU” (Mushemeza 2007, 102).  
227 Interview, Tito Rutaremara, January 2015. 
228 Interview, Rutaremara, January 2015. 
229 Habyarimana did not recognise the existence of refugees, which RANU claimed to represent. 
Instead, he claimed that they had been “resettled in neighbouring countries” (Reed 1995, 49).  
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reclaim their land in the 1960s.230 Founding member Rutaremara wrote a document 
entitled Dukore Iki? in 1983, echoing Lenin’s ‘What is to be done?’ (Kimonyo 
2014). However, there was limited progress in building a ‘refugee consciousness’ 
within the refugee community.231 As Rutaremara said, “by 1985, RANU was still 
only restricted to young intellectuals. It was not yet a mass, dynamic movement.”232 
 RANU was unable to appeal to varying shades of opinion and chose to 
temper its Marxist rhetoric by 1987.233 RANU was renamed RPF in 1987. Four 
political papers were adopted, including a political programme (with objective 
conditions), operational guidelines, a code of conduct and a zero option (to return to 
Rwanda through violent action).234 An Eight Point Plan was adopted, which 
presented a clear message to a broader audience. The central themes were 
democracy, national unity and the right of return of refugees, while corruption would 
be replaced with the rule of law (Reed 1996). Rwigyema was the first Chairman. 
Unlike RANU, the RPF had a permanent cadreship, although it was still voluntary.  
“We want to be progressive and most importantly, we wanted 
people to be educated politically. Now, we had values. We will 
always do self-analysis about what we are doing. We would always 
do things for the people and the goal would be self-reliance. We 
don’t want any one from outside. If they come, they are welcome 
but we don’t need them. We needed to fight negative tendencies. 
When we changed to RPF, we also began to focus more on women 
and youth. Women have nothing to lose and much to gain – they 
are a true revolutionary group. Then we sensitised and created 
cells, mobilised the youth and created structures including the 
Congress and the Political Bureau. By October 1990, we were 
doing it. We were a big movement.” 
RANU’s eventual success was down to the experience of their members in 
Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA). Two of their prominent members – 
Rwigyema and Kagame – were part of the inner clique who ‘returned to the bush’ to 
begin a civil war against the Obote government. Obote had strategically persecuted 
Tutsis within Uganda while Museveni relied on them for military support (Reed 
                                                          
230 RANU later changed its name to avoid being confused with Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR) 
– (RANU spelt backwards) (Mushemeza 2007). UNAR was the predominantly Tutsi party associated 
with rhetoric around Tutsi supremacy in 1959.  
231 By 1983, the clandestine RANU still only had about 100 members (Kuperman 2004).  
232 Interview, Rutaremara, January 2015. 
233 There was also dissent in relation to RANU’s attitude to the monarchy, with many equating it with 
an antipathy for religion. Anti-monarchist rhetoric was tempered in the new organisation. 
234 Interview, Rutaremara, January 2015. 
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1995). Rwandans within the NRA were sent on training missions abroad (Otunnu 
1999). Many held senior posts. Rwigyema was Deputy Commander of the NRA and 
later became Deputy Minister of Defence. Kagame was Head of Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence. Peter Bayingana was Head of the NRA Medical Services. Chris 
Bunyenyezi and Sam Kaka were commanding officers.235 These officers rallied 
support for Museveni within the Tutsi community. Led by Rwigyema, they were 
“instrumental in recruiting, training and sensitising refugees, a process which 
crystallised into a military and political organisation that later made empowerment of 
refugees a reality” (Mushemeza 2007, 104). Gradually, support among the NRA 
cadres grew and the RPF transformed from a “merely socio-political organisation to 
a political-military organisation” (Rusagara 2009, 174). Until the late 1980s, many of 
these cadres were primarily concerned with the NRA’s success (Essack 1993). 
However, two events motivated Rwigyema and others to prioritise returning to 
Rwanda. The Ugandan parliament forbade non-citizens from owning land, 
specifically naming Banyarwanda refugees (Mamdani 1996) and Rwigyema was 
removed from his position as Deputy Minister of Defence. Peter Bayingana, the 
NRA’s Director of Medical Services, was similarly sidelined earlier (Amaza 1999). 
In October 1990, the military wing of the RPF – the Rwandan Patriotic Army 
(RPA) – invaded Rwanda. Rwigyema led the RPA. He had led a parallel command 
structure within the NRA, code-named ‘Inkotanyi’.236 The group largely consisted of 
Rwandan Tutsis whom Rwigyema and Kagame had recruited to support Museveni’s 
NRA. By the time Rwigyema’s group reached Rwanda, their numbers had increased 
by thousands.237 Refugees in neighbouring countries joined the effort. The war effort 
was funded by several businessmen including Valens Kajeguhakwa, Tribert 
Rujugiro, Silas Majyambere (Hutu), Assinapol Rwigara, Vedaste Rubangura and 
Evariste Sissi. The RPA succeeded in recruiting other Tutsi refugees and some claim 
they even set up 36 cells within Rwanda by the end of 1987 (Misser 1995). However, 
they were unable to convince a significant number of Hutus to join their cause. Hutus 
                                                          
235 Kaka was a leading commander during the liberation struggle. He was named the first Chief of 
Defence Staff after the genocide. He later retired from the military and became a senator and later, a 
Commissioner in the National Human Rights Commission. In 2007, he was arrested (and later 
released) (along with Frank Rusagara) for obstructing the arrest of businessman, Assinapol Rwigara. 
236 The Kinyarwandan translation is ‘tough fighters’ – a legend that continues to be attached to RPF 
cadres in the region. 
237 Reed (1996) estimates the number of RPA officers and supporters as 10,000 by the time they 
reached Rwanda. Prunier (1995) estimates this number at 2,500. 
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who did join the RPF cause included those who had quarrelled with Habyarimana.238 
Most leading RPF members were Tutsis and had Ugandan roots. However, several 
leading figures, including Denis Polisi, Rutaremara and Jacques Bihozagara, were 
from other countries or had worked outside the region.239  
The RPA suffered a major setback when Rwigyema died on the second day 
of battle.240 Two other senior officers Bayingana and Bunyenyezi died soon after. A 
month later and upon his return from a training course at Fort Leavenworth in the 
United States, Paul Kagame assumed command of the RPA.241 After military 
setbacks, Kagame made the decision to regroup in the Virunga mountains. President 
Museveni gave tacit support, with southern Uganda used as a base for operations 
(Scherrer 2002). Many military officers interviewed referred to their time in Virunga 
as a formative experience for the movement. They endured difficult conditions and 
cadres made efforts to remind them of the purpose of fighting the war. Kagame 
retrained, reorganised and recruited for his army, relying on a network of contacts in 
Uganda and abroad (Waugh 2004). Many senior cadres helped him, including female 
leaders such as then-Financial Commissioner Aloysia Inyumba who raised funds for 
the liberation effort. In early 1991, Kagame launched two RPF military operations 
that were significant. The RPA took control of Gatuna – a border post on the 
transport corridor to Mombasa. A raid on Ruhengeri prison was launched, which 
freed former allies of Habyarimana, including Lizinde and Biseruka. Lizinde and 
other freed inmates joined the RPA’s military effort.242 The RPA only held 
Ruhengeri for a day before withdrawing to the mountains. In the process, they 
increased (what is now glorified as) “the mythic power of the guerrilla forces”, 
gained military equipment and reinvigorated their movement (Rucyahana 2007, 50). 
                                                          
238 Prominent Hutus within the RPF included Alexis Kanyarengwe and Pasteur Bizimingu. 
Kanyarengwe had been in exile after escaping from Rwanda in 1980 and later became RPF Chairman. 
Bizimungu had worked under Habyarimana’s leadership, leading the electricity and water utility 
company, ELECTROGAZ. He later became President of Rwanda.  
239 Rutaremara was in France for most of the 1980s but remained an active member of RANU. He has 
served as the RPF’s General Secretary, an MP and the Chief Ombudsman. He is currently responsible 
for internal discipline within the RPF. Polisi served as Third Vice-Chairman of the RPF. He later 
served as a parliamentarian, the Party’s General Secretary and as Ambassador. He currently serves on 
the Rwanda Elders Advisory Council. Bihozagara served as a minister and ambassador. 
240 There are contested narratives concerning whether Rwigyema was killed by his own officers 
(Bayingana and Bunyenyenzi) or by a bullet from opposition forces (Prunier 2009, Reyntjens 2013).  
241 Antagonism existed between Bayigana’s group and Rwigyema’s group prior to the war 
(Bamurangirwa 2013). 
242 Some of these inmates (including Lizinde, Biseruka and Captain Muvunanyambo) led a coup 
attempt against Habyarimana in 1980. 
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4.3 The Civil War and Genocide 
 
Habyarimana’s authority was vulnerable to three constituencies – donors, 
rival elites and the population. Because of reduced global coffee, tea and tin prices, 
the national budget was under increasing strain. There was also increasing 
resentment among the population, with the government imposing increasingly 
coercive policies, including forced coffee cultivation.  Rising inequality characterised 
this period. Though 86 per cent of the population lived below the poverty line, the 
income share of the wealthiest decile of the population increased from 22 per cent in 
1982 to 52 per cent in 1994 (Uvin 1998, 115). Donors made aid conditional on 
opening up political space, which made it increasingly difficult for Habyarimana to 
manage opposition from domestic elites. This aid formed the life support for 
Habyarimana’s government until it was cut in 1993.243 The imposition of a structural 
adjustment programme resulted in cuts in health and education spending, which 
contributed to increasing popular grievances (Uvin 1998).244 During this period, the 
ruling MRND chose to highlight ethnic differences to retain its grasp on power. This 
strategy would eventually culminate in the rise of Hutu Power elites and the genocide 
that followed in 1994. Specifically, the akazu and its supporters perceived the 
genocide as the only strategy through which they could retain their hold on power. 
Box 4.3 details a chronology of events that led up to the genocide. 
                                                          
243 The imposition of structural adjustment led to an increase in user fees in health and education, and 
even access to water “contributed significantly to social tensions and fears” (Newbury 1995, 14). 
244 This included both a requirement for a devaluation of the Rwandan franc, as well as removals of 
subsidies of Rwandan producers (Storey 2001) 
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Habyarimana pursued a two-track strategy, permitting political liberalisation 
as a response to pressure from donors, while promoting internal repression inside 
Rwanda (Newbury 1995). Before the RPF invasion, Habyarimana established a 
national commission to prepare a new constitution.245 Immediately after the invasion, 
Habyarimana’s government staged a fake attack on Kigali, which led to the 
imprisonment of 8,000-10,000 people (mostly Tutsi businessmen and intellectuals) 
(Verwimp 2011). This fake attack drew foreign support, with foreign troops (French, 
Belgian and Zairean) contributing to FAR efforts in pushing the RPA back to 
Uganda. The Rwandan army also began a recruitment drive, with the army growing 
from 9,335 troops in 1990 to 27,913 in 1991 (Melvern 2004). Habyarimana 
repeatedly used the perception of the RPF as an external threat to legitimise violence 
against Tutsis over the next few years and deflect pressure from opening up political 
space. Tutsi civilians, perceived as allies to RPF invaders, were victims of arbitrary 
arrests, assassinations and organised massacres (Lemarchand 1995, Vandeginste 
2003). From 1990 to 1993, between 2,000 and 10,000 Tutsis were killed in 
massacres and murders (Mann 2005).246 
The RPA’s successful guerrilla warfare strikes (including in Ruhengeri) in 
1991 were met with retaliation by the Habyarimana government with massacres of 
Tutsis in Kinigi and assassinations of Tutsi politicians and businessmen. 
Habyarimana’s opposition in Rwanda took the opportunity to establish political 
parties. Working in the tradition of Kayibanda’s party, The Mouvement 
Démocratique Républicain (MDR) was re-established in March 1991. Other parties, 
including the Partie Social Démocrate (PSD) and Parti Libéral (PL), were 
established soon after. Most parties, including the ruling party, used militias to 
conduct violence against Tutsis or opposition members.247 Most prominent among 
these groups was the Interahamwe, the ruling MRND’s youth wing, which took at 
least 200 lives during 1992 and 1993 (Des Forges 1999). The ruling MRND not only 
had advantages in recruiting youth members and organising violence but also led in 
spreading extremist messages. Habyarimana’s close associates “incited hatred among 
                                                          
245 Reyntjens (1996) makes an unconvincing argument that the RPF was prompted to invade the 
country because of Habyarimana’s decision to embrace democratic reforms. Even though 
Habyarimana made these claims, there is little evidence of his willingness to cede political control.  
246 It is difficult to determine the precise number of Tutsis killed. Verwimp (2004) estimates the 
number at 2000. 
247 Militias included the MRND’s Interahamwe, PSD’s Abakamobozi and the PL’s Jeunesse Liberal. 
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the population with impunity” through local journal Kangura and Radio Rwanda 
(Verwimp 2013, 127). Extremist elements in the military also propagated extremist 
messages. Theoneste Bagosora led a military commission in December 1991 that 
identified Rwanda’s “principal enemy” as “Tutsi inside or outside the country, who 
are extremist and nostalgic for power” (Straus 2006, 25).  
In June 1991, a new constitution was accepted. In October, Habyarimana 
finally ceded some power by appointing a new Prime Minister (Sylvestre 
Nsanzimana) and inducting a member from a different party into the cabinet. 
Opposition parties pressured Habyarimana to enact democratic reforms promised in 
the constitution. In November 1991, the PL, PSD and MDR signed a joint 
memorandum that highlighted the regime’s refusal to enact democratic reforms 
(Prunier 1995). During this phase, ceasefires were agreed (in March and September) 
but were violated soon after. Low-intensity operations continued, with the RPF 
succeeding in its guerrilla operations. Massacres against Tutsis also took place 
(including in the Northwest and in Bugesera in early 1992). Habyarimana organised 
many of these massacres to deflect from his increasing isolation (Eltringham 
2004).248  
Increasing frustration among opposition parties led them to organise a rally 
against the Habyarimana government in January 1992. Habyarimana bowed down to 
pressure and in April, Dismas Nsengiyaremye (MDR) was appointed Prime Minister. 
Habyarimana also resigned as chief of the armed forces. Nsengiyaremye publicly 
criticised Habyarimana for his ‘double language’ in negotiations with the RPF 
(Bertrand 2000) and told him to reign in MRND cadres that were destabilising the 
country (Prunier 1995). In March, the extremist Coalition pour la Défense de la 
République (CDR) party was established. CDR worked closely with extremists 
within the MRND. During this period, the RPA made advances, including taking the 
town of Byumba. In June 1992, the RPF and the new Rwandan government began 
talks in Arusha. The prospect of a settlement in Arusha contributed to the 
polarisation of Rwandan politicians. Hardliners argued that Habyarimana had ceded 
too much to the RPF in ministerial positions, the military and the parliament. 
Another critical issue was the stipulation of a right to return for refugees (particularly 
                                                          
248 Many MRND allies, including Hassan Ngeze, were involved in organising the Bugesera massacre 
(Eltringham 2004). 
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for the RPF). Some RPF officials admitted that they agreed to talks to gain 
credibility, legitimacy and support from the international community so that a UN 
force would be deployed to reduce the risk to RPF cadres in Kigali (Cohen 2007). 
Des Forges (1999) argued that the RPF was also motivated for tactical reasons 
because their forces were spread out and they were strategically disadvantaged.  
While talks were underway, extremist propaganda continued within Rwanda. 
In November 1992, Leon Mugesera (MRND) gave a speech in Gaseke commune and 
called for Tutsis to be sent back to Ethiopia via the Nyabirongo River and for Hutus 
to mobilise against the invasion. This speech was a call for retaliation and self-
defence (Straus 2006). Until the Arusha Accords were signed in August 1993, 
massacres continued (in Bugesera in January 1993), as did violence between 
opposing parties and between the RPF and the government.249 In February 1993, the 
RPA launched a lightning attack against Kigali, which was only repelled with help 
from French soldiers. The government became increasingly aware that France stood 
between itself and defeat (Barnett 2002). 
Opposition parties also fought for power among themselves as they began to 
consider the establishment of a transitional government as a realistic possibility. In 
the MDR, Faustin Twagiramungu (Kayibanda’s son-in-law) and other moderates 
worked to exclude extremists such as Frodauld Karamira and Donat Murego. In July 
1993, Nsengiyaremye was not allowed to extend his term and Twagiramungu was 
able to force through the appointment of Agathe Uwilingiyimana as Prime Minister 
(Des Forges 1999). The appointment of the transitional government was continually 
postponed as Hutu Power segments developed across parties and began to work 
against moderate Hutu elements. In neighbouring Burundi, the first Hutu President 
Melchior Ndadaye was killed in a military coup led by Tutsis. His death convinced 
many MRND politicians that genocide was the only rational option (Lemarchand 
1995). In November, Karamira accused the RPF of links to Ndadaye’s assassination 
and called for all Hutus to unite collectively against the Tutsi threat, baptising his 
wing of the MRND as ‘Pawa’ (Gasana 2002, Melvern 2004). Some Hutu elites 
openly embraced exclusivist nationalism that framed Tutsis as a common enemy 
                                                          
249 Prominent politicians, including possible MDR Prime Ministerial candidate Emmanuel Gapyisi, 
were assassinated (African Rights 1995). Gapyisi was organising an alliance across party lines 
between those who were equally opposed to Habyarimana and the RPF (Des Forges 1999). Other 
politicians like Prime Minister Nsengiyaremye and Defence Minister James Gasana fled to Europe. 
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(Straus 2006). As Karamira developed this rhetoric, Twagiramungu and 
Uwilingiyimana maintained their original position of fighting for freedom and 
democracy for all Rwandans and engaging in talks with the RPF (Eltringham 2004). 
These splits were evident in most other parties (Prunier 1995). The PL was originally 
denounced as a Tutsi party and a branch of the RPF (Chretien et al. 1995). Justin 
Mugenzi, who was the PL’s leader, had been previously called ibyitso (an RPF 
collaborator). Mugenzi became the leader of the extremist wing of the PL and 
marginalised prominent Tutsi leader Landwald Ndasingwa (Prunier 1995).250  
There was little progress in establishing a Broad Based Transitional 
Government, as outlined in the Arusha Accords. In the months that followed, there 
were increasing warnings that extremist wings had begun to organise large-scale 
violence (Des Forges 1999). Death squads had operated within Rwanda since 1992 
under the direction of Habyarimana and his wife’s family (Reyntjens 1996). In 1993, 
UNAMIR troops reported that Habyarimana had publicly expressed intentions to 
distribute grenades to the Interahamwe and the CDR (Des Forges 1999). In January 
1994, Twagiramungu accused the Defence Ministry of training more than 1,000 
members of the Interahamwe (Orth 2001). The Interahamwe, the CDR’s militias 
(Impuzamugambi), the Presidential Guard, the FAR and the gendarmerie had all been 
prepared to conduct the genocide (African Rights 1994). The RPF was also not 
counting on peace to hold and was preparing for renewed war (Jones 2001).  
On 6 April, 1994, a plane carrying Habyarimana, Deogratias Nsabimana, 
President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi, and key hardliners Elie Sagatwa and 
Juvenal Renzaho, was shot down on its approach to Kigali. Immediately, Hutu 
hardliners blamed the RPF for shooting down the plane. Hutu extremists painted 
Habyarimana’s assassination as “undeniable proof” that Tutsis would do anything to 
regain power (Turner 2005). Within hours, Interahamwe roadblocks were set up in 
Kigali and houses were searched (Prunier 1995). In a few hours, the fastest genocide 
of the twentieth century was underway (Straus 2006). The Presidential Guard, 
militias and the army largely conducted it. The first victims were the Prime Minister, 
opposition politicians (including Ndasingwa) and large numbers of Tutsis. Among 
the opposition politicians, Twagiramungu only survived because the killers had the 
wrong address (Guichaoua 1995). The genocide took the lives of over 800,000 
                                                          
250 Ndasingwa built Hotel Chez Lando. His sister is the current Foreign Minister Louise Mushikiwabo. 
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people, with a large number of them Tutsis.251 It is difficult to estimate the number of 
Hutus who participated in the slaughter. The government estimates the number in the 
millions (Mamdani 2001) and others argue it was between 175,000 and 210,000 
(Straus 2004).252  
On 7 April, Kagame warned Dallaire that the RPF would strike if the killings 
were not stopped (Dallaire 2003). Kagame restarted military operations the next day. 
Meanwhile, the head of the Presidential Guard Bagosora tried to seize power and 
install extremists in positions of authority. Though some military officers (like 
Marcel Gatsinzi and Leonidas Rusatira) opposed such moves, the interim 
government was largely controlled by extremist elements. Bagosora and other Hutu 
Power elites drew up lists of victims, legitimised and promoted violence against 
Tutsis. On 12 April, the interim extremist government moved to Gitarama and 1000 
Interahamwe militia also accompanied their relocation (McDoom 2014). Fifteen 
days into the genocide, most Tutsi gathering sites were attacked and destroyed, with 
more than half of all victims killed on those sites (African Rights 1995, Kuperman 
2001). The killings did not erupt all over Rwanda at the same time. Rural Kigali and 
Kibungo prefectures were the first zones of widespread genocidal killings 
(Davenport and Stam, quoted in Boone 2014, 246). The genocide began later in most 
other prefectures and was limited to one or two communes in some of these 
prefectures (Straus 2006, Des Forges 1999). Some government officials and army 
officers also resisted orders to kill Tutsis in some provinces (Des Forges 1999, 
Verwimp 2013). However, Hutu Power elites legitimised the killing of Tutsis (using 
instruments such as extremist journal, Kangura, and radio station, RTLM). Though 
some perpetrators used this opportunity to settle individual scores, the genocide was 
promoted and legitimised by Hutu Power elites who saw the elimination of Tutsis as 
the only way to retain power.  
The RPF’s victory resulted from a “total war strategy and disarray in the 
FAR, which was distracted by the demands of the genocide” (Gourevitch and 
                                                          
251 The exact numbers have been debated. Some (Prunier 1995) claim that 800,000 people died, with 
3/4th of them Tutsis. Des Forges (1999) argued that at least 500,000 Tutsis died and this was 3/4th of 
the Tutsi population. Using UN data, Reyntjens (1997) argued 600,000 Tutsis were killed. Verwimp 
(2013) estimates that roughly 81 per cent of Tutsis living in Rwanda died. He also argues that around 
4 per cent (or nearly 300,000) of the Hutu population died. Uvin (2001) cited the number of deaths at 
one million. Straus (2006) argues that 75 per cent of the Tutsi population died.  The RPF (GoR 2002) 
estimates that 1,074,017 people died, with over 93 per cent of them Tutsi. 
252 Straus (2006) argues that 7-8 per cent of the Hutu population committed the killings. 
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Kagame 1996, 167). Earlier, in June, France received Security Council approval to 
deploy a force – Operation Turquoise – to save lives and to preserve “territory and 
legitimacy” for the interim government (Des Forges 1999, 24). Though the operation 
may have saved some lives, it allowed many Hutu Power elites to flee Rwanda (Des 
Forges 1999, Lemarchand 2001). Kagame’s forces took Kigali on July 4 and two 
weeks later, their victory was complete.  
Kagame calls the genocide “the defining event in Rwandan history” 
(Gourevitch and Kagame 1996, 167). Events in 1994 signalled clear winners (RPF 
leaders) and losers (Hutu extremists). RPF rule has been legitimised through 
positioning its cadres as saviours of Rwanda, following the genocide. The RPF’s 
victory was also a victory for its ideology and the central goals of the struggle were 
permanently lodged within the ideals of those cadres who shared experiences during 
the liberation effort. RPF cadres argue that they achieved this victory on their own. 
The international community failed them and French forces colluded with their 
enemies (Wallis 2006).253 Observers have strengthened this position by showing that 
foreign actors (such as the UN or the United States) ignored the genocide (Barnett 
2002, Lynch 2015).254 Kagame and the RPF have been cast as heroes within RPF 
narratives. These positions have been contested on several counts. 
The most contested debate has centred on which group was responsible for 
shooting down Habyarimana’s plane.255 Initially, scholars (Prunier 1995, Des Forges 
1999) seemed convinced that extremist political and military leaders had shot down 
the plane. Many akazu members lied about their whereabouts on the night before the 
plane was shot down. Many senior officials, including Bagosora (who was in direct 
contact with the Presidential Guard and key leaders), seemed in control of events at 
the time (Des Forges 1999, Melvern 2006). The Presidential Guard’s decision to 
immediately target leaders who were in a position to take charge of the government 
also supports such claims. Extremists were also not content with the concessions 
made by Habyarimana in the Arusha agreement. Most damning is the geometric-
                                                          
253 In 2008, Rwanda’s Mucyo Commission published a 337-page report that explored the French 
government’s role during the 1994 genocide. It accused France of financing the Habyarimana 
government, training the Interahamwe militias and instructing French soldiers stationed in Rwanda to 
turn a blind eye to the genocide. RPF Senator Antoine Mugesera accused Kofi Annan of having “a 
heavy responsibility” in the genocide (Ellison 2001). 
254 International intervention is unlikely to have stopped the genocide although it may have reduced its 
scale (Kuperman 2001).  
255 See Verwimp (2013, 150) for a list of arguments on both sides. 
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ballistic research report by the French judges Trevedic and Poux, which found that 
rockets were fired from the Kanombe military base, which the Presidential Guard 
had occupied.  
Other scholars (Straus 2006, Reyntjens 2013) have accused Kagame of 
ordering Habyarimana’s assassination. French judge Brugière conducted an 
investigation, which supported these claims. Observers who claim that the RPF are 
responsible have relied on testimonies of former RPF officers who have left the 
country in exile. Such officers include Abdul Ruzibiza, Theogene Rudasingwa and 
Kayumba Nyamwasa. However, these observers seem willing to take these 
testimonies as evidence, without acknowledging that exiled officers have an 
incentive to delegitimise the RPF. 
It is impossible to know who is responsible for assassinating Habyarimana 
and the others who were on that plane. Melvern (2008) argues that “whoever is 
eventually found guilty will carry the moral responsibility for starting the genocide.” 
Regardless of who shot down the plane, the RPF is not responsible for murdering 
large numbers of Tutsis after the plane was shot down. Those killings were 
conducted by Hutu Power elites who had taken control of the government. However, 
the continued contestation of memories among different groups has political 
implications for the legitimacy of RPF rule. 
The RPF government and many scholars argue that the genocide was pre-
ordained and followed a master plan (Prunier 1995, Des Forges 1999, Longman 
1999, Verwimp 2013). However, other scholars disagree and argue that the genocide 
was a strategy improvised by elites out of opportunity and threat (Mamdani 2001, 
Mann 2005). Inflammatory claims centre on denial of the genocide. Davenport and 
Stam (2009) used spatial mapping software to show that most victims were Hutus 
(500,000-700,000) and not Tutsis (300,000-500,000). Davenport and Stam’s (2009) 
assumptions regarding the population of Tutsis in Rwanda is estimated on the basis 
of calculations regarding Tutsi numbers in the 1991 census. Some (Herman and 
Peterson 2010, Collins 2014) have used these claims to argue against the occurrence 
of genocide in Rwanda. However, the calculations on which these claims are made 
are dubious because the population of Tutsis is likely to have been underreported 
because of the Habyarimana regime’s exclusionary policies (Des Forges 1999). One 
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estimate has underreporting at around 40 per cent (Verpoorten 2005). Originally, it 
was acknowledged that the RPF ended the genocide (African Rights 1995). 
However, others argue against casting the RPF as heroes, citing evidence that 
Kagame was more concerned with outright victory than saving the Tutsi population 
(Reyntjens 2013, Des Forges 1999, Kuperman 2004, Dallaire 2003).  
Critics have also argued that the RPF engaged in revenge killings after the 
war was over. The RPF was criticised for ignoring these crimes (Pottier 1996, 
Prunier 2009) and for killing hundreds of thousands before, during and after the 
genocide (Reyntjens 1996, Des Forges 1999). RPF supporters also recognise that 
such killings took place (Gourevitch 1998, Melvern 2004). Kagame admitted that 
individuals carried out revenge killings (Gourevitch and Kagame 1996). However, he 
clearly differentiated between such killings and those that occurred during the 
genocide, arguing that since many of these soldiers were being tried in courts, it 
showed that the killings were not state-sanctioned (ibid). Reyntjens (2009) 
acknowledges that some military officers were prosecuted but notes that “sentences 
were lenient” and no one was charged for massacres. He cites the example of Fred 
Ibingira, who was charged with negligence (but acquitted of the charge of murder) 
after 2,000 people were killed in an internally displaced camp in Kibeho (Reyntjens 
and Vandeginste 2005). However, there is no convincing evidence that the RPF 
government launched plans through the state to target Hutus (as a group) specifically. 
There is no excuse for those reprisal attacks but they do not amount to genocide. 
This thesis takes the position that genocide was conducted by Hutu Power 
elites in Rwanda. A variety of factors led to the genocide. There were a number of 
factors that contributed to tensions, including conflicts over land (André and Platteau 
1998), gender dimensions (Burnet 2012, Taylor 2001), regional tensions, population 
pressure, the weakening economy, donor demands and the politicisation of ethnicity. 
Official discourse on the 1994 genocide maintains the ethnic division that the RPF-
led government denounces in theory: moderate Hutus are victims of politicide while 
Tutsis are victims of genocide (Eltringham and Van Hoyweghen 2000). Developing 
a story that clearly outlines the parties involved as two ethnic groups downplays the 
class and regional dimensions of conflicts. 
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This thesis does not have any additional information to add to the debate 
regarding who shot Habyarimana’s plane, the exact numbers of the genocide or 
reprisal killings. However, it stresses that contesting claims of the RPF’s (and 
Kagame’s) position as saviours and heroes of the country following events in 1994 
are central to Rwandan politics today. While the dominant coalition protects such 
beliefs, rivals contest those beliefs to threaten the credibility of ruling elites.  
4.4 Countering Hutu Threats, Establishing the Monopoly of 
Violence 
 
 After the genocide, the RPF continued to fight opponents within the country 
and in DRC. There was a genuine distrust of the population and Hutu RPF elites 
were a possible threat (because they could potentially mobilise popular grievances). 
The RPF maintained the appearance of a broad-based coalition but understood that 
Tutsi security depended on monopolising political control among Tutsis (or ensuring 
the monopoly of violence was shared with those who were loyal to RPF ideology).  
After 1994, Vice-President Kagame led the dominant coalition within the 
RPF, which comprised the Tutsi Ugandan inner clique and other loyalists (including 
some Hutu politicians). A scattered group of Hutu RPF members and other political 
parties opposed the dominant coalition. Other political parties included Mouvement 
Démocratique Républicain (MDR), the Parti Social Démocrate (PSD) and the Parti 
Démocrate Chretien (PDC). President Bizimungu (RPF) and Twagiramungu (MDR) 
were both Hutus. Nine ministers were Tutsi while 12 were Hutu. Under labels of 
“power-sharing” and “national unity”, the 1994 government represented (on paper) 
“a genuine government of national unity” (Prunier 2009, 7).256   
 The unity did not last long. While the RPF may have envisioned a society 
where broad-based inclusion could mean open political competition, the party’s own 
survival quickly became predicated on Tutsi rule (Mamdani 2001). The RPF’s 
central concern till 2000 was countering security threats inside and outside 
Rwanda.257 Hutu ministers such as Interior Minister Seth Sendashonga and Prime 
Minister Twagiramungu protested against the military’s reluctance to reign in 
reprisal killings. Kagame replied by “defending the honour of the army”, either 
                                                          
256 Reyntjens (2013) disagrees with this, suggesting it was a façade from the beginning. 
257 This opinion is expressed in interviews often. 
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denying the charge or claiming the security forces were doing the best they could 
(Prunier 2009, 9). Twagiramungu later resigned while Sendashonga was fired in 
August 1995. Soon after, both left Rwanda. Others such as Lizinde followed.258 The 
initial years were a “period of massive imprisonment, arrests and killings, both 
public and discreet, of an unprecedented magnitude” (Ruzibiza, quoted in Reyntjens 
2013, 10). Kanyarengwe was among those who chose silence as a method of protest, 
rather than exit.259 He officially resigned “because he wanted to devote himself to 
other functions” but he may have resigned in protest against massacres committed by 
the RPA in Ruhengeri (Kanyarengwe’s home district) (Reyntjens 2013, 18). When 
Hutu leaders chose to exit, many of them attempted to form new coalitions outside 
Rwanda as an alternative to power. Exit was a pathway to voice for some of them. 
However, Kigali countered such attempts. For example, Sendashonga had begun to 
build support (even meeting Ugandan government officials to apprise them of his 
plans) before he was allegedly assassinated on RPF orders (Prunier 2009).  
After Kanyarengwe’s resignation, the façade of ‘power-sharing’ gave way to 
executive dominance. By 2000, even Bizimungu had resigned.260 When Hutu leaders 
decided to voice their protest and challenge the regime, such protests were not 
tolerated. Bizimingu’s attempt at establishing a new party in 2001 led to his house 
arrest (Reyntjens 2011).261 He was imprisoned in 2004 and given a 15-year prison 
sentence.262 Other Hutus and rival party leaders such as Pierre-Celestin 
Rwigyema,263 Bernard Makuza264 and Vincent Biruta seized the opportunity to prove 
their loyalty to the RPF.265 Kagame replaced rivals with loyalists, thereby 
consolidating his power and position. The 2003 constitution was established, which 
legalised the existence of a multiparty system, with restrictions (Golooba-Mutebi 
2013). Critics (Reyntjens 2006, Beswick 2010) have argued that the constitution has 
                                                          
258 Lizinde was shot and killed in Nairobi in 1996. 
259 Kanyarengwe died because of poor health in 2006.  
260 Although he resigned “for personal reasons”, charges of tax fraud, corruption and illegal 
dispossession of land were levelled against him (Reyntjens 2004, 181). Kanyarengwe’s position was 
delegitimised publicly (as is the norm when officials are excluded). 
261 He established the Parti démocratique pour le Renouveau-Ubuyanja (PDR-Ubuyanja)  
262 He was released in 2007 but did not engage in any form of outright protest. 
263 He replaced Twagiramungu as Prime Minister in 1995 and remained in the post till 2000. He was 
later accused of being involved in the genocide and fled Rwanda. This case was suspended in 2011. In 
2012, he returned to the country and was elected to the East African Legislative Assembly. 
264 Makuza was Prime Minister from 2000 to 2011. He then became a member of the Senate. 
265 Biruta served as the Speaker of the Parliament. He has also served as Minister of Education and 
President of the Senate. He is a Tutsi and a PSD leader. 
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allowed the RPF to consolidate power under the guise of multiparty democracy 
although there is very little space for dissent in Rwandan politics. Supporters argue 
that national dialogues and forums for political parties ensure that the government 
listens to divergent voices within Rwanda (Golooba-Mutebi 2013). By the early 
2000s, the Kagame-led RPF established a monopoly of violence and power among 
its Tutsi cadres and loyal Hutus. 
 The position of many Hutu leaders was insecure but many have assumed 
prominent positions. For instance, Marcel Gatsinzi had been Chief of Staff of the 
Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) in April 1994. Gatsinzi was removed from his post in 
the early 1990s after publicly opposing the genocide. He was reintegrated into the 
RPA after the genocide and was eventually promoted to the rank of General. He later 
served as Minister of Defence and then as Minister of Disaster Management and 
Refugee Affairs.266 During this time, Gatsinzi was repeatedly accused of genocide 
charges. Emmanuel Habyarimana preceded Gatsinzi as Minister of Defence, serving 
from 2000 to 2002. In 2002, he was removed from his position for his “extreme pro-
Hutu” views (BBC 2003). He fled Rwanda in 2003. Boniface Rucagu, a popular 
Ruhengeri politician, was arrested on genocide charges six times between 1994 and 
1997 (Kinzer 2008). In 1997, he was appointed Governor of Northern Province to 
wean the Northwest away from Hutu extremism (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2013). 
He currently serves as head of the National Leadership Training Programme, Itorero.  
The RPF disciplines Hutu opponents who challenge dominant narratives or 
mention ethnicity in political campaigns. In 2010, Victoire Ingabire, President of 
FDU-Inkingi, returned to Rwanda to contest the elections. She challenged the RPF 
discourse by publicly saying that Tutsis were not the sole victims of the genocide (at 
a genocide memorial centre). After the speech, she was arrested and charged with 
“genocide ideology, minimising the genocide and divisionism” (Waldorf 2011, 58). 
Ingabire is still in prison today. There may be genuine grievances among the 
population today (as the scholarly ‘consensus’ suggests). However, Tutsi elites (and 
rivals) collectively guard against the mobilisation of such grievances.  
                                                          
266 He was retired in 2013. 
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 Some prominent loyal Hutus remain in positions of power. Pierre Damien 
Habumuremyi served as Prime Minister between 2011 and 2014.267 Francois 
Kanimba has served as Minister of Trade and Industry since 2011.268 Anastase 
Murekezi is the current Prime Minister.269 The government’s paranoia is justified by 
the threat Hutu leaders pose in mobilising the population on the basis of ethnic 
divisionism. Critics (Lemarchand 2006) argue that ‘real’ power sharing would have 
led to a more equitable distribution of power. Reasoning follows that the RPF’s 
methods only mask increasing inequality between ethnicities and will end in renewed 
ethnic conflict (Ingelaere 2010). However, there is limited opportunity to 
instrumentalise ethnic differences. The more pressing threat to the current 
government comes from within its RPF Tutsi elite. Box 4.4 illustrates that the RPF 
ideology was legitimised through historical experiences, including its position as 
saviours after the genocide (with Kagame as the leading figure) and shared refugee 
experiences during the liberation effort. RPF ideology was strengthened through 
distancing itself from the reigns of previous Hutu leaders and the colonial 
administration) and the threat posed by former genocidaires abroad. To retain its 
monopoly of violence, the RPF works against threats posed by opponents within the 
country (dissenters) or alliances between opponents abroad that could galvanise the 
dissatisfaction of segments of the population. 
                                                          
267 Habumuremyi’s rise was surprising for many within Rwanda. “Even for me, this is a shock. He had 
no reputation. If anything, he had a corrupt reputation” (Interview, senior RDF officer, January 2012). 
He had served the government since 2000 in posts at the National Electoral commission, as a 
Representative in the East African Legislative Assembly and as Minister of Education. In 2014, 
Habumuremyi was removed as Prime Minister. Three explanations were presented for this reshuffle: 
i) it was a political decision ahead of the next election; ii) One of Habumuremyi’s relatives was in the 
FDLR and returned to Rwanda without going through the demobilisation process (Long 2014); iii) He 
was involved in “business deals conducted through members of his family” and his “propensity for 
photo ops” (Kanuma 2014a). The second and third propositions delegitimised Habumuremyi as acting 
for his own benefit and against RPF values. 
268 Kanimba was Chairman of the Governance Task Force, which negotiated the first structural 
adjustment Programme in Rwanda. He had worked for the Habyarimana government for 11 years in 
the Ministry of Economic Planning. From 1995-2000, he was the World Bank’s Chief Economist in 
Rwanda. He then worked at BNR till 2011, serving as the Governor of the Bank for nine years. 
269 Murekezi is a PSD member. He previously served as the Minister for Public Service and Labour. 
141 
 
Box 4.4: Illustration of Threats during the First Phase of RPF Rule: The 
Primitive Accumulation of Coercive Power 
 
4.5 Consolidating the Monopoly of Violence: From Security to 
Discipline  
 
 Senior RPF cadres were the primary rivals to Kagame’s power. They retained 
individual holding power and shared the collective memories and experiences of the 
liberation effort. Though few of them were accorded the same degree of heroism 
within the narratives of the genocide as Kagame, many cadres were respected 
because of their contributions during the liberation effort and after 1994. Since 2000, 
Kagame has countered their power and capacity to collaborate against him. Appeals 
to the collective memories of shared experiences of these elites are used to draw their 
loyalty while gradually reducing their access to rents. In this way, the dominant 
coalition strengthens the moral appeal of RPF narratives to counter the moral 
authority of others’ choices to betray the RPF cause.  The moral authority is also 
bolstered by the dominant coalition’s own threat of violence. 
Kagame’s consolidation of power has been a gradual process. Starting in 
1994, Kagame retained some degree of control over most decision-making despite 
the government being led by President Bizimingu and the RPF by Chairman 
Kanyarengwe (Reyntjens 2004, Prunier 2009). Kagame was 36 when he became 
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Vice-President in 1994. Other RPF leaders also demanded power and had the 
Loyalty of cadres. Apart from those already mentioned, other senior leaders included 
Polisi, Rutaremara, Patrick Mazimhaka,270 Frank Mugambage,271 Charles 
Murigande,272 Joseph Karemerera273 and Theogene Rudasingwa.274 As Kagame 
increased his hold on power in the 1990s, he relied on several military officers. Most 
prominent among those were Kayumba Nyamwasa,275 Patrick Karegeya,276 James 
Kabarebe277, Charles Kayonga278 and Karenzi Karake.279  
When senior RPF cadres are excluded, they are ‘publicly’ accused of 
corruption, collaborating with enemies or advancing their own interests above that of 
the nation. Such acts go against values (anti-corruption, self-sacrifice), which are 
perceived as necessary to pursue ideological goals (self-reliance). Kagame’s 
supporters defend him by suggesting that corruption charges are genuine.280 Many 
prominent RPF cadres – Kayumba, Karake and Kabarebe – had substantial holding 
power of their own, after leading military victories in the late 1990s. In interviews 
and exchanges with other military officers, it was clear that these individuals 
commanded respect from their peers and subordinates.281 Evidence of holding power 
can be determined by the formal positions that individual elites occupied during and 
                                                          
270 Mazimhaka was Second Vice-Chairman of the RPF. He later served as minister under the 
Bizimungu government and became a Special Envoy for President Kagame. Between 2003 and 2008, 
he was Deputy Chairperson of the African Union’s Africa Commission.  
271 Mugambage was the first National Police Chief. He is the current High Commissioner to Uganda. 
272 During the liberation effort, Murigande was the RPF Spokesperson in the United States. He was 
later appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs and is the current High Commissioner to Japan. 
273 Joseph Karemerera is a founding member of the RPF. He served as Minister of Health, Minister of 
Education and later as an Ambassador. He is currently a Senator. He was also part of a team, along 
with Rutaremara and Antoine Mugesera, that was tasked to come up with a “transition formula” that 
would deliver “change, continuity and stability” after 2017 (when Kagame is supposed to end his term 
as President) (Rutayisire 2013). As early as 1999, Karemerera had charges against him for corruption, 
highlighting his delicate relationship with Kagame (Reyntjens 1999). Mugesera was also a Senator 
and had previously been the Chairperson of Ibuka (the most prominent survivors’ organisation). 
274 Rudasingwa served as the RPF’s General Secretary, Ambassador to the United States and as 
Director of the Cabinet. 
275 Kayumba led the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) and was Chief of Defence Staff.  
276 Karegeya was the former Chief of the External Security Organisation. He is credited with a pivotal 
role in establishing Rwanda’s intelligence services. 
277 Kaberebe is revered as a hero within the RDF, primarily because of his exploits in the military 
efforts in the DRC. He has served as the Chief of Staff in both the Rwandan and Congolese militaries 
(under Laurent Kabila). In 2014, he remained the Minister of Defence. 
278 Kayonga held command positions during the liberation effort. He served as a brigade commander 
in counter-insurgency operations in the late 1990s. Kayonga was the Defence and Military Advisor to 
the President and the Chief of Staff of the Army (land forces). He was named CDS in 2010.  
279 Karake had earlier served in the NRA. He led efforts at containing the insurgency in the Northwest. 
He later headed DMI and the National Security Services (NSS). 
280 Interview, two senior RPF cadres, May 2012; Interview, Senator, January 2015. 
281 Interviews and informal exchanges. 
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after the liberation effort. For military elites, holding command positions shows that 
they have developed loyalties within military networks. If elites choose to exit, the 
government’s decision to highlight them as threats or as ‘terrorists’, show their 
continued relevance among elites in Rwanda.282 Not everyone who exits and is 
accused of terrorism has the same holding power. Individuals such as Joel Mutabazi 
and Abdul Ruzibiza were not prominent officers during the liberation effort and are 
less threatening than officers such as Kayumba Nyamwasa and Patrick Karegeya.  
 Possible rivals were slowly weeded out.283 In 2000, Joseph Sebarenzi, the 
Speaker of the National Assembly, resigned. He (2009) claims that he chose to resign 
because he was under pressure from RPF cadres whom he had begun to investigate. 
The government began inquiries against Mazimhaka and Emmanuel Mudidi, then-
Minister of Education. Reyntjens (2013, 14) said Sebarenzi was accused of 
“dictatorial tendencies.” Sebarenzi fled to Uganda and later to America. Sebarenzi 
(2009) said that Kagame’s exclusion of Tutsi elites was motivated by “fear of his 
enemies.” Because individual elites, even within Rwanda, support such claims, it is 
clear that Kagame’s decisions to act against senior figures antagonise others. 
However, elites continue to trust Kagame as the best option given that an alternative 
(e.g. an election) may result in a Hutu victory.284  
Destroying the reputation of others was essential for ruling elites if their 
actions (either the RPF’s punishments or the challenges of rivals) were to be 
legitimised. This is true of the ‘Gang of Four’ – Kayumba, Karegeya, Rudasingwa 
and Gahima – who established the Rwanda National Congress (RNC) in December 
2010. In 2010, this group published the Rwanda Briefing, which accused the RPF 
government of corruption and nepotism, human rights violations and marginalising 
Hutus (Nyamwasa et al. 2010). Senior RDF officials Richard Rutatina and Jill 
Rutaremara (2010) defended the government against such accusations and accused 
the ‘Gang of Four’ of hypocrisy. Kayumba’s relationship with Kagame became 
frosty, starting in 2001 when he went on a ‘study tour’ to the UK in 2001. However, 
he was reintegrated into the dominant coalition on his return. Rumours spread that he 
                                                          
282 See Kagame (2010), Ssuuna (2013), Musoni (2014a), Stevis and Barker (2014). Karegeya called 
such accusations ‘a political tool’ (Mukomobozi 2014). 
283 For a selected list of Tutsis who went into exile in the early 2000s, see ICG (2002).  
284 Though a critic, Sebarenzi (2009, 227), shares a distrust of elections. He argues Tutsi security 
would be “in jeopardy, a view shared with most Tutsi I [Sebarenzi] speak with share, and for good 
reason.” 
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was plotting a coup in the early 2000s.285 He was later sent to India as Ambassador. 
One observer – Prunier (2009, 302) – argued that Kagame was particularly worried 
about “pre-empting the Kayumba-Kabarebe faction from organising a coup.” 
Karegeya was also identified as a possible threat because of his extensive contacts in 
the Ugandan government. In 2005, he was arrested for indiscipline, subordination 
and desertion. He spent 18 months in prison. After his sentence ended in 2007, he 
fled to South Africa. Rudasingwa developed a reputation abroad and was responsible 
for establishing the Office of the President, serving as Kagame’s key civilian aide. In 
2005, he fled from Rwanda and moved to the United States after being gradually 
eased out of political responsibilities.286 Rudasingwa joined his brother Gerald 
Gahima, former Attorney General and Vice President of the Supreme Court, who had 
gone into exile in 2004 after being accused of corruption. In 2010, the four were 
indicted for “menacing the authority of the state, ethnic divisionism, terrorism and 
forming a terrorist group” (Reyntjens 2013, 95). 
 Kagame’s interests should not be equated with that of the entire RPF. “The 
RPF is a deeply divided, fragile, paranoid party” (Clark 2010). There are schisms 
between elites and immature factions vie for power within the centralised hierarchy.  
“The RPF is a mass movement. There are always problems inside. 
We had the first generation and the second and now, we are on the 
third generation. When a movement becomes a bigger group, these 
internal divisions will happen.”287 
Kagame used a group of loyal Tutsi elites – mostly within his intelligence 
services – to batter the power of the older cadres of the RPF’s Tutsi elite. These new 
loyal cadres may have manipulated Kagame to increase their own power.288 Among 
the new group of loyalists were intelligence officers such as Jack Nziza,289 Tom 
                                                          
285 He returned to Rwanda after his ‘study trip’ and was installed as head of the NSS. During this stint, 
it is rumoured that he planned and even attempted a coup (Reyntjens 2013).  
286 He was sacked from his post of Chief of Staff at the Office of the President in 2004, two weeks 
after his brother was forced to resign as Vice President of the Supreme Court. Rudasingwa (2013) 
writes about how he was frequently warned to avoid depicting himself as a hero and working for his 
own individual interests. 
287 Interview, Rutaremara, January 2015. 
288 Rivals make these charges (Rudasingwa 2013). 
289 Until 2013, Nziza was the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Defence (MoD). He was then 
made Inspector General of the RDF. He has also worked at the DMI and is perceived as Kagame’s 
‘eyes and ears’ within the military ranks. 
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Byabagamba290 and Emmanuel Ndahiro.291 Rivals accuse this group (primarily Nziza 
and Ndahiro) of promoting the image that Kayumba was building an “army-within-
the-army” to overthrow Kagame (Rudasingwa 2013, 382). The new group of 
loyalists do not occupy a stable position within the hierarchy. This group of loyalists 
compete against each other and other senior cadres. Intelligence services organised 
informal power networks. Increasing surveillance over the lives of elites has been 
used to impose discipline in line with uniform party behaviour.292 Leadership has 
ensured an atmosphere of mutual suspicion among elites so that they do not voice 
dissent through collective action.  
The ‘Gang of Four’ publicly argues that they formed the RNC because they 
disagreed with the direction of RPF policies. This group rejected the corruption 
charges that had been levied against them (Nyamwasa et al. 2010).293 Booth and 
Golooba-Mutebi (2013, 9) identify the RNC as “a marriage of convenience among 
four people with different views and very different reasons for breaking relations.” 
Frictions in the relationship between Kayumba and Kagame emerged in 2001. 
Internal discipline within the party was used as a tool to consolidate the monopoly of 
violence and legitimise the exclusion of senior RPF cadres. Elites who had secured 
vast amounts of land in Eastern province without permission were disciplined.294 
Ruling elites used their authority to administer discipline on those who had 
contradicted internal values of the party. Regardless of whether such accusations 
                                                          
290 Byabagamba was the head of the army’s Presidential Guard. In 2011, he fell out briefly with 
Kagame but returned a few months later as the head of the Counter Terrorism Unit in the MoD. 
Byabagamba’s wife, Mary Baine, previously headed the RRA. She also served as permanent secretary 
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
291 Ndahiro was Kagame’s personal doctor and later served as Karegeya’s replacement at the External 
Security Organisation (ESO). He then became head of the NSS. In 2011, he was replaced in this 
position by Karenzi Karake. 
292 Interviews with senior RPF cadres supported these claims. Nyamwasa et al. (2010, 33) accused 
such individuals of “committing egregious human rights abuses, including arbitrary arrests and 
detentions, torture, politically motivated criminal prosecutions and detentions, extra-judicial killings 
and enforced disappearances of opponents and critics.” 
293 Rudasingwa (2013) admits he was disciplined by Kagame for allocating gift shops to Kayumba’s 
wife when he was in-charge of building the Intercontinental Hotel. Such incidents show that Kagame 
had grounds to discipline these individuals.  
294 Former Minister of Local Government Protais Musoni, Musoni’s brother Theoneste Shyaka 
(collectively 351 ha) and Brig. Gen. Sam Kaka (115 ha) were among the senior officials accused of 
such offences. Other officers whose land was later redistributed included Charles Kayonga (334 ha) 
and Frank Rusagara (387 ha). All these individuals retained 25 ha of land (Kimenyi 2008). Others 
included Alfred Nkubiri (508 ha), Patrick Ngoga (384 ha), Edgard Rwangabwoba (380 ha), Fred 
Ibingira (320 ha), Kayumba Nyamwasa (207 ha), Aloys Muganga (199 ha), James Kimonyo (176 ha), 
Charles Muhire (119 ha) and Theoneste Mutsindashyaka (105 ha) (Reyntjens 2013). 
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were true, the charges affected the legitimacy of individuals against whom these 
accusations were made.295 
In 2010, the RNC appealed across ethnic lines to Hutus in exile. Rudasingwa 
(2013) lists the Hutus who joined the organisation. This appeal lost them the support 
of many sympathisers who had been loyal to Kayumba.296 RPF narratives also 
maintain a broad-based appeal. Thus, similar RNC appeals were a direct attack on 
the legitimacy of the government’s values. The RNC aimed to build a broader 
support base outside Rwanda and to gain legitimacy among the Rwandan population. 
The ‘Gang of Four’ was treated with suspicion by those they tried to recruit.297 
Nyamwasa and Karegeya were accused of human rights abuses by potential recruits 
(Rudasingwa 2013). Gahima was accused of illegally detaining people after the 
genocide (ibid). Many potential recruits questioned why they would partner with a 
group that sidelined previous Hutu allies like Kanyarengwe (ibid). Kayumba and 
Karegeya were both involved in setting up the intelligence services that had reduced 
the capacity for dissent within Rwanda. In 2012, Paul Rusesabagina, who had fallen 
out with Kagame, left the RNC because of similar doubts.298  
In one speech, Kagame recognised the threat of the RNC: 
“Those who deal in rumours and falsehoods – the likes of 
Rusesabagina, Kayumba, Karegeya, Rudasingwa, Gahima – these 
are useless characters. They don’t represent anyone among our 
more than 11 million Rwandans. Those trading in falsehoods and 
their foreign backers – human rights organisations and foreign 
media practitioners – should know that nobody loves Rwanda and 
Rwandans more than we do.”299 
Many of the initial financiers of the liberation effort in the 1990s (who later 
became prominent economic elites) have also fallen out with the government. 
Rujugiro is a prime example within this group.300 He left Rwanda in 2009 and has 
                                                          
295 Interviews with junior RDF officers, January-May 2012 and May 2013. 
296 “Kagame was harsh with Kayumba, Karegeya and those guys. But why are they talking to those 
who we were fighting with us? They betrayed us!” (Interview, RDF Officer, Kigali, March 2012). 
297 Rudasingwa (2013) recognises this. 
298 Rusesabagina became famous after the movie, Hotel Rwanda, gained worldwide acclaim. He built 
his support base after writing his book (2006) and establishing the Hotel Rwanda Rusesabagina 
Foundation. He was later accused of sending financial support to the FDLR (Rice 2010). 
299 Kagame (2010) 
300 Tribert Rujugiro made substantial contributions to the RPA’s Production Unit during the war. 
Although he was already wealthy, he engaged in personal business ventures in Rwanda after the 
genocide, as well as playing a lead role in Tri-Star. He was also the first Chairman of the Rwandan 
Chamber of Commerce and RIEPA. He was also a founding member of RIG. He was removed from 
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been linked with the RNC and David Himbara (Special Correspondent 2014, Africa 
Confidential 2014).301 The government seized his assets (worth $20 million) in 2013 
(Esiara 2013). Valens Kajeguhakwa and Evariste Sissi fled Rwanda in the 2000s. 
Rwigara died in 2015 in a car accident but his family members claimed there was 
foul play (Special Correspondent 2015). Majyambere lives in Uganda but still retains 
some business interests in Kigali, even pledging $10 million at the National Dialogue 
in 2012 (although it was unclear whether investments had been finalised) (Tabaro 
2012a). Others like Vedaste Rubangura and Miko Rwayitare had died earlier. Some 
others like Bertin Makuza, Faustin Mbundu and Jean-Baptiste Mutangana remain 
active (but are not leading actors in any sector). Among the most prominent loyal 
economic elites are Hatari Sekoko and Egide Gatera. Sekoko has risen from his 
position as a sergeant during the liberation effort to becoming among the richest 
businessmen in Rwanda.302 With some exceptions, the RPF has failed to cultivate 
new loyal investors to replace those who invested in the liberation effort. This has 
contributed to difficulties in building reciprocal partnerships with capitalists and 
hindered economic development.  
The exit of political, military and economic elites who share collective 
memories of the struggle against the Habyarimana government poses the main threat 
to the dominant coalition in Rwanda. Since the RNC has been established, senior 
RPF cadres have developed an option to voice their resistance through a political 
organisation. This thesis does not argue that the RNC could potentially unseat 
Kagame. Instead, it argues that the RNC’s establishment has forced a rebalancing of 
power within the RPF. Since 1994, the RPF has ensured that no Hutu threat can 
mobilise support from the population along ethnic lines. Instead, any political 
challenger to Kagame would have to delegitimise the credibility of Kagame’s 
position and his ability to deliver the RPF’s goals. Such a challenge would have to 
expose the contradictions between the RPF narratives and actions, while arguing that 
                                                                                                                                                                    
the RPF National Executive after the UK and South Africa questioned his tax status. He was later 
accused of financing the CNDP in UN reports (Fessy 2012). 
301 Himbara previously worked as Head of the SPU in the Office of President and as Principal Private 
Secretary to the President. He fled Rwanda in 2009 and since then, he has been a vocal opponent.  
302 Sekoko’s investments include Agrocoffee (a coffee exporting company), Kigali City Towers, 
Akagera Game Lodge (with Dubai World), shared ownership of the block lease of the Rwanda High 
Commission in London, the construction of the Kigali Marriott Hotel (through New Century 
Development – a joint venture with Chinese inestors) and the construction of a shopping mall and taxi 
park (with the Ruparelia Group). He is also a leading investor in Rwanda Investment Group (RIG). 
Many of his investments are made through his company – Doyelcy Capital Partners.   
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Kagame’s greed (rather than the nature of capitalist accumulation) is to blame for 
negative outcomes in Rwanda. This is only likely to succeed if rival leaders 
challenge Kagame’s legitimacy directly, while respecting the collective memories 
among other senior RPF cadres. Box 4.5 illustrates that the dominant coalition in 
Rwanda has blocked threats posed by rivals inside and outside the country. 
Box 4.5: Illustration of Threats against the RPF’s Monopoly of Violence  
 
4.6: Between Exit and Loyalty: Oscillating between ‘Inclusive’ 
and ‘Exclusionary’ Bargains 
 
Box 4.6 illustrates how the RPF has stabilised its rule by oscillating between 
‘inclusive’ and ‘exclusionary’ bargains. Those who are loyal to the RPF are 
highlighted on the right side. The left side highlights groups who propagate the anti-
RPF narrative. Excluded RPF cadres are placed between the RPF and the RNC.303 
There are also other important actors (Hutu-led groups and neighbouring countries). 
However, in analysing the elite bargain (where the biggest threat to the dominant 
coalition emanates from), the three primary groups that determine the holding power 
of rival coalitions are the RNC, the dominant coalition (Kagame, his family and 
Loyal senior cadres) and senior RPF cadres (especially those who led the liberation 
                                                          
303 Senior RPF cadres, who are ‘Loyal Senior Officers’, are in both groups. Often, their re-integration 
into the dominant coalition is undertaken to keep powerful makeweights on side. Their positions are 
never static or assured, given the vulnerability of the elite bargain. 
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effort). Former RPF elites chose Exit to Voice their protest collectively against 
Kagame’s leadership.304 These two coalitions compete with each other to draw the 
Loyalty of senior RPF cadres. Each senior cadre retains his or her own holding 
power. The dominant coalition appeals to the moral authority of RPF ideology to 
retain the support of RPF cadres who are edged out of political positions. This 
bargaining occurs while the RPF is regenerating its cadreship. Through such 
‘oscillation’, the RPF tries to appeal to a broader base while legitimising the 
exclusion of the powerful members of the party and military. 
BOX 4.6: Kagame v/s Rivals: Visualising Competitive Holding Power  
 
Decisions to exclude elites are legitimised by reminding elites of the need to 
maintain discipline and collectively commit to economic development. Such 
disciplinary actions work in line with achieving ideological goals (self-reliance), 
which are relevant because of the salience of external and internal threats. The 
government shores up the elite bargain by activating “us-them boundaries between 
their networks and outsiders, fend off rival claimants to coordinate and represent all 
or the same networks, draw necessary resources from their networks and reproduce 
                                                          
304 Both Kayumba and Karegeya escaped. Rudasingwa and Gahima were allowed to Exit but were 
constantly watched to see if they were speaking with estranged groups (Rudasingwa 2013). 
Rwanda 
National 
Congress
Kagame + Family 
+ Loyal Senior 
Officers
Exit Loyalty 
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the structures they have built, while sustaining their own power” (Tilly 2003, 35). 
This occurs through highlighting the threat of the FDLR in the DRC or donors’ 
threats to withdraw aid. When individual elites decide to exit, they must justify their 
decisions either by attacking Kagame’s credibility or demonstrating that they are not 
motivated by material reasons. Donor support has provided the RPF with the 
flexibility to exclude elites and discipline those who are perceived as threats. The 
significance of donor support is understood by rival elites, who use their positions 
abroad to question Kagame’s legitimacy.305  
All of these shifts have occurred within an environment of secrecy (because 
of the threat of violence within Rwanda). Elites have little opportunity to voice their 
protest, often out of fear and distrust of other elites. The option of exit is also 
restricted since the President (or other senior officers) has direct control over 
authorising international travel.306 The dominant coalition demands loyalty but many 
elites within Rwanda are looking for an opportunity to exit.307 Administrative 
positions in embassies are distributed carefully. These positions are used as ways to 
steer senior cadres away from positions of power in the military or reward older 
cadres for their loyalty.308 Other officials are kept waiting for long periods of time 
without being given jobs. A preferred option for excluded elites is to join the private 
sector (which military officials are not ‘allowed’ to do while they are in service).309 
This is akin to giving individuals rents in exchange for silence. Ensuring donors and 
senior cadres remain loyal is central to legitimising RPF rule. 
Reshuffles among upper echelons of the military and cabinet are ways of 
ensuring elites continue to compete against each other by proving their loyalty within 
the formal RPF structure. It also ensures that existing networks of support for elites 
                                                          
305 In 2015, David Himbara (2015) spoke at a US Congressional Hearing about Rwanda, accusing 
Kagame of human rights abuses and violence against opponents. 
306 Such claims were evident in informal conversations with several military officials.  
307 Many military and government officials expressed a desire to work and study abroad. However, 
they said “the boss” would have to grant it. The boss was always Kagame, no matter what the rank 
(although all of these respondents were high-ranking officials). 
308 One interview, senior RPF cadre, May 2013; Two Interviews, senior RPF cadres, January 2015. 
309 Spouses of military officers are allowed to work in the private sector. Rose Kabuye, the former 
Chief of State Protocol and Kigali’s first mayor, was loyal to the dominant coalition. However, her 
relationship with Kagame cooled after Kayumba went into exile. She eventually ‘retired’ and joined 
her husbands’ businesses, Virunga Logistics and Startech Limited. She said: “I was done. I’m always 
here to serve a country but it was time to give youth an opportunity” (Interview, May 2013). Her 
husband, David Kabuye, was a former RPF cadre and had been a businessman in Kigali for several 
years. David Kabuye continued to be a member of the reserve force. 
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are broken up. The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) has changed twice since 2010. 
Generals Kabarebe and Charles Kayonga were removed from their posts and 
transferred to administrative jobs.310 Patrick Nyamvumba has been the new CDS 
since 2013. He had served as Force Commander for the United Nations (UN) 
peacekeeping operations in Darfur for four years. Shifting Kabarebe out of the 
position of CDS removed him from a position of immediate threat but encouraged 
him to stay loyal as the Minister of Defence. Kayonga’s removal as CDS mirrors 
Kayumba’s treatment in the earlier 2000s when Kayumba was sent to India. Some 
senior cadres are often reintegrated into power structures. Among such individuals is 
Karenzi Karake, the head of NSS. In the aftermath of Kayumba’s escape in 2010 and 
Ingabire’s arrest, Karake and Charles Muhire (former Chief of Staff of the Air Force) 
were arrested.311 Later, he was reintegrated as head of the NSS in 2011. Verhoeven 
(2012) suggests that the elevation of the popular Karake was a way of retaining the 
support of senior cadres. Reshuffles such as these place the onus on troublesome 
cadres to be loyal to the RPF.  
Another move in recent years has been the replacement of older military 
cadres with new, younger cadres. Ex-FAR and former FDLR soldiers have also been 
reintegrated. By 1998, 38,500 ex-FAR officers were reintegrated into the army 
(Jowell 2014). Former FAR and FDLR officers now occupy senior positions across 
Rwandan government branches. Examples include Paul Rwarakabije (Rwanda 
Correctional Services), Jerome Ngendahimana (Deputy Chief of Staff – Reserve 
Force), Daniel Ufitikirezi (RSSB), Andre Habyarimana (Head of Reserve Force, 
Northern Province), Evariste Murenzi (Commanding Officer of the Rwanda 
Mechanised Infantry Battalion) and Albert Murasira (CSS Zigama). Recently, there 
have been two large spurts of retirements. In 2013, 79 officers were retired from the 
RDF including six generals (Tabaro 2013a). In July 2014, a further 483 RDF officers 
were retired including two generals and eight colonels (Karuhanga 2014).312 The 
retirement age was set at 55 for generals, 50 for other senior officers (the ranks of 
major and colonel) and 50 for non-commissioned officers. Increasing Hutu numbers 
                                                          
310 Kabarebe moved on to become Minister of Defence and was replaced by Kayonga in 2010. 
Kayonga was appointed Ambassador to China in 2013.  
311 Muhire previously publicly disagreed with Kagame’s actions (Clark 2010). He held command 
positions during the liberation effort. From 1995 to 1997, he was Chief of Plans, Operation and 
Training at RPA headquarters. He was Chief of Staff of the Air Force for 13 years. In 2010, he was 
named Chief of Staff of the Reserve Force. In July 2014, he retired.  
312 Retirees’ entitlements include three years of gross salary (Karuhanga 2014). 
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now make up most of the RDF. The RDF is mixed ethnically, regionally and by 
country of birth (Jowell 2014). Government ministries retain few senior cadres who 
occupied prominent positions during the liberation effort and in the 1990s. One 
report argued that Protais Musoni and Tharcisse Karugaruma were among the last 
senior cadres in ministerial positions (Kagire 2013). The leading figures in official 
RDF posts are younger and more educated in Kagame’s representation of RPF 
ideology than older cadres, who had helped build it.  
The dominant coalition has sharpened its public discourse, publicly stressing 
the importance of placing the national effort above individual priorities. In a Rwanda 
Today article (Special Correspondent 2014), eight powerful individuals including 
Rose Kabuye, Patrick Mazimhaka and Tharcisse Karugaruma were described as 
having “fallen from limelight.” The party-owned newspaper, The New Times, replied 
to the article reiterating that the RPF defined itself on three principles: “efficiency, 
accountability and delivery.” The article emphasised that there are “no sacred cows” 
within the party and aggrieved cadres have an “internal transparent mechanism of 
addressing issues” (The New Times 2014). Kagame loyalist Nshuti Manasseh 
reinforced these ideals, stressing that many of the older cadres are no less ‘iconic’.313 
Instead, Manasseh (2014) writes, “there is a time to go and do other private 
engagements that are beneficial to the country.” 
While older cadres may have “fallen from the limelight”, they continue to 
wield influence in determining the balance of power between Kagame’s dominant 
coalition and the RNC. By staying inside Rwanda, these cadres remain a threat to the 
dominant coalition and represent an opportunity for the RNC. Their choices have an 
impact on the relative holding power between the two coalitions. Some like 
Kabarebe and Karake occupy formal positions of authority but are also potential 
rivals whose loyalty could shift the power balance between the two coalitions. The 
dominant coalition attacks the public image of the RNC and has designated the 
organisation as a threat.314 The rivalry between Kagame’s dominant coalition and the 
                                                          
313 Manasseh previously served as Minister of Trade and Commerce, and Minister of Finance. He was 
also Chairman of CVL till 2013. He retains his position as a Presidential Advisor and has written 
articles in 2013, expressing support for Kagame to extend his presidential term beyond 2017. 
314 The government claimed that the RNC had begun recruiting students at the National University of 
Rwanda (Musoni 2014b).  
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RNC takes the form of public attacks on the values of their rival group.315 Regardless 
of whether such charges are accurate, the stigma associated with corruption 
delegitimises the moral authority of the accused.316 Kagame said of the RNC: “Most 
of those you know have cases to answer, with clear evidence to show for it. It is not 
my job to explain why they went or what they embezzled” (Kagire 2014a).  
Kagame has also been accused of favouring some loyalists. A parliamentary 
report alleged mismanagement of funds in the construction of the Rukarara 
hydropower project in 2011. The report highlighted the involvement of high-profile 
loyalists including John Rwangombwa317 and Kampeta Sayinzoga318 (although the 
report left out the name of James Musoni who was Minister of Finance when the 
project was commissioned).319 Punishments were not imposed though 30 people 
were questioned in 2012 (Karinganire 2012). Rwangombwa stressed that they “had 
all the required documents.” Such favouritism contradicts the RPF narrative. 
However, retaining the support of technicians and some loyal political figures is 
necessary to strengthen the dominant coalition.  
Estranged RPF members are faced with a choice: stay loyal to the national 
cause or choose to Exit and join the RNC. Other options are somewhere in between 
where elites are bought off to stay in Rwanda or leave (but choose not to protest). 
Fear and the threat of violence are used to force senior cadres to remain silent. In 
situations when exit is controlled, as Hirschman’s (1993) analysis of East Germany 
                                                          
315 Members of the dominant coalition are constantly changing and elites compete with each other for 
these positions. This group includes individuals who occupy prominent formal positions within the 
military and the party (and have occupied them for some time). Nziza and Musoni are prominent 
Loyalists in the military and political wings (Interviews). Others have included Kabarebe, Charles 
Kayonga, Patrick Nyamvumba, Nziza, Ndahiro, Dan Munyuza, Agnes Bingwaho (the former family 
paediatrician and now, Minister of Health), Inyumba (before she passed away), Nshuti Manasseh, 
John Rwangombwa, Kampeta Sayinzoga, Claver Gatete, John Rwangombwa and Martin Ngoga. 
316 The RPF is not the only political party in Africa to stigmatise the corrupt in this way (Olivier de 
Sardan 1999).  
317 Rwangombwa has been the BNR Governor since 2013. He has previously served as both Minister 
of Finance (2009-2013) and Permanent Secretary in MINECOFIN (2005-2009).  
318 Sayinzoga has been Permanent Secretary at MINECOFIN since 2009 (when she was just 27). She 
is also the wife of Kagame’s nephew. She is extremely popular with donors who see her as one of the 
brightest Rwandan officials (Interviews with embassy officials). 
319 Musoni joined the RPF in 1990 (Mushemeza 2007). He has previously served as Mayor of the City 
of Kigali, Commissioner General of the RRA (2001-2005), Minister of Commerce (2005-2006), 
Minister of Finance (2006-2009) and was later Minister of Local Government (2009-2014). He is 
currently the Minister of Infrastructure. In 2012, a Rwanda Focus article challenged Musoni’s 
practices, alluding to him as “the main godfather, the chief manipulator, the master of intrigue, the 
boss of machinations… who has built a formidable network of political minions in important 
institutions” (Kanuma 2012). 
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shows, voice is often agitated. Elite resistance does occur, similar to Scott’s 
‘everyday forms of resistance.’320 This resistance takes various forms. Examples 
include breaking party rules, occasionally testing the party line, foot-dragging and 
speaking to people to whom they are not supposed to speak.321 The threat of violence 
and the appeasement of elites through rents (which goes against RPF values) are the 
only options available to restrain the use of voice by disenchanted elites. Another 
strategy used to force the loyalty of elites is the use of rhetorical commonplaces of 
‘self-reliance’ that draws on the shared experiences of the liberation effort. 
Three events are explored to show how they affected the elite bargain. In 
2012, the Rwandan government was forced by donors to withdraw its support for the 
March 23 Movement (M23), a DRC-based rebel group linked to Rwanda. This 
reignited tensions within the RPF.322 Elites had previously disagreed with Kagame’s 
decision to put Laurent Nkunda, the leader of the National Congress for the Defence 
of the People (CNDP), under house arrest in 2009.323 These elites retained interests 
in the DRC – both material and in the form of personal loyalties with former soldiers. 
Other elites were “sick of war” and were no longer convinced the FDLR posed a 
significant threat.324 Kagame’s choice to bow to international pressure highlighted 
the necessity of retaining international support. As tensions resurfaced between RPF 
elites, Kagame astutely used the Agaciro Development Fund (AgDF) to bind the elite 
together by creating “an invisible army of the nation” (Kagame 2012b).325  
“The fund came up when there was blackmail from the 
international community. It is not really the fund that was 
important but the mentality of collectiveness that came with it.”326 
The AgDF was used as a symbol of self-reliance and drew directly on the 
collective experiences of vulnerability of senior cadres. The official line remained 
                                                          
320 Scott (1985, 29) terms this as “the prosaic but constant struggle between the peasantry and those 
who seek to extract labour, food, taxes, rents, and interest from them.” 
321 Personal observations of elite resistance. 
322 Interviews conducted in May 2013 with military officials. 
323 Observations made through interviews with serving military officers. 
324 Powerful older cadres such as Kayonga and Muhire were perceived to support this line. 
325 The AgDF was conceived in the 2011 National Dialogue. In 2012, it was launched as a sovereign 
wealth fund, initiated by voluntary contributions of Rwandans to help secure financial autonomy. 
326 Interview, Nzabamwita, January 2015. 
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that the withdrawal of aid had bound the elite to a common purpose – “they thought 
this would weaken us but it had the opposite effect.”327  
“Our fund started when donors stopped their funding. People were 
uncomfortable about the DRC and how Rwanda was being unfairly 
treated. We can have a buffer – a solidarity fund. All Rwandans 
then gave what they could and the leadership led by example.”328 
Second, two assassination attempts were attributed to Kigali in 2014. Out of 
the two targets, Kayumba survived while Karegeya died.329 Initially, Kagame did not 
deny allegations of the RPF’s involvement and did not show remorse when news of 
Karegeya’s death was received. Kabarebe marked it by saying, “Karegeya chose to 
be a dog and died like a dog”, while Kagame called him a traitor (Himbara 2014). 
The RPF accused Kayumba and Karegeya of supporting the FDLR, assisting 
enemies of the regime and engaging in terrorist activities.330 Regardless of whether 
Kigali ordered the attack, the tone of the replies signifies the precarious nature of the 
elite bargain. These former allies were depicted as traitors and were linked to 
supporting security threats. The RPF’s lack of remorse was a signal to those elites 
who considered supporting the rival coalition. As Wrong (2014) writes, “the more 
dramatic the retribution, the stronger the reminder of loyalty’s value.”  
Third, three prominent RPF cadres – Frank Rusagara, Byabagamba and 
David Kabuye – were arrested.331 Rusagara and Byabagamba were charged with 
“spreading rumours with intent to incite people into rebellion against government 
and carrying out activities aimed at tarnishing the image of the country” 
(Uwiringiyimana 2014). Kabuye was initially charged with illegal possession of a 
firearm and remanded to jail for 30 days (Musoni 2014c). However, he completed a 
six-month sentence and was arrested on his release for “inciting insurrection and 
insulting senior government officials” (Special Correspondent 2015). As of April 
2015, the court cases against Rusagara and Byabagamba were still being pursued. 
                                                          
327 Interview, Nzabamwita, May 2013. 
328 Interview, Vianney Kagabo, AgDF, January 2015. 
329 Karegeya advised South African and Tanzanian intelligence, who sent their troops to the DRC to 
counter the M23. Karegeya’s support of enemies was a direct affront to the RPF (Gatehouse 2014). 
330 Gahiji (2014b) accused the FDLR and RNC of holding talks in Tanzania. Lt. Joel Mutabazi, who 
was accused of terrorist acts, was accused of links to the RNC and FDLR (Musoni 2014d). Kizito 
Mihigo, a Rwandan musician accused of terrorist acts, was reported to have admitted to links to the 
RNC and FDLR (Musoni 2014e). 
331 Rusagara was previously the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Defence and the Commandant 
of the Nyakinama Military College. 
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A few days later, Kagame said (at an RPF meeting): 
“No one owes you anything. You cannot go around asking to be 
paid for the sacrifices of your past. We cannot live in the past. Do 
not expect to sit back and benefit from the hard work of others. 
Don’t tell me about your excellent past when you are not telling me 
about your excellent present or future.”332 
These arrests were part of a series of warnings aimed at senior RPF cadres. 
Prominent female RPF cadres, who were wives of two of these officers, were also 
publicly admonished for speaking out against the government.333 The choice to act 
against senior cadres demonstrated the fragility of the elite bargain. Other prominent 
officials resigned in the same period. Angelique Katengwa (of the Rwanda Social 
Security Board) was charged with illegal tendering and abusing her public office 
(Musoni 2014f). Jean Damascène Ntawukuriryayo (President of the Senate) resigned 
after being accused of taking unilateral actions and failing to work with other 
senators (Kagire 2014b). Loyalist Makuza replaced him as President of the Senate. 
The RPF’s alleged violence or the approval of violence and its actions against 
senior cadres indicates the weakness and turmoil within the dominant coalition. The 
RPF fears the emergence of a viable rival faction. North et al. (2009) highlight the 
fear of factions in LAOs, with factions growing primarily because they assumed they 
would be better off if they used violence. The RNC’s threat to the dominant coalition 
had become worrying enough for Kagame to use violence. Decisions have been 
taken to weaken the RNC and impose fear on those senior cadres who resorted to 
voice inside Rwanda or were trying to exit. This is similar to Gambetta’s (1993) 
description of the use of violence by mafiosos in Sicily where the use of violence is a 
signal that things are not going as planned.  
 Following the assassination attempt on Kayumba, diplomatic relations 
between the Rwandan and South African governments reached a deadlock. The 
South African government accused Rwandan diplomats of attempting to murder 
refugees living in South Africa. Four Rwandan diplomats were expelled. Rwanda 
responded by expelling six South African embassy staff (Maylie 2014). An HRW 
(2014) report, following Karegeya’s death, highlighted RPF violence against exiles. 
This reaction was a warning to estranged RPF cadres. Rudasingwa said, “Kagame 
                                                          
332 Musoni (2014g). 
333 These cadres were Rose Kabuye and Mary Baine (Kanuma 2014b). 
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has never had any support among the Hutus; Tutsi support is fracturing. So he is 
nervous. He supports himself through fear” (Wrong 2014).  
 However, the RNC’s decisions have countered the actions expected of those 
who share a collective memory with other senior cadres. This has detrimentally 
affected the RNC’s legitimacy within Rwanda and became particularly evident after 
a BBC documentary, Rwanda’s Untold Story, was aired in October 2014. In the 
documentary, Rudasingwa, Nyamwasa and other critics accused Kagame of ordering 
the shooting down of Habyarimana’s plane. Rudasingwa and Nyamwasa had 
previously made these allegations. Kagame (Smith 2014) and the Ngoga Inquiry 
Committee (Baird 2015) accused the BBC documentary of genocide denial. The RPF 
also accused the ‘Gang of Four’ of collaborating with the FDLR. The RNC also 
struggled to work collectively as an organisation. Recent reports suggest that there 
was in-fighting among leadership, although Rudasingwa had taken on the primary 
leadership role (Joint Report 2014). The RPF has also reintegrated several former 
exiles, including former Prime Minister Rwigyema, Gerard Ntashamaje and Evode 
Uwizeyimana.334 It is unlikely that the RNC, as an organisation, will unseat the RPF. 
However, it provides a political option for disenchanted elites. Its existence as an 
organisation threatens the dominant coalition as the sole carrier of RPF ideology.  
Any challenger to Kagame’s rule must contest his legitimacy. However, 
Kagame will face challenges to his moral authority and his monopoly of violence in 
the coming years. The most significant event in the near future is the 2017 elections. 
Sheikh Harerimana, the leader of another party in the ruling coalition (Parti 
Démocrate Idéal), initiated discussions to change the constitution to extend 
Kagame’s term in 2010. Tharcisse Karugurama publicly argued against this proposal, 
voicing his concerns to foreign journalists (McGreal 2013, Hitimana 2013). Kagame 
later acknowledged that Karugurama’s decision to take a public stand contributed to 
his removal as minister (Gahiji 2013, Clark 2014a). Over the last few years, several 
articles have been written by journalists and prominent party officials – including 
Jack Kayonga (2015), Nshuti Manasseh, Joseph Karemera (2015) – advocating 
                                                          
334 Ntashamaje was a leading figure in the liberation effort in the 1990s. He also worked in the 
Ministry of Justice (MINIJUST) after 1994. In exile, he became president of an opposition group, 
Rally of the Rwandan People (RPR-Inkeragutabara). He returned to Rwanda in 2011 and works with 
the Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission. Uwizeyimana was a vocal opponent of 
the RPF abroad. He returned to Kigali in 2014 and serves as a consultant in the Ministry of Justice. 
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changing the constitution. Kagame (2015) admits that two schools of thought have 
emerged on whether he should pursue a third term. He said he did not wish to pursue 
a third term but welcomed debate. Two local journalists interviewed in 2015 
suggested that the next two years would provide a test to the degree of free speech 
that exists in Rwanda.335 The government was willing to allow some space for 
opposition but it had already reacted against several television stations and 
journalists.336 The maintenance of a Developmental Political Settlement in Rwanda 
depends on whether ruling elites are able to retain a monopoly of violence during this 
political transition and stay committed to economic development. This will also 
depend on the international community’s (donors and investors) reactions to 
Kagame’s decision regarding extending his term.  
4.7 Concluding Remarks 
 
 A Developmental Political Settlement in Rwanda must retain its stability 
through countering threats against its rule. This chapter has shown that regime 
change in Rwanda has never simply been a result of horizontal inequalities or ethnic 
differences. Rwandan governments have always used narratives (and ideology), rents 
and violence to retain the legitimacy of their rule. President Kagame uses these 
instruments. The elite bargain is stabilised through the use of rhetorical 
commonplaces of self-reliance that appeal to the collective memories of vulnerability 
of senior RPF cadres (backed up by the threat of violence). Using Albert 
Hirschman’s (1970) Exit-Voice-Loyalty framework illustrates how different actors 
retain the agency to influence certain actions. Retaining the loyalty of senior cadres 
while minimising their options to voice and exit contributes to stabilising the 
political settlement. Vulnerability has also affected the capacity of ruling elites to 
retain loyal economic partners (other than investment groups). The Developmental 
Political Settlement will persist if ruling elites can address existing vulnerabilities 
and if they are able to build reciprocal arrangements with economic actors to 
collectively invest resources to achieve self-reliance.    
 RPF ideology has emerged out of shared experiences of vulnerability 
experienced by RPF elites. It is argued that narratives hold a moral authority because 
                                                          
335 Interviews, two local journalists, January 2015. 
336 Interviews with several journalists, January 2015. 
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of their appeal to these memories and experiences, as well as the expectations of 
donors. This chapter shows that the contestation of narratives affects the legitimacy 
of the RPF government. It also shows that rival elites continue to pose a threat to the 
dominant coalition in Rwanda. Frictions among elites force the dominant coalition to 
construct narratives in line with the expectations of three constituencies. However, 
frictions have also made the government reluctant to empower individuals (who 
could potentially become threats). The next chapter explores the RPF’s economic 
ideology and the values on which it is based. It showcases the investment groups that 
have been used in a variety of sectors.  
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CHAPTER 5: ECONOMIC NATIONALISM  
5.1 Introduction 
 
RPF cadres developed RPF ideology based on their experiences and their 
understandings of Rwanda’s historical past. RPF ideology continues to be 
transformed through its interactions with foreign actors and the demands from 
domestic constituencies – elites and the population. Dominant narratives reflect the 
changes in evolving systems of accumulation. The utopian goal of ideology – self-
reliance – remains the same. Disciplinary actions are legitimised by developing 
common expectations of behaviour in line with achieving ideological goals. 
Economic Nationalism is the term used to denote RPF ideology. Its goal – 
self-reliance – does not refer to autarchic economic policies. Rather, the RPF actively 
engages with foreign investors and global markets while attempting to retain control 
over the direction of the economy. Self-reliance has always been a central focus for 
the RPF. However, till 2000, the government was still more concerned with security 
interests and only developed a clear economy strategy in 2000, with the publication 
of VISION 2020 (GoR 2000). New rhetorical commonplaces like Agaciro are 
developed to reflect the evolution of RPF ideology. 
The use of Agaciro serves two symbolic purposes. The first purpose of 
Agaciro was as a rallying cry alongside the establishment of AgDF. It was a reaction 
to the withdrawal of aid by donors (in 2012) amidst allegations that the Rwandan 
government was funding rebel groups in the DRC.337 Such rhetorical commonplaces 
are legitimised through the collective memories of vulnerability experienced by 
senior RPF cadres. Any frictions among elites are portrayed as petty, compared to the 
needs of the nation. 
 “Agaciro has been – and continues to be – the indispensable 
ingredient of Rwanda’s transformation. To truly grasp the meaning 
of Agaciro, it helps to contemplate, the consequence of its absence. 
The genocide in Rwanda eighteen years ago had its origins in 
decades of bad governance, hateful ideologies and impunity. For 
that to have happened – to the unbelievable degree that it did – 
                                                          
337 “Donors thought aid withdrawal would weaken us but Agaciro made it have the opposite effect” 
(Interview, Nzabamwita, May 2013). 
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people had to have surrendered the last shred of their dignity 
because to truly value one’s own life means valuing the lives of 
others. As a people, Rwandans have since sought to rebuild a sense 
of individual as well as collective worth.”338 
 The second symbolic purpose of Agaciro was directed at the citizenry. 
Domestic surveys in 2012 highlighted the country’s severe inequality and the 
government’s failure to match ambitions with employment, as well as difficulties in 
creating access to wage work. Agaciro supports government policies of creating 
‘entrepreneurial citizens’ (Kamat 2004) who would create their own jobs. This 
rhetoric has occurred alongside the RPF government’s attempts to create productive 
employment opportunities, with a new focus on TVET training, as well as 
establishing a national target of creating 200,000 off-farm jobs annually (since 2012). 
“Agaciro is about making sure I have my self-worth. I should not 
be dependent on government. People should find solutions for 
themselves.”339 
“The key thing for the government is to focus on public awareness 
and change the mindset. We have no room for absorption. Every 
year, there are 15,000 graduates. People cannot wake up and 
expect jobs. They have to create their own jobs and many young 
people are doing that.”340 
After showcasing the values of RPF ideology, this chapter details the scarcity 
of resources – one condition of ‘systemic vulnerability’ (Doner et al. 2005). 
Rwanda’s reliance on foreign aid is explored, while also showing that the 
government has prioritised tax collection. Reducing the government’s reliance on 
exporting low-quality primary commodities, which are vulnerable to global price 
fluctuations, contributes to achieving self-reliance.341 The government has tried to 
capture the most out of global value-chains by processing primary commodities and 
other ambitious forms of vertical diversification. Following a brief discussion of 
literature on upgrading primary commodities and its applicability to the Rwandan 
case, the use of investment groups in Rwanda is explored. The use of such 
companies highlights that the dominant coalition has chosen to centralise rents to 
negotiate vulnerability and challenges from rival elites (who could gain access to 
                                                          
338 Kagame (2012c). 
339 Interview, Kagabo, AgDF, January 2015. 
340 Interview, Business Development Fund (BDF), January 2015. 
341 “When you look at our past and see what happened, you immediately know that we must diversify 
away from coffee and tea” – Rugwabiza, February 2012. 
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rents). The proliferation of investment groups has occurred alongside the reduced 
prominence of formerly loyal economic elites, as shown in Chapter 4. The pyrethrum 
sector is used as an example to illustrate that though the government uses investment 
groups to effectively centralise rents and organise labour to appropriate production 
strategies, achievements are still blocked by fluctuations in international prices. This 
example shows that successful capitalist accumulation depends on the government’s 
capacity to manage three constituencies: donors (through initial privatisation of the 
company; organising labour through cooperatives with facilitation from donors), 
rival elites (through centralising rents) and the population (organising labour through 
cooperatives and engineering control grabs). 
The current debate about the use of investment groups is divided into those 
who argue such companies are used to achieve developmental outcomes (Booth and 
Golooba-Mutebi 2011, 2012a) and others who argue that the economy is suffering 
because elites have captured the economy through these companies (Gokgur 2011, 
2012). Rather than arguing that these companies have always resulted in positive or 
negative outcomes, the strategy of using these investment groups should be studied 
as one ‘in process’. There is agreement with Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2011, 
2012a) that these investment groups are a way for the dominant coalition to 
centralise control over rents and diversify the economy. However, this chapter argues 
that the proliferation of new investment groups is evidence of attempts at distributing 
and managing rents through a centralised structure. Rents are distributed to formal 
institutions, which are managed on the basis of loyalty and governed by appealing to 
ideology.  
 This chapter draws on primary data from interviews with respondents 
working (or previously involved) in investment groups. Government officials and 
private sector respondents have also been interviewed. Work done by previous 
authors has provided a base to undertake this research. However, this chapter adds 
more to the existing knowledge on the topic. For example, the existing literature on 
Rwanda’s investment groups has not recognised two new military investment groups 
– Agro-processing Industries (API) and Ngali. Analysing RPF ideology through the 
vulnerability experienced by senior RPF cadres is a contribution to the existing 
literature. The statistical data used has been obtained from government sources.  
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5.2 Targeting Self-Reliance while Managing Three 
Constituencies 
  
Economic Nationalism requires RPF cadres to place the interests of the nation 
ahead of their own individual interests. The pursuit of self-reliance assists the 
dominant coalition in consolidating their position against threats. The RPF’s public 
rhetoric expected internal discipline (including zero tolerance for corruption) and 
self-sacrifice from its cadres since the inception of the movement. 
“If we didn’t have discipline, we wouldn’t have had anything. 
What made us have revolutionary discipline is because we all 
understood why we gave things up and why we sacrificed. Since 
we started and even before our war, we have had internal discipline 
within our movement. Self-sacrifice was there in the years before 
2000 when we worked for free. Now, we get salaries. But the work 
we do for the RPF is more than what we do for our job. I finish 
work at 5 in the evenings. Sometimes, we stay till 11 and 12 for 
party work and go do mobilisation on the weekends.”342  
Economic Nationalism is strengthened by four main discourses, which 
reinforce the salience of threats through appealing to the collective memory of shared 
experiences among senior RPF cadres. These discourses work in direct contrast to 
the demands of donors and remind RPF cadres of the importance of managing the 
economy in a way that is conducive to achieving self-reliance (whether through the 
use of investment groups, loyal domestic actors or managing foreign capital). These 
discourses are used to strengthen “an embattled regime confronted by relentless 
internal enemies and external criticism” (Verhoeven 2012, 239). 
 The four main discourses are: 
(i) Genocide – the violence of predecessors; Kagame’s RPF as liberators   
Such discourses reiterate the dangers the Tutsis would face if there was a 
return to an alternative Hutu-led government. There is an emphasis on the 
role Kagame played in liberating Rwanda and rehabilitating society after 
the genocide.343 
(ii) Threat - The constant danger of external threats.  
Such discourses include references to the FDLR across the border in the 
DRC and ‘terrorists’ within Rwanda. 
                                                          
342 Interview, Rutaremara, January 2015. 
343 Critics have argued that the increasing “centralisation of memory in recent years” is part of a 
strategy of “keeping the genocide alive” and serves to legitimise authoritarian rule (Meierhenrich 
2011, 292). See also Guyer (2009). 
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(iii) Solidarity and Self-reliance – We are on our own. 
Such rhetoric surfaces when Rwanda’s autonomy is threatened. For 
example, the creation of the AgDF was sped up after foreign aid was 
withdrawn in 2012.  
(iv) Superiority – The superiority of the RPF government versus previous 
governments. 
Historical myths ("the lessons of history") are a crucial part of all political 
ideologies (Vansina 1998). Drawing anything good from the period 1959-
1994 contradicts a central aspect of the government’s discourse, that 
everything after 1959 was malign (Eltringham 2004, 175-6).  
Meles Zenawi, the former Prime Minister of Ethiopia, has been an example 
for Kagame as RPF strategy has evolved.344 Meles’ practices were based on an 
appreciation for the governance and power techniques marked by vanguard party rule 
in the Marxist-Leninist tradition. In Ethiopia, such techniques included “the party-led 
state in politics, economics and society, the party ruling in the name of the ‘rural 
masses’… co-optation of civil society, elections with a strong supervisory role of the 
dominant party and a political evaluation of public servants via party-led evaluation 
sessions” (Hagmann and Abbink 2011, 592). RPF rule shares many of these features. 
In the way that Lenin had envisioned the vanguard party as the drivers of the 
revolution, the RPF’s dominant coalition envisioned themselves as the drivers of 
economic change. Indiscipline was the enemy of Lenin’s vanguard – “to deviate 
from it (socialist ideology) in the slightest degree means strengthening bourgeois 
ideology” (Lenin in Scott 1998, 151). For the RPF, the enemy was anyone who 
threatened the achievement of self-reliance (and consequently, the power of the 
dominant coalition). Within the RPF, publicly speaking against the RPF’s strategy 
was perceived as betrayal.  
“For us, we think that when people have problems, they should 
come to us. Why would they go to foreigners or somebody else? If 
people go away and talk to other people, they are following their 
own interests. We have mechanisms to discuss grievances 
internally and we deal with these problems.”345 
                                                          
344 Kagame (2013a) lauded Meles as “a modernizer who dedicated his life to advance socio-economic 
transformation of his country and the continent.” He described Meles as someone who “rejected 
conventional models” and stressed “self-reliance is a mindset. Talking about aid in the manner that 
emphasises the need to reduce dependency does not mean you don’t need it. It means you have an 
ambition and want to work towards generating your own resources as much as you can.”  
345 Interview, Nzabamwita, May 2013. 
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 Similar to Meles, Kagame ensured the strategy had a focus on modernisation. 
A well-organised city was perceived as central to courting investment, with urban 
cleanliness and modernity the basis of the ‘New Rwanda’ (Goodfellow 2014).  
“In the process of 18 years, we’ve done so much. You can’t 
compare us with the previous government. That was a closed 
economy and a pseudo-communist government. There were two or 
three trading companies. We’ve built our country into a place to do 
business. Look at the infrastructure, the tourism. We’ve learned 
from the Singaporean experience. Just look at Kigali 10 years ago 
and now – this is what good governance does.”346 
Managing foreign investment and using foreign aid effectively were part of 
the government’s strategy to achieve self-reliance. Self-reliance was conceptualised 
as decreasing reliance on aid and reducing its vulnerability to global markets 
(vulnerability to fluctuations in international commodity prices).347  
“Self-reliance is always tough. The international community wants 
to donate. But it is not just money, it is also their ideas. There is 
always a war of containment. The more we become dependent, the 
tougher it is to retain our ideas. The aim has always been to get the 
money and use it in the way we want.”348 
However, adhering to Economic Nationalism and managing the ‘war of 
containment’ was difficult. As technicians and elites are exposed to different 
policies, the choices of how to achieve goals may change. In its positions to market-
led reforms, attitudes often change and are specific to certain sectors. 
“Initially, the IMF was very strong on privatisation – pushing us to 
do it… For a few years, there were complications because there 
were lots of changes in government. Now, there’s some stability 
and we are really pushing more and more interaction with the 
private sector. Hopefully, it can be similar to before when OTF had 
developed clusters in sectors… Now, any cabinet paper has to 
show that they have consulted with the private sector.”349 
Economic priorities became increasingly prioritised after the Congo Wars. 
After the United Nations Group of Experts (GoE) reports began to be published in 
2001, the government was pressured by transnational advocacy groups and donors to 
clamp down on humanitarian abuses and illegal trade in conflict minerals. The 
                                                          
346 Interview, Rwangombwa, May 2012. 
347 Publicly, government officials state that foreign investment is the solution to reducing dependence 
on foreign aid (Interview, Amina Rwakunda, MINECOFIN, March 2012). 
348 Interview, Rutaremara, January 2015. 
349 Interview, Bayigamba, PSF, January 2015. 
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government interpreted these accusations as a threat to its autonomy. These 
accusations served as a trigger to focusing on the domestic economy. Self-reliance 
included the need to reduce its reliance on revenues from the DRC.350  
“In the very first RPF documents, they wanted development to be 
an objective for the population. To achieve that, they wanted to 
give values to each citizen and wanted to make sure they were not 
vulnerable to international price fluctuations. That had been 
difficult for the old regime.”351 
The government recognised that “foreign aid was like a hallucinogen called 
angel dust – it felt good but had a lot of bad side effects” (Amsden 2007, 71). To 
avoid ‘bad side effects’, the government has generated increased domestic tax 
revenues while attracting more foreign aid (Figure 5.1).  
“We’ve maintained a stable economy. We’ve reduced poverty by 
12 per cent. This kind of thing has only happened in the Asian 
tigers. We’ve grown the financial sector. We’re still dependent on 
aid but we’ve increased our tax base a lot. Taxes have grown three 
per cent in nominal terms.”352 
Rwanda emphasises building an appearance of adherence to the neoliberal 
cum ‘good governance’ project (Oya and Pons-Vignon 2010). In the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, the government took advantage of being a ‘special case’ and welcomed 
new donors such as the UK, Netherlands and Sweden (Hayman 2009a, 47). To 
maximise aid, the government appealed to ‘genocide credit’ where it took advantage 
of the international community’s guilt. The government has maintained some control 
in its relationship with donors. It decides the sectors in which donors can work and 
has strategically managed donor relationships, profiting from the lack of coordination 
between donors and “positions on Rwanda being far from unanimous” (Hayman 
2009b, 592).353  
                                                          
350 “Our country’s leadership is committed to development. The President pushes us to break into new 
products. We have limited resources and a lot of needs and challenges. But out of patriotism and 
togetherness, we can address these challenges” (Interview, Afrique Ramba, RSSB, May 2012). 
351 Interview, Kigabo, January 2015. 
352 Interview, Rwangombwa, May 2012. 
353 Rwanda does better than many other African countries in accessing policy space. However, 
Rwanda does not have complete control over aid. Projects are still assigned in line with donor 
priorities. Aid was also not delivered on time. Donors only delivered 59.3 per cent of aid promised in 
2010/11 and 57.9 per cent promised in 2011/12 (Abbott and Rwirahira 2012). 
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Source: MINECOFIN 
Figure 5.2 indicates that the government is reliant on foreign aid, which 
comprises around 40 per cent of its budget. Aid has not been a disincentive to 
mobilise domestic resources.354 The Habyarimana government had also been 
successful in broadening the tax base. However, it relied on coffee as the main 
source of tax-income. The RPF government has diversified its tax base but depends 
largely on trade taxes and ‘large’ taxpayers.355 Large taxpayers contributed between 
40 and 70 per cent of domestic revenues (Di John 2006). The Rwanda Revenue 
Authority (RRA), established in 1997, successfully increased domestic revenue 
collection.356 Success was attributed to taxation reforms including the 
implementation of Large Taxpayer Officers, which collected 47 per cent of total 
taxes in 2007 (Di John 2010). The RRA broadened its tax base further by taxing the 
informal economy.357  
                                                          
354 Moss et al. (2006, 11) identifies high level of aid to be correlated with low levels of taxation. 
355 In Rwanda, 80 per cent of total taxes are collected from 13 large companies (Di John 2009b, 18) 
356 The RRA surpassed fiscal revenue collection targets every year between 2000 and 2007 (RRA 
2008, 11). 
357 The number of taxpayers increased by 56.7 per cent between the 2008/09 and 2009/10 fiscal years 
(RRA 2010). This was largely because of a “recruitment exercise” of informal sector taxpayers. 
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Source: MINECOFIN 
 Tax revenues and foreign aid both comprise around 40 per cent of the 
domestic budget (Figures 5.2-5.3). While tax collection and foreign aid have both 
increased at a similar rate, the government is still heavily reliant on aid (Figure 
5.1).358 Kagame stresses the importance of reducing reliance on aid but also 
recognises that the government will need “more aid.”359 Tax collection has increased, 
with direct taxes and taxes on goods and services boasting the heaviest increases 
between 1990 and 2011 (Figure 5.4). However, the RPF government has not 
sufficiently widened its tax base. Property tax collection has only increased slightly 
and it has decreased as a share of total tax revenues collected since 1990 (Figure 5.5), 
                                                          
358 “We depend 48 per cent on external aid – that is 48 per cent on the good will of other countries. 
Reducing this dependence is the key challenge” (Interview, Uwitonze, May 2013). 
359 Kagame (2009) said: “Africa is at a development stage where more aid – not less is required to 
confront continued socioeconomic difficulties.” 
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despite a construction boom in Kigali. This could have amounted to 5-6 per cent of 
GDP (Goodfellow 2014). Property tax legislation was drafted in 2006 but has not yet 
been implemented. Property tax remains a controversial issue in Kigali. Many senior 
RPF cadres bought land in Kigali, with senior retired officers relying on such 
properties for income.360 Property tax threatened their incomes. The neglect of 
property tax indicates the existence of a fiscal settlement where some are excluded 
from taxes. Some observers (Torero et al. 2006) have argued that elites have resisted 
the collection of property tax. The government has recently committed to increasing 
property tax collection (Mugisha 2014a), with military investment groups setting up 
road signs in Kigali.361 Since then, the IMF (2014) has urged the government to 
prioritise the collection of property taxes. The IMF advised the government to 
transfer tax collection rights from local authorities to national authorities, as well as 
to migrate from a land lease fee to a fixed asset tax in Kigali. There are also other 
reasons including ‘capability traps’, since the government does not have the expertise 
to manage such changes, rapidly changing policies and other technical issues 
(Goodfellow 2014). The interests of ‘three constituencies’ converge in reforms aimed 
at improving property tax collection in Rwanda. If elites resist such reforms, the 
RPF’s commitment to delivering on its goals of redistributing benefits to the 
population can be questioned. If the RPF collects increasing property tax, it would 
clearly signal commitment to its ideology.  
 
Source: MINECOFIN 
                                                          
360 Interviews, senior RPF cadre, November 2011; senior RPF cadre, May 2013. 
361 Interview, Andrew Nyamvumba – Ngali, January 2015. 
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
500000
600000
Figure 5.4: Composition of Tax Revenues (Million RwF): 1990-
2011
Direct Taxes Taxes on Goods and Services Taxes on External Trade
170 
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5.3 Contesting Vulnerability and Climbing Value-Chains 
  
The government has focused on processing primary commodities and 
capturing increasing portions of the value-chain to reduce its vulnerability to 
fluctuations in international commodity prices.362 Achieving value-addition makes 
traditional export sectors more productive and contributes to achieving self-reliance. 
Hirschman (1981) described how export-oriented development could be understood 
in terms of linkages derived from its staple.363 Hirschman proposed three types of 
linkages: fiscal linkages, consumption linkages and production linkages.364 
Production linkages included both forward linkages (processing commodities) and 
backward linkages (Producing inputs to be used in commodity production).  
 Literature has developed around Global Commodity Chains (GCC) and 
Global Value Chains (GVC). Such literature is a response to shifts in the behaviour 
of global capitalism. This literature identifies economic structure and behaviour in 
“the core” Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
countries as determining the limits and potential of economic activity and change in 
“the periphery” countries (Cramer 1999). Such literature is concerned with industrial 
                                                          
362 Diversification is an urgent priority. “Diversification has failed in the rest of Africa but it is 
prioritised in Rwanda because our history shows how important it is.” (Interview, Williams 
Nkurunziza, then High Commissioner to India, October 2011). 
363 Linkages or linkage effects refer to “investment-generating forces that are set in motion, through 
input-output relations, when productive facilities that supply inputs to that line or utilise its outputs are 
inadequate or non-existent” (Hirschman 1981, 65). 
364 Fiscal linkages refer to taxes that are collected from resource rents. Consumption linkages refer to 
the demand for other goods that is generated from the incomes earned in the commodities sector. 
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upgrading i.e. “a process of improving the ability of a firm to move to more 
profitable and/or technologically sophisticated capital- and skill-intensive economic 
niches” (Gereffi 1999, 52). Upgrading fosters the creation of forward linkages and 
deepens backward linkages.365 
A distinction is drawn between buyer-driven and producer-driven value 
chains (Gereffi 1994). In buyer-driven chains, retailers and marketers of the final 
product exert the most power because of their ability to shape consumption patterns 
through their brand names. In producer-driven chains, power is driven by final 
product manufacturers and is characteristic of capital, skill or labour intensive 
industries. Commodity chains are analysed through the relationship of inter-firm 
behaviour – particularly, in relation to how “lead firms define and manage quality”, 
and maintain entry barriers along the chain (Gibbon and Ponte 2005, 177). The firm 
is the centre of analysis and is conceptualised as the locus of activity for investment 
decisions where lead firms seek to maximise profitability by specialising and 
expanding into activities that would ensure the highest profits. Such work offers a 
framework to examine the power relations within these chains. 
But GVC, GCC and other strands of commodity studies literature are often 
perceived as “fatalistic” (Cramer 1999), ignoring the importance of labour and class 
relations (Selwyn 2012), conflating the ‘nationality’ of African capital and its effects 
(Bernstein and Campling 2006) and ignoring ‘linkages’ one commodity may have 
with others, the multiplier effects for the rest of the economy and for state-building. 
Endogenous constraints – “power-cuts and shortages of key inputs are rife, firm 
organisation is weak, and infrastructure is absent and unreliable” – are rarely 
recognised (Cramer 1999, 1249). A positive role for state intervention has been 
neglected in favour of what Bernstein and Campling (2006, 240) call “globalisation, 
and the novelties.” For example, Daviron and Ponte (2005, 246) show that the coffee 
sector has moved away from a “public-controlled system” to “one that is more 
private and buyer-dominated” where few players control the bulk of international 
trade and roasting. National coffee agencies have been suppressed and local actors 
are forced to ally with international players or disappear. They conclude that the best 
                                                          
365 Value-addition spurs a cluster of supplier industries, which feeds beneficially into other sectors 
(Kaplinsky et al. 2011). Beneficiation in the South African diamond sector was an example of such 
success (ibid). 
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that can be hoped for are comprador firms that are acquiescent to foreign capital. 
Thus, commodity studies have restricted the possible role of state regulation, which 
can “lower entry barriers to local producers” (Gibbon and Ponte 2005, 160). This is 
symptomatic of the ‘jaundiced’ and ‘pessimistic prognosis’ of African economic 
development (Sender 1999). 
In Rwanda, “adding value” is a priority in every sector. On the Frontier 
Group (OTF) – a consultancy group inspired by Michael Porter’s work on value-
chain analysis and competitive advantage – drafted sector strategies.366 Porter’s work 
has become a powerful analytical tool in corporate strategic planning and has also 
gained popularity in the development practitioner community. His primary concern is 
how individual firms can create and sustain competitive advantage by outperforming 
their rivals, using the value-chain as a tool to analyse firm competitiveness. The 
development practitioner community has been influenced by Porter’s work to seek 
out large, multinational firms as partners in intervention. These firms are used to 
develop their supply chains back to farm-gate, as evidenced in International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) and United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) examples from Indonesia (Neilson 2014). Such efforts have often been 
plagued by a myopic focus on firm-level competitiveness, which ignore broader 
structural themes of how inequality is reproduced in the global economy (Bair 2005). 
The tendency to view the world as a global marketplace reduces actors to economic 
agents, all driven by a similar utilitarian logic. Like commodity studies, there is no 
place in this analysis for discussions of power relations between actors other than 
firms. Porter’s analysis has encouraged donors to charge the most powerful 
companies with responsibility to find ‘ethical’ ways to make profits.367 However, the 
‘ethical’ way is founded on simplistic assumptions around empowerment of ‘small 
farmers’ and using certification schemes (e.g. fair trade). The first step is to contend 
with contextual realities in the nations that are the subjects of study and the complex 
interests that motivate actors in these societies. 
                                                          
366 CEO Michael Fairbanks’ OTF Group has led projects in 35 countries and 20 sectors. Their work is 
based on Porter’s influential research on the importance of industry clustering, which emphasises that 
regional clusters of related industries (rather than individual companies or single industries) are the 
source of jobs, income and export growth in developing countries. 
367 Porter and Kramer (2011, 65) argued that there is growing convergence between business and 
social needs. “Shared value is not social responsibility, philanthropy or even sustainability, but a new 
way to achieve economic success.”  
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Nations are a part of Porter’s (1990) analysis. However, he ignores the 
importance of politics. Porter builds a step-by-step procedure for increasing 
competitiveness. He lists factors such as physical knowledge, capital resources 
including national infrastructure and cultural institutions. He simplifies these 
problems to a ‘diamond theory’, which is assumed to be a scientific and rational way 
of solving a nation’s social problems. Such management strategies are built on the 
technocratic tradition of the value of experts and are incorporated into state-centred 
engineering (Kantola and Seeck 2010). The RPF government used Porter’s 
credibility and popularity to model the image that the government is run in a similar 
management style.368 Pursuing such policies does not mean that politics has 
disappeared. It simply means politics is geared to fit into these narratives.  
This thesis explores the RPF narratives of ‘upgrading’ in the three traditional 
sectors. Government interventions have contributed to some success in achieving 
these goals. However, further growth is impeded by difficulties in incentivising and 
supporting firms to be loyal to these strategies.  
5.4 The Investment Groups – Managing Loyal Capital 
 
 Investment groups are the symbolic representations of Economic 
Nationalism. ‘Getting capitalism started’ – the mandate of these investment groups – 
refers to going into new sectors, building the sector through a subsidiary company 
and leaving once the subsidiary company has broken even.369 Investment groups 
receive these rents ahead of powerful individual elites. In Rwanda, two examples are 
often cited as examples of ‘getting capitalism started.’370 Those critical of these 
investment groups focus on companies like Inyange Industries, which obtained a 
large share of the market in dairy products. However, it is argued that the process of 
‘getting capitalism started’ is still in progress in the case of these companies. 
                                                          
368 See Crisafulli and Redmond (2012). Kantola and Seeck (2010, 37) use the example of Finland to 
show that mimicking Porter’s management style was “mainly a legitimating device rather than an 
actually effective way to raise the productivity of a nation.” 
369 Interview, John Mirenge, May 2012. 
370 Serena Hotel was built by an investment group despite many donors advising against it. Once 
Serena Hotel was built, other domestic and foreign investors came in to the sector. The Serena Hotel 
is currently owned by the Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development. CVL originally owned shares 
in MTN – Rwanda’s first mobile telephony company. The telecom sector is now liberalised, with Tigo 
and Airtel occupying substantial shares of the market. 
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 Political parties and militaries have established businesses in several 
countries. Agebaz (2013) compares experiences in Malaysia, Taiwan, Ethiopia and 
Rwanda.371 Malaysia’s ruling party businesses provided evidence of cronyism but 
also created employment opportunities and empowered the Malay middle class 
(ibid). Taiwan’s Kuomintang used party businesses to develop new sectors. 
Competitive clientelism slowly emerged through empowering party conglomerates 
and this provided “a soft landing towards multi-partyism” (Agebaz 2013, 1478). In 
Ethiopia, party owned businesses included The Endowment Fund for the 
Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT). EFFORT invested in strategic sectors. In 
Ethiopia, some of these companies retained monopoly control over sectors while 
some companies operated in liberalised environments.372 
Investment groups have been the subject of disagreement between Rwanda 
scholars. This disagreement mirrors the larger academic debate on rent seeking. 
Gokgur (2011, 2012) follows the neoliberal logic of Anne Krueger (1974) who 
emphasises that such rents encourage state agents to waste resources on unproductive 
activities. Gokgur fails to differentiate between these investment groups and the 
government. She simplistically assumes that their ‘close’ relationship must be a way 
to ensure benefits are retained by a small group of elites. Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 
(2011, 2012a) take a heterodox line, emphasising the importance of ‘close’ 
relationships between the private sector and the state in the early stages of 
industrialisation. They emphasise that investment groups work strictly in line with 
national priorities. 
“There is a very thick line between us and the government. We 
keep close relationships. We lose a lot of deals and we win some. It 
is through the work that we have done that we have built a 
reputation. Rwanda is the only country I know that you can sit on a 
computer in China and win a tender.”373 
Investment groups were created as a response to the political vulnerability 
faced by the dominant coalition. These groups have proliferated because the 
dominant coalition has faced difficulties in finding ‘private’ investors who have 
enough funds and patience to stay loyal to Economic Nationalism. Rather than being 
                                                          
371 Agebaz (2013) has not analysed power relations within the elite bargain in the countries studied.  
372 For a detailed study on EFFORT, see Vaughan and Gebremichael (2011). 
373 Interview, Kayonga, January 2015. 
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an avenue for elites to maximise their rents, investment groups are symbolic tools 
used by the RPF to reduce the capacity of individuals to keep rents for themselves. 
Investment groups are divided into ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ investment 
groups.374 Formal investment groups are those companies with formal connections to 
the military (RDF) or the party (RPF). ‘Informal’ investment groups comprise those 
groups where ‘private’ investors have pooled their own money to create investment 
groups. Kagame has directed the formation of informal investment groups and 
different regional investment groups (even investing his own money).375 The RSSB 
and the RDB’s Assets and Business Management Department also provide funds for 
strategic investments.376 
 Tri-Star Investments emerged out of the RPF Production Unit. The 
Production Unit had functioned as a treasury for political contributions to the RPF’s 
‘liberation effort’ in the early 1990s. The initial funders included sympathetic 
diaspora and Banyarwanda refugees from Uganda and other neighbouring countries 
– some of whom are named in Chapter 4. After the genocide, Tri-Star continued to 
function as a Production Unit. Initial investments were made in line with national 
priorities e.g. the provision of social services, rebuilding roads and transport links.  
“Some things must be contextualised within our history – 
especially where Rwandan has come from since 1994. We had to 
find ways to provide basic services to people. The previous 
government had stolen most of the money from the treasury. Tri-
Star invested in things the people needed. People saw there was 
potential and then Tri-Star left. This was a way the government 
motivated people to invest. In a way, it was to help privatisation 
and to entice new investors to come here.”377 
Tri-Star was involved in a variety of sectors including metals trading, mobile 
telephony, road construction, housing and food processing. One of its subsidiaries – 
Rwanda Metals (RM) – was involved in the trading of minerals from the Congo. RM 
                                                          
374 Gokgur (2012) identified these groups collectively as ‘partystatals’. However, this term is 
confusing because the party does not have control over all these groups. 
375 Interviews, Faustin Mbundu (PSF and RIG investor) and Jean Philippe Kayobotsi (formerly at the 
Office of the President), March 2012. 
376 “If we want to facilitate privatisation, the government has to go where investments are not 
attractive and show that profits can be made. Then we can sell our company to private investors or 
open up the sector or retain shares. When you talk about setting up a company in Rwanda, the 
payback period is seven years. It is up to us to lead the way in taking losses and working for our 
future” (Interview, Ufitikirezi, then-RDB, May 2012). 
377 Interview, Francis Gatare, then-Private Secretary to the President of Rwanda, Now, CEO – RDB, 
May 2012. 
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was sold to a Botswana-based firm in 2002 amidst initial outcry over allegations that 
the firm traded ‘conflict minerals’ (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2012a). There is 
disagreement about the extent of profits made by companies like RM.378 Such 
companies were unlikely to have become avenues for individual profit although 
individuals involved in companies derived power from their positions.379 Tri-Star did 
not enter the traditional export sectors after these sectors were liberalised.  
Tri-Star was renamed Crystal Ventures Ltd. (CVL) in 2009. The company, 
like its earlier incarnation, was a ‘first-mover’ in several sectors including telephony, 
civil works and property management (Box 5.1). In 2014, CVL had a 50 per cent 
stake or more in 12 companies operating in Rwanda. CVL’s subsidiaries were the 
largest players in the sectors in which they operated. CVL had joint ventures with 
several foreign and domestic companies, including other investment groups. In 2013, 
CVL employed between 70,000 and 100,000 Rwandans and values itself at 500 
million USD (Mazimpaka 2013).380  
Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2011, 2012a) argued that CVL was an attractive 
partner for foreign investors, enticing investors to come to Rwanda. Gokgur (2012) 
disagreed with such claims. She suggested that the presence of investment groups 
inhibited domestic entrepreneurship and foreign investors. Gokgur claimed that 
domestic entrepreneurs and investors were reluctant to compete in environments 
where such companies held majority controls over operations. There was a 
perception among most ‘private’ respondents that investment groups received 
benefits that were not available to ‘private’ companies.381 Despite such claims, the 
presence of investment groups has not stopped increasing number of companies 
being registered across the country.382 Micro, small and medium enterprises 
accounted for 98 per cent of total businesses and accounted for 41 per cent of total 
                                                          
378 Reyntjens (2013, 165) implies RM made large profits, writing that these companies could not be 
developmental “if they underdeveloped its neighbours.” Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2012a) agree 
that the company did make some profits but these profits were was not as large as in MTN, the 
telephony company CVL had shares in. Mwenda (2013) claimed RM was an “unmitigated disaster.” 
379 Many trusted officers such as Dan Munyuza performed roles at RM. Munyuza served in the RPA 
during the liberation effort and he was a junior officer during the Congo Wars. In 2010, Munyuza was 
appointed Head of Military Intelligence. In 2011, he was transferred as Head of Foreign Intelligence. 
In 2013, Munyuza was named Deputy Inspector General of the Police.  
380 Considering Rwanda’s GDP is about $6.5 million, CVL’s value is more than 1/13th the value of the 
entire economy. 
381 Interviews, domestic private sector representatives, April and May 2012. 
382 Interview, Hannington Namara, CEO – PSF, April 2012. 
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private sector employment. Most of these companies did not survive beyond three 
years (MINICOM 2010). Complaints usually included difficulties in accessing 
finance, high costs of doing business and heavy taxes. In fact, many of these 
investment groups are now being encouraged to develop supply chains through 
backward linkages with Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs).383 Thus, there is no 
evidence that foreign investment or the growth of domestic companies is hampered 
by benefits received by investment groups.384 
While working as a consultant in Rwanda, Gokgur (2011) identified the 
presence of investment groups as an impediment to attracting foreign investment. 
Donors approached the government and questioned them about their use of these 
investment groups.385 Gradually, negative press regarding these companies gathered 
pace. The RNC and other critics highlighted the obstructive presence of these 
companies and accused the government of giving these groups benefits that were not 
accorded to other individuals in the private sector (Nyamwasa et al. 2010, 
Rudasingwa 2013). The government defended CVL’s failures and attributed them to 
mismanagement rather than corruption.  
“Donors criticised us about these companies. But do they know 
how China developed? It is easy to criticise but they don’t care to 
understand the functions of these companies.”386 
RPF members including Rujugiro, Alfred Kalisa,387 Faustin Mbundu,388 James 
Gatera389 and John Mirenge have previously led Tri-Star and CVL.390 In 2012, after 
criticism of CVL’s performance, there was a change in management (showing the 
government’s sensitivity to perceptions around these companies). Jack Kayonga, the 
                                                          
383 As part of EDPRS 2, the government encourages investment groups to become ‘vertically 
integrated’ to find new suppliers, rather than produce their own inputs (MINECOFIN 2013).  
384 “Sure, it isn’t easy to enter the market. But these companies are not the problem. I have an 
advantage because my partners and I are young and we have international experience and prior 
expertise. These groups are not efficient enough. It is easy to blame them but there are other reasons 
why companies don’t survive.” – Interview, Jean-Philippe Kayobotsi, Ujenge group, May 2013. 
385 Interviews, Dutch and British Embassy officials, Kigali, October and November 2011.  
386 Interview, Emmanuel Hategeka, MINICOM, January 2015. 
387 Alfred Kalisa was the CEO and Board Chairman of the former Bank of Commerce, Development 
and Industry (BCDI), which acted as an investment bank. In 2007, he was accused of illegally 
advancing loans to himself and his family members, totalling up to 800 million RwF, as well as 
inflating the cost of constructing the BCDI headquarters. He was pardoned in 2010 (Ssuuna 2010). 
388 Mbundu, Gatera and Mirenge were officially listed as CVL shareholders (Booth and Golooba-
Mutebi 2012a). Mbundu is from a Ugandan business family, which had also contributed towards the 
Production Unit. He owned several businesses. He was also PSF Chairman between 2011 and 2013, 
before leaving the post to devote more time “to his personal business” (Tabaro 2013b). 
389 Gatera has been the MD of the Bank of Kigali since 2007. 
390 Since 2010, Mirenge has been CEO of Rwandair. 
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former CEO of BRD, was named the new Chairman. He replaced Nshuti Manasseh. 
Elias Baingana, who had served as DG of the National Budget in MINECOFIN, was 
brought in as Chief Operating Officer of CVL.  
“Crystal Ventures is about changing the lives of our people. 
Criticisms have been unfair. For example, in construction, we have 
been criticised for taking deals. But we have about 5 per cent. The 
Chinese have 90 per cent. Many of our companies began as start-
ups. Since they have all grown tremendously. If you look at import 
substitution, we have invested in Granite. There has also been 
significant contribution to employment and to GDP. We are also 
transferring skills. When we started, 60 per cent of engineers were 
foreigners. Now, about 80 per cent are Rwandese.”391 
Formal investment groups also included RDF-owned companies.  
“It works as a ‘demonstration effect’ and the military companies 
are at the centre of it. The thinking is that the military is disciplined 
and successful. Let’s use these resources and get them to do public 
works, logistics etc. The military will push themselves better than 
others because they are trained in the ideology.”392 
The creation of Horizon Group (in 2007) led to a distinction between the 
party and the military in the economic sphere. Ownership is not held by the MoD 
directly. Instead, Horizon has two shareholders – Military Medical Insurance 
(MMI)393 and Credit Savings Society Zigama (CSS Zigama).394 The military was 
previously involved in undertaking socio-economic projects in line with national 
priorities. For instance, the military built the first coffee washing stations (CWS). 
Horizon’s first venture was a construction company, which was established after an 
initial gift of equipment from the government and military engineers were seconded 
from the army (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2012a). Horizon built irrigation dykes 
and later began constructing roads. In constructing the first asphalt concrete road in 
Rwanda, Horizon cut the cost of such investments in half.395 Earlier, German-owned 
STRABAG and Chinese construction companies had collaborated to fix artificially 
higher prices. Such investments also created jobs for Rwandans (since some 
                                                          
391 Interview, Kayonga, January 2015. 
392 Interview, former OTF consultant, February 2012. 
393 MMI operates directly under the Ministry of Defence. It guarantees high quality healthcare to its 
employees, in accordance with the norms of the Rwandan healthcare system. It receives money 
directly from salaries of military personnel.  
394 CSS Zigama was founded in 1997 and inaugurated in 1999 as a microfinance bank for military 
officers. As of 2011, it counted 60,000 members and 122 employees, operating 14 branches. It had 
also begun to operate as an investment bank for military companies. 
395 Interview, Eugene Haguma – CEO Horizon, May 2013. 
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international companies including Chinese construction companies and Indian 
hydropower projects continued to employ labour from their own countries). Horizon 
Logistics is another subsidiary and is involved in supporting the activities of the 
peacekeeping forces. Horizon SOPYRWA is the third subsidiary and is engaged in 
pyrethrum processing. Horizon’s board does not include any military officers, apart 
from its CEO. Officially, Horizon and other military companies operate 
autonomously. In reality, hiring-and-firing decisions and other forms of pressure are 
exerted directly from the Ministry of Defence (or higher up).396 
 API formerly operated under the banner of Horizon as Horizon Agro-based 
Production. Like Horizon, the company’s shares are split between MMI and CSS 
Zigama. Unlike Horizon, its senior management (in 2011) almost entirely comprised 
senior military officers. API’s operations were geared to make the most out of RDF-
owned land and to address food security.  
“The problems we are addressing are both internal and external. 
Prioritising the economy is important for us if we are to address the 
security of the country. You can never divorce the RDF from food 
security. Our enemy is hunger. API has shown that massive 
production of one crop (cassava) can address the problems of our 
people. Now, we are doing so well that farmers are looking at 
cassava as a cash crop. If a shop in Rwanda is not selling Kinigi 
flour then I would say it is not functioning for Rwandans.”397  
API directly employed farmers in the production of coffee, cassava and other 
strategic crops, providing a source of wage labour.398 API employed soldiers in 
cassava production across 1,300 hectares of land. As of 2011, the company operated 
ten CWS, had harvested 800 ha worth of maize and planted 400 ha of soyabean in 
Eastern Province.399 Some of API’s operations are located in Gako where the military 
academy is based. Out of 1000 ha of land in Gako, 700 ha was allocated to cassava 
production and 90 ha to soyabean production. API also owned the Nyanza dairy, 
which is one of the oldest dairies in Rwanda, and invested $800,000 in the upgrading 
of the facility (Gathani and Stoelinga 2013). While the other investment groups are 
                                                          
396 CEOs of API and Ngali both mentioned that they were directly answerable to Kabarebe or Jack 
Nziza. Haguma also mentioned that he maintained contact with MoD and is answerable to them.  
397 Interview, Nzabamwita, January 2015. 
398 It only produces and exports 100 per cent fully washed coffee in line with national priorities. 
399 Interview, Emmanuel Nzamurambaho, API, April 2012. 
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engaged in sectors other than agriculture, this firm is focused on intensifying 
agriculture production (as well as value-addition in coffee). 
 Ngali Holdings (previously known as Digitech) was established in 2010. 
Ngali had a similar structure to Horizon. There were few serving military officers 
comprising Ngali’s management or Board of Directors. The CEO is Major Andrew 
Nyamvumba who is on a secondment from the army.400 Similar to Horizon, 
disciplinary power over hiring-and-firing resides in the Ministry of Defence (or 
higher up).401 Ngali was originally set up as an engineering firm. It has broadened its 
mandate to include infrastructure, Information and Communications Technology 
(ICT), energy, healthcare, pharmaceuticals and ecology (Box 5.1). The company was 
created to assist in meeting Rwanda’s structural deficits, particularly in relation to 
energy. Ngali aimed at having at least 255 MW worth of energy projects by 2017, 
which would likely cost around 778 million USD. Ngali had already developed 
several partnerships with companies in China, Czech Republic, Spain, South Africa, 
Kenya and DRC.402 Ngali also helped establish the East Africa Commodity Exchange 
(EAX).403 Ngali co-owns the EAX with Nigerian Tony Elumelu’s Foundation, Heirs 
Holdings, Berggruen Holdings and 50 Ventures.   
“Our mandate is to help solve the structural deficits that our 
country faces. We work in the national interest. Energy is one of 
our key constraints to sustain economic development. We are 
looking for strategic partners. The vision is to do things no one else 
is ready to do but that will benefit Rwanda in the long-run.”404 
 There are many informal investment groups that operate in Rwanda. Among 
these groups is the Rwanda Investment Group (RIG), which was created in 2006. 
The creation of RIG was part of a national drive to pool investments to strategic 
sectors. There are also regional investment groups and sector-specific investment 
groups. The Petrocom Group, headed by Egide Gatera, is another example of such a 
group.405 These were patriotic projects.406  
                                                          
400 Andrew Nyamvumba is CDS Patrick Nyamvumba’s brother. He was involved in the liberation 
effort in the early 1990s.  
401 Interview, Nyamvumba, April 2012. 
402 Internal Ngali documents. 
403 On 5 November 2013, the first trade deal was conducted on the EAX, with 50 metric tonnes of 
maize sold by a Ugandan to a Rwandese farmer for $19,900 (Mugwe 2013). 
404 Interview, Andrew Nyamvumba, CEO – Ngali, October 2011. 
405 Discussed in Chapter 8. 
406 Interview, Mbundu, March 2012.  
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“It was all the President’s initiative. Businessmen sometimes 
complained about lack of funds when they were asked to invest in 
national projects. He called some of the most important Rwandan 
businessmen to his farm and asked them: ‘Can you think bigger 
than sole ownership?’ From that meeting, RIG started getting 
capital. RIG went into energy and cement. These investments are 
made where the country needs it most.”407 
Originally, RIG’s shares were split between Hatari Sekoko, Rujugiro, the 
National Social Security Fund (NSSF), Tri-Star and various private individuals 
(Gokgur 2012). The share base transformed over time. Within the first two years of 
operation, RIG invested over 11 billion RwF, mostly in energy, cement and real 
estate (RIG 2009). Investments are now restricted to energy and cement – two 
important strategic sectors.408 Investments in energy contribute to solving 
infrastructural constraints. Cement is among Rwanda’s top imports. The cement 
company, CIMERWA, had previously been managed by a Chinese company 
(CBMC) under a Build, Own, Operate and Transfer (BOOT) agreement that expired 
in July 2006. The government then sold a 90 per cent stake in the company to RIG. 
“Since RIG’s acquisition, the company has been operating with an installed capacity 
of 100,000 tonnes per year to serve the domestic market, although the estimated 
domestic demand is approximately 370,000 tonnes” (Gathani and Stoelinga 2013, 
168). After a failure to raise additional funding, RIG sold a large percentage of its 
shares to the BRD and RSSB (ibid). RIG is a relatively smaller enterprise than 
formal investment groups. It has been much harder to discipline individual investors 
to invest in strategic sectors.409  
 Contributions to the academic debate about these companies hold that all 
these firms have the same interests. Gokgur (2012, 35) labels these investment 
groups as “extractive economic and political institutions.” Booth and Golooba-
Mutebi (2011, 2012a) argue that these companies deploy rents in line with long-
horizon rent centralisation. These contrasting arguments do not recognise the 
competing interests among Rwandan elites. Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2013) 
emphasise how RPF cadres work proactively to achieve consensus, rather than 
highlighting that the commitment of elites is strengthened through shared 
                                                          
407 Interview, Mirenge. 
408 MINECOFIN (2013) estimates current domestic installed energy capacity at 110 MW and 
anticipates a demand of 563 MW in the medium term. 
409 Interview, consultant – PSF, March 2012. 
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experiences of vulnerability. The centralisation of rents is legitimised by arguments 
that strict discipline is imposed within these companies.410 The dominant coalition 
would be hypocritical if they were taking rents away from individual elites and using 
it for their own corrupt motives (thus battering the credibility of their own narrative). 
Developing new investment groups has created organisations that compete for rents 
that are distributed by the Presidency. While these companies collaborate with each 
other, they are expanding by looking for new investments in new sectors.411  
 The debate is quick to judge the outcome of this strategy. The investment 
groups should be analysed on a sector-specific basis with emphasis on understanding 
rent seeking as a process. The net effect of rent seeking should be equated with the 
net social benefits associated with rent outcomes minus the cost involved in seeking 
rents (Khan 2000b). The next section details the example of Horizon SOPYRWA, 
describing how this company was disciplined after private owners had failed to make 
the most of ‘first-mover advantages’ that were originally allocated to them. Judging 
the strategy as a ‘process’ in relation to wider social benefits shows evidence of 
control grabs, according to Huggins (2014). However, Huggins (2014) simplistically 
assumes that these companies are being used to make elites rich (without any 
evidence). It is more likely that control grabs are being used to speed up the pace of 
class formation in rural areas that are necessary for accumulation strategies. This 
example shows that the government is more willing to facilitate formal investment 
groups (who it controls) than private investors. However, even when capitalist 
accumulation is facilitated successfully, exogenous factors such as reduced 
international prices can impede growth.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
410 Interview, Haguma, May 2013. 
411 As Haguma said, “there will always be a need for Horizon in the economy. As long as Rwanda 
wants to develop new sectors, Horizon will have a place.” (Interview, Haguma, May 2013). 
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Box 5.1: The Investment Groups 
 
5.5 Investment Groups in Action: Horizon SOPYRWA 
 
Pyrethrum is a natural flower-based pesticide, used as an alternative to 
synthetic chemical pesticides to control a wide range of insects. It was introduced in 
Rwanda in 1936. In 1963, the Kayibanda government expanded the pyrethrum 
industry. The Kayibanda government granted two hectares of land to each individual 
farmer in the Virunga region, located in northwest Rwanda. The rich volcanic soil in 
the Northwest and the high altitudes suited the production of pyrethrum. Rwanda is 
one of the few countries (including Kenya, Ecuador, Tanzania and Australia) that 
produces significant quantities of pyrethrum. In the 1970s, the government merged a 
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“planters association” with an industrial facility, creating OPYRWA – a company 
that processed the flowers to export raw pyrethrum extract. The Habyarimana 
government increased production until the global market suffered in the late 1980s.  
The RPF government had three specific goals in the pyrethrum sector. Firstly, 
it aimed at ensuring farmers and wage workers were organised to cultivate pyrethrum 
(and they received necessary inputs) so consistent quantities of pyrethrum would be 
supplied to the factory. Second, owners of the factory would invest in the necessary 
technological innovations to better the quality of pyrethrum extracts produced in the 
factory. Third, value-addition would be prioritised in terms of improving the quality 
of pyrethrum produced and manufacturing pesticides using that pyrethrum. The 
government managed its ‘three constituencies’ by initially privatising the factory 
(embracing market-led reforms) before buying the factory and placing it under 
Horizon’s control (thereby centralising rents) and promising benefits would be 
distributed among ‘small farmers’ through ‘cooperatives’. Organising production in 
this way was coercive but it also ensured better distribution of agricultural inputs 
(Huggins 2014). Though these constituencies were managed, reduced international 
prices and shifts in higher nodes of the global pyrethrum chain have impeded growth 
in the sector. Interviews and statistics indicate that the government has chosen not to 
force continued pyrethrum cultivation.412 This is a significant difference between the 
current government and the Habyarimana government, which forced cash crop 
cultivation despite a fall in global prices in 1980s. 
Before Horizon’s takeover 
 
Until 2001, domestic pyrethrum production remained at low levels because of 
conflict in Northwestern Rwanda. Then Finance Minister Donald Kaberuka opted for 
privatisation as the solution to revitalising production in the sector. OPYRWA was 
among the 31 public companies privatised between 1997 and 2003. It was sold to 
four businessmen, including Paul Muvunyi who served as Chairman and Managing 
Director. Kaberuka urged Muvunyi and other owners to invest in production and 
quality increases (Engineering News Online 2002).413  
                                                          
412 Interview, Bill Kayonga – NAEB, January 2015. 
413 Kaberuka was Finance Minister from 1997 to 2005. He was then elected AfDB President. 
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OPYRWA was renamed SOPYRWA by private investors. Even though 
international prices for pyrethrum increased, domestic production of pyrethrum 
flowers steadily decreased between 2004 and 2008 (Figures 5.6-5.8).  While 
SOPYRWA was under private ownership, price per unit of the product remained 
low, as did total revenues (Figure 5.7). Exports increased in 2006 and 2007 because 
regional production was being sent to Rwanda after a fire in Kenya’s pyrethrum 
processing factory.414 While SOPYRWA was in ‘private’ hands, production declined 
from 1350 metric tonnes (mt) of dried flowers in 2004 to 209 mt in 2008. Pyrethrum 
farmers switched to growing potatoes because they were not paid.415 The company 
was accused of “financial mismanagement leading to cash shortages in the refinery, 
buyers not being supplied and SOPYRWA’s failure to invest in new seed stocks, 
extension services and maintenance of the factory.”416 Foreign buyers, including 
Valent BioSciences, Whitmeyer and SC Johnson, did not receive the pyrethrum 
promised in contracts with SOPYRWA. The company then filed for bankruptcy.  
 
Source: MINECOFIN and Huggins (2013a) 
                                                          
414 Interview, Eugene Haguma, May 2013. Kenya began sending Rwanda its pyrethrum production in 
2004 (Masibo 2004). 
415 Internal MINAGRI document. 
416 Ibid. 
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Source: MINECOFIN 
 
Source: MINECOFIN 
Post-Horizon takeover 
Private investors were unable to incentivise farmers to produce pyrethrum in 
the region. Muvunyi claimed that farmers received increased prices after the factory 
was rebuilt in 2007, with Horizon’s additional investments (Namara 2007). Horizon 
established full control over the company and invested in the revitalisation of the 
processing plant. The government facilitated Horizon’s accumulation strategies by 
encouraging farmers to join cooperatives. Horizon used these cooperatives to 
organise labour to pyrethrum production (Huggins 2014). Consequently, domestic 
production of pyrethrum increased. SOPYRWA claims to have the best quality 
pyrethrum extract in the world and produces five per cent of global production. 
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Those involved in the sector claimed that global supply currently only meets half (or 
even a quarter) of global demand (Namata 2009; USAID 2010a).417 
At first, Horizon bought 70 per cent of the plant. Karisimbi Business Partners 
– a Kigali-based consultancy that was involved in SOPYRWA’s turnaround – cited 
the change in ownership as crucial to revitalising the sector (Kalan 2012). Horizon 
invested in upgrading the processing plant and worked with the government to 
ensure farmers in the region dedicated 40 per cent of their land to growing 
pyrethrum. The rise in unit price and total revenues from pyrethrum was dramatic 
(Figures 5.7-5.8). Exports did not reach the heights of 2006 but have shown steady 
improvement (Figure 5.6). Horizon made investments in upgrading equipment and 
refurbishing the factory. Managers travelled to other countries (e.g. Australia and 
Kenya) to learn from best practices around the world. In 2012, the government asked 
SOPYRWA to treble its revenues over the following three years. Additional land was 
also allocated to growing pyrethrum. Horizon was effective in organising labour to 
the production of pyrethrum and attracting better prices for Rwandan pyrethrum. In 
2011, Horizon established a joint venture with UK-based Agropharm Ld., named 
Agropharm Africa Ltd. This joint venture was established to refurbish the pyrethrum 
refining plant and collaborate with Horizon in the production of end-use pesticides. 
Value-addition attempts have been successful, with Agropharm producing a variety 
of products, including end-use pesticides. These pesticides have been used in the 
domestic agriculture sector over the past two years.  
Horizon appealed publicly to farmers to grow pyrethrum in public meetings 
and in newspaper articles (Gasore 2013). To address the concerns of farmers, 
Horizon worked with USAID to organise farmers into 24 cooperatives and savings 
and credit cooperatives. USAID (2010b) reported that farmers were being paid at 
least 20-40 per cent more than in 2008. This ‘organisation of labour’ was legitimised 
by donor choices to support the empowerment of cooperatives. The choice to 
empower cooperatives was a way for the state to speed up processes of rural 
differentiation and facilitate accumulation strategies. The Ministry of Agriculture and 
                                                          
417 Interview, Gabriel Bizimungu, MD-Horizon SOPYRWA, November 2011. 
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Animal Husbandry (MINAGRI) works closely with Horizon to organise labour in 
service of Horizon’s accumulation strategies (e.g. providing access to inputs).418 
Critical commentators such as Huggins (2014) argue that predatory elites 
dominate most cooperatives in the agriculture sector since they are administered 
from top-down rather than from bottom-up. Huggins (2014) describes one 
cooperative in Musanze where farmers preferred to sell their land to the cooperative 
at below-market rates rather than join and risk confrontation with the powerful 
cooperative president. He claims similar trends have developed in the pyrethrum 
sector and argued that farmers are coerced into growing pyrethrum (Huggins 2014, 
376). He finds evidence that a ‘control grab’ took place where transfer of control 
over the mechanics of land use and agricultural production was taken away from the 
smallholder farm households by state agencies.  
Though Horizon’s investments were initially effective, progress has hit 
roadblocks recently. Between 2012 and 2014, international pyrethrum prices fell by 
more than 20 per cent. In the same period, unit prices decreased by more than 32 per 
cent and the volume of pyrethrum exports fell by 73.6 per cent from 35.9 tonnes to 
9.46 tonnes (BNR 2014). The farmgate price for producers (1,080 RwF) was not 
reduced (Nkurunziza 2014). Poor weather conditions and difficulty in accessing the 
market had a detrimental effect. Pyrethrum exports more than halved between 2012 
and 2013 (reaching $3.98 million in 2013 and $1.83 million in 2014). Farmers began 
to publicly criticise Horizon for forcing them to grow pyrethrum despite low returns 
(despite the government officially encouraging farmers to intercrop with potatoes). 
One farmer complained: “We should not be stopped from cultivating food crops on 
the land… if we grow potatoes, we get enough food and money to send our children 
to school” (Habimana 2013). Bizimungu and NAEB officials argued that ‘farmers 
needed to change their mindset’ and that farmers were offered services, which would 
bring the value of one kilo of pyrethrum flowers to nearly 3000 RwF (Habimana 
2013). Government officials complained that farmers’ yields remained low despite 
the provision of free organic manure and improved seeds (Nkurunziza 2014). 
Government interventions facilitated Horizon’s investments and contributed 
to capitalist accumulation. Strategies in the sector were geared to achieving value-
                                                          
418 Interview, Raphael Rurangwa – MINAGRI, February 2012. 
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addition and increasing productivity in line with achieving ideological goals of self-
reliance.  Reduced global prices hampered growth in productivity and quality. 
However, the government has not reduced the farmgate price. Statistics of reduced 
production indicate that the government has not forced farmers to grow pyrethrum or 
that farmers have successfully resisted such coercion (if it was applied). This shows 
that the government and Horizon have been forced to react to the international 
environment and the demands of labour while organising capitalist accumulation.  
5.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
 This chapter has detailed the values that are expected of RPF cadres in line 
with Economic Nationalism. It has shown how Agaciro has reflected ways in which 
the government has been forced to navigate the demands of three constituencies. 
Investment groups are symbols of RPF ideology. They have been used to respond to 
difficulties in dealing with demands from three constituencies. The continued 
prominence of investment groups reflects the government’s difficulties in developing 
partnerships with loyal investors. Though the use of these investment groups has 
often been marked with increased productivity and progress in line with strategic 
goals, the RPF ideological project and its narratives mask that success depends on 
the exploitation of workers. This is the case with Horizon SOPYRWA, where 
‘success’ has been projected through empowering cooperatives, increasing the 
quality and quantities of pyrethrum production. Through organising ‘small farmers’ 
into ‘cooperatives’, accumulation strategies were facilitated and legitimised by 
donors (as USAID and the IFC gave funds to these policies). Capitalist accumulation 
expanded in the sector until adverse international prices inhibited growth.  
Being perceived to represent the values of Economic Nationalism helps 
Kagame retain a hold on power. Investment groups are used to centralise control 
over rents in the pursuit of self-reliance, while reducing the opportunity for rivals to 
develop independent control over rents. However, these groups are also easy targets 
for critics who equate close state-business relations with corruption. The government 
has strategically managed such perceptions by avoiding publicising the work of these 
companies, hiding some of them and demonstrating that it disciplines individuals 
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who are accused of mismanagement or corruption.419 For example, two Horizon 
officials were accused of embezzling funds in 2010 (Ndikubwayezu 2009). Paul 
Semana and John Zigira were later retired during an episode of mass retirements in 
2013. This incident shows that while these companies are not free from becoming 
avenues for personal corruption, the government disciplines those who are accused 
of such activities. Conversely, it could also be argued that charges of corruption are 
used by ruling elites to legitimise choices to oust certain officers (since both Zigira 
and Semana were rumoured to have been close to Nyamwasa, who fled the country 
in 2010). The centralisation of rents and authority is threatened, either when there is 
a possibility that certain individuals may become rivals or through individual acts of 
corruption. However, the dominant coalition is sensitive to such threats and works to 
consolidate control over rents. 
 Rwanda’s economic strategy is a product of the international environment, 
which demands it conducts development in certain ways. However, the RPF 
government (as with other East Asian developmental states) finds way to intervene in 
markets to prioritise achieving strategic goals. Interactions with foreign actors and 
global markets contribute to determining the trajectory of economic policymaking. 
Equally, domestic pressures (from rival elites and the population) determine the 
space within which the government can enforce capitalist accumulation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
419 Ngali, despite its size and mandate, is not ‘known’. Donors said that they had never heard of the 
company (Interviews, Donors, October 2011-May 2012).  
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CHAPTER 6: COFFEE WAS POWER – 
MAINTAINING A DEVELOPMENTAL 
POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN RWANDA’S 
COFFEE SECTOR 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter describes the evolution of the coffee sector in Rwanda. The RPF 
government’s strategy of pursuing value-addition contrasts with the strategies of 
previous governments, which focused on the production and export of low-quality 
coffee. Understanding the transformation of the coffee sector contributes to 
illuminating how ruling elites have navigated “three constituencies” while remaining 
committed to achieving self-reliance. Government strategies have been characteristic 
of developmental states, as highlighted by Wade (1990) – with the government 
making productive investments, intervening to promote value-addition and exposing 
the sector to foreign competition.  
The strategic position of coffee in national politics is common among late 
developing countries, with 90 per cent of coffee produced in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America (Ponte 2002). Coffee production in Rwanda has never represented even one 
per cent of global coffee production.420 However, coffee has been Rwanda’s leading 
export for most of its history. More than 98 per cent of the coffee produced in 
Rwanda is Arabica coffee. Robusta coffee is only produced in the Southern Province 
and some is exported out of Rwanda after arriving from neighbouring countries. 
Coffee is produced throughout Rwanda except in the northeast and southeast corners. 
Coffee production is concentrated in the central and western provinces. The coffee 
season has two harvests. The first occurs between March and June. The second, 
smaller harvest takes place between September and November.  
The RPF government has focused on moving away from the production of 
low-quality semi-washed coffee (SWC) to high-quality fully washed coffee (FWC). 
It has also roasted coffee domestically, sold single-origin packaged coffee abroad 
                                                          
420 Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) data indicates Rwanda’s highest 
share of global coffee production was achieved in 1986 (0.79 per cent). 
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and established coffee shops abroad. Rwanda is not the only country to have 
transformed its coffee sector in this way. In 1989 in Mexico, the rupture of the 
International Coffee Agreement (ICA), coupled with broader neoliberal market 
reforms, meant that coffee producers lost their price support (Calo and Wise 2005). 
The dismantling of the parastatal Instituto Mexicano del Café (INMECAFE) in 1993 
sent further shocks to Mexican coffee producers (Foley 1995). During this time, 
cooperatives began efforts that made Mexico a pioneer in the organic coffee market, 
even exporting the first organic coffee (Nigh 1997, Barham et al. 2011). In 2014, 
Mexico was the second largest exporter of organic coffee, behind Peru (Perez 2014).  
To break into niche markets, The RPF government has identified the 
importance of “selling the Rwandan story” to build the brand of Rwandan coffee.421 
These initiatives are taken to tap into “coffee karma" (Zizek 2014). Certification 
from organisations such as fair trade supports narratives that emphasise that progress 
within the coffee sector benefits vulnerable workers.422 Developing narratives that 
support the image of specialty coffee benefiting vulnerable segments of the 
population is essential to legitimise the changes to the systems of accumulation that 
have accompanied shifts in production techniques. 
RPF narratives project that growth has been aimed at improving the 
livelihoods of the rural population.  
“The whole idea of VISION 2020 was to transform livelihoods of 
the rural people. It was all the President’s idea and success is down 
to his leadership.”423 
Donors and the existing literature focus on the conditions of ‘smallholders’ 
who are perceived as a homogeneous group. This distorts the picture of rural 
conditions. The narratives that are created mystify that the expansion of the coffee 
sector depends on the continued exploitation of producers. The government has 
organised labour through empowering local elites (on the basis of loyalty) and by 
                                                          
421 Internal OTF and NAEB presentations. Zizek takes the example of Starbucks’ ad campaign: “It’s 
not just what you’re buying. It’s what you’re buying into.” Campaigns such as these emphasise the 
importance of buying into a coffee culture where consumers buy into Starbucks’ fair trade coffee and 
thereby support small farmers who grow coffee around the world. Such ‘coffee karma’ is usually 
misplaced. “Fairtrade standards have been based on the erroneous assumption that the vast majority of 
production is based on family labour” (FTEPR 2014, 16). 
422 Rwanda has among the highest number of fair trade certified coffee producer organisations in 
Africa (Elder et al. 2012).  
423 Interview, MINICOM official, November 2011. 
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organising farmers in cooperatives. For systems of accumulation (and shifts in 
production techniques) to be sustained, minimising resistance is essential. RPF 
narratives justify the use of coercion in the short-term if changes in production 
techniques result in better outcomes.  
“Change does not come so easily. We had to use a stick and tell 
them to do things. Our farmers just used to get beans, put them in a 
sock and take them. We wanted to do something to change it. We 
built washing stations, organised cooperatives. Now, everyone is 
convinced. This is the effect of long-term planning.”424 
RPF narratives project that liberalisation of trade-and export and the ‘private’ 
control of washing stations have been responsible for productivity increases.425 Such 
claims fit the RPF’s strategy of publicly embracing ‘market-led reforms’.426 This 
chapter shows that loyal private investors or investment groups have invested in the 
most risky innovations (like setting up coffee shops or roasting coffee) in the sector. 
Foreign-owned companies dominate ‘trade-and-export’ operations. To retain 
ownership of policies, the government faces challenges in facilitating loyal investors, 
as well as disciplining and monitoring the performance of exporting companies and 
owners of washing stations.  
As is expected of any government, the RPF government officials rarely 
recognise the achievements of preceding governments. “Before 1994, those 
governments concentrated on nothing. They had no strategy and no policies so they 
went nowhere.”427 The ‘miracle’ nature of the crop stresses how coffee production 
has lifted many out of poverty and how it has fostered reconciliation.428 The ‘miracle’ 
story also focuses on how women have been empowered through the cultivation of 
coffee.429 While the government has made investments in the rehabilitation of the 
                                                          
424 Interview, Nzabamwita, January 2015. 
425 “After 1994, it was decided to liberalise the coffee sector. After investors came in, it became easier 
to export. Domestic investors were important in setting up washing stations. If it was just the 
government, we would not have done so much” (Interview, Pontien Munyankera, NAEB, February 
2012). 
426 “At the RDB, we facilitate investors to step up their investments. We monitor their activities and 
help them with anything they need. I have a large team in my (agriculture) department and account 
managers responsible for every company” (Interview, Tony Nsanganira, then-RDB, March 2012).  
427 Interview, BNR official, May 2013. 
428 McLaughlin (2006) describes how Tutsis in the Abahuzamugambi coffee cooperative worked with 
Hutus who helped murder their family members. 
429 In a Washington Post article, Weiner (2014) describes how Rwandan coffee plantations are 
increasingly run by women. This story provides publicity for the CVL-owned Bourbon Coffee shop in 
Washington, D.C. Another article describes how Sainsbury’s sells single-origin Rwandan coffee 
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sector, the Habyarimana government actually outperformed the RPF in coffee 
production and exports and in export revenues (Figure 6.1, 6.3, 6.4). Habyarimana 
prioritised coffee production at the cost of other traditional sectors (tea and minerals) 
and the manufacturing sector (which enjoyed growth in the 1970s). Since the RPF 
government took over, coffee exports remained low until 2003 but have increased 
since then (Figure 6.3). Revenues increased after 2003 because of the regeneration of 
coffee production and resurgence in global coffee prices. Domestic coffee production 
has not responded to international prices, showing that price signals do not directly 
affect the behaviour of cultivators (Figure 6.1). The average price of Rwandan coffee 
exports has remained close to global coffee prices (New York-C).430  
 
Source: FAOSTAT and World Bank 
Yield in the 1970s was comparable to the early years of the RPF government. 
However, yield has consistently decreased whenever there has been an increase in 
area under coffee cultivation (Figure 6.2). This is a general trend both for the 
Habyarimana government (since 1984) and the RPF government (since 2006).431 
Such trends suggest that increasing the area of coffee harvested was either met with 
increased resistance or marginal lands were brought under cultivation. It indicates 
that coffee production, rather than being an opportunity for farmers, may be 
cultivated through coercion or out of necessity. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
produced by female smallholder coffee farmers in the Agricultural Coffee Cooperative of Mabanza 
(KOPAKAMA) (Rooke 2014). 
430 New York-C is the standard reference price for coffee worldwide. 
431 These trends were more dramatic for the Habyarimana government. 
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Figure 6.1: Total Coffee Production and Global Coffee Prices: 
1961-2013
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Source: FAOSTAT 
 
Source: Rwanda Coffee Development Authority (OCIR-Café) and MINECOFIN 
 
 Source: OCIR-Café and MINECOFIN 
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Figure 6.2: Total Area Harvested for Coffee and Yield: 1961-2013
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Figure 6.5 indicates the monthly volumes and prices of coffee exports. Export 
volumes of coffee do not neatly correlate with increases in export prices, suggesting 
that factors other than price determine the volume of coffee that is exported.  Most 
ordinary coffee in Rwanda has traditionally been exported between April and 
September.432 FWC is exported throughout the year. Timings of international 
competitions such as the Cup of Excellence (CoE) also have an impact. Since 2006, 
the government has strategically managed quantities of coffee exports by reacting to 
price fluctuations in international coffee prices. Previously, the government had 
failed to maximise revenues when international prices spiked (MINAGRI 2008a).  
 
Source: MINECOFIN 
 
Source: MINECOFIN and World Bank 
                                                          
432 There is usually a surge in exports in one month every year (July 2010, September 2011, August 
2012). Before 2006, annual highs were usually recorded in June or July. Increased export volumes in 
these months were not matched by annual highs in export prices, except for in 2012 (Figure 6.5) 
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Chapter 6A illustrates the historical evolution of coffee sector policies. 
Previous governments achieved success in increasing coffee production. However, 
they never made any attempt to reduce vulnerability to fluctuations in commodity 
prices. When coffee prices fell in the late 1980s, the Habyarimana government’s 
decision to force coffee cultivation on the population reflected its short-term 
priorities. The RPF government has learned from the mistakes of previous 
governments. It prioritises value-addition to counter vulnerability to fluctuations in 
global commodity prices. Such policies also contribute to achieving its ideological 
goal (self-reliance).  
There has been some academic research (e.g. Elder et al. 2012, Guariso et al. 
2012, Mujawamariya et al. 2013) undertaken in the Post-1994 Rwanda coffee sector. 
Most of the empirical evidence presented in this chapter about the Post-1994 Rwanda 
coffee sector is a result of primary data. Existing academic literature and government 
documents have also been used as sources. Most statistical data has been obtained 
directly from government sources. Some historical data has also been taken from 
online databases (e.g. World Bank and FAO databases). Existing academic work also 
contributed to detailing the history of the coffee sector.  
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6A – The Politics of Coffee Production 
in Pre-1994 Rwanda 
6.2 Coffee and the Politics of National Development  
 
Everywhere coffee has been grown,  
the politics of coffee has proved central to the politics of national development.433 
 
 Paige’s (1997) Coffee and Power describes how coffee dynasties in three 
Central American countries shaped the political and economic trajectories of these 
countries. Coffee elites in these countries were divided into agrarian (landed coffee 
elite) and agro-industrial factions (coffee processors). The expansion of the agro-
export economy in Central America was accompanied by increased exploitation of 
the population. This exploitation fostered new social forces that challenged the old 
order. The landed coffee elite and coffee processors in these countries suppressed 
their differences when they were under attack from revolutionary elements through 
the 20th century. In the 1980s, revolutionary elements within these countries 
challenged the political status quo. This challenge tempted the agro-industrial faction 
to confront the traditional power of the agrarian faction. Ultimately, breakaway 
groups of agro-industrial elites triumphed. Their support came from a wave of new 
social forces built on the grievances of the population. However, the success of these 
revolutions did not result in gains for peasants.434 The victorious agro-industrial elites 
adopted neoliberalism, which helped them concentrate control over economic 
resources, rather than delivering on promises of liberalism and freedom.  
Elites in these countries chose to adopt neoliberalism through very different 
paths. In El Salvador, coffee elites supported an extreme right-wing party. In 
Nicaragua, coffee elites supported socialist revolution and in Costa Rica, coffee elites 
supported sustained democracy (Paige 1997). Elite narratives stressed that freedom 
and liberalism would be an outcome of their economic reforms. In reality, these 
                                                          
433 Bates (1997, 1) 
434 Revolution has a variety of definitions. It is used by some to represent dangers threatening 
governments and for others, it is the only sign of action against repressive governments (Yoder 1926). 
For Marx, revolutions were not just restricted to political change but entailed a fundamental change in 
norms and values and how people experienced the world (Kraminick 1972). Though the narratives of 
revolutions highlighted in this chapter were ‘publicly’ fought to achieve such change, these 
revolutions rarely delivered their promises. 
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revolutions re-empowered elites whose plans “were very much at odds with the goals 
for which peasants had imagined they were fighting” (Scott 1985, 29). 
Social relations around coffee production have been central in determining 
the trajectories of political and social transformation in many African countries (but 
in quite different ways). In Angola, the expansion of the coffee export economy 
between 1950 and 1960 led to the expropriation of African-owned lands and the 
growth of a migratory labour system. Such economic changes were met with 
resistance by a political coalition comprising coffee labourers, African coffee farmers 
and traditional tribal authorities. A revolutionary nationalist movement, rather than a 
revolutionary socialist movement, was the result (Paige 1975). In Kenya, a post-war 
assault on an emerging African capitalist class fed rising resentment against the 
colonial government (Cramer and Richards 2011). The Mau Mau uprising that 
followed was an alliance between three groups of discontented Kikuyu: the urban 
unemployed and destitute; dispossessed squatters and poor peasants and tenants and 
members of junior lineages of the Kikuyu who were dispossessed of their land when 
senior lineages developed exclusive access (Throup 1987). In the post-independence 
period in Kenya, Africans (of which many were Kikuyus) obtained 90 per cent of the 
total acreage of foreign-owned coffee (Sender and Smith 1986). In Tanzania, the 
colonial administration discouraged the emergence of African capitalist 
agriculture.435 Near the end of colonial rule, the administration supported 
smallholders in coffee production and encouraged the formation of cooperatives. 
Nyerere later disbanded cooperatives in favour of ujamaa village units – central to 
nationalist discourse.436 In the mid-1990s, the coffee sector was liberalised. Foreign 
companies then captured the market before the government re-empowered local 
interests (Ponte 2004). Coffee, itself, did not bring political changes. To understand 
the politics around the production of commodities, “it is important to explore the 
social relations that surrounded, built up and helped determine policy towards 
particular commodities” (Cramer 2006, 151). 
                                                          
435 Rwandans provided the main source of labour for coffee and cotton farms in Bukoba in northwest 
Tanzania (Raikes 1978, 306). 
436 Ujamaa is translated as familyhood, community and socialism or more generally translated as 
‘development’ in idea and practice (Hunter 2008). Ujamaa acted as a rhetorical commonplace for 
nationalism in Tanzania. Such ideas directly opposed former colonial rulers (and South Asian traders).  
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The revolutionary narratives embodied by agro-industrial elites in Central 
American countries drew upon the grievances of the population but identified a false 
enemy (Paige 1997). Victorious elites simply replaced other elite factions. 
Kayibanda led the ‘ethnic’ revolution in 1959 by drawing on popular grievances 
against exploitative elites. He emphasised a ‘false’ ethnic identity of these opponents 
to clearly identify a common enemy.437 As a leader of the coffee cooperative, 
Kayibanda depicted himself as the leader of farmers fighting against the oppression 
of the Tutsi monarchy. In reality, the elites that took over independent Rwanda 
simply replaced former chiefs and the colonial administration.  
Since then, politics around the coffee sector has been central to political 
transitions in Rwanda. Tensions over rents in the coffee sector have contributed to 
tensions among elites. When rents under the control of Northern elites were 
threatened by Kayibanda’s southern base, Habyarimana mounted a coup to protect 
these rents. While prices were high in the 1970s, Habyarimana’s elite bargain was 
relatively stable. When coffee prices fell in 1980, Ruhengeri elites (a rival group in 
the Northwest) attempted a (failed) coup against Habyarimana. As the prices of 
coffee, tea and tin fell in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Habyarimana was 
increasingly reliant on the coffee sector as a source of rents for his elites. Farmers 
were also forced to produce coffee despite decreasing international prices. This led to 
genuine grievances among the population, which were mobilised along ethnic lines 
by extremist Hutu Power elites during the civil war and genocide that followed. 
6.3 The Colonial Beginnings 
 
The colonial administration used the production and export of coffee to reach 
into rural Rwandan society and reconstruct social relations. Belgian rule intended to 
destroy the “old balance of forces” between cattle chiefs, land chiefs and army 
chiefs, concentrating power in the hands of one single chief (Lemarchand 1970, 119). 
Prioritising coffee cultivation had the advantage of “loosening the hold of the 
traditional political authorities and pastoral and land patrons” (Dorsey 1983, 172), as 
well as providing new revenues. Chiefs were then forced to compete with one 
                                                          
437 The identity was false in two ways: (i) The identity itself was a political creation, rather than one 
based on distinct common heritage or physical features; (ii) Hutu elites were also guilty of exploiting 
the population. 
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another to retain their status as elites. At first, chiefs resisted these reforms by 
refusing to repair administrative offices or simply refusing to take orders (Ruzindana 
1974, Dorsey 1983). Eventually, chiefs worked with the colonial administration. 
Coffee production rose from 10 tonnes in 1927 to 2000 tonnes in 1937 (Newbury 
1988, 156). In fact, “62 million coffee trees were planted in Ruandu-Urundi by the 
end of 1957” (Newbury and Newbury 2000, 867).  
The transformation of social relations in Rwanda imposed a ‘double 
colonialism’ (Pottier 2002) where chiefs and the colonial administration worked to 
exploit the peasantry to secure surpluses and status. The power of chiefs was 
determined by their ability to exploit labour and siphon agricultural surplus from the 
peasantry. Belgian colonial administration intensified the exploitative nature of the 
patron-client relationship when “chiefs were encouraged to become coffee 
entrepreneurs” (Pottier 2002, 183). Eventually, rural class differentiation and 
economic insecurities “preceded and served as a catalyst for political mobilisation 
along ethnic lines” (Newbury and Newbury 2000, 868). The coffee campaigns 
became unpopular because they were coercive and strictly administered. Coffee 
growers were disciplined through strict procedures including pruning, spraying and 
mulching at regular intervals. Inter-planting of coffee crops with food crops was 
prohibited (Newbury and Newbury 2000).438  
The new institutional hierarchy proved a catalyst for “intense anti-chief and 
anti-Tutsi sentiment generated by these institutions” (Newbury 1988, 146). Power in 
the 1950s was based on colonial forms of production and status – dominated largely 
by Tutsi elites and the monarchy. While there were also Hutu elites, Tutsi hegemony 
was entrenched through the monarchy, subsidiary political institutions, the 
predominance of Tutsi cultural traditions and a system of social relations based on 
inequality (Lemarchand 1970, 474-475). In the 1950s, Belgian administration chose 
to change allies and work with Hutu intelligentsia who challenged Tutsi hegemony. 
In doing so, the Belgians challenged the inequality they had institutionalised.  
 
                                                          
438 Increasing food insecurity coincided with the forced cultivation of cash crops (Newbury 1988). 
Other ‘famine crops’ such as manioc were also forcibly grown (Newbury and Newbury 2000). 
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6.4 Kayibanda and Coffee 
 
Politics around coffee production has allowed elites to cement the distinction 
between classes and ethnic groups, force the population to pay taxes and introduce 
monetary economy in rural areas (Verwimp 2003). In 1956, Father Louis Pien, a 
European priest, donated a hectare of land to establish the coffee cooperative – 
Travail, Fidélité, Progrès (TRAFIPRO). Grégoire Kayibanda – a former seminarist, 
school teacher and intellectual, became head of TRAFIPRO a year later. Kayibanda 
built his economic and political support base from the coffee sector. While serving as 
head of TRAFIPRO, Kayibanda became the chief editor of the influential Catholic 
periodical – Kinyamateka. He then consolidated his position as the leading advocate 
of Hutu Power. By 1958, TRAFIPRO had earned half a million francs and developed 
a membership of over 100 farmers (Kamola 2007, 579). In the ‘ethnic’ revolution 
that followed, coffee revenues contributed to Kayibanda’s political movement. He 
mobilised popular grievances and highlighted the fear that the monarchy would 
consolidate Tutsi hegemony across Rwanda.  
Kayibanda’s racial egalitarian rhetoric did not yield results for the population. 
The revolution “did not change the institutional character of the state apparatus” 
though it “signified free access to land and freedom of labour to the Bahutu 
peasantry” (Mamdani 1996, 33). Kayibanda’s ideology “buttressed his elitist and 
secretive authoritarian government” (Prunier 1995, 59). Kayibanda ruled through a 
similar organisation of chiefs as his colonial predecessors but now predominantly 
“through a local network of Hutu on every hill, and from a small group of politicians 
from his home town of Gitarama” (Melvern 2004, 8).  
Coffee was the predominant source of foreign exchange during Kayibanda’s 
reign. In 1962, Rwanda exported coffee (55 per cent), minerals such as Cassiterite, 
tin, and Wolfram (37 per cent), pyrethrum (3 per cent) and tea (2 per cent) (IBRD 
1968). In 1962, Kayibanda signed the ICA, which guaranteed coffee prices although 
it limited African countries to “small, inflexible market shares during a period of 
increasing demand” as it imposed quotas and price controls on exporting and 
importing countries (Kamola 2007, 580).439 The ICA guaranteed attractive prices for 
Rwanda and secured a revenue base through which Kayibanda could build his 
                                                          
439 In some years, the Kayibanda government was unable to meet its production quotas (EIU 1972). 
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support base. Soon, “the gap between revolutionary austerity and post-revolutionary 
embourgeoisement was getting wider and wider every day” (Lemarchand 1970, 239). 
Kayibanda turned TRAFIPRO into a state-run marketing board, with its headquarters 
in the South (his home region). By 1966, TRAFIPRO controlled 27 shops nationwide 
and 70 buying-up points for coffee (Pottier 1993, 11). OCIR-Café, a government 
board, was founded in 1964 to oversee coffee exports and manage relationships with 
international coffee traders. The Kayibanda government forced the rural population 
to produce coffee, with punishments imposed on those who neglected coffee plants 
or intercropped coffee with subsistence foods such as sweet potatoes or beans 
(Boudreaux 2007, 5).  
Kayibanda relied primarily on a small group from his birthplace, Gitarama in 
the South.440 TRAFIPRO was “the economic arm of the regime” (Verwimp 2003, 
163).441 By the late 1960s, the rift between the Northerners and Kayibanda’s 
Gitaramistes sharpened – “TRAFIPRO’s regional bias, corruption and the climate of 
terror it supported led to determined opposition” (Pottier 1993, 11). Northerners 
formed a distinctive subculture within Rwanda. Incorporated late into the monarchy, 
there were few dealings with the direct Tutsi leadership or Tutsi culture. As Baxter 
(1962, 281) highlights: “The proud boast of the Kiga (northerners) is that they never 
were, as a people, subjugated by either Tutsi or Hima.” In June 1973, Kayibanda 
countered Northern power by establishing a new bureau, ONACO, which assumed 
control over private commerce. This new organisation was a threat to property 
owners in the North. When Habyarimana seized power a month later, he immediately 
suspended ONACO, branding it “communist” (Smith 1998, 236). 
Habyarimana mobilised support for himself as a leader of the North through 
leveraging his wife’s eminent position in the region. His wife, Agathe Kanziga, was 
much more influential as part of a wealthy small northern Hutu Abahinza lineage 
(Reyntjens 1985, Prunier 1995). Habyarimana’s coup ensured that “power and 
privilege remained a monopoly of the North” (Lemarchand 1995, 9).  
 
                                                          
440 This group included Calliope Mulindahabi. 
441 TRAFIPRO became the umbrella organisation for Rwanda’s producer cooperatives. It was 
partially funded by the Swiss Development Agency and also provided basic services for the 
population (Carney 2014).  
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6.5 Habyarimana and Coffee 
 
It is the Rwandan peasant that makes Rwanda live. Because the 
foreign currency we have for our imports, is because of the coffee, 
because of the tea, because of the export of furs, there you can see 
the role of the peasant, the farmer, the cultivator – Habyarimana 
quoted by Verwimp (2000, 344) 
In Habyarimana’s “development dictatorship”, agriculture was the “one and 
only solution” to overcome the problems Rwanda faced and progress was to be 
achieved through prioritising the production of coffee (Verwimp 2000, 334). 
Habyarimana glorified production of coffee in development terms to endear himself 
among the masses (Uwizeyimana 1996). Through the Second Republic’s image of a 
Peasant-State, Habyarimana was able to marginalise non-farming groups, especially 
the Tutsi pastoralists, to subsume increasing amounts of land under agricultural 
production (Verwimp 2000). Such policies meant “pastoral lands were converted into 
land for cultivation and into paysannats” (Verwimp 2011, 398).442 Through an 
aggressive expansion strategy, the number of households living in paysannats 
increased from 30,000 in 1973 to 54,000 by 1983 (Verwimp 2011, Bart 1993). The 
programme displaced over 80,000 farmers and their families into previously 
unoccupied areas (Clay and Lewis 1990).  
Coffee and the Elite Bargain 
Habyarimana’s ascent to power was accompanied by targeting Kayibanda’s 
southern elite allies and an accommodation of Northern elites. Frictions developed 
between two Northern-based groups (from Ruhengeri and Gisenyi). These groups 
“began to compete among themselves to know who would get more” (Prunier 1995, 
86). Habyarimana found his strongest support within the Gisenyi group. Rivalries 
surfaced during Theoneste Lizinde’s coup attempt in 1980, which coincided with 
falling coffee prices.443 “The political stability of the regime followed exactly the 
curve of those prices” (Prunier 1995, 84) (Figure 6.7). However, reduced prices did 
not neatly correspond to regime change. Low prices may have been a source of 
                                                          
442 Paysannats – group homesteads, similar to the historical system of Gukeba – were introduced by 
the colonial administration and developed grazing lands into land for cash crops. Each household was 
given two hectares for cultivating cotton in Bugarama and coffee in Mayaga (MINITERE 2004). 
443 Lizinde and Kanyarengwe were from Ruhengeri. By 1980, they were the only two prominent 
members of the Ruhengeri group who held key posts.  
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grievances among elites and the population. However, a successful coup depended 
on rivals galvanising these grievances against the government. 
Figure 6.7 highlights how the elite bargain was tested once again after coffee 
prices fell in 1988. The murder of Stanislas Mayuya, perceived as a possible future 
successor to Habyarimana, coincided with a fall in coffee prices. The Gisenyi group 
were allegedly behind the murder and soon, “the various clans were at each other’s 
throats” (Prunier 1995, 87). As the sources of rents grew thinner, Gisenyi elites 
concentrated their control over these limited sources.  
 
Sources: World Bank 
Despite some good years for other exports (Figure 6.8), coffee comprised 60-
80 per cent of exports for much of the 1970s and 1980s (Rake 1984). Habyarimana 
immediately shut down TRAFIPRO (as a coffee marketing board).444 This was a 
symbolic move as TRAFIPRO was associated with widespread corruption during 
Kayibanda’s reign (Pottier 2002). In place of a marketing board to manage the sector, 
a monopsony coffee export agency (Rwandex) was established. This agency was a 
public-private partnership: majority-owned (51 per cent) by the government and the 
other shares were divided between Anthony Wood, George Drew and Robert Hasson 
(Carr 1999, 189). Rwandex worked with OCIR-Café to organise smallholder 
                                                          
444 TRAFIPRO continued to operate as a producer cooperative for other crops till the mid-1980s. 
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farmers. It sold the bulk of this coffee to British-based Drucafé. Rwandex exported 
80 per cent of the coffee produced domestically. OCIR-Café exported between 18-20 
per cent.445 Etiru, whose shares were held by Belgian ownership and the government, 
exported 1-2 per cent.446 Rwandex exports regularly exceeded the export quotas set 
by the International Coffee Organisation (Africa Today 1991, 1538). Rwandex sold 
its exports to British-based Drucafe, as did OCIR-Café, while Etiru sold only to 
Sobelder in Belgium (Ngabitsinze et al. 2012).  
 
Source: EIU Reports 
  Dependence on the Gisenyi clique for support became increasingly 
problematic for Habyarimana in the late 1980s. As this clique became increasingly 
powerful, Habyarimana strategically liberalised the coffee sector ‘a little’ to counter 
their power. He encouraged La Rwandaise – a Belgian concern that operated 
agencies for Toyota and Mercedes in Rwanda – to compete with Rwandex. The 
company built a factory in Ruhengeri and captured about five per cent of the market 
(EIU 1989). However, Rwandex still dominated the market. In the months before the 
genocide, Rwandex played an institutional role in organising the platform for 
violence. Des Forges (1999, 128) documents this by highlighting the “unusually 
high” 16,000 machetes produced between August and December 1993 by Rwandex 
Chillington – a company that was the only domestic manufacturer of machetes, 
                                                          
445 “OCIR-Café exported coffee so the government could keep some revenues since most shares of the 
other two companies were owned by foreigners” (Interview, Munyankera, OCIR-Café employee since 
1989, February 2012). 
446 Interviews, NAEB officials.  
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jointly owned by Rwandex and a British company, Plantation and General 
Investments. Habyarimana’s akazu held control of key posts in all three agencies 
(including the local management of Rwandex).447 Other elites who led the 1990s 
violence also had interests in the coffee sector.448 During the Habyarimana era, coffee 
was both an avenue for rent extraction among elites and a platform through which 
elites controlled and organised supporters.449  
Coffee Production 
Increasing land was dedicated to the cultivation of coffee in the early years of 
Habyarimana’s reign. “From the peasants’ perspective, it was often economic 
nonsense to cultivate coffee, since other crops gave higher yields” (Verwimp 2000, 
354). Bananas and banana beer were an important source of income and they 
competed against coffee cultivation (Bart 1993). Production of these commodities 
was relatively undemanding of labour (Verwimp 2003). The sale of banana beer was 
the most widely used method to raise money within households throughout the year 
(Pottier 1993). There were contradictory government policies – with households 
encouraged to seek food security while also being encouraged to produce export 
crops (Little and Horowitz 1987). 
In the 1970s, a generous price was offered to coffee farmers, which was 
sustained because global prices were high (Capeau and Verwimp 2012).450 The 
generous farmgate price contributed to convincing farmers to continue coffee 
cultivation. Without such an incentive, farmers would have abandoned coffee en 
masse (Tardif-Douglin et al. 1996). Coercion accompanied the fall in global coffee 
prices in 1977. The 1978 law on coffee cultivation made the neglect of coffee trees 
                                                          
447 Felicien Kabuga, one of the most prominent businessmen in the akazu, owned coffee plantations 
and had privileged access to Rwandex (Des Forges 1999). Kabuga was said to be among the chief 
financiers of the genocide. Protais Zigiranyirazo, Habyarimana’s brother-in-law, controlled activities 
in the sector. Zigiranyirazo is accused of being one of the leading conductors of the genocide 
(Mushikiwabo and Kramer 2006). Another brother, Seraphin Rwabukumba, ran both La Centrale (the 
national importing authority for consumer goods) and BNR’s foreign currency division, allowing him 
to easily divert coffee profits into the hands of the akazu (Kamola 2007). 
448 Fabien Neretse headed OCIR-Café from 1989 to 1991. He later served in the Rwandan Armed 
Forces (FAR) and was a leading figure in the Interahamwe. Before Neretse, Enoch Ruhigira headed 
OCIR-Café. He later became Director of the Cabinet Office and was close to the President. 
449 The population was not passively incorporated into enacting violence. As with the revolution 
decades before, elites were able to “tap into widespread antagonism of Hutu peasants towards the 
Tutsi”, rather than trick them into it (Mamdani 2001, 108).  
450 Prices rose sharply after a frost in Brazil (the world’s largest exporter of coffee) limited global 
supply (Kamola 2008). 
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punishable and placed a monitor in every commune (Capeau and Verwimp 2012). 
The government outlawed intercropping and restricted fertilizer use to coffee and tea 
farming. Uprooting coffee trees was outlawed and fines were levied on perpetrators 
(Verwimp 2003). The government contributed funds from its budget to support the 
producer price up to 1983 (Tardif-Doughlin et al. 1996). It also stabilised the farm-
gate price by depreciating the Rwandan Franc after abandoning the fixed exchange 
rate with the dollar. Other export discoveries (e.g. tobacco) were never prioritised 
enough to diversify exports.451 This failure contributed to reducing Habyarimana’s 
authority and allowed rival coalitions (including Hutu Power coalitions) to gain in 
strength. 
Coffee prices steadied over the next four years before a spike in 1985. During 
this time, the Gisenyi faction consolidated its hold on power and the government 
increasingly prioritised coffee production. In this period, production increased on a 
biannual cycle (Figure 6.5). Yield improved between 1983 and 1986 (Figure 6.6). 
Between 1981 and 1984, less land was also committed to coffee cultivation (Figure 
6.4). Prices gradually fell after 1985, with the exception of a small resurgence in 
1987. A ‘triple torrent’ followed: “between 1985 and 1992, the real world price of 
coffee fell by 72 per cent, the price of tin by 35 per cent, and the price of tea by 66 
per cent” (Storey 1999, 49). Combined “export earnings declined by 50 per cent 
between 1987 and 1991 and the demise of state institutions unfolded thereafter” 
(Chossudovsky 1996, 939). There was a steady increase in land under coffee 
cultivation after 1986 when global coffee prices fell (Figure 6.9). Total coffee 
production also remained quite high (Figure 6.10). Yield dropped significantly after 
1986, signalling resistance to forced coffee cultivation (Figure 6.11). 
                                                          
451 However, as late as 1992, export discoveries were made. In 1992, Rwanda began exporting the 
kamaramasenge (small bananas) to Switzerland in August (1 million tonnes a month) (EIU 1992a). 
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Regional differences in the organisation of coffee production showed a 
relationship with the beginnings of violence. In the Northwest where Coffee yields 
were highest (and the akazu had its support base), less land was allocated to coffee. 
There were also less stringent controls and farmers had more freedom to grow crops 
of their choice (Clay et al. 1995, 23). The first signs of resistance to the regime 
originated in the South where repression was highest and land allocated to coffee 
cultivation was above the national average (Clay et al. 1995, 29). In 1993, 
Habyarimana dedicated more land to coffee production. Yield and production both 
fell by then, indicating the de-legitimisation of the government’s coercive policies 
(Figures 6.4-6.6).  
“Before the war, the former regime was very close to coffee. Even 
in land that was not suitable for coffee, they tried to grow coffee. It 
was an obligation to grow coffee. 90 per cent of inputs were 
reserved for coffee. When prices fell, they still forced people.”452 
The violence of the 1990s originated in the historical organisation of the 
sector where the state apparatus and agrarian elites collaborated to exploit the 
population. Narratives used to justify the genocide cast the Tutsi as violent 
oppressors and Hutu leaders as liberators. However, Hutu leaders did not deliver on 
the racial egalitarian ideals of their governments. In the coffee sector, leaders 
pursued short-term, exploitative policies. While perpetrators of violence in the 1990s 
also reacted against Hutu oppressors, violence was legitimised through falsely 
equating ethnic differences with class differences.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
452 Interview, employee at local coffee company, March 2012. 
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6B – Economic Nationalism in the 
Rwandan Coffee Sector 
6.6 The Value-Chain and Getting Started Again 
 
 
  
After 1994, the RPF government liberalised the coffee sector. Previous 
governments used marketing boards and export agencies to facilitate accumulation 
strategies of elites and organise labour to the production of coffee. Marketing boards 
in Africa have been criticised for “misuse of funds, inefficiency of operations, and 
the depressing effects on farm production of their marketing policies and practice” 
(Jones 1987, 379). However, marketing boards provided some advantages for 
producer countries. They held an “aggregated producer power”, which increased 
their bargaining power against the consuming end of commodity chains (Kaplinsky 
2004). Without marketing boards, exporting companies competed with each other for 
domestic production and consequently, ended up with lower profits.  
The Kayibanda government organised the sector through a government-run 
marketing board, TRAFIPRO. The Habyarimana government abolished TRAFIPRO 
but “aggregated producer power” through a monopsony export agency, Rwandex. 
The state regulatory agency, OCIR-Café, was responsible for supporting domestic 
coffee production. Prior to 1994, nearly all Rwandan coffee was ordinary SWC. 
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Farmers picked the coffee cherries during annual harvesting periods. Cherries were 
then de-pulped manually and then coffee parchment was dried. Farmers then sold 
coffee parchment to local traders (or middlemen) who transported coffee to the 
marketing board, export agencies or OCIR-Café. Exporters then processed the coffee 
parchment into green coffee, ready for export.  
After 1994, coffee exports gradually reduced as a share of total exports, 
dropping from 70 per cent in 1995 to about 20 per cent in 2000. In the late 1990s, it 
was difficult to convince farmers to grow coffee. A damning study (Loveridge et al. 
2003) showed that farmers were taking better care of their coffee trees in 1991 
compared to 2001.453 Global coffee prices declined significantly between 1997 and 
2001. Farmers uprooted coffee trees and replaced them with food crops. Plantations 
were neglected and coffee was not harvested (MINAGRI 2008a). A large share of 
coffee was grown in the Northwest where unrest represented “the greatest challenge” 
to Rwandan security since the genocide (African Rights 1998, 1). By 2000, conflict 
had calmed because of “the gradual shift from sheer repression to sensitisation” 
(Reyntjens 2006, 1112). However, global prices remained low until 2002 and only 
increased again after 2003. After a fall in global coffee prices in 2002, the 
government sped up the process of adopting FWC.454  
“In 2002, coffee prices fell. The banks were unwilling to give loans 
to coffee companies. The projection was that the problems would 
not be resolved in the next three years. It made getting way from 
coffee even more important. Mining exports saved us in 2002.”455 
The government used a mixture of coercion and price incentives to ensure 
farmers continued to grow coffee. “Farmers were not really keen to continue growing 
coffee. They preferred producing beans or staple crops. In plantations, farmers had 
already started inter-planting crops and taking down their coffee trees.”456 To 
incentivise farmers to produce coffee, the government guaranteed a minimum 
producer price of around 300 RwF. Producer prices were between 50 and 75 per cent 
of the exporter price at this time (Table 6.1). Figure 6.12 indicates that prices 
received for coffee cherries by domestic producers were more than the export price 
                                                          
453 The study shows that Rwandan farmers were mulching, pruning and applying less pesticides in 
2001 as compared to 1991. In 1991, farmers pruned more trees and applied more chemical fertilizers. 
454 Interview, Anbalagan Swamy, RwaCof, March 2012. 
455 Interview, Rugwabiza, February 2012. 
456 Interview, Raphael Rurangwa, MINAGRI, February 2012. 
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received by exporting companies. Maintaining attractive prices was central to 
incentivise farmers to grow coffee. Figures 6.13 and 6.14 indicate that the RPF 
government offered a higher price for coffee cherries than the Habyarimana 
government.457 The government funded the difference with funds from European 
Union (EU)-funded Stabilisation of Export Earnings Scheme (STABEX).458 After 
1994, the government introduced a progressive export tax system designed to keep 
producer prices close to 300 RwF/kg. Production prices fluctuated in several years 
(particularly in 1997), which prompted speculative purchases among exporters to buy 
coffee from merchants and farmers. The progressive export tax was replaced by a flat 
ad-valorem export tax rate of 16 per cent in 1998. Since then, producer prices have 
moved closer in line with world prices.459  
Table 6.1: Producer Prices for Semi processed Coffee: 1994-1999 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Producer Prices (RwF/Kg) 300 300 300 350 300 270 
Producer Price (in share of export price) 146.2 63.6 68.2 52.8 72.9 72.6 
Source: IMF (2000) 
 
Compiled from OCIR-Café documents 
                                                          
457 Figure 6.12 shows average prices. Producer prices varied between regions, depending on transport 
costs and other factors. In 1998, most prices ranged from 270-290 RwF/kg. However, in Kibuye, 
prices were as low as 240 RwF/kg because of transport difficulties between Kibuye and Kigali. 
458 STABEX funded a variety of activities in the sector till 2010 (including the construction of roads, 
planting of seedlings, developing new plantations and extension activities). 
459 Internal OCIR-Café documents 
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Compiled from OCIR-Café Internal Documents 
 
Source: OCIR-Café 
 After 2000, consultancy groups and international organisations advised the 
government on revitalising the coffee sector.460 Value-addition was identified as the 
solution to escape the ‘low-quantity, low-quality’ trap where exporters had become 
less demanding of quality and were involved in intense rivalry over small volumes of 
coffee. Other constraints contributed to the deterioration of coffee quality, including 
inadequate training of agricultural extension workers, lack of motivation for growers 
to produce quality, lack of agricultural research and insufficient processing units and 
basic equipment (MINAGRI 1998). USAID projects – Partnership for Enhancing 
Agriculture in Rwanda through Linkages (PEARL), Assistance à la Dynamisation de 
                                                          
460 MINAGRI (1998) identified constraints that contributed to the deterioration of coffee quality, 
which included inadequate training of agricultural extension workers, lack of motivation for growers 
to pursue quality, lack of agricultural research and the lack of processing units and basic equipment. 
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l’Agribusiness au Rwanda (ADAR) and Agricultural Cooperative Development 
International/Volunteers Overseas Cooperative Assistance (ACDI-VOCA) – 
supported the specialty coffee value-chain by organising rural cooperatives, helping 
them develop business plans and obtaining credit, helping private sector investors 
invest in washing stations and providing technical assistance (Boudreaux 2007, 
Chemonics 2006). OTF contributed to writing the 2002 national coffee strategy, 
providing market analysis and developing clusters to get actors within the domestic 
value-chain to work together. Other donors were involved in similar projects, 
including the International Fund for Agricultural Development project (IFAD) – 
Smallholder Cash and Export Development Project (PDCRE).  
Boxes 6.2 and 6.3 illustrate the SWC and FWC value chains in Post-1994 
Rwanda. In 2000, most actors in the SWC value-chain were struggling. The coffee 
sector comprised 400,000 coffee growers. OTF and USAID research indicated 
growers were not using inputs on their crops and preferred to use fertilizer and 
pesticides on subsistence crops or bananas. Despite farmers getting better prices than 
they received during the 1980s, they suffered because inflation was also rising. 
Seedlings were sold to farmers at 5RwF each (about $0.015) (Schluter and Finney 
2000). Farmers refused to pay this amount. In 1999, “there was a stand-off between 
farmers and OCIR-Café.”461 Eventually, OCIR-Café gave seedlings away for free. In 
2001, one exporter said that coffee in Rwanda was marked by “bankruptcy at the top 
and misery at the bottom.”462 OTF reports indicate that exporters accumulated debt of 
around three billion RwF. The government did little to facilitate the accumulation 
strategies of investors during this period. 
                                                          
461 Internal OTF documents. 
462 Ibid. 
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The FWC Value-Chain 
 
To produce FWC, farmers sell cherries to washing stations. Cherries are then 
pulped and fermented to remove the mucilage and then beans are washed, dried and 
sorted. Coffee parchment is then sent to dry mills to remove parchment, producing 
export-ready green coffee (Box 6.3). To move into specialty coffee, the Rwandan 
government prioritised the construction of washing stations. In 2000, Rwanda only 
had two washing stations (Masaka and Nkora). Neither of these was in operation. 
Several donors supported these projects. USAID projects included PEARL I (2000-
2003), PEARL II (2003-2005) and Sustaining Partnerships to Enhance Rural 
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Enterprise and Agribusiness Development (SPREAD). Other projects included SNV 
Netherlands Development Organisation’s similar support of coffee cooperatives like 
Association des caféiculteurs de Musaza (COCAMU) and IFAD’s Project for Rural 
Income through Exports (PRICE). 
The RPF government has successfully increased FWC production, installing 
several CWS and incentivising (and coercing) farmers to ‘stop processing at home’ 
and sell their cherries to washing stations.  These actions aimed to tap into the ‘Latte 
revolution’ – the changing consumption patterns of coffee in the industrialised world 
(Ponte 2002). The government targeted the specialty coffee market, which was 
growing at almost 15 per cent annually. EIU (2007, 10) notes: “stagnation in many of 
the traditional coffee-drinking markets of North America and Western Europe will 
restrict growth in demand, although demand for high-quality specialty coffees, 
including Rwanda’s finest fully washed Arabica, will remain buoyant.”  
The total number of CWS in Rwanda increased from 2 in 2000 to 213 in 2012 
(Figure 6.15). In 2014, there were 229 CWS in Rwanda.463 Quantities of FWC 
produced have consistently increased (Figure 6.16). Difficulties in getting farmers to 
adopt FWC, making the operations of CWS more efficient and finding a market for 
FWC blocked the success of strategies.464  
 
Source: OCIR-Cafe 
                                                          
463 Interview, NAEB Official, January 2015. 
464 “Semi-washed coffee is linked to the C-Price so prices and supply are more assured. I know I have 
a market for it. Selling fully washed coffee is not so easy. Once you receive cherries, you have to 
pulp, dry and transport. No buyer will buy fully washed coffee unless they have samples. So you have 
to take a risk to pay for coffee, treat coffee without knowing if you will find a buyer” (Interview, Jean 
Paul Rwagasana, CBC, May 2012). 
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Source: OCIR-Café 
6.7 Retaining Loyalty and Minimising Resistance – Adopting 
FWC and Organising Coffee Producers 
  
The adoption of FWC (and the new systems of accumulation that came with 
it) required the loyalty of domestic producers, local investors (in setting up washing 
stations) and foreign capital (in setting up washing stations and sharing technology). 
The government adopted FWC while justifying that it would bring gains for small 
farmers.465 Cooperatives were used to organise labour for FWC production. RPF 
narratives stressed that FWC production had benefited ‘small farmers’ through the 
empowerment of cooperatives.466 “Cooperatives are used to make sure farmers get 
money to overcome poverty.”467 However, there have not been ‘mutual gains’ for all 
actors working across the value-chain and assumptions regarding ‘cooperatives’ and 
‘small farmers’ ignore that the most vulnerable actors in the coffee sector are 
wageworkers. Initially, there was less convincing evidence that farmers who adopted 
FWC have benefited. However, this has changed (Macchiavello and Morjaria 
2015a).  Coffee farmers who sold their cherries to washing stations had relatively 
high consumption expenditures, suggesting promoting FWC production has 
benefited coffee growers and even contributed to improving food security (Murekezi 
                                                          
465 “Whoever has sent their coffee to washing stations has seen the benefits. The problem is to 
convince them to send their coffee” (Interview, Celestin Gatarayiha, NAEB, November 2011). 
466 “These policies are about the farmers. If farmers are producing fully washed coffee, it will make 
them less vulnerable to changes in prices” (Interview, NAEB Official, May 2013). 
467 Interview, Badrou Bazambaza, NAEB, May 2012. 
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and Loveridge 2009).468 In 2015, government officials claimed that the minimum 
price for unprocessed coffee was at 170Rwf/kg, compared to some farmers receiving 
more than 250Rwf/kg for FWC (Nkurunziza 2015).469 Though its adoption was 
accompanied by difficulties and bad decisions, the government reacted to problems 
to make the value-chain more efficient.  
Farmers did not immediately adopt FWC.470 In theory, FWC had the added 
benefit of freeing up labour time. Under the SWC chain, farmers had to de-pulp 
coffee cherries manually. Under the FWC chain, farmers delivered coffee cherries to 
washing stations.  
“When farmers process at home, they just lose time. They use bad 
practices – sometimes they even use stones. If they take their 
cherries to the washing station, it gives them more income.”471 
 
However, FWC also required more attention to be paid to coffee trees during 
cultivation. Adopting FWC also threatened the power of local traders (or 
middlemen). It took time to construct, finance and implement CWS. Farmers only 
received benefits of coffee cultivation after three years (when the first harvest took 
place). The government conducted sensitisation programmes to educate farmers on 
best practices and convince them to sell their cherries to washing stations, rather than 
to middlemen. This has been a challenge for the government because coffee farmers 
are heavily scattered across the Rwandan hills and farmers use disparate methods 
(OCIR-Café 2009a). The government has intensified research and capacity building 
through a Farmer Field School (FFS) approach, which will train 10,000 coffee 
farmers per year (MINECOFIN 2013). Plots of land were ‘trialled’ to educate the 
farmers on new methods and the positives of adopting new techniques.472 The 
                                                          
468 Their sample was obtained from fieldwork conducted between 2001 and 2007. Others claimed that 
only 29 per cent of farmers who took part in the FWC chain were beneficiaries of the new adaptation 
(Oehmke et al. 2011). 
469 NAEB increased the coffee farm-gate price from 142Rwf to 200Rwf in March 2014 before 
reducing it again later in the year (Interview, NAEB Official, January 2015). 
470 Farmers are rarely convinced to embrace value addition because working harder on trees often do 
not justify the price differentials that are offered (Ponte 2001). 
471 Interview, Gatarayiha. 
472 FFS are used widely in Rwanda and as part of the Crop Intensification Programme. 
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government also imposed barriers on SWC production, outlawing its sale during 
certain months. It has been difficult to enforce bans on selling SWC.473  
To organise labour to coffee production and improve the distribution of 
inputs, the government encouraged farmers to join the land consolidation programme 
whereby coffee was cultivated as ibiterane – larger coffee plantations. This helped 
the government facilitate the adoption of FWC. In 2013, coffee covered around 2.3 
per cent of total cultivable land, and was grown predominantly by smallholder 
farmers on plots of less than one hectare (Nzeyimana et al. 2013).474  
“The problem in the coffee sector is farmers are scattered. We need 
them to increase the number of trees they have on their land. 
Farmers will keep land but then they can work together and it will 
also be easier for us to facilitate their work.”475 
Scholars argue against land consolidation, citing the work of those (e.g. 
Ansoms et al. 2008, GoR 2004) who have found that small production units perform 
better per land unit than large ones. However, such studies wrongly assume that 
smallholder farmers are the most vulnerable workers in the sector. Such assumptions 
ignore the existence of landless rural households whose “poverty rate has increased” 
and who “depend only on wage labour and other non-farm sources of income” 
(MINAGRI 2009, 32). Some domestic elites owned large plantations. Depute Enoch, 
a former member of the National Asembly, had a 30 ha coffee plantation, with 
180,000 trees (Erlebach 2006).476 Farmers owned farms of varying sizes and many 
employed wageworkers to cultivate coffee.  
Cooperatives were also used to organise farmers to adopt FWC. Though most 
coffee farmers were still not organised in cooperatives, this number was increasing – 
only 8.2 per cent in 2006 and 20 per cent in 2009 (OCIR-Café 2009a).477 Some 
cooperatives, which were supported by donors, were successful. For example, the 
Maraba cooperative sold washed coffee for $3.26/kg in 2004 and this was up to 
$4.08/kg in 2007 (Boudreaux and Ahluwalia 2009). Farmers had more freedom to 
sell their coffee to different buyers and interplant coffee with other crops (ibid). 
                                                          
473 Interviews, Exporting company representatives and consultant, January 2012, April 2012; May 
2013. 
474 NAEB estimates the average size of a smallholder farm for coffee at 0.1 ha. 
475 Interview, Corneille Ntakirutimana, NAEB, March 2012. 
476 Erlebach (2006) also found that other wealthy families owned large plantations. 
477 This is despite government legislation that requires coffee farmers to join legally registered 
cooperatives. 
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Boudreaux (2011, 195) finds “cooperatives have been an important asset for 
Rwanda’s smallholder farmers, allowing them to earn more money from coffee, 
develop additional  skills, and work cooperatively with others in ways that may 
promote reconciliation.” There are concerns over coercion and punishments 
(Musahara and Huggins 2005, Huggins 2009, 2009a). Many cooperatives are formed 
on government orders, rather than being built ‘bottom up’. Cooperatives required a 
membership fee, which edged out the most vulnerable farmers.  
“Because these cooperatives were created top-down, there’s a lack 
of ownership. It is not easy for farmers to re-take ownership of the 
cooperatives. Most of the managers are not doing well. 
Management is usually not interested in delivering services to 
farmers.”478 
 One study on Huye province showed that membership of cooperatives 
decreased because of the requirements that came with coffee certification, 
cooperative membership requirements including maintenance fees and minimum 
numbers of trees, lack of awareness of benefits of the cooperatives and long 
distances to be covered when delivering coffee (Mugabekazi 2014). The most 
vulnerable members of the cooperatives did not renew their membership, while 65 
per cent of the ‘small farmers’ who were members employed wage labour (ibid).  
The government was also badly advised in initially building large washing 
stations (following the advice of USAID-funded PEARL), which turned out to be a 
poor decision. “These large machines used a lot of labour, lots of water and the costs 
of production were high. Just a bad idea.”479 These large washing stations were 
characterised by under-utilisation. Nearly 75 per cent of CWS still used traditional 
wet mill machines with uneconomical oversized capacity (Guariso et al. 2012).  
The placement of washing stations has also been criticised. Many more CWS 
were installed than originally planned. In several districts, there were many CWS in 
close proximity. In others, one CWS held monopolies over large areas. Table 6.2 
highlights the variation in allocation of CWS across the six districts, with between 
four and eight million coffee trees. These districts represent 45 per cent of the total 
number of trees nationwide, according to the 2009 coffee census (OCIR-Café 
2009a). Out of the six districts, only Rusizi (92.2) and Ngoma (67.5) enjoyed average 
                                                          
478 Interview, Kayisinga, February 2012. 
479 Interview, Munyankera, OCIR-Café, February 2012. 
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utilisation rates above 50 per cent. Nyamasheke had more than double the amount of 
coffee trees than Ngoma but had more than five times the number of CWS. Washing 
stations also compete against each other. This has created an artificial price for 
cherries and exporters complained that farmers got away with inferior quality.480 
Figure 6.17 shows the average prices received by farmers for coffee cherries where 
Rwanda performs well, compared to neighbouring countries. 
Table 6.2: CWS Data for top-6 Districts 
District Total Trees No. of 
CWS 
Theoretical 
Capacity in 
Cherries 
(tonnes) 
Cherries 
Processed 
in 2011 
Utilization 
Rate 
Nyamasheke 8,739,115 31 14,800 5,265 35.6 
Rusizi 6,121,002 19 8,950 8,256 92.2 
Gakenke 5,166,853 13 7,500 2,302 30.7 
Kamonyi 4,292,794 11 4,900 2,379 48.6 
Ngoma 4,292,396 6 3,250 2,193 67.5 
Rutsiro 4,115,004 15 9,400 3,262 34.7 
Source: OCIR-Café 
Figure 6.17: Average Regional Price Received for Cherries (2001-2007)  
 
Source: OTF 
Between 2003 and 2005, utilisation of washing stations remained low. 
However, utilisation rates gradually improved (Figures 6.18-6.20; Table 6.3). Most 
CWS were initially built in the Western and Southern provinces (56 of 79 washing 
stations in 2006). There was variation across regions in the pace of adopting FWC. 
FWC represented 50 per cent of all coffee produced in the Western Province in 2006 
                                                          
480 Sources include OTF, exporting companies like RTC and RwaCof 
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compared to 21 per cent in the Southern Province (Table 6.4). Despite such policies 
resulting in increasing amount of FWC being produced, the strategy of building 
CWS was sporadic and disorganised.  
“Anyone could apply for a license. The government directed BRD 
to prioritise such applications but investors were not ready and 
badly advised. It was a mess and we should have done it better.”481 
 
Source: National Agricultural Export Board (NAEB) 
 
Source: NAEB 
                                                          
481 Interview, NAEB Official, November 2011. 
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Source: NAEB 
Table 6.3: CWS Performance (2003-2005) 
 2003 2004 2005 
Capacity Utilisation 14 per cent 25 per cent 32 per cent 
Direct Exports 
(tonnes) 
162 (48.5 per 
cent) 
542 (74.7 per cent) 475 (65.4 per cent) 
Total FWC Exports 
(tonnes) 
334 726 726 
Average Price 
(USD/kg) 
2.32 (100.9 per 
cent) 
2.42 (104.3 per 
cent) 
3.12 (107.2 per 
cent) 
FWC Average Price 2.3 2.32 2.91 
Export Value (USD) 376,474 (49.1 
per cent) 
1,314,038 (78 per 
cent) 
1,483,433 (70.2 per 
cent) 
Total FWC Value  768,200 1,684,320 2,112,660 
Source: NAEB 
Table 6.4: Regional Distribution of CWS (2006)  
  Share of FWC (per cent) Washing Stations Kms of Roads 
NORTH 7 9 41 
SOUTH 21 23 67 
WEST 50 33 171 
EAST 19 12 29 
KIGALI 4 2 0 
Source: OTF 
The government revised its strategy after 2008. Alternatives to large, old 
washing stations were sought. Technoserve – a US-based nonprofit that works with 
farmers to support cooperatives and integrate them into the FWC value-chain – 
introduced eco-friendly pulpers, which were smaller and more energy-efficient and 
thus more tailored to the Rwandan market’s needs. Such innovations have helped 
make the FWC chain more efficient. However, many of the problems regarding the 
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location and low utilisation rate of washing stations remain (with many not being 
utilised at all). There is considerable variation, with CWS operating at above 100 per 
cent and others no longer in operation or operating at very low capacity (Figure 
6.21). However, on average, the utilisation rate is increasing (Figure 6.22).  
Source: NAEB482 
 
Source: NAEB 
CWS occupy an important node in the domestic value-chain. CWS compete 
for cherries with middlemen and supply washed coffee to exporters. While exporters 
directly own some CWS, many CWS are independently owned. Strengthening CWS 
operations is vital to convince farmers to engage with the FWC chain. Initially, the 
government encouraged cooperatives and other private sector companies to invest in 
                                                          
482 No data for 2006. 
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the construction of washing stations. Many of these washing stations ended up 
bankrupt because of a lack of knowledge, lack of technical expertise and bad advice 
from donors. As of 2012, most washing stations operate under 50 per cent capacity. 
Total installed capacity of washing stations was enough to process 70 per cent of 
harvested coffee in 2012 (Macchiavello and Morjaria 2015b). In 2012, 18 were not in 
operation because of financial difficulties while 13 were in turnaround plans (NAEB 
2012). Figure 6.23 shows the variations between utilisation rates at CWS. 
 
Source: NAEB 
The rise in New York-C prices has meant SWC has provided attractive 
revenues (and FWC exports are most likely to be beneficial when New York-C 
prices are low) (MINAGRI 2008a). The government has become more cautious in 
the placement and distribution of washing stations.483 The government has 
encouraged partnerships between cooperatives and exporters. By 2012, 44 
cooperatives worked directly with domestic exporters (NAEB 2012).484 
Middlemen are often perceived as a threat to the FWC value-chain. These 
traders were usually local businessmen, large landowners, eminent figures or 
informal traders that have long-established links to the localities and with farmers. 
Some had operated in the sector since before the genocide but the majority were new 
entrants.485 Middlemen include money-lenders who pay for farmers’ children’s 
schooling when the family is short of cash and also include individuals in the village 
                                                          
483 A group of UK-based researchers has been employed to study the placement of CWS in Rwanda. 
484 Many cooperatives own CWS and some CWS owners also exported coffee.  
485 Interview, Jean Claude Kayisinga, SPREAD, February 2012. 
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with access to transport. Middlemen guaranteed an assured price to farmers. Relying 
on such prices gives farmers reason to resist the adoption of FWC. Government 
officials admitted the difficulty in replacing middlemen who often held a high 
standing in their communities.486   
“Middlemen control the market. They know what the farmers need. 
They have personal relationships with them. Its very difficult to 
move these middlemen out. They’re usually farmers themselves or 
some kind of local authorities. They help farmers when farmers 
need them and farmers are loyal to them.”487 
Middlemen worked closely with both exporters and CWS owners. With 
knowledge of both the SWC and FWC market, they often engage in speculation to 
gain maximum profits. ‘Double side-selling’ occurred where farmers inside 
cooperatives sell to middlemen while farmers outside cooperatives may sell to 
cooperatives where they are not members (Mujawamariya et al. 2013). The volatile 
nature of coffee prices can often leave middlemen with losses because their choices 
to speculate backfired (where they promise much higher prices to farmers than they 
will receive).488 However, this rarely leaves them unable to sell coffee (although they 
may have to sell it at a lower price) as exporters scramble for limited national 
production. Middlemen were active because the government had not been entirely 
successful in convincing farmers of the benefits of adopting FWC. 
“If washing stations are up and running, it becomes easier to 
enforce policy. At NAEB, we find it difficult to stop people from 
pulping at home when CWS doesn’t work. Middlemen are only 
there because of the gap in the market.”489 
Many exporters disagreed with the government’s goal of increasing FWC at 
the cost of SWC. In 2012, a survey was conducted that found a difference of $1.40 
per kg between the export price of FWC and SWC, with benefits accruing to farmers, 
labourers at the CWS, the CWS owner and the financier (Macchiavello and Morjaria 
2015a). The exporter was the only actor to lose money. Exporters lost up to $0.4/kg 
on FWC compared to the same quantity of ordinary coffee (ibid). Government 
officials retain a preference for encouraging competition between exporters, 
believing that such competition will reduce the capacity of single exporters to dictate 
                                                          
486 Interviews, NAEB and exporting companies, October 2011-May 2012. 
487 Interview, Uwitonze, March 2012. 
488 Interviews with exporters. 
489 Interview, Kanyankole, May 2013. 
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policies.490 At the CWS level and the exporter level, speculation creates ‘false 
alarms’ down the value-chain, which distorts the market.  
“Because of speculation, farmers think they can get more. Some 
give 200, others give 220. It is always difficult for farmers but 
speculation helps them. The government isn’t thinking about the 
private sector. They are comfortable because of competition being 
there but it only helps the big companies. To succeed in this sector, 
you have to go two or three years without making money. It is very 
hard to survive.”491 
Any attempt at breaking into niche markets will fail unless agricultural 
practices are improved and issues affecting the quality of coffee produced are 
addressed. The government used cooperatives to distribute inputs efficiently and 
tackle pests and weather conditions when they affect crops. Large shares of Rwandan 
coffee are afflicted with two diseases: antestia bug and potato-taste defect.492 
Bigirimana et al. (2012) indicate that 80-95 per cent of coffee trees suffered from 
coffee leaf rust. Since domestic exporters do not have direct control over the 
cultivation practices of farmers, the government is responsible for ensuring better 
quality cherries reach the washing station. The government has achieved this through 
the distribution of better quality seeds, insecticides, coordination with donors and 
active extension services.493 New seedlings were planted and distributed to farmers 
for free to push through the regeneration of coffee trees. However, there has been 
limited progress and old coffee trees planted during the 1970s have now reached the 
end of their life-cycle. The 2009 Coffee Census found that only 52 per cent of coffee 
trees were ‘productive’, while only 24 per cent were classified as ‘young’ (6 months-
3 years old) (OCIR-Café 2009a).  
“Our farmers are not following good agricultural practices. Coffee 
is not well-maintained. Productivity is low. Some trees can have 
10-15 kgs but those trees only produce 2-3 kgs. Of course, farmers 
are still poor and they don’t have faith in prices for coffee so we 
also have to improve our communication to them.”494 
However, there has only been limited success in incentivising farmers to 
mulch, weed, prune trees or use fertilizer. The 2009 Coffee Census indicated that the 
                                                          
490 Interviews, May 2013 and January 2015. 
491 Interview, Domestic coffee exporter, January 2015. 
492 Antestia bugs have been associated with a “potato taste”, which is a concern for international 
buyers of Rwandan coffee. 
493 Interview, Gatarayiha, February 2011. 
494 Interview, Munyankera, February 2012. 
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use of pesticides and mulching was only evident on a little more than half of all 
coffee trees (OCIR-Café 2009a). The government imposed fines on farmers who 
were caught not using mulch on their coffee trees.495 The share of coffee trees that 
were pruned was much less (OCIR-Café 2009a). Exporters still complain that most 
farmers do not use fertilizers on their coffee crop.496 One exporter explained why 
farmers were reluctant to ‘waste’ fertilizer on coffee: 
“Why would I spray fertilizer on coffee that would be harvested 
after six months? Tomatoes take three months. I may as well put 
fertilizer on tomatoes.”497  
While more fertilizer is being used on coffee, exporters are unhappy with the 
way fertilizer is distributed. OCIR-Café (2009a) indicates eight per cent of trees to 
have received manure while 76 per cent received fertilizers. Currently, fertilizers for 
coffee are distributed to farmers on credit by CWS. Exporters claim that barely three 
per cent is paid back. As a result, exporting companies are forced to take the hit.498 
The government struggles to maintain a delicate balance between appeasing 
investors (who are concerned with their profit margins) and incentivising farmers to 
take care of their crops, with only limited government funds and expertise available.  
In 2015, coffee producers were receiving better prices for producing FWC 
than ordinary coffee (Macchiavello and Morjaria 2015a). Though ‘small farmers’ 
may be receiving better prices, it does not mean the most vulnerable workers receive 
benefits. However, employment at washing stations has also been an added benefit. 
Nevertheless, empowering cooperatives and encouraging the portrayal of uniform 
groups of ‘small farmers’ distorts images of rural Rwanda. The government masks 
processes of rural differentiation to tap into ‘coffee karma’ (Zizek 2014) and 
legitimise systems of accumulation in the coffee sector. Though the adoption of 
FWC may have resulted in some success, it has also been accompanied by negative 
outcomes for some workers. Its adoption continues to face resistance and negatively 
impacts the full-scale adoption of FWC.  
 
                                                          
495 Interview, Paul Stewart – Technoserve, February 2012. 
496 Interviews, RTC, Rwacof and CBC. 
497 Interview, Emmanuel Rusatira, RwaCof, March 2012. 
498 Interview, Dargan, December 2011. 
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6.8 Loyalty and Managing Capital – Building and Owning CWS 
  
The government initially found loyal investors to make investments in CWS. 
The military, the NSSF, local elites and cooperatives contributed the first 
investments in washing stations. Faustin Mbundu, for example, invested in the 
construction of the largest washing station (capacity of 2000 tonnes) in Nkora in 
2003.499 Vincent Ngarambe (MIG) and Chrysologue Kubwimana (Kinunu) also made 
investments.500 A coffee cooperative, Cooperative pour la Promotion des Activities 
Café (COOPAC), built the other washing station of equal capacity.501 Some local 
investors also made investments.502 A few cooperatives (funded by donors) also 
owned CWS.503 Licenses for washing stations were allocated on a first-come, first-
serve basis. Most of these CWS were funded partially through grants and partially as 
BRD loans and later through loans from commercial banks. However, the 
government did little to facilitate the investments of CWS owners.  
Most CWS owners were unable to pay their loans and incurred significant 
losses, demonstrating that the government did not build effective reciprocal control 
mechanisms with these investors. In a survey of 125 CWS conducted in 2008, results 
found that 59 per cent of CWS did not have financial statements, while only 10 per 
cent were self-funded, 71 per cent had delayed access to credit, 62 per cent had 
solvency problems and 38 per cent had inadequate production.504 CWS were unable 
to demonstrate creditworthiness of their projects or access to appropriate collateral 
(USAID 2009). CWS failed to pay back loans despite FWC prices gaining a 
                                                          
499 Mbundu still owns this washing station.  
500 Kubwimana is currently a Senator. 
501 Emmanuel Rwakagara established COOPAC in 2001. COOPAC comprises over 2000 members 
and owns four washing stations. Rwakagara returned to Rwanda in 2001 from the DRC. No farmer 
other than Rwakagara had a land holding of more than 0.5 ha. Rwakagara’s land holding was 15 ha 
(Coulet 2012). In most cooperatives, a few members with large land holdings contributed most of the 
coffee production.  
502 One such investor was Alfred Nkubiri, the owner of Enterprise Nkubiri Alfred and Sons (ENAS). 
Nkubiri owned coffee plantations in Eastern province. ENAS is involved in a variety of other 
agricultural activities including fertilizer distribution, cereal exports and rice production. Nkubiri was 
accused of grabbing land in the East, up to 508 ha (Reyntjens 2013). Another investor was MP 
Juvénal Nkusi, the former speaker of Parliament and current Chairman of the Public Accounts 
Committee. Nkusi also owned the Sake coffee plantation in Eastern Province.  
503 Most cooperatives were supported by donors. Abahuzamugambi, which was established in 1999, 
was supported by PEARL. Abahuzamugambi invested in the construction of a washing station in 
2003. In 2014, the cooperative owned four washing stations. The cooperative has been successful in 
developing a partnership with UK-based Union Hand Roasters who sell their single-origin coffee as 
Maraba coffee in Sainsbury’s and other department stores. 
504 NAEB Coffee Working Group Meeting (March 2012). 
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premium of 45 cents/lb above the C-Price (MINAGRI 2008a). As of 2009, OTF 
indicated that three Rwandan banks (BRD, BCR and BK) had given loans amounting 
to 19 million USD to washing stations.505 Eighteen per cent of loans worth 3.4 
million USD had defaulted. BRD made 43 per cent of these loans and 45 per cent of 
these washing stations were profitable in 2007. However, CWS owners and 
cooperative managers still argued that it was difficult to access credit.506 Banks 
countered criticisms by arguing that loans to the coffee sector increased every year.507 
However, loans were restricted to those who could exhibit a capacity to invest in the 
maintenance and success of the washing station. Even donor funding was not enough 
to facilitate the investments of CWS owners.508 Successful CWS owners were 
limited to established exporters or well-funded cooperatives like COOPAC or 
Abahuzamugambi.  
“When we started, all of us (banks) gave out a number of loans to 
the private sector and cooperatives. By and large, these loans were 
not paid back. We were all learning in the sector back then. Now, it 
has changed. We help those who apply with services to help them 
write a business plan, get the right documents etc. But we also have 
to be stricter.”509 
 
In 2012, out of the 18 washing stations with an installed capacity of more 
than 1000 tonnes of cherries, only five were cooperative-owned. Only one exporter – 
investment group, API – owned such washing stations. Prominent businessmen such 
as Faustin Mbundu, Robert Bigirimana, Mugunga Ndoba and Chrysologue 
Kubwimana own two each. Despite loyal investors operating in the sector, many 
have struggled to keep their businesses profitable. Some like Mbundu are gradually 
moving out of the coffee sector entirely.510 The government expected these investors 
to sacrifice their money by making initial investments but did not incentivise these 
companies further.  
                                                          
505 The banking sector had liberalised by this time. Several new commercial banks established 
operations. Coffee was no longer the top priority for the BRD. The government rapidly identified 
other new sectors including energy, tourism and ICT. 
506 Interview, CWS owners, April 2012; Interview, NAEB official, May 2012. 
507 Interview, Gatera, April 2012. 
508 Donor funding increased from $10.7 million in 2004 to $24.0 million in 2008 (USAID 2009). 
509 Interview, Jack Kayonga, then-President, BRD. Similar statements were made by representatives 
of BCR, BK and BPR. 
510 Mbundu had sold a stake in his coffee company in 2011 to Nigerian-based group, Kaizen. 
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 Existing CWS were hamstrung by the need to pay loans. Washing stations, 
with relatively more capital, enjoyed an advantage in being able to pay farmers “on 
the spot” for their cherries. CWS are also induced to buy lower-grade cherries to 
make sales. CWS also attempt to ‘cheat’ by selling low-quality coffee to exporters or 
international traders by ‘mixing’ it with better-quality coffee.511 The current make-up 
of CWS ownership is undergoing a revamp, with exporting companies encouraged to 
invest in washing stations.512 To increase production and improve quality to meet 
certification requirements, every node of the value-chain is likely to become 
increasingly reliant on better-resourced actors. Since the government has prioritised 
this approach, these ‘better-resourced actors’ must be disciplined and contracts must 
be strictly enforced.  
6.9 Managing Capital – Rwanda’s Coffee Exporters 
 
 In January 1995, the government ‘opened up’ the sector to private (both local 
and foreign) investors. This section emphasises that local elites invested in the sector 
both out of opportunity and out of loyalty to Economic Nationalism. These 
investments did not reap benefits for local elites. Foreign-owned companies now 
dominate trade-and-export operations. These foreign-owned companies threaten the 
market share of local companies.513 The government strategy currently equates 
market competiveness with productivity. Government officials recognise their role as 
regulators and their responsibility to spur innovation. The government faces 
difficulties in disciplining investors, enforcing contracts and incentivising foreign 
actors to prioritise value-addition.  
Enacting market-led reforms challenged the privileges Rwandex had enjoyed 
for the previous two decades.514 Rwandex retained its ownership structure, with the 
government retaining a significant percentage of ownership. RPF supporters and 
prominent businessmen who had supported the liberation effort also invested. 
Rujugiro and Mbundu were among the first to establish exporting companies. Most 
companies had trouble remaining solvent and were unable to repay bank loans.  Six 
                                                          
511 Exporting companies are guilty of doing the same to international traders (Interview, Uzziel 
Habineza, Volcafe, March 2012. 
512 Larger exporting companies like RTC, Rwacof and CBC have developed direct contracts with 
washing stations owned by cooperatives. These companies have also built their own washing stations. 
513 “Delays in paying farmers for their cherries meant RTC or RwaCof moved in on our market share” 
(Interview, John Rebero, Misozi, April 2012). 
514 Rwandex remained partially owned by the government 
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new companies entered the sector, two of which went bankrupt after two years 
(MINAGRI 2008a). Later, other smaller companies (Salama Café, KAGERA-Coffee 
and Al Café) that entered in 1994 also went bankrupt (IMF 2000). Some others 
gained market share.  Coffex captured 15 per cent of the market in 1997, before 
leaving the sector. Others like CAFERWA disappeared but re-entered later.  
There was a sharp turnover within the sector, as exporting companies entered 
and disappeared rapidly. In 2000, for instance, there were only four exporting 
companies (Schluter and Finney 2000). Swiss-based RwaCof, owned by Sucafina, 
entered Rwanda in 1995 and captured significant market share, partly because of 
their foreign contacts.515 Since then, Rwacof has remained one of the biggest 
exporters in Rwanda. Rwandex’s market share was under increasing threat from new 
entrants but it remained a significant player. Table 6.5 indicates that Rwacof and 
Rwandex shared about 65-75 per cent of the domestic market between 2000 and 
2002, while Agrocoffee (owned by loyal businessman Sekoko) made gains despite 
reduced world prices.516 
Table 6.5: Annual Exports (tonnes) of top Coffee Exporters (2000-2002) 
Exporter 2000  2001 2002 
RWACOF 3437 (22.3 per cent) 4907 (27.3 per cent) 5148 (26 per 
cent) 
RWANDEX 8326 (53.9 per cent)   7462 (41.5 per cent) 7540 (38 per 
cent) 
SICAF 2671 (17.3 per cent) 3009 (16.7 per cent) 2239 (11.3 per 
cent) 
AGROCOFFEE 1473 (9.5 per cent) 2640 (14.7 per cent) 2717 (13.7 per 
cent) 
Source: OCIR-Cafe 
Figure 6.12 indicates exporters were making less than the producer price 
during some months between 1998 and 2000. The government made little effort to 
build reciprocal control mechanisms with investors. In 1997, the government did not 
raise the farm-gate price in response to increases in world prices. The heavy tax 
burden on exporters was a major incentive for exporters to smuggle coffee through 
other countries (IMF 2000). Exporting companies also had to pay a handling fee of 
                                                          
515 RwaCof bought the Gikondo coffee factory in 1997.  
516 Agrocoffee is a joint venture between Sekoko and Sucafina. 
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$48 per ton to OCIR-Café, which was later replaced with a fee of three per cent of 
the final freight price.  
Owners of smaller exporting companies complained they suffered because of 
comparatively limited knowledge and resources. All these companies competed for a 
small amount of coffee production and none was able to attract sufficient volumes to 
break even in 2000.517 Companies struggled to develop international networks 
through contacts with buyers and were unable to develop links with farmers and 
middlemen to ensure delivery of better quality products. The international players 
that came in, especially Sucafina, are credited with helping organise the sector and 
also imparting knowledge and enabling a ‘transfer of technology’ to other exporters.  
“It was very difficult in the beginning. It is clear that people have 
learned from us and the Rwandex owners that used to be here 
earlier. But being owned by a large company, our primary concern 
is increased quality and consistent production.”518  
 
The government feared a powerful economic player developing a monopoly. 
It used Rwandex and smaller companies to limit the power of Rwacof, which was the 
best-resourced company in the sector. When coffee prices dropped after 1997, 
Rwandex regained significant market share (Table 6.5). Rwandex then took on the 
financial burden of buying coffee from farmers when ‘private’ companies were 
unable to generate profits.  
However, Rwandex’s prominence reduced with the advent of FWC. One of 
the owners, George Drew, died in 2004. The company then gradually lost market 
share and became a bit-part player in the market. Foreign ownership was opposed to 
the FWC as it signalled a break from ordinary SWC, which they had sold on the 
international market for over two decades.519 The introduction of FWC meant foreign 
owners had to find new buyers for specialty coffee. RwaCof was also not fully 
supportive of the introduction of FWC because their parent company, Sucafina, had a 
preference for SWC.520 Coffee Business Centre (CBC) and Kasama Coffee Company 
(KCC) – two other prominent companies – also traded in both SWC and FWC. Many 
                                                          
517 OTF Presentation. Coffee Consultation Summit. Boston, 2002. 
518 Interview, Swamy, RwaCof, February 2012. 
519 Findings confirmed by two interviews (Interview, Fina Kayisanabo, USAID, October 2011 and 
Kayisinga, October 2011). The government used Rwandex to produce their own brand of roasted 
coffee – 1000 Hills Coffee (Boudreaux 2007).  
520 Interview, Swamy, February 2012. 
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exporters such as ‘bottom up’ cooperatives like RWASHOSCCO, COOPAC and 
Misozi traded solely in FWC.521 This was largely because donor support was 
contingent on the adoption of FWC. Horizon Agrocoffee – later known as API 
(military company) – and companies operated by loyal local businessmen such as 
CAFERWA and Agrocoffee only exported FWC. Foreign companies were not 
obliged to export only FWC. However, the government relied on their expertise and 
international contacts to access international markets. Sucafina (Rwacof’s parent 
company) was a major player since it bought most coffee produced in Rwanda.  
 The assets of Rwandex were taken over by Scott Ford, an American 
billionaire, in 2009.522 Ford had sold Alltel to Verizon in a multi-billion dollar deal in 
the same year. He bought the assets of the old Rwandex for 2.3 million USD and 
established a new exporting company (with an initial investment of 7 million USD) – 
Rwanda Trading Company (RTC). Ford’s company initially embraced FWC and 
developed new markets for Rwandan coffee in the United States. RTC used new 
innovations in the FWC chain to capture more of the market. The introduction of 
these innovations helped make the domestic coffee sector more efficient. RTC was 
also forced to offer higher prices to farmers to compete with existing companies. 
“Early on, we had to offer prices above the regular market price and it worked. It was 
difficult to compete with Rwacof and CBC – they were the big deal here but we’ve 
made some pretty impressive strides.”523 In the last two years, RTC has captured 
about 10-15 per cent of domestic market share through innovations and making 
direct links with cooperatives and washing stations.  
RTC eventually branched out to ordinary coffee. “Early on, we had to do 
fully washed coffee because we had to capture market. That was our opportunity. 
Now, we’re established so we’ll do what makes most sense for us.”524 RTC, CBC and 
Rwacof now dominate trade-and-export operations. These three companies were 
                                                          
521 RWASHOSCCO was formed in 2005 with the support of USAID. 85 per cent of their production 
was sold to the United States to roasters such as Paramount coffee. The rest was roasted locally and 
sold in hotels (Interview, Zacharie Ntarikutimana, RWASHOSCCO, February 2012). 
522 Rwandex failed to clear three billion RwF worth of debt – owed to Bank of Kigali, Banque 
Populaire du Rwanda and COGEBANQUE. Rwandex was put up for sale three times 
(unsuccessfully) before RTC bought the assets of the company (PSF 2010).  
523 Interview, James Dargan, RTC, February 2012. 
524 ibid 
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expected to secure 40-50 per cent of the market. Despite CBC having a bad year in 
2012, these companies continue to be the prominent players in the sector.525  
Exporters continue to enter and disappear in the sector, showing that the 
government has not been able to build ‘champions’. The government is more 
concerned with confronting monopolies than building partnerships. In 2011, Kaizen 
– a West African based venture capitalist firm – acquired stakes in three local 
exporting companies in a bid to compete in the domestic market. In the absence of 
loyal investors, the government encourages the entry of such investors to keep the 
sector competitive and discipline the larger companies. Mbundu’s company, 
CAFERWA, was among the companies that were bought by Kaizen.  
“My company went into FWC. It was very challenging. People 
were not sending cherries. The banks also didn’t know the process 
and were being a little edgy. Personally, I was finding the coffee 
market quite difficult. Now, I’m going to work with Kaizen for 3-4 
years and then we’ll list the company.”526 
 
In five months, Kaizen acquired eight washing stations. Kaizen owners 
initially beat out competition by paying farmers for coffee cherries immediately once 
cherries were delivered to washing stations (unlike most cooperatives).527 Kaizen has 
also embraced value-addition, setting up coffee shops in Lagos and developing new 
markets in West Africa. However, the entry of new investors presents dangers as 
these companies offer higher prices to farmers and distort the market to capture 
market share. The burden then shifts from middlemen to exporters who struggle to 
sell their coffee to international buyers and are forced to take losses.  
“When new investors come in, they pick up some of your 
suppliers. They just pick the right price. In year 2, they start having 
problems because of a lack of experience. They give better prices 
to farmers but don’t have buyers.”528 
 
This was the case in the 2012 coffee season. With global coffee prices 
declining in 2012, exporting companies had speculated for higher prices and 
                                                          
525 “The reason why CBC lost market share was because we managed the price badly. We signed 
contracts with suppliers that were not honoured. We made a loss for some containers then” (Interview, 
Musengimana, May 2012). 
526 Interview, Faustin Mbundu, April 2012. 
527 Interview, Gilbert Gatali, Kaizen, March 2012. 
528 Interview, Rwagasana, May 2012. 
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experienced difficulties when the New York-C price fell. This sudden fall coincided 
with a rise in FWC exports, showing that suggestions that FWC would be most 
profitable when international prices for ordinary coffee reduced were correct.  
Figures 6.24-6.27 indicate that over 40 companies and cooperatives export 
coffee. In 2014, 63 companies exported coffee out of Rwanda.529 The domestic trade-
and-export market is competitive. As the CEO of a leading domestic exporter said, 
“We are always on our toes, it is an incredibly competitive environment.”530 An 
owner of a domestic company was positive despite increasing competition.  
“I started the company in 2006 with another friend. I previously 
worked at BRD as a project analyst and had a Forex bureau after 
that. It was easy to enter the market but business is difficult. The 
coffee sector is very competitive and we have too many exporters 
compared to our production. I’m aiming to produce 10 per cent of 
Rwanda’s production. Things are possible in the sector – we just 
have to get our strategy right.”531 
In 2015, he was interviewed again. He had entered a joint-venture with 
Dorman’s after experiencing difficulties. 
“KCC came to Dorman’s this month. We had to go into partnership 
to reinforce supply side and market linkages. Competition is good 
but too much can kill the industry. All Rwandans are closing their 
businesses. You have to be strong to survive.”532 
 
Unlike during previous governments, the coffee sector (through trade-and-
export operations) is no longer a place a small group of elites retain profits.533 
Instead, elites (who head cooperatives or own exporting companies) compete with 
foreign-owned companies, other domestic elites or cooperatives to make profits. 
However, the government faces challenges of retaining control over policymaking, 
with NAEB being pushed to become ‘self-sustainable’ and cut unnecessary 
expenditure.534 Closer coordination with larger companies has been prioritised 
recently, with NAEB encouraged to work closely with the Coffee Exporters and 
Processors Association of Rwanda (CEPAR), which was established in 2010.535 The 
                                                          
529 Interview, NAEB Official, January 2015. 
530 Interview, Swamy, March 2012. 
531 Interview, Kivu Arabica Coffee Company (KCC), May 2012. 
532 Interview, KCC, January 2015. 
533 Some elites may make money from owning coffee plantations (e.g. Nkubiri and Nkusi). 
534 Interview, NAEB official, January 2015. 
535 CEPAR comprises less than 20 of the top exporters in Rwanda. 
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increasing presence of companies such as CBC, Rwacof, RTC and Kaizen on both 
the exporting and CWS nodes of the value-chain also requires the government to 
work more closely with these companies. Building reciprocal control mechanisms, 
which encourage these companies to prioritise the production and sale of FWC is 
essential if appropriate systems of accumulation in the sector are to expand. 
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6.10 Selling Narratives, Marketing FWC and Other forms of 
Value-Addition  
 
After adopting FWC, focus shifted to roasting coffee and finding a market for 
such coffee internationally. OTF studies found that between 2001 and 2003, there 
were very few countries in Africa that had successfully found a market for roasted 
coffee internationally. Ivory Coast (162 tonnes) and Cameroon (76 tonnes) led the 
way in exports of roasted coffee during this period. Only Kenyan, Zimbabwean and 
Ethiopian coffees were receiving prices of more than 3USD/kg. In the absence of 
domestic demand for coffee, it was challenging to incentivise exporters and 
cooperatives to engage in roasting (when profit margins were already thin).  
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OTF favoured marketing a pure/single-origin coffee along the lines of 
Kenyan AA, Wallenford Estate (Blue Mountain) and La Minita Estate, Costa Rica. 
Such efforts have been inhibited by inconsistencies in coffee quality and insecure 
relationships with actors further up the value chain. USAID marketed Rwanda’s 
specialty coffee around the United States and convinced roasters like Specialty 
Coffee Association of America and the Coffee Quality Institute to get involved in 
Rwanda (Chemonics 2006). Starbucks provided technical assistance. 
Rather than a continued push to build more washing stations, exporters claim 
that FWC would be better served by more investments in marketing Rwandan coffee. 
“It is difficult for us to find buyers for our products. We can’t always move fully 
washed coffee. The Rwandan semi-washed coffee established a brand over decades. 
Rwandan fully washed coffee is still new on the market.”536 Such struggles differ 
depending on the exporter but this is particularly true for the smaller exporting 
agencies that do not have direct links with international buyers. Since Sucafina buys 
a large chunk (33 per cent of all coffee exports in 2012 although only 17 per cent of 
FWC exports) of Rwandan production (both SWC and FWC), it is the easiest buyer 
to approach for smaller companies. CBC owner Rwagasana complained that RwaCof 
had an advantage while the transition to FWC was still in its infancy. 
“RwaCof has a mother company. They can make mistakes and not 
feel it.  As soon as I have a problem with one container or two, I 
end up having a terrible year. But in the end, we also sell to 
Sucafina so until I find new buyers, RwaCof will have an 
advantage.”537 
The government invested in marketing Rwandan coffee. However, these 
investments were geared to improving the image of Rwandan coffee at large, rather 
than helping a specific investor. The government sent delegations to events held by 
the Specialty Coffee Association of America and Japan, the East African Fine 
Coffees Association, and has also held a national barista competition since 2008. The 
government has also engaged directly with international buyers including the Rogers 
Family who visited Rwanda in 2009 and bought 58 containers after the visit.  
One innovation was attending and holding CoE events (OCIR-Café 2009b). 
The CoE programme is managed by the Alliance for Coffee Excellence, Inc., a US-
                                                          
536 Interview, Rebero, March 2011. Similar statements were made by other exporters. 
537 Interview, Rwagasana, May 2012. 
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based non-profit organisation. Rwanda was the first African country to hold a CoE 
event in 2008 and has held the event annually since then.538 At these events, coffee is 
evaluated, tasted, scored and cupped at least five times and then auctioned to the 
highest bidders. Such events have been instrumental in building a reputation for 
Rwandan specialty coffee and exposing Rwandan coffee to new markets.539 Auctions 
take place both online and in person. In 2011, 36 Rwandan lots were auctioned and 
attracted buyers from all over the world including Japan, Taiwan, the United States, 
South Africa and Australia. The highest price of the winning lot was 44.31USD/kg, 
the lowest price was 11USD/kg, and 33,689kg of coffee was auctioned in total 
(NAEB 2012). This is up from the 2009 CoE when prices were between 4.2USD and 
26.5USD/kg. Coffee sold at the CoE receives much higher prices than the usual price 
obtained for FWC, which is 2USD/kg-6.2USD/kg, and for SWC, which was 
1.86USD/kg-3USD/kg (OCIR-Café 2009b). 
 The government and exporters both agree that the the CoE’s success has 
incentivised farmers to engage in the FWC value-chain more productively. 
Investment group API has been an example to follow in this regard, obtaining the 
highest price in the 2011 auction. Since API is a formal investment group, the 
government is sure of the loyalty of this firm and ensures FWC production is adopted 
on military-owned land to facilitate API’s accumulation strategies.  
Most samples that are brought to the CoE are usually selected. In 2011, 189 
samples were brought to the competition and 132 were selected (NAEB 2012). 
However, it is a gamble for farmers if their coffee is not selected.  
“The CoE has brought a lot of fanfare. Every farmer thinks they 
have the best coffee in the world and NAEB encourages them. 
However, every farmer tries and most of the coffee doesn’t 
actually make it to the competition. Then its difficult to sell that 
coffee.”540 
The CoE has also helped Rwandan coffee reach new markets. The United 
States has become an alternative to traditional European markets. The Rwandan 
government has also actively sought new markets through engaging with Turkish, 
                                                          
538 Mexico’s largest coffee trading company held a national quality competition in each state to 
encourage producers to invest in agricultural techniques (and as market research to establish the best 
regions for coffee production) (Renard and Perez-Grovas 2007). 
539 Interview, Robinah Uwera – NAEB, November 2011. 
540 Interview, Dargan, February 2012. 
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West African and East Asian investors. Despite the concentration among roasters in 
the international coffee chain, the emergence of small roasters represents 
“interstices” (Ponte 2002), which the government hopes to exploit.541 TRADEMAP 
data shows that in 2012, Rwanda exported coffee to 40 countries.  
The option of roasting coffee was explored through roasting in Rwanda itself 
or toll roasting (a contract for roasting Rwandan coffee by an existing coffee roasting 
business in the country of consumption). OTF estimated that roasting in Rwanda 
would entail higher transportation costs, processing and packaging costs, and capital 
and depreciation costs as compared to toll roasting. Toll roasting would ensure the 
finished product matched market tastes, avoided air freight costs and ensure quicker 
delivery to the market. Immediately, contacts were sought in Europe, North America, 
China and Japan in the mid-2000s to explore such avenues. OTF approached Green 
Mountain Coffee, who partnered with Arkansas-based Westrock Coffee and Scott 
Ford’s RTC. Ford was an exception among investors and was already a trusted 
‘Friend of Rwanda’. PEARL (and later SPREAD) were also encouraged  to use their 
contacts to find partnerships with roasters in America. The Abahuzamugambi 
cooperative, which was established in 1999 and supported by PEARL, found a 
market for their coffees through Union Coffee Roasters in the UK and Community 
Coffee in the United States. Their coffee is exported as single-source/traceable coffee 
and is bought at premiums and sold at Whole Foods, Intelligentsia Coffee and Third 
Rail Coffee in New York (Easterly and Reshef 2010). Similar achievements were 
made by RWASHOSCCO and Buf Coffee – coffee cooperatives (formerly financed 
by donors). Potential buyers were reticent about the government’s approaches, which 
OTF argued was because of inconsistencies in coffee quality and the failure of 
domestic partners in delivering consistent and timely supply.  
 The government has pushed companies to roast coffee domestically. Coffee 
roasted domestically is sold either in local coffee shops, hotels, domestic 
supermarkets or in the East African market. As of 2009, there were six main coffee 
roasters – all were domestic companies: Kinunu Coffee, Maraba Coffee, Sacof 
Coffee, Aromec Coffee, Tora Coffee and Bourbon. OCIR-Café also roasted coffee 
worth 93 tonnes in 2009 (OCIR-Café 2009b). Aromec and Tora sold their coffee in 
the Middle Eastern and Ugandan supermarkets respectively. By 2012, 116.8 tonnes 
                                                          
541 Interview, NAEB, May 2013. 
243 
 
of roasted Rwandan coffee earned 831 million RwF (NAEB 2012). While there have 
been impressive strides (Figures 6.28-6.29), much depends on the promotion of a 
Rwandan “coffee culture” and then convincing exporters to take risks in investing in 
the long-term benefits of roasting at home (that OTF and other consultants doubt 
because of the lack of market). Growing a “coffee culture” depends on the existence 
of an expatriate community living in Rwanda. The government’s attempt at 
convincing the population to drink coffee is unlikely to be successful.542 Other 
success stories are difficult to emulate. In Ethiopia, coffee drinking was ingrained in 
the country’s culture while Kenyan retail chains like Dorman’s have taken advantage 
of Kenyan middle-class ‘changes in taste’ and a vibrant expatriate community.543 
 In spite of these difficulties, the government (NAEB and BRD) has worked 
with partners, the Clinton Hunter Development Initiative (CHDI) and the Hunter 
Foundation, to create a coffee company – the Rwandan Farmers Coffee Company 
(RFCC) – and invest in a 3 million USD coffee processing factory in Kigali. In 2015, 
the RFCC began operations and will produce under the brand – Gorilla’s coffee – 
and sell to local, African, Asian and European markets.  
“The President talked to Mr. Clinton and Mr. Tom Hunter and 
made this happen. Back in the day, we used to ground coffee with 
a stick but now, we are producing finished products in our country. 
This is a big matter of pride. But if you think about everyone who 
is doubting us, we already have contracts in the UK and we hope to 
break even within 2-5 years. The clients have also given two coffee 
cooperatives in Muhanga and Rulindo grants and under this 
agreement, farmers will get 20 per cent of profits. All money will 
go back into the coffee sector.”544 
 The government has made progress in value-addition (packaging and setting 
up shops) and marketing coffee (although more work needs to be done). However, 
they have not picked national champions to the extent other countries did. Easterly 
and Reshef (2010) attributed the success of one value-addition attempt in Uganda to 
the “strong, entrepreneurial spirit, commitment and passion” of the successful owner 
of Good African Coffee, Andrew Rugasira. Rugasira roasted, packaged and exported 
FWC directly to the UK to be sold at Sainsbury’s and Tescos. While this is a “feel-
good story” and Rugasira’s achievements are impressive, he has had government 
                                                          
542 Even most government officials seem unconvinced by this. 
543 Consultancy reports. 
544 Interview, RFCC, January 2015. 
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support. His book (2013) shows how his personal contacts in embassies and the 
Ugandan government helped him procure roasting contracts and assisted him in other 
ways. For example, he discusses how a Ugandan Embassy official in China put him 
in touch with a Chinese national who then helped provide contacts for equipment for 
a roasting and packing facility (Rugasira 2013, 133). This is not to take anything 
away from Rugasira who displayed innovation, creativity and succeded in capturing 
more of the value-chain. However, his accumulation strategies were facilitated 
through Ugandan government interventions.545 
 Most value-addition strategies emphasise ‘coffee karma’ stories where 
cooperatives, characterised as a group of hardworking vulnerable small farmers, 
work together to get the most out of tiny landholdings. Successful cooperatives are 
not evidence of the utopian assumptions associated with the cooperative movement. 
Rwakagara heads COOPAC and has more than 30 times the amount of land than any 
other farmer. Abahuzamugambi has succeeded primarily because of international 
contacts developed through donor support. Both these cooperatives have heavy 
membership fees, which limit the possibility of vulnerable workers becoming 
members. COOPAC’s annual membership fee is 10,000 RwF and Abahuzamuambi’s 
annual fee is 5000 RwF (Mujawamariya et al. 2013). Such contradictions are 
acknowledged by bureaucrats: 
“The cooperatives are not strong. Most cooperatives are captured 
by the elite. Even when they have money, they don’t invest back 
into coffee.”546 
The government also plays an important role in developing contacts and 
popularising Rwanda ‘coffee karma’ stories. Personal relationships between Kagame 
and Howard Schultz at Starbucks and Peter Rogers of the Rogers Family Company 
have assisted the creation of partnerships in exports of single-origin Rwandan 
packaged coffee.547 Rogers Family Company plans include a partnership with loyal 
businessmen Alfred Nkubiri’s ENAS to build washing stations.  
                                                          
545 Officials in the Rwandan government argued that this was not an ‘entrepreneurial’ success 
(Interviews, President’s Office and NAEB, May 2013). Rugasira also has links with the Ugandan 
military (Tangri and Mwenda 2003). In 1998-99, he was paid $4,486,805 by Uganda’s Ministry of 
Defence to transport military equipment and soldiers to and from the DRC (ibid). 
546 Interview, Uwitonze, March 2012. 
547 Costco and Rogers Family Company have also invested in growing coffee on 100 hectares of 
consolidated land in Ngorero district. Such plans include assisting 400 smallholder farmers in the 
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6.11 Bourbon Coffee – Using Loyal Companies to spark 
Diversification 
 
 Rwanda’s most ambitious value-addition attempt was Bourbon Coffee. This 
ended up being a brand-building exercise and the venture itself is unlikely to have 
made profits. Bourbon Coffee was established in 2006 by Arthur Karuletwa – a 
Rwandan who moved to America in 1995, and worked for Proctor & Gamble, and 
then for the Rwandan government including as a consultant at OCIR-Café (Frederick 
2008). Bourbon was initially imagined as the ‘Starbucks of Rwanda.’ Karuletwa’s 
wife previously worked at Starbucks. Bourbon has three stores in Kigali and one 
each in Washington DC, New York, Boston and London.548 It aimed at providing a 
market for high-quality coffee produced by Rwandan farmers and was developed in 
close collaboration with the state. The shops themselves are geared to provide a 
Western-style coffee experience, importing their condiments and pushing a 
Starbucks-style ambience. Bourbon’s success was an example to others, with 17 new 
coffee shops established across Rwanda by others.549 Other coffee shops include 
Brioche (with 3 establishments in Kigali) and Kaizen’s Neo.  
 Karuletwa initially partnered with CVL. Later, he was pushed out of 
ownership and this remains a contentious issue among many in Rwanda.550 The RPF 
defends itself by stating that it took over the company to act like a venture 
capitalist.551 Since Karuletwa did not have the capital or the capacity to engage in the 
expansion of Bourbon, CVL stepped in to take over. Others say this was one of the 
bitterest episodes of Karuletwa’s life and that he was pushed out once he no longer 
agreed with their plans for expansion.552 From the government’s point of view, using 
CVL’s Bourbon (where rents were centralised and loyalty was assured) was 
strategically important. Since Karuletwa chose silence and did not publicly voice his 
discontent, he remains influential within the domestic coffee sector – contributing to 
                                                                                                                                                                    
district (Jones 2014). Rogers Family Company already buys Rwandan coffee, roasts the coffee in the 
US and sells it to Costco as Kirkland Rwandan Coffee. 
548 The London store was closed down in 2012.  
549 The government invested in training baristas and encouraged the construction of local coffee shops 
in Kigali (Interview, Nzaramba, NAEB, March 2012). 
550 One consultant and one former employee at Bourbon, January and March 2012. 
551 Interview, NAEB, November 2011; SPU, May 2013.  
552 Interview, former employee of Karuletwa at Bourbon and consultant who previously worked with 
CVL. 
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bringing RTC to Rwanda. He is also the co-owner and founder of Inzozi Coffee 
Traders, which sources single-origin Rwandan coffee.553 
 After establishing stores in Rwanda, Bourbon was encouraged by CVL 
ownership to explore expansion abroad. Among upper management, there was 
debate about what was the best way to proceed. Those with experience in the coffee 
industry doubted that any expansion would be successful. Instead, African markets or 
niche branding should have been explored.554 Despite these warnings, a decision was 
reached to set up showcase shops in the US and the UK. Buying up prime real estate 
in Soho in London without doing market research was a detriment to the success of 
these shops. Additionally, Bourbon maintained its Starbucks-like ambience abroad, 
which worked against comparative advantage. “If it was selling Rwandan coffee, it 
should look like its selling Rwandan coffee” was an observation by exporters who 
were puzzled by their strategy.555 Profits from local stores were invested in 
Bourbon’s expansion internationally but (some of these shops have closed down) the 
stores have not been profitable.556 CVL was criticised for such failed experiments. 
However, government officials were positive about the contribution of the 
experiment to marketing the specialty coffee brand of Rwanda abroad.557  
6.12 Conclusion – The Vulnerability of the Developmental 
Political Settlement 
 
 This chapter shows that the RPF government has been committed to tackling 
the vulnerability associated with producing low-quality coffee for global markets. 
The government’s interventions in this sector have been characteristic of 
interventions made by developmental states (Wade 1990). Though previous 
governments enjoyed larger quantities of coffee production, the economy was 
vulnerable because of its dependence on low-quality coffee as the primary source of 
foreign exchange. Unlike previous governments, there is little evidence that elites 
have captures rents in the coffee sector in post-1994 Rwanda. During previous 
                                                          
553 He is now a Starbucks employee, based in Seattle. 
554 Interviews with domestic export companies. 
555 Unnamed exporter (Kigali, May 2013) 
556 Interviews, Government officials, exporting companies.  
557 Interview, Patrick Gihana-Mulenga, Commercial Attaché, High Commission of Rwanda in the UK, 
April 2013. 
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governments, the clientelism that was associated with the coffee sector detrimentally 
affected political stability.  
 The RPF government has developed an economic strategy that is geared to 
achieving ideological goals (self-reliance) and navigating the demands of three 
constituencies. In the process, it has used loyal investors for strategic investments 
(although it has done little to develop long-term partnerships with these investors). It 
has used cooperatives to organise labour to new production techniques (adopting 
FWC) and distribute inputs more effectively. The sector has also been liberalised to 
induce innovation and encourage a competitive environment. The government has 
developed narratives to maintain the legitimacy of the systems of accumulation on 
which the strategy has been developed. It maintains an image of liberalising the 
sector and promoting the image that a competitive environment has resulted in a 
level playing field for all private sector operators. The sector is now dominated by 
foreign actors, with many smaller companies struggling to survive. Images of 
empowering ‘small farmers’ through encouraging farmers to join cooperatives feed 
assumptions that cooperative members receive equal benefits and that ‘small 
farmers’ are a homogeneous group. Evidence has been presented that this is not true 
and ‘control grabs’ are taking place (or, at least, cooperative membership is restricted 
to those who have the resources to meet certain requirements). Narratives have been 
used as a way to mask the political processes and exploitation that have accompanied 
the revitalisation of the coffee sector. 
Though conditions of ‘systemic vulnerability’ motivate ruling elites to pursue 
strategies in line with achieving self-reliance, vulnerability (associated with having to 
meet the demands of three constituencies) has also reduced the government’s 
capacity to deliver economic development. Because there are few individual loyal 
capitalists on whom the government relies, no individual local investor is encouraged 
to make strategic investments. Either the government or investment groups usually 
lead strategic investments. Since the sector has been liberalised and the government 
has limited resources and expertise, it is very difficult to monitor the increasing 
number of companies and actors that operate in the sector.558 Smaller local 
companies question these policies.559 The achievement of future targets will depend 
                                                          
558 Interviews, 2 NAEB officials, January 2015. 
559 Interview, local exporting company, January 2015. 
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on the government’s capacity to convince coffee producers to adopt appropriate 
practices and to discipline private sector operators in line with national goals. 
Maintaining the strength of narratives will be crucial to ensure the government 
capitalises on ‘coffee karma’ stories and breaks into specialty markets. 
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CHAPTER 7: BUT WE HAVE MINERALS 
TOO: MAINTAINING A DEVELOPMENTAL 
POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN RWANDA’S 
‘REBORN’ MINERALS SECTOR 
7.1: Introduction - The Clash of Mining Narratives 
 
This chapter describes the evolution of the minerals sector in Rwanda. It 
shows how the RPF government has refocused its attention on the domestic minerals 
sector and away from extracting revenues from minerals emanating from the DRC. 
Such strategies work in line with ideological goals of achieving self-reliance. The 
RPF government has only revitalised the domestic minerals sector in recent years but 
since then, there has been progress in increasing mineral production and export 
revenues. There has also been some progress in beneficiation. However, the 
government (with inadequate expertise, funding and skills) faces challenges in 
ensuring that policies are geared in line with long-term objectives because it has 
experienced difficulties in disciplining and monitoring private companies, as well as 
enforcing legislation.  
The RPF government’s achievements have exceeded those of previous 
governments. However, previous governments experienced periods of high 
production and Habyarimana’s government even invested in the construction of a tin 
smelter. The RPF government’s interventions share the basic characteristics of a 
developmental state, identified in Wade (1990). The government has made some 
productive investments (through making some investments in research and the 
tagging system, which has led to the revitalisation of the sector), broken ties with 
commercial networks in the DRC (that can be equated with government intervention) 
and exposed the sector to international competition. The government intervened to 
provide incentives to investors who engaged in value-addition, without which such 
investments would not have been made.  
Rwanda’s domestic minerals sector has received little attention when 
compared to the minerals sector in the DRC. Both Rwanda and the DRC are located 
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on the same Central African Kibara orogenic belt. This belt extends from Katanga in 
the south to southern Uganda in the north. Most of Rwanda’s mineral production 
comprises the 3T minerals: Cassiterite (or Tin), Wolframite (or Tungsten), 
Columbite-Tantalite (Coltan or Tantalum). Other minerals include gold, beryl and 
gemstones including sapphire.  
The narrative in the international press, made popular by claims around 
‘conflict minerals’, assumes that most of Rwanda’s mineral exports originate from 
the DRC.560 This narrative criticises the RPF government for supporting rebel groups 
in the DRC to access mineral wealth in the Kivus.561 Supporters of this narrative 
deride the international community for failing to discipline the Rwandan government 
for its involvement in the Kivus over the past decade. In late 2012, fighting broke out 
between the M23 (a rebel group linked to the Rwandan government) and the Armed 
Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC). Donors accepted the 
narrative put forward by civil society organisations and suspended aid.562 This forced 
the RPF government to sever ties with the M23.563  
This simplistic narrative reduced Rwanda’s intentions of supporting rebel 
groups in the DRC to motivations of greed. Such accusations resonated with the 
popular work of Paul Collier and his colleagues (2001), which tested whether civil 
wars were caused by ‘greed’ or ‘grievance’. The work of Collier and his colleagues 
drew a sharp distinction between these two categories of motivations to categorise 
events and fit them into statistical models. Collier went against conventional wisdom 
that grievances caused civil wars. Instead, Collier’s (2000, 96) results 
“overwhelmingly point to the importance of economic agendas as opposed to 
grievances.” Such theories relied on the logic that if individuals were driven by self-
interest and rational choice, they might be driven to violence (Cramer 2006). The 
                                                          
560 Autesserre (2012) highlights that the narrative focuses on the illegal exploitation of natural 
resources as a primary cause of violence. Examples can be seen in the work of the Enough Project and 
the Friends of the Congo. For examples of news articles, see Allen (2009), Polgreen (2008). 
561 Such rebel groups include the CNDP and the M23. 
562 Donors had withdrawn aid before over similar allegations. In 2004-5, the UK and Sweden delayed 
aid disbursements (Hayman 2009a). In 2008, Netherlands and Sweden suspended budget support.  
563 Aid was cancelled by many donors, including the EU (suspended $90 million), UK (withheld $34 
million), Sweden (suspended over $10 million), Germany (suspended US$26 million), Netherlands 
(cancelled $6 million) and the United States (cancelled $200,000 in military aid) (Beswick 2014). In 
December 2012, then-Minister of Finance Rwangombwa said: “Rwanda was expecting $362 million 
from donors in general and sector budget support and of that, we had received $122 million while 
$240 million is yet to be released” (Kagire 2012a). In 2013, donors reinstated aid. 
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popular narrative around DRC’s ‘conflict minerals’ mirrored these assumptions and 
neglected the variety of reasons why individuals and groups engage in conflict. 
Advocates of this ‘Coltan Rush’ narrative organised themselves around the 
myth that the DRC held 80 per cent of global tantalum reserves.564 The DRC has 
rarely produced more than 20 per cent of the world’s tantalum and only holds around 
seven to eight per cent of global reserves (Nest 2011). Those who highlighted the 
greedy motives of elites as the single source of conflict reduced the complexities of 
the DRC to a single solution: make the export of conflict minerals illegal. This 
reasoning ignored the “diversity of violent conflict: the diversity of its causes and 
motivations and the diversity of its conduct and organisation” (Cramer 2006, 136). 
The commodity itself is rarely the reason why people fight. Through the conversion 
of a commodity into a resource, a process of social construction takes place. 
Explanations of how the commodity is transformed into a resource can explain how 
control over local resources influences the strategy of belligerents (Le Billon 2001). 
Both ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ are important motivating factors for conflict.565 
However, rather than viewing them independently, motives of violence must be 
understood in the context of historical social relations and how the greedy 
manipulate the grievances of others (Keen 2008). The conflict in the Kivus is rooted 
in local tensions that originate from the colonial era. Motivations of Rwandan elites 
have transformed since the Congo Wars began. Groups of elites maintain different 
loyalties and interests. Operating within the same military commercial networks may 
force loyalty to a centralised authority but also contribute to friction among elites 
within the political hierarchy. In addition, commodities other than ‘conflict minerals’ 
are traded in the Kivus. Actors in the region have also profited from trading coffee, 
timber, food and fuel. There is little doubt that funds from trading in the Kivus have 
contributed to the growth of the Rwandan economy. Section 7.6 highlights how the 
RPF generated funds from military efforts and centralised rents that were received 
from trading minerals. 
The RPF’s own defensive narrative clashes with the narrative in the 
international press. The RPF charges the popular press with ignoring the historical 
                                                          
564 Coltan (columbo-tantalite) is a heat-resistant metal that is used in electronic devices.  
565 Greed is a significant factor in civil wars, interacting with grievances in complex ways (Keen 
2012). See Stewart (2008), Cederman et al. (2013) for grievance-based explanations of conflict.  
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interaction of the communities in the Kivus, the need to protect the Banyarwanda 
population in the Kivus and the presence of Hutu militias (FDLR) that pose a threat 
to Rwandan national security. In recent years, RPF officials have argued that the 
government deserves credit for the revitalisation of the domestic minerals sector.566  
“Think about this in terms of our history. There is a long history of 
interaction of our communities. You could even say that parts of 
Eastern DRC are actually part of Rwanda… For us, security is the 
number one issue. When it comes to FDLR in DRC, that 
government is incapable of doing anything. We have lost one 
million people in three months because of those people and they 
continue to kill others in DRC. Others are so arrogant that they 
have forgotten this event. But in Rwanda, we have to counter any 
genocide… After the Dodd-Frank Act, others thought that Rwanda 
is finished now. But it has actually made Rwanda more stable. 
They have helped us in sending the political message that Rwanda 
does not depend on the illegal exploitation of minerals. Now, these 
investors can no longer blackmail us that they would rather trade 
minerals than invest in the domestic minerals sector. Soon, we 
hope that we will no longer have to export raw minerals to 
Malaysia and we can export finished products here.”567 
The RPF government has prioritised the rehabilitation of the mining sector 
since the early 2000s. The government focuses on increasing domestic production 
and adding value by processing minerals (beneficiation). The government relied on 
donors and consultancy firms like OTF for technical support. OTF identified 
Rwanda’s competitive advantage in becoming a future hub for the transport of ‘legal’ 
minerals in the region. OTF argued that Rwanda could become a ‘hub’ if it 
successfully built processing facilities and developed contacts with foreign buyers. 
Neighbouring countries would then be convinced to send their minerals to Rwanda, 
rather than send them further abroad to be processed. The RPF’s strategy required 
the government to construct narratives to retain a ‘positive’ image, which would be 
beneficial to entice support (from donors and investors). The government eventually 
chose to reduce its reliance on Congolese minerals to bet on the future of the 
domestic minerals sector (and self-reliance). To access the long-term benefits of such 
policies, elites and the government were required to reduce their reliance on ‘dirty’ 
mineral networks from the DRC (or to integrate these networks into a ‘formal’ 
supply chain e.g. through formal re-exports). It was a political opportunity (and a 
                                                          
566 Interview, MINIRENA officials, May 2013; January 2015. 
567 Interview, Nzabamwita, January 2015. 
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risk) as transition costs from those who gained from commercial trading networks in 
the DRC would have to be negotiated in the process. 
The domestic minerals sector remained relatively inactive in the 1990s. Total 
mineral production was below 200 tonnes till 1996.568 Since 2004, mineral 
production has increased (Figure 7.1). Large shares of mineral production are likely 
to have originated from the DRC in the early 2000s. As late as 2005, OTF reports 
estimated that only 45 per cent of Coltan and Cassiterite and 61 per cent of Wolfram 
exported out of Rwanda was produced domestically. However, several new mining 
sites have begun operations and ‘domestic’ mineral production has increased. 
 
Source: MINECOFIN 
RPF narratives mystify the harsh realities associated with accumulation 
strategies around the extraction of minerals (both at home and in the DRC). This 
chapter shows how dealing with demands from “three constituencies” has impacted 
the transformation of the domestic minerals sector. Developing a ‘clean’ image of the 
domestic minerals sector was essential for the government to retain access to foreign 
aid and to maintain its image as a ‘donor darling.’569  To develop this image, the 
government not only embraced tagging initiatives but also privatised state-owned 
assets and liberalised trade-and-export operations. The choice to begin tagging 
minerals and liberalise the sector worked in line with long-term ambitions of value-
addition and revitalisation of the domestic sector (and Economic Nationalism) above 
                                                          
568 According to Bundesanstalt fur Geowissenschaftren und Rohstoffe (BGR) estimates.  
569 In September 2014, the government signed a new grant with the EU Development Fund worth 460 
million Euros. The previous grant received from the EU was 290 million Euros (Mwai 2014). In 2012, 
the EU had frozen aid to Rwanda. 
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individual profit-making interests.570 RPF narratives highlight that the privatisation of 
state-owned concessions led to the successful transformation of the minerals 
sector.571 Privatisation has empowered foreign firms that generated profits in global 
markets.572 No national champions remain competitive although a variety of smaller 
domestic comptoirs have survived.573 The government now relies on legislation to 
ensure private companies work in line with national priorities.  
The government has promoted cooperative formation and ‘formalisation’ to 
organise labour to the production of minerals. OTF advised the government to focus 
on formalising the minerals sector through supporting artisanal and small-scale 
mining (ASM) and new private sector players. Formalisation was not simply a way 
to empower small-scale miners. It was also used as an opportunity to ‘standardise 
rural peasantries’ to assist the state in exerting greater control of the peasantry (Scott 
1998). Government strategy was based on the assumption that formalising the sector 
would maximise long-term revenues. However, the Rwandan government did not 
recognise the challenges facing small-scale miners nor did it recognise the ease with 
which miners smuggled minerals through ‘informal’ channels. The government 
initially encouraged all actors, including small-scale miners, to invest in prospecting 
and research before engaging in extracting minerals. The government neither had the 
budget nor the personnel to enforce such rules. Also, small miners were unable to 
fund costs of geological surveys.574 MINIRENA (2010, 31) emphasised the need to 
“increase the rigour applied to the small mine permit process such that each applicant 
had to have an initial estimate of the deposit reserves and a rough map of the deposit 
to be mined.” Companies and small-scale miners relied on trading and extraction to 
re-invest in research (if they were interested in investing in research at all). OTF 
identified constraints in the sector, including high electricity costs, costs of 
                                                          
570 In the first few years of the tagging system, ‘conflict minerals’ from commercial networks may 
have still been traded. However, there was a clear choice made to prioritise the ‘public’ narrative at 
the cost of short-term benefits from trading ‘conflict minerals’.  
571 “Mining and trade in minerals have been recovering mainly due to the privatisation of government-
owned miners, which increased productivity” (MINIRENA 2010, 6). 
572 Angola and Sierra Leone as two countries where liberalisation had similar effects (Reno 1997). 
573 Comptoirs refer to companies that export minerals. 
574 At a meeting in 2006, David Bensusan, then of Eurotrade International, raised questions with 
regard to this policy, citing the cost of a geological survey for a reasonably sized permit area at 32,000 
USD, and upward of 100,000 USD for a more detailed non-alluvial study to evaluate quality of 
reserves. He warned that the cost would decrease both the participation and profitability of ASM, 
calling instead for larger players to support small miners in reserve estimation.  
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environmental legislation compliance, outdated ASM techniques, inadequate 
transportation facilities, lack of water supply and difficulties in accessing finance.  
The mining sector has been reorganised over the past two decades, with all 
concessions under private ownership. The Ministry of Land, Environment, Forestry, 
Water and Mines (MINITERE), later renamed the Ministry of Natural Resources 
(MINIRENA) in 2011, led government responsibilities in the sector. The Rwanda 
Natural Resources Authority (RNRA) was established as an agency within the 
ministry in 2011. The RNRA is in charge of the promotion and protection of the 
environment and natural resources. Within the RNRA, a department dealt 
exclusively with the minerals sector - Office of Mines and Geology of Rwanda 
(OGMR).575 OGMR was renamed the Geology and Mines Department (GMD) in 
2011. OGMR and later GMD were the focal points within the ministry and 
responsible for most mining activities after 2009.  
There has been very little academic research (Perks 2013) undertaken in 
Rwanda’s minerals sector. Information has been obtained primarily from interviews 
(with government officials, representatives from the private sector, cooperative 
leaders and military elites). Statistics have been obtained directly from government 
sources. For the section on Rwanda’s engagement in the Kivus, details from existing 
academic work and policy documents are used. Historical data was obtained through 
interviews, existing academic literature and from government offices in Kigali. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                          
575 OGMR was established in 2007 as a department within MINITERE. After a reorganisation of the 
ministry, OGMR was subsumed within RNRA. 
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7A: The History of Rwanda’s Minerals 
Sector  
7.2 Mining during the Colonial Administration 
 
 RPF narratives hold that prior to 1994, Rwanda was historically a conduit for 
trading minerals that originated from the DRC.576 These narratives ignore the 
achievements of independent governments (MINIRENA 2010).577 In reality, the 
mining sector was more than a trading hub. Preceding governments prioritised the 
sector but failed to develop a long-term vision for capitalising on resources.  
 The first geological observations were made during the visit of German Duke 
Mecklenburg in 1909 (MINIRENA 2010). Investments by the colonial 
administration were motivated by the success of Union Minière du Haut Katanga 
(UMHK), which had begun to prosper after initial difficulties (Buelens and Marysse 
2009). In 1925, Cassiterite was discovered in Rwanda. Concessions were only 
opened for prospecting in 1927 after delays in establishing mining legislation 
(Hillman 1997). Unlike in Katanga, there was no dominant charter company. 
Concessions were allocated competitively in Rwanda.578 As a result, capital 
mobilisation was a problem in Rwanda, compared to Katanga. The largest 
concession in Rwanda went to a local commercial house (owned by Belgian settlers), 
Compagnie du Kivu, which later formed Société Minière de Muhinga et de Kigali 
(SOMUKI). Other initial concessionaries consolidated their holdings to establish 
Société des Mines d’Etain du Rwanda-Urundi (MINETAIN).579 The absence of 
powerful chartered companies limited mineral production during this period 
(Hillman 1997).580  
                                                          
576 “The mining sector wasn’t exploited before 1994. The previous government didn’t put in any 
effort” (Interview, Josiane Barabareho, SPU, November 2011). 
577 MINIRENA (2010) highlights the potential of the minerals sector but emphasises years of low 
mineral production (1980-1984). 
578 The Société Générale de Belgique (SGB), a powerful Belgian financial group, entered the Congo 
through the creation of the Compagnie du Katanga (CK), providing the capital necessary for the 
exploitation of mineral resources in the region. 
579 Later, two other mining companies were established: GEORWANDA in 1945 and COREM in 
1948 (MINIRENA 2010). 
580 Though there may have been fewer minerals in Rwanda as compared to Katanga, the absence of 
chartered companies in Rwanda inhibited systematic prospection and exploration. 
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Minerals were first exported out of Rwanda in 1928, with the export of 68 
tonnes of Cassiterite. The first mining code was established in 1938, which detailed 
the provision of concessions, as well as licenses for research, exploration and 
extraction. Other discoveries followed: Wolfram (in 1937), Gold (in 1933) and 
Coltan (in 1947). Cassiterite was the most widely extracted mineral in Rwanda. The 
colonial administration received more than 75 per cent of mining export receipts 
from Cassiterite (Figures 7.2 and 7.3). However, production of all minerals was 
relatively low, compared to global production. Annual Cassiterite production was 
barely one per cent of global production (Uwizeyimana 1988). Individual companies 
invested in research and geological missions (particularly true of MINETAIN and 
SOMUKI).581  However, these companies competed with each other, rather than 
pooling resources for a common purpose. Many mining sites were developed during 
this time although most did not hold concentrated mineral deposits.582 Very few 
large-scale industrial mines were established and most investors prioritised extraction 
(rather than prospecting) to capture short-term profits. 
                                                          
581 325.4 million Belgian Francs were invested by companies in Rwanda (Uwizeyimana 1988). 
582 In 1955, 85 per cent of the region’s 269 mining sites were located in Rwanda (Bezy 1990). 
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Source: Uwizeyimana (1988) 
Rwandans migrated to work in industrial mines in the Eastern DRC in the late 
1920s. In 1926, a decree was issued that authorised Rwandans to seek employment 
freely outside the country and legally opened Rwanda to contract workers from 
neighbouring countries. Three recruiters rushed to Rwanda: the UMHK, Comité 
National du Kivu (CNKI) and individual settlers (Mamdani 2001). The UMHK’s 
need for labour was hastened by increasing resistance from ‘troublesome 
Rhodesians’ who sabotaged activities at mines, while also persuading local 
Congolese workers to protest (Higginson 1989). Forced labour practices between 
1914 and 1928 were met with growing resistance among the Congolese population. 
The context featured “incoming white settlers and fleeing locals” (Mamdani 2001, 
240). UMHK used the famine of 1928 in Rwanda to draw in more workers.583 The 
                                                          
583 7000 workers left from Ruanda-Urundi to work on UMHK mines in Katanga till 1930 (Newbury 
1988). This migration was then stopped.  
Figure 7.2: Total Domestic Mineral Production till 1985 
(tonnes)
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Figure 7.3: Total Value of Mineral Exports till 1985 (Million 
RwF)
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share of UMHK workers from Rwanda and Burundi rose from three per cent in 1926 
to 30 per cent in 1930 (Higginson 1989).  
In 1937, an organised phase of immigration began. Land was taken away 
from the local Twa and Hunde population and declared terres dominiales (state-
owned lands) before being reserved as a zone for Rwandan immigration 
(Bucyalimwe 1997). The new generation of ‘transplanted’ Banyarwanda was granted 
its own native authority in Gishari in Masisi, which led to tensions with the local 
population.584 This zone was invalidated in 1957, fomenting a post-independence 
crisis of citizenship (Mamdani 2001). Migrant numbers rose after another famine in 
Rwanda.585 These miners were given uniforms and money directly by the white 
settlers – unlike akazi, which was unpaid (Mulinda 2010).586  
The relationship of industrial mining with development outcomes has been 
‘contentious and ambiguous’ (Bebbington et al. 2008). The sector is associated with 
positive attributes such as the potential to generate large profits. However, it is also 
tainted with a reputation for appalling labour conditions, environmental degradation 
and spectacularly unequal distributions of income between companies and their 
miners. The establishment of mines in Rwanda and in neighbouring countries 
provided benefits for mining companies, opportunities for peasants as well as new 
forms of exploitation.587 Through opportunities in the mining sector, many peasants 
escaped forms of forced labour such as ubureetwa and akazi. Many Rwandan mining 
concessions were located in densely populated areas, forcing many off their land.588 
Miners often performed tasks for the colonial administration while also being forced 
to work for local chiefs. In these circumstances, ‘mining farmers’ suffered a kind of 
double exploitation.589 SOMUKI’s low wages and appalling working conditions were 
similar to “the mining methods of the Pharaohs” (Hillman 1997, 163).  
Rwandan chiefs were charged with the dual and contradictory responsibility 
of recruiting migrants for wage work, while ensuring enough peasants were tied to 
                                                          
584 Historical land conflicts between the Banyarwanda and other groups in the DRC are a source of 
conflict today (Vlassenroot 2004). 
585 Migrants increased up to 24,448 in 1945, from 8,492 in 1942 (Mamdani 2001). 
586 Forced labour was usually done for little or no pay. 
587 By 1932, MINETAIN and SOMUKI employed over 900 workers (Uwizeyimana 1988). 
588 Most new mining concessions were located in regions with a population density of more than 500 
habitants/km2 (Uwizeyimana 1988). 
589 Maconachie and Binns (2007) use this term in the context of livelihood diversification in Sierra 
Leone.  
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patron-client relationships under their authority. Chiefs forced peasants to perform 
increasing amounts of ‘illegal’ work, while also resisting Belgian demands by 
refusing to relinquish manpower from local projects (Newbury 1988). Chiefs were 
wary of the economic advancement ‘escaping’ brought peasants. Compared to the 
coffee sector, mining provided an opportunity “at independence” (Bezy 1990, 22).590 
They worked long hours in difficult conditions while also developing “political 
consciousness.” Many leaders of early Hutu protest activity in the 1950s were former 
contract wageworkers in the mining sector (Newbury 1988).  
7.3 Kayibanda and Mining 
 
Kayibanda aimed for the government to secure some control over the 
domestic minerals sector. In 1963, he repealed the colonial mining code. The 
colonial mining code gave companies sole ownership of mining operations within 
their concessions. Repealing the code was part of the government’s strategy to make 
ASM the core of mining operations. In doing so, Kayibanda gave miners free access 
to concessions and tried to bring all unexploited concessions under government 
control. Such reforms were enacted in 1971, with 49 per cent of land under initial 
concessions returned to the government (Uwizeyimana 1988).591 
Total annual production was around 2000 tonnes during Kayibanda’s reign 
(Uwizeyimana 1988). Kayibanda was unable to bring commercialisation (trade and 
export) under government control. MINETAIN and SOMUKI produced more than 
half of the minerals produced in Rwanda (Figures 7.4 and 7.5). During this time, 
companies did not make any fresh investments. However, companies established 
basic infrastructure for workers such as footpaths around mining sites, which are still 
intact today.592 Companies remained viable because they continued to pay low wages 
(Uwizeyimana 1988). One reason these wages remained low was the immense 
competition within the peasantry to sell their labour power. Few alternatives to 
obtain wages existed.  
                                                          
590 Despite this “independence”, Uwizeyimana (1988) maintains that most miners wasted their 
sporadic gains in wealth, with mining areas accounting for 1/3rd of the drunks in Rwanda. 
591 SOMUKI was the worst affected, with 78 per cent of the land originally assigned confiscated 
(Uwizeyimana 1988) 
592 Interview, Uwizeye, December 2011. Also in Perks (2013).  
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Source: Uwizeyimana (1988) 
 
Source: Uwizeyimana (1988) 
7.4 Habyarimana and SOMIRWA 
 
 Habyarimana’s government successfully gained some control of domestic 
concessions. Habyarimana worked with Jean-Louis Van Den Branden, the new 
President of Geomines, to transform the domestic minerals sector.593 Their leadership 
represented a “spectacular change” for the future direction of the minerals sector 
(UNECA 1984, 50). Concessions and resources of various mineral operators were 
amalgamated (Uwizeyimana 1988). Concessions were bought from other operators 
and merged under a single company – Société Minière de Rwanda (SOMIRWA). 
                                                          
593 Belgian-owned GEOMINES owned SOMUKI and GEORWANDA. 
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Belgian-owned Geomines owned 51 per cent of the company’s share capital and 
provided management expertise. The government retained 49 per cent of shares.  
SOMIRWA became the dominant player in the mining sector, processing the 
ore produced in its own mines, as well as buying ore from small miners. SOMIRWA 
then initiated ‘subcontracting’ labour arrangements, which persists as the dominant 
labour arrangement in the sector today. Under ‘subcontracting’, SOMIRWA 
organised rural labour by providing miners with access to concessions and 
controlling commercialisation (trade and export). Local entrepreneurs and 
landowners (exploitants) organised artisanal miners into working teams and paid 
them according to their production (Perks 2013).594 Under such labour arrangements, 
permit holders and national operators were financially constrained and could not 
develop their mineral deposits. Miners struggled for daily wages under a backdrop of 
unenforced mine and labour standards, fluctuating international prices and 
ineffective government regulation (Perks 2013). Theft and smuggling persisted. 
Middlemen took advantage of sporadic and inconsistent governance, aware that 
miners would sell their products to the highest bidder.  
 SOMIRWA was the largest employer in Rwanda. It directly employed over 
2500 miners and over 7500 wageworkers (Bezy 1990, Blanc 1984).595 During most 
of the 1970s, SOMIRWA maintained direct employment on its large concessions, 
while using the subcontracting model on smaller deposits. However, as prices fell in 
the 1980s, SOMIRWA favoured the subcontracting model rather than directly 
employing miners. SOMIRWA had control over the value-chain within the ‘formal’ 
artisanal mining sector.  
SOMIRWA’s monopolistic control over trade and export operations was 
similar to the control Rwandex had in the coffee sector. The differences between 
prices offered at the London Metal Exchange (LME) and the prices SOMIRWA 
offered to miners domestically were shared as profits between the government and 
Geomines. However, there were several groups further down the chain (Box 7.1) that 
distorted the market i.e. informal comptoirs or negociants. These groups encouraged 
                                                          
594 “Usually, there’s a chief of the miners. He’s the one who organises his teams and pays them. The 
companies subcontract to these chiefs. Most mines have this arrangement. Sometimes, this chief 
becomes an exporter or an informal trader. We want mining companies to employ everyone directly” 
(Interview, Uwizeye, November 2011). 
595 Uwizeyimana (1988) cites this as 7700 in 1976, rising to 9557 in 1981.   
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the creation of ‘informal’ mineral networks outside the formalised chain. Most 
artisanal miners suffered during the commodity crises that followed in the 1980s. 
SOMIRWA reacted to the fall in tin prices by reducing the buying prices offered to 
their exploitants. Constraints included the lack of adequate research into mineral 
deposits, the sporadic deposits of existing minerals, inadequate infrastructure and a 
lack of investments.  
 
Minerals were a valuable source of foreign exchange during the 1970s and 
1980s. The minerals sector was second only to coffee, representing approximately 20 
per cent of total exports (Figure 7.6). Production was steady in the 1970s. Two 
million kilograms of Cassiterite were produced in Rwanda for most of the 1970s 
(Figure 7.7). Wolfram production ranged from 500,000kg-900,000kg (Figure 7.8). 
Coltan production ranged from 350,000kg-750,000kg but was relatively inconsistent 
between 1973 and 1983 (Figure 7.9). Export receipts were buoyed by high 
international tin prices, with the tin price at $8.2/ton in 1974, $10.7/ton in 1977, and 
$17.2/ton in 1980 – in comparison to $6.9/ton in 1989 (Bezy 1990). Many elites 
derived power and profits from their positions at SOMIRWA (Braeckman 1994). 
Elites who were loyal to Habyarimana (including former minister Shingiro 
Mbonyumutwa and Francois Habukubaho) represented the government at 
SOMIRWA offices and were responsible for activities at state-owned mines 
(Mbonyumutwa 2009).  
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Source: Internal GMD documents and Uwizeyimana (1988) 
 
Source: Internal GMD documents and Uwizeyimana (1988) 
 
Source: Internal GMD documents and Uwizeyimana (1988) 
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Source: Internal GMD documents and Uwizeyimana (1988) 
In 1977, the government introduced plans to build a smelter to process ore 
produced in Rwanda. Rather than being part of a long-term ‘developmental’ 
ambition, the construction of the smelter was undertaken to take advantage of rising 
global tin prices.596 Since Belgian owners showed little interest in the investment, the 
government retained sole ownership of the smelter (UNECA 1984).  The smelter was 
built in 1981 in Kabuye (15 km from Kigali) at a total cost of 8.9 million USD. The 
construction of the smelter was financed by a loan from the European Investment 
Bank (2.7 million USD) and SOMIRWA’s own cash reserves (6.2 million USD) 
(World Bank 1985). Despite the impressive infrastructure that was built, the smelter 
never yielded profits.597 The supply of minerals never matched the 3,000-ton capacity 
of the smelter (only 25 per cent in 1983).598  
Heavy losses hit SOMIRWA in the early 1980s. Losses amounted to 2.2 
billion RwF in 1984 before the company finally went bankrupt in 1985 (Bezy 1990). 
The choice to invest in a smelter reduced the government’s capacity to react to the 
fall in global tin prices. Processing costs exceeded the decreasing market prices for 
tin. Resources would have been better utilised in investments in geological mapping. 
Following this shock, increasing stress was placed on the coffee sector as the main 
source of exports.  
                                                          
596 Brazil’s entry (a large, low cost producer) and a reduction in global demand were reasons for the 
price crash. The crash coincided with the collapse of the International Tin Agreement in 1985, which 
“persuaded the developed world that commodity price stabilisation was infeasible” (Gilbert 1996, 6). 
597 Interview, Raphael Ritter De Zahony, Manager – Phoenix Metals, May 2013. 
598 After 1985, an Indian investor rented the smelter till 1994. In 1994, he left and never came back 
(Interview, de Zahony). 
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Geomines closed operations in Rwanda in 1985. Over the next few years, the 
government acted as a caretaker for concessions. The European Economic 
Community (EEC) expressed concerns about Rwanda’s subcontracting model – 
particularly in regard to the dependency that was placed on miners and associated 
problems with smuggling. The EEC proposed ASM formalisation as an 
advantageous strategy for both the government and miners. “For the former, it would 
enhance revenues and limit negative social, security and environmental impacts, 
while for the latter it would ensure social protection and promote fuller economic 
participation” (Perks 2013, 740). Consequently, the government-supported Union 
National des Coopératives Artisanales Minières et Rwandaises (COPIMAR) was 
established in 1988. COPIMAR generated profits almost immediately through 
buying and selling the production of its members. It even repaid their original loan 
(Perks 2013).599 The relative success of this experiment was surprising since most 
‘top-down’ approaches to formalise and support ASM in Africa have failed.600  
The Habyarimana government struggled to reduce the trade deficit and find 
new sectors for the accumulation of rents in the 1980s. The mining sector’s inactive 
concessions presented an opportunity to solve these problems. In January 1989, 
Régie d’Exploitation et de Développement des Mines (REDEMI) was formed to 
operate the former SOMIRWA concessions. REDEMI operated in a total area of 
104,000 ha with a capital of 97 million RwF (GoR 2010). Habyarimana reactivated 
the defunct concessions “from the ashes” (UNCTAD 2006, 61), ignoring donor 
advice to ditch the old subcontracting model. Habyarimana’s government reacted by 
increasing the unit price for minerals produced through subcontracting arrangements, 
maintaining a state monopoly of in-country buying and limiting export contracts to 
one or two international buyers (Perks 2013).  
Mineral production at both REDEMI and COPIMAR was impressive in 1989 
(Figure 7.10). Initial success (especially for REDEMI) waned over the next few 
years (Figures 7.10, 7.11). Elites retained control of rents in the minerals sector. 
Trusted government official Jean Bosco Bicamumpaka, who served as REDEMI’s 
first director, and other Gisenyi elites such as Nzabandora served as directors at 
                                                          
599 Interview, Augustin Ruhigira, Executive Secretary – FECOMIRWA, April 2012. 
600 These strategies usually fail to account for the reluctance of artisanal miners in securing a license 
(Hilson 2009). 
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mines. These officials were loyal to the akazu (Revue de Presse 1993). Jean 
Mburanumwe, the President of COPIMAR, worked closely with Protais 
Zigiranyirazo (a lead figure in the akazu) during the genocide (ICTR 2008). 
REDEMI provided access to wages for an increasingly oppressed population. Nearly 
10,000 miners were employed in 1989. They worked either as artisanal miners under 
COPIMAR, as permanent employees at REDEMI (2,798) or under subcontractors.  
 
Source: OGMR documents 
 
Source: OGMR documents 
 Though Habyarimana invested in the construction of a tin smelter and 
negotiated some national control of the domestic minerals sector, his policies did not 
counter vulnerabilities to global price fluctuations. Research was also not prioritised. 
Habyarimana’s policies were more geared to appeasing the concerns of individual 
elites than to delivering long-term outcomes for the population. He installed loyal 
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government officials at SOMIRWA to ensure he retained full control over 
distribution of rents. Investments in REDEMI in 1989 may have provided some 
respite for Habyarimana. However, REDEMI was also on the verge of bankruptcy by 
1993, losing 50 million RwF a year (EIU 1993). Habyarimana failed to develop long-
term policies that were geared to countering vulnerability to global price fluctuations. 
The RPF government’s policies are contrastingly different in this respect when 
compared to those of its predecessors. 
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7B: The Minerals Sector in Post-1994 
Rwanda (and the Kivus) 
7.5 The Congo Wars 
 
 Rwandan presence in the Kivus was – according to one academic – fuelled 
simply by the “need (of the Rwandan elite) to maintain a lavish lifestyle and possess 
a large and efficient army” (Reyntjens 2009, 226-227). RPF narratives contest these 
claims. Instead, RPF narratives posit that national security interests and the need to 
protect Banyarwanda groups in the Kivus motivated Rwandan involvement in the 
DRC.601 This section highlights the reductionism displayed in popular narratives, 
which imagine RPF elites as unified in their goals to extract revenues from accessing 
mineral wealth in the DRC. The RPF had control over commercial networks in the 
Kivus during the Congo Wars and over the following decade. A trade-off existed 
between rebuilding the domestic minerals sector and maintaining ‘dirty’ commercial 
networks in the Kivus.  
The RPF’s initial involvement in the Congo Wars was legitimised on the 
basis of protecting national security interests. The RPF highlighted the strengthening 
of Hutu militias in refugee camps outside Rwanda and the funding received by 
camps from donors.602 Former Interahamwe and ex-FAR soldiers controlled these 
camps and launched infiltrations into Rwanda almost immediately after 1994 
(Prunier 2009). Within Rwanda, Tutsis quarrelled between themselves distinguishing 
on the basis of their “tribes of exile” (Prunier 2009). Increasing numbers of Tutsi 
refugees and a citizenship crisis in the Kivus coincided with the retreat of Hutus from 
Rwanda.603 Ugandan RPF cadres rebuilt a national Tutsi identity by outlining a clear 
enemy in the retreating Interahamwe (and its allies).604 Mobutu’s decision to harbour 
genocidaires made the Congolese government an enemy of the RPF. Kagame built a 
                                                          
601 “None of this is about minerals. There is a history here. The boundaries themselves have been 
artificially drawn and why don’t you talk about the FDLR and the way it kills people in the DRC?” 
(Interview, junior RDF officer, November 2012). 
602 Stearns (2011) finds that these camps received more funds from donors than was received by the 
Rwandan government.  
603 The Banyamulenge were in danger of losing their land after the Vangu commission declared all 
Rwandans had to return to Rwanda in 1995 (Kisangani 2012). 
604 The Interahamwe was also a ‘real’ threat to the security of the RPA government. 
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regional support base including Uganda, Burundi and Angola. When the First Congo 
War began in September 1996, greed was not the primary motivation.605  
In 1997, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire 
(AFDL)-led forces, supported by Angolan, Rwandan and Ugandan troops, installed 
Laurent Kabila as the new President of the DRC. In 1998, Kabila reacted against 
Rwandan control by sending many of his Rwandan supporters home. James 
Kabarebe was fired from his post as Kabila’s first CDS. Kabarebe retaliated by 
launching a military effort against the Congolese government and took control of the 
Kivus in 48 hours (Prunier 2009).606 From then on, neighbouring countries and the 
rebel groups they supported fought over control of the Kivus. Commercial networks 
developed around the trade of minerals such as Coltan, tin, diamonds and gold, 
agricultural goods such as coffee and timber and the control of land. Initially, these 
commercial networks were developed to pay for continued military efforts.607 
Rwandan interests were slowly transformed to what Jackson (2002) called an 
‘economisation of conflict’ where actors reoriented their goals to create profitable 
opportunities.608 However, the values of Economic Nationalism dictated that profits 
obtained from commercial networks were re-invested in line with national priorities, 
rather than to make elites rich. In comparison to the networks of other countries, 
UNSC (2001) and Vlassenroot and Romkema (2002) observed that Rwandan 
commercial networks were disciplined with strict centralised control from Kigali.609 
Even the most disciplined “ideological” project, as Stearns (2011, 301) calls 
Rwanda’s incursion into the Congo, had contradictions. Discipline was unlikely to 
have been applied universally. It is possible that some elites were allowed to make 
                                                          
605 For the RPF, the security threat outweighed the importance of potential gains from accessing the 
DRC’s mineral wealth. Coltan prices had not risen yet.  
606 It is unclear whether Kabarebe had the full support of the RPF’s dominant coalition. Kabarebe’s 
actions may have been a source of contention among elites in Rwanda (Prunier 2009).  
607 Kagame described it as a “self-financing war” (Jackson 2002, 528). 
608 Zimbabwe’s reasons for being involved in the Kivus were also perceived to be motivated by greed 
(Dashwood 2000). President Robert Mugabe and Zimbabwean soldiers used the Congo Wars to 
transform themselves into ‘military entrepreneurs’ (Chitiyo in Towriss 2013). The former intelligence 
chief became one of the richest men in Zimbabwe. Others who profited included General Solomon 
Mujuru and Vice Air Marshal Robert Mhlanga (Towriss 2013). However, Nest (2001) argued that 
greed was only one factor and became the central motivating factor later. Other reasons included 
Mugabe’s desire to establish Zimbabwe’s position as a regional power. 
609 UNSC reports gathered empirical evidence through interviews with rebel groups, donors, NGOs 
and a variety of relevant sources. For a criticism of their methods, see Clark (2013b). 
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individual profits. However, the legitimacy of the positions of elites within RPF 
hierarchy depended on being perceived to obey the values of Economic Nationalism. 
Rwandan troops and the rebel groups they supported, including 
Rassemblement Congolaise pour la Démocratie-Goma (RCD-G), were opposed by a 
combination of rebel groups.610 Military commercial networks funded their military 
efforts. Such networks extracted revenues from mining in the Kivus in a number of 
ways. Military and rebel officers (usually younger ones) engaged in mineral 
extraction themselves. Military networks invested in shares in mining companies. 
Militaries and rebel groups provided protection for companies and imposed taxes on 
local and international actors. Many companies were established primarily in 
response to the rising mineral prices (particularly Coltan). Coltan prices increased 
about tenfold during 2000 before a dramatic fall. These companies linked traders, 
politicians and military officers on the Rwandan side of the border with those on the 
Congolese side of the border. Rwandan-linked companies included Société Minière 
des Grands Lacs (SOMIGL),611 Rwanda Metals (RM)612 and Grand Lacs Metals 
(GLM). UNSC (2001) indicates 35 companies (from a number of countries) traded 
minerals through Rwanda in 2001. Jackson (2002) finds that during 18 months in 
1999 and 2000, Rwanda could have made nearly “$17 million a month”, while 
UNSC (2001) finds the total amount to be nearly $250 million.613 In 1997, Rwanda’s 
official Coltan exports increased despite very little mining taking place domestically 
                                                          
610 Alliances constantly shifted in the DRC. However, Rwandan-supported groups were often opposed 
by groups formed on anti-Tutsi sentiment. Reyntjens (2005) describes how mai-mai militias (who had 
previously fought Kabila) later aligned with Kabila to form an ‘anti-Tutsi’ coalition. Anti-Tutsi 
rhetoric also assisted Rwandan-supported groups to enlist support since “every anti-Tutsi slur or 
assault was a reminder of past violence” (Stearns 2008, 263). 
611 SOMIGL obtained a monopoly for the commercialization and export of Coltan and was managed 
by the notorious Aziza Gulamali. Gulamali shifted alliances in the region several times (UNSC 2001). 
However, this monopoly did not last long. The RPA dissolved SOMIGL, centralised control over 
rents and frustrated RCD-Goma’s attempts at raising revenues for its own purposes (UNSC 2002). 
612 RM was a Tri-Star subsidiary, which acted as a centre for organising the export of minerals from 
the DRC out of Kigali. Some key RPF members have been identified as directly involved in RM and 
GLM including Dan Munyuza (Cuvelier and Raeymaekers 2002) and Francis Karimba, who was 
RM’s director and later became Commercial Attaché in the Rwandan High Commission in South 
Africa. The Rwandan government sold RM in 2003 because of international outcry against 
exploitation of international resources. Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2012a) suggest that money from 
the sale may have been used to set up new companies under the Tri-Star banner. RM is no longer 
listed as an exporter of minerals in Rwanda. 
613 There are numerous different calculations. 
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(ibid). Diamonds were also officially listed as exports although Rwanda held no 
diamond deposits (ibid).614  
During the Congo Wars, the Rwandan military developed contacts with 
international mining companies. Chris Huber, for instance (who is still active in 
Rwanda), was accused of using several companies including Finmining and 
Finconcord to export Coltan from Kigali to Kazakhstan (and later to processing 
plants in other countries).615 Rwanda-based companies including Rwanda Metals and 
COPIMAR were used as comptoirs (Cuvelier and Raeymaekers 2002). Links were 
established with arms suppliers such as Viktor Bout (UNSC 2002).616 Inevitably, 
some military officers developed privileged access within these networks. Those 
RPF cadres who respected Kigali’s centralised control above individual temptations 
increased their importance within the RPF.617 Kagame was reluctant to cede power 
within commercial networks, often reserving positions for his own relatives.618 
Many contacts developed during this time were also encouraged to establish 
mining operations in Kigali.619 The ‘conflict minerals’ narrative posed a threat to 
domestic networks of accumulation. Many foreign companies were forced to stop 
direct business in Central Africa because of negative publicity.620 Such decisions 
were often temporary but forced international companies to improvise by altering 
ownership structures e.g. Cabot used Malaysia Smelting Corporation (MSC).621 One 
company, Pyramides International, shifted its focus to the Rwandan minerals sector. 
“Since 2002, we left trading. It was a big, expensive decision. But 
we became convinced Rwanda had minerals. Our reserves were 
greenfield reserves. Many people thought we were crazy but now, 
you can see everyone is coming here.”622 
                                                          
614 Current MINECOFIN statistics do not list records of diamond exports. 
615 It is rumoured that he is connected to Rwanda Rudniki, one of the largest exporters in Rwanda. 
616 In 2002, Kagame claimed to have ended all links with Viktor Bout (Africa Confidential 2002). 
617 Rwandan elites increased their own power within the RPF hierarchy because they controlled 
commercial networks. Some of these individuals included Dan Munyuza (junior officer in these 
operations) and senior officers including Kabarebe.  
618 Alfred Rwigema, the President’s brother-in-law, was on Eagle Wings Resources International’s 
(EWRI - a company connected with Huber) payroll in Kigali (Cuvelier and Raeymaekers 2002)  
619 EWRI, which was named in UNSC (2001), began explorations for Coltan in Gitarama (Cuvelier 
and Marysse 2003). 
620 Some European and North American traders such as Starck and Cabot International imposed an 
embargo on minerals out of Rwanda. Starck, Cabot and Ningxia process around 70- 80 per cent of the 
world’s Coltan (Nest 2011). Rwandan comptoirs then relied more on Asian comptoirs. 
621 The ownership structure of most mining companies is unclear.  
622 Interview, Mahmoud Salem, Pyramides International, January 2015. 
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RPF interests in the DRC were organised through the Congo Desk (CD).623 
The CD included many senior military officials who ran military and economic 
operations in the Congo. The CD was initially created as a division within the 
Rwandan External Security Organisation (ESO) (Reyntjens 2001). CD received taxes 
from comptoirs operating in the region. On average, a comptoir with a turnover of $4 
million/month paid $200,000 per month to the CD (UNSC 2001). After the battle for 
Kisangani between RPA-supported and Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF)-
supported forces (where now-General Patrick Nyamvumba beat the forces of veteran 
Ugandan officer James Kazini), the CD forced all local diamond traders to sell to a 
single principal comptoir (UNSC 2002).624 These comptoirs deliberately undervalued 
the price of minerals (paid to miners) to increase the margins to be shared by the CD 
and themselves, at the cost of rebel groups such as RCD-Goma (UNSC 2002).  
These informal networks were amalgamated through La Systeme – an 
‘informal economy’ consolidated through Rwandan-owned companies or by 
Rwandan- or RCD-protected companies (with owners paying these groups for the 
privilege of operating in the market). The companies who profited from the system 
enjoyed reduced business costs; fewer tax agencies and little political interference 
(Stearns 2013). The CD was a power centre for RPA officials through the war. 
Working together in the war effort forged alliances and loyalties among elites in the 
military. Many RPA cadres forged relationships, on the basis of kinship, personal 
and historical loyalties, with their Tutsi brethren across the border (Longman 2002). 
Such alliances and loyalties did not necessarily correspond with loyalty to Paul 
Kagame’s leadership.625 Several military officials including Kayumba626 and 
Kabarebe developed power of their own.627 Such factions and disagreements 
gradually re-shaped the elite bargain within Rwanda (as described in Chapter 4).  
In 2003, a power-sharing agreement was reached between rebel groups and 
the Congolese government. Rwandan-supported RCD-G was one of several groups 
                                                          
623 The GoR (2002) denies the existence of the Congo Desk.  
624 The CD was operated directly by military officials such as Kabarebe, Charles Murigande, Nziza, 
Karegeya and Mazimhaka (Mararo 2005). The CD consolidated disciplinary authority over comptoirs. 
UNSC (2002) documents how Aziz Nassour, Israeli businessman Philippe Surowicz and Lebanese 
businessman Hamid Khalil had managed such monopolies. 
625 Observations from interviews with military officials. 
626 When military officers were asked about Kayumba, only one described him as a “traitor”. Most 
continued to show some admiration of him and some showed regret that divisions had emerged 
between Kagame and Kayumba.  
627 Military officers interviewed (both higher-ranked and lower-ranked) tended to revere Kabarebe.  
274 
 
who ceased fighting the Congolese government. The agreement held that belligerents 
of the Second Congo War (1998-2002) would be merged into a new national army. 
The new national army promised to geographically spread military officers and 
ensure a ‘balanced’ composition within the military ranks (Baaz and Verweijen 
2013). The RCD-G dodged attempts at integration and operated autonomously in the 
Kivus. The RCD-G justified its resistance by stressing the need to protect the Tutsi 
population in the Kivus. After the agreement, Eugene Serufuli was appointed 
Governor of North Kivu. Serufuli was an RCD member and the former Vice-
President of the Tous Pour la paix et le Developpement (TPD) NGO, established in 
1998.628 The move to elevate Serufuli, a Hutu, was helpful for the RPF since the RPF 
feared the isolation of the Tutsi community in the Kivus. Serufuli promoted himself 
as a “Rwandophone” leader, organising marches and public rallies protesting the 
threats Kinshasa directed against both Hutus and Tutsis (Stearns 2008).  
Laurent Nkunda, a former RPA soldier who had fought in the liberation 
effort, refused to join the Congolese army in 2003. Profiting from the continued 
support of the Rwandan government and Serufuli, Nkunda reacted to the deal by 
organising several rebel militias, with the support of other RCD-G dissidents.629 
Nkunda enjoyed enormous popularity among Tutsis in the region for his stance on 
protecting Tutsi rights (Lemarchand 2009). In 2006, Nkunda formed the CNDP on 
the premise of protecting Banyamulenge citizens from genocide. Serufuli also 
switched sides and began working closely with Kabila while highlighting Tutsis as 
enemies. 630  Rwandan commercial networks were gradually reorganised since the 
RPF chose to support Nkunda against Serufuli (Stearns 2008). Within a few months 
of its formation, the CNDP became one of the most powerful groups in the DRC in 
military, political and economic terms (Baaz and Verweijen 2013).  
“The CNDP was never a Rwandan puppet” or simply an extension of the RPF 
(Stearns 2012, 58). Elements within the CNDP resisted Kigali’s control. Some within 
the CNDP had “uncomfortable and distrustful relations with Kigali” (Baaz and 
Verweijen 2013, 580). Nkunda was increasingly popular within CNDP ranks and 
                                                          
628 In South Kivu, the Rwandan hierarchy supported a less well-organised militia led by Xavier 
Chirhibanya (Prunier 2009). 
629 The Rwandan government encouraged them to be more independent this time (Stearns 2008). 
630 Earlier, Serufuli “forced Nkunda to flee to Rwanda in 2005” (Stearns 2013, 22). Serufuli’s support 
base in the Hutu community were unhappy with Rwandan control in the region (Stearns 2008). 
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enjoyed the respect of several older RPF cadres.631 Kigali countered Nkunda’s rise in 
power in the region by installing Bosco Ntaganda as the new leader of the CNDP in 
March 2009.632 Nkunda was then placed under house arrest in Rwanda.633 Twelve 
days after being announced as the new leader of the CNDP, Ntaganda announced 
joint operations with the Congolese army to fight the FDLR.634 Ntaganda’s wealth 
and increased prominence fostered discord within CNDP ranks.635 Some even joined 
other rebel groups.636 Sultani Makenga, a prominent Nkunda loyalist, was a rival to 
Ntaganda’s power within the CNDP.637  
With the reorganised CNDP and through Kigali’s support, Ntaganda’s 
influence strengthened. Ntaganda worked closely with the RPF, removing Nkunda 
loyalists and placing his own officers and those chosen by the RPF in positions of 
responsibility (Stearns 2013). However, tensions continued to grow within the CNDP 
as Ntaganda favoured his own patronage network above other powerful officers. The 
Congolese government also countered Ntaganda’s power with increased attempts at 
reintegrating the CNDP into the army, appeals to Kigali and the mobilisation of the 
Congolese population on ‘us-them’ rhetoric against Tutsis (Stearns 2012).  
In April 2012, the M23 was formed. The M23 officially mutinied because 
Kinshasa did not respect the 23 March 2009 agreement.  The mutiny was actually a 
reaction from former CNDP officials to the Congolese government’s attempts to 
constrain its power. After Rwanda was accused of providing support to the M23, 
many donors withdrew aid. The Rwandan government eventually reacted by 
withdrawing support from the M23. Though the M23 relied on the RPF for support, 
the M23 had a tense relationship with the RPF.638 The M23 was not unified and 
tensions persisted between the Makenga and Ntaganda wings.  
                                                          
631 Interviews, May 2013. 
632 Ntaganda had joined Nkunda’s forces in mid-2005 as Chief of Staff (Stearns 2008). 
633 Though Nkunda roams Kigali with relative freedom, Kagame’s decision to place him under house 
arrest was perceived as an affront to a senior leader (Interviews, Kigali, May 2013). 
634 This agreement was signed on 23 March 2009.  
635 “Ntaganda himself made millions of dollars from mineral smuggling, embezzlement of military 
funds, and tax rackets” (Stearns 2012, 39). 
636 One group joined the Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo (FPLC), a small multi-
ethnic group based in Rutshuru and hostile to the Rwandan government (Stearns 2012). 
637 Makenga is the current military chief of the M23. In early 2013, two wings of the M23 fought 
against each other. Makenga’s Kifuafua fought Ntaganda’s Kimbelembele (Vogel 2014). In November 
2013, Makenga surrendered to Ugandan forces. He is currently being held in Uganda. 
638 Stearns (2012, 54) quotes an ex-CNDP officer: “We didn’t like the RPF but we had similar 
interests.” 
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The ‘economisation of conflict’ gradually represented a trade-off with 
achieving self-reliance. Businessmen including Rujugiro had individual interests in 
the Kivus that were protected by Ntaganda’s forces.639 Rujugiro’s own decision to 
exit the dominant coalition can be ascribed to decisions such as these, which showed 
little concern for his individual property rights. Other businesses were engaged in 
selling goods in the Kivus.640 Rebel leaders including Ntaganda owned cattle ranches 
in Masisi (Stearns 2012, UNSC 2012a). However, Rwandan and M23 involvement in 
the DRC was also motivated by the need to protect the Tutsi population in the Kivus. 
Individual RPF elites held a variety of loyalties and interests in the DRC. Some elites 
had pushed to withdraw support for M23 much earlier.641 Others pushed to continue 
support for the M23.642 The choice to withdraw support from the M23 caused 
tensions within Kigali. 
“Of course. These are difficult decisions. We fought alongside 
some of these people. But it is simple for us. We debate about it 
and then we reach a decision. Then everyone agrees to that. Once 
decisions are made, there is no disagreement anymore.”643 
Analysis that develops the image of a homogeneous predatory elite 
(Reyntjens 2004, 2013) or an RPF elite that operates through consensus (Booth and 
Golooba-Mutebi 2013) does not explain why Kagame’s government survives. The 
survival of Kagame’s government depends on maintaining the perception of 
perceived progress while the elite bargain is re-shaped. The dominant coalition 
dissuades estranged elites from contesting its position by displaying a credible threat 
of violence. The RPF retains moral authority through strengthening its own 
narratives. The failure of RPF rivals to delegitimise RPF narratives has reduced the 
capacity of rivals to mobilise support for its claims. Refocusing on the domestic 
minerals sector threatened individual power centres in military networks in the DRC. 
The Developmental Political Settlement was maintained by refocusing efforts on 
revitalising the mining sector while countering threats from rivals.  
                                                          
639 Rujugiro invested in land in Masisi while the CNDP controlled the area. This land was worth 
“millions of dollars” (Stearns 2012, 59).  
640 A MINICOM study in 2012 indicated that 80 per cent of informal exports went to the DRC. Most 
of this was in food and beverages, with CVL-owned Inyange also trading in the region. In 2011, there 
was a sharp growth in footwear exports. 
641 Interviews, RDF Officers, May 2013. 
642 Ibid. 
643 Interview, RDF officer, January 2015. 
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7.6 But We Have Minerals Too… 
 
Focusing on the domestic minerals sector led to foreign actors acquiring 
control of the sector. The government faces a challenge in developing effective 
partnerships with these actors. The successful revitalisation of the domestic minerals 
sector will depend on the continued facilitation of the strategies of those willing to 
invest in making the most of mineral concessions and engaging in beneficiation. 
While there is a need to develop partnerships with actors who have control of key 
assets (such as mines like Rutongo or the tin smelter), it will also be necessary to 
avoid becoming too dependent on those who own such assets. 
“We need to have a good cocktail in the sector. The industry is 
open and we can’t have monopolies. Business entities will work 
together and work with us. It is difficult but we can find solutions. 
That’s why we are paid. We can’t oblige these companies but we 
can find solutions that work for all of us.”644  
Capitalising on domestic mineral resources has contributed to reducing the 
trade deficit, increasing the tax base and providing wage employment. Emphasising 
the existence of a domestic minerals sector also diverts attention from the negative 
outcomes associated with the ‘conflict minerals’ narrative. Embracing fast-faced 
privatisation reforms has left the government with little capacity to discipline private 
actors and enforce legislation.  
“If we compare it to the life of a human, the sector is in 
kindergarten. We are just reviving it and looking at what are the 
best options. It is always difficult to get miners to optimally use 
their concessions. We are still dealing with the consequences of the 
reforms we took. Sometimes, there are speculators and they take 
advantage of the weaknesses in our system. Other times, they 
acquire licenses without understanding what mining is.”645 
The minerals sector only recovered to 1970-levels in 2004. Annual Cassiterite 
exports did not reach the 2000-ton mark (consistently achieved in the 1970s) till 
2004. Gradually, the RPF government has begun to exceed the performances of its 
predecessors. Between 2004 and 2012, annual Cassiterite exports were between 3000 
and 5000 tonnes.646 Since 2006, Wolfram exports have exceeded 1970s levels (with 
                                                          
644 Interview, Imena, January 2015. 
645 Interview, Imena, January 2015. 
646 2011 was an exception. Cassiterite production was nearly 7000 tonnes in that year. 
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the exception of 2008). Coltan exports are at their highest levels in Rwandan 
history.647 Government officials recognised that a large share of these exports (in the 
early 2000s) comprised minerals that originated from the DRC.648  
 
Source: MINECOFIN 
Until the early 2000s, the domestic minerals sector was not prioritised. State-
owned REDEMI retained ownership of domestic concessions through the 1990s and 
early 2000s. Very few new mining sites were developed.649 Labour was organised 
around two inherited methods – the earlier subcontracting arrangement and local 
cooperatives. In the 1990s, COPIMAR was relatively active in organising small-
scale miners although many small-scale miners operated independent of COPIMAR. 
Government departments were hindered by a lack of expertise. Very few geologists 
and officials from the previous regime stayed on.650 The government did not retain 
centralised control of the domestic minerals sector. Informal comptoirs operated and 
their networks were established through security guarantees. Smuggling within 
Rwanda was likely to have occurred with help from government officials.651  
 In the 1990s, REDEMI acted as a comptoir for minerals being re-exported 
from the DRC. During the first Congo war, there were surges in Cassiterite and 
Coltan exports from Rwanda in some months in 1997 and 1998 (Figure 7.14 and 
7.16). Most spikes in exports before 2004 are explained by an increase in minerals 
                                                          
647 During the 1970s, Coltan exports did not cross 100 tonnes. 
648 Interview, MINIRENA officials, November 2011 and March 2012. 
649 These included Bugarama, gold in Myove and Byumba and Sapphire mining (informally) in 
Nyungwe. 
650 Interview, Uwizeye, January 2012. 
651 Interview, Evode Imena (then-Geologist, Geology and Mines Department), February 2012. 
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traded from the DRC and as a response to global prices (Figures 7.13-7.16). During 
the Coltan Rush that started in late 2000, prices rose exponentially from 20 USD/kg 
in January to about 200 USD/kg in December. Price increases were caused by an 
overvaluation of the technology market, particularly because of the introduction of a 
new generation of mobile phones and video games (Sony Playstation II). Prices 
subsided by July 2001. Most of the Coltan that came through Rwanda originated in 
the DRC. Some Coltan was a product of artisanal mining. Many peasants in the 
eastern part of Rwanda (e.g. Gatumba), shifted from agricultural activities and either 
became agents of REDEMI or exploited minerals as artisanal miners (Bucagu et al. 
2008). Some ‘lucky ones’ were able to develop enough networks and capital to 
become negociants and middlemen.  
Cassiterite production has increased within Rwanda. However, international 
tin prices have not had a significant impact on domestic production of Cassiterite 
(Figure 7.13). Similar stories hold true for Wolfram and Coltan (Figures 7.14 and 
7.15). The government’s attempts to revitalise the mining sector focused on three 
central priorities: (a) ensure labour is organised to extracting minerals; (b) investors 
are attracted to Rwanda and those that invest work in line with national priorities e.g. 
investments in exploration before extraction; (c) investments are made to process 
minerals to ensure more profits are captured within the domestic value-chain.  
 
Source: MINECOFIN 
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Figure 7.13: Monthly Cassiterite Production and Prices: 1996-
2013
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Source: MINECOFIN 
 
Source: MINECOFIN 
7.7 Retaining Loyalty and Minimising Resistance – ASM and 
Labour Arrangements 
 
 In 2001, Rwanda’s minerals sector provided wage employment to more than 
25,000 Rwandans. Most jobs were unskilled and unregulated. Early targets within 
the minerals sector aimed for employment to reach 37,000 by 2011, of which 20-30 
per cent would be women (MINITERE 2006). By 2011, the government had 
exceeded targets. 58,000 were employed in the minerals sector in 2011 compared to 
22,000 in 2006 (Malunda 2013).652 Government policy prioritises professionalising 
the mining sector, while advancing ASM’s interests in the medium-term. Nearly 500 
                                                          
652 These numbers included those who were self-employed and those who worked for wages (but not 
those who were involved in the trading of minerals). 
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Figure 7.14: Monthly Wolfram Production and Prices: 1996-
2013
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Figure 7.15: Monthly Coltan Production and Prices: 1996-2013
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permits have been distributed to small-scale miners to exploit concessions.653 
However, small-scale miners are a diverse group, with concessions ranging from less 
than one hectare to over 500 hectares.654 Many small-scale miners held multiple 
permits. 
“Our motto is ‘professional mining.’ How can we transit from a 
sector that was dominated by guessing where some people try and 
see if they can gain something quickly by getting a license? Now, 
we want people to have plans, have estimates about reserves and 
then develop the mine… In the future, I don’t see Rwanda having 
700 mining companies and 700 sites. We want to merge the 
smaller sites. Right now, there are five companies on one hill. We 
want them to make a consortium and produce more. Then we can 
collect royalty or they can easily send minerals to the smelter.”655 
New investors retained the old subcontracting model. The government 
prioritised formalising the subcontracting model used by companies, while also 
formalising ASM practices through strengthening cooperatives and ensuring official 
employment contracts, health insurance and payroll taxes. The government 
encouraged local companies to provide equipment and employ miners directly (but 
found it difficult to force companies).656 The government focused on organising local 
cooperatives to facilitate the supply of minerals to comptoirs and formalise 
employment procedures.657 In Rwanda, Perks (2013, 733) lauds “the spirit of the 
cooperative, whereby members invest in the operations through contributions and 
redistribute annual profits.” She is positive about the egalitarian ideals of these 
cooperatives in comparison with the DRC, where cooperatives were disorganised and 
rarely represented the interests of artisanal miners. In the DRC, artisanal miners 
earned more from mining than in smallholder agriculture but “layers of taxation and 
payment for security entrenched many groups of artisanal miners into cycles of 
poverty and debt” (Perks 2011, 1123).  
Despite Perks’ optimism regarding cooperatives in Rwanda, it is likely that 
the distribution of profits was unequal between members of cooperatives and 
wageworkers that are employed by small-scale miners. Cooperatives are charged 
                                                          
653 Internal MINITERE document 
654 Data shared by GMD 
655 Interview, Imena, January 2015. 
656 Interview, Uwizeye, February 2012. 
657 “Earlier, all miners were selling about one kilogram each to comptoirs. Now, one person sells all 
the minerals as a cooperative”. (Interview, de Zahony, May 2013). 
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with organising labour to mineral production. Joining cooperatives requires an initial 
investment from miners.658 Rules such as these reduce the capacity of vulnerable 
miners to join cooperatives and become ‘formalised’ in the sector. Some miners may 
be forced out of the sector while others continue to operate informally.659  
Formalisation provided an opportunity for the government to increase its tax 
base and also to reduce ‘informality’, which was perceived as regressive and a threat 
to efficiency.660 In 1995, 36 African countries legalised artisanal operations or 
indicated a purpose of doing so (Fisher 2007). This trend ignored that the process of 
formalisation often concealed social and power relations that make the access to 
resources extremely unequal (Chachage 1995). Formalisation relied on assumptions 
that reforms meant equal gains for all actors. OTF worked with COPIMAR to create 
regional cooperatives by 2006. Original plans held that new cooperatives would send 
their production to COPIMAR or its later incarnation, Federation des Cooperatives 
Minières au Rwanda (FECOMIRWA).661 COPIMAR or FECOMIRWA would then 
export minerals they received. Top-down cooperative formation in Rwanda was 
modelled on the example of Ghanaian artisanal gold mining and in particular, the 
Precious Minerals Marketing Corporation (PMMC). 
The PMMC had overseen tenfold gold production increases between 1989 
and 1997. PMMC received revenues worth $117 million from gold exports and $98 
from diamond exports.662 PMMC acted as a centralised comptoir, facilitating trade 
out of Ghana. 750 licensed agents purchased from artisans and sold local gold 
production to the PMMC. OTF envisioned COPIMAR having a similar role in the 
Rwandan mineral sector. The Rwandan government learned from the Ghanaian 
example to create mining district centres where 400 cooperatives quickly registered. 
In Rwanda, 22 cooperatives were established by 2010. A further seven signed up by 
2012 and a total of 39 were established by 2013. In 2011, the federation had a total of 
749 members, with a further 4,419 workers hired as permanent or casual labour.663 In 
2012, the federation produced about 42 per cent of total domestic production (Perks 
                                                          
658 Interview, FECOMIRWA representative, May 2012. 
659 Government respondents argue that small-scale miners operate through informal channels and 
work against formalisation efforts. 
660 Interview, Imena. 
661 FECOMIRWA was formed in 2009.  
662 Information from OTF Internal documents. 
663 Interview, Ruhigira, April 2012. This may have been because of the institution of the tagging 
system and the requirement for miners to sell their minerals through the formalised sector. 
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2013).664 This increased from six per cent in 2011 and seven per cent in 2007 
(Mitchell and Garrett 2009).  
OTF also emphasised the example of Chinese success in the tin and tungsten 
sectors. China was the world’s largest producer of both tin and tungsten, and 
produced half of its tin and one-third of its tungsten through ASM practices. OTF’s 
work focused on quantifiable targets. In this case, production or the numbers of 
cooperatives created were measures of success. However, the PMMC has not been 
universally perceived as a successful experiment. One observation finds that the 
PMMC was unable to provide small-scale miners with even “minimal technological 
and financial assistance” and instead concentrated power among foreign 
entrepreneurs from India, Sri Lanka and Lebanon (Hilson and Clifford 2010). 
However, the PMMC did offer guaranteed close-to-market prices to cut the number 
of middlemen and predatory traders (UNECA 2011). In Rwanda, FECOMIRWA has 
been established with no guarantees extended to the federation in protecting their 
supply of minerals. As a result, FECOMIRWA has struggled to compete in the 
liberalised trade-and-export environment. 
“Earlier, we were number 3 in exports. Now, it is unlikely that we 
can compete with Phoenix and MSA. The biggest problem has 
been money. In this business, you need cash.”665  
FECOMIRWA only buys minerals from cooperatives. Individual 
cooperatives are free to sell their products to other comptoirs and this has often 
resulted in competitive pricing between comptoirs. FECOMIRWA officials claim 
they struggled to compete with other comptoirs in some years because of other social 
responsibilities e.g. giving loans to members. They complained of added difficulties, 
such as the increase in taxes and payments because of recent transparency 
initiatives.666 
“From the time we started, we have had a decline in production. 
We give mining cooperatives technical advice and even invested in 
mining cooperatives. Once the traceability system came and with 
                                                          
664 This number is questionable. ‘Illegal’ minerals from the DRC could have found their way to less-
stringently watched cooperatives. Another interpretation would hold that transparency initiatives 
forced miners to join cooperatives. Under transparency initiatives, no minerals outside the 
‘formalised’ value-chain were cleared for export. Since the government required miners to join 
cooperatives for their products to enter the ‘formalised’ chain, FECOMIRWA gained importance. 
665 Interview, Ruhigira, January 2015. 
666 Interview, Ruhigira, April 2012. 
284 
 
added taxes, they found situations where if they supplied minerals 
to us, we deducted our initial investments. Now, other comptoirs 
compete with us and our miners sell their minerals to them. Our 
production should be increasing but the environment has meant it 
has decreased.”667 
Perks (2013) found that FECOMIRWA ensured miners received a fair price 
for their labour, compared to SOMIRWA where they ‘worked for free.’ Where 
formalisation proponents have often expected illegal operators to unrealistically take 
the initiative on their own to secure a license (Hilson 2009), Perks’ respondents 
indicated that they were facilitated in the process of acquiring permits by the 
government, unlike in most countries (Ghana – Hilson and Potter 2003). However, 
such facilitation is not perfect given the government’s budgetary difficulties and lack 
of expertise in the sector. Thus, some miners remained “trapped in a vicious circle of 
poverty, indebtedness and consequently bound to various middlemen who, in the 
absence of formal support, exploit their advantageous position and provide loans on 
inequitable terms” (Hilson 2009, 3). Such ‘traps’ are accentuated by the reluctance of 
banks to ‘risk’ loans to cooperatives, let alone individual miners, with access to 
finance a significant impediment in the sector.668  
Companies complained of labour shortages even though prices were high, 
indicating that the government had difficulty in organising labour for mineral 
production. Often small-scale miners entered mining simply to make enough and 
then leave.669 Despite government discourse around formalisation and full-time 
contracts for miners, most companies paid miners on the basis of their production. 
Such arrangements were risky for miners who did not trust the potential of minerals 
within deposits.670  
Though the government has achieved some success in organising labour to 
mineral production, there is no evidence to support assumptions that members 
receive equal benefits. The government has been unable to support FECOMIRWA in 
organising cooperatives effectively. Such interventions are required to organise 
labour to mineral production efficiently and reduce the power of comptoirs who are 
better placed to buy minerals from small-scale miners.  
                                                          
667 Interview, Ruhigira, January 2015. 
668 Interviews, BK, BPR, Fina Bank and BCR. Difficulties in accessing finance have been identified 
as a problem by government officials (Interviews, GMD and SPU). 
669 Interviews, several comptoir representatives, January 2012-June 2012 and May 2013. 
670 Interview, two domestic mining companies and one foreign-owned comptoir, February-May 2012.  
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7.8 Managing Capital – Privatisation and Liberalisation in 
Rwanda’s Domestic Minerals Sector 
 
 RPF narratives attribute the success of the minerals sector to the privatisation 
of REDEMI’s concessions and the liberalisation of trade-and-export operations 
(MINIRENA 2010). The ‘trade and export’ side of the minerals sector was initially 
liberalised in the late 1990s. Two international comptoirs then operated alongside 
REDEMI and some locally owned companies. ‘Informal’ comptoirs also operated. In 
2004, REDEMI exported about 60 per cent of Rwanda’s Cassiterite. Some of these 
exports came from the REDEMI-operated Cassiterite processing facility in Rutongo. 
COPIMAR and Metal Processing Association (MPA), among other companies, were 
also involved in the production and export of Cassiterite (Pourtier 2004). REDEMI 
exported most of the Wolfram in Rwanda (approximately 65 per cent in 2004). Most 
Wolfram was produced in the REDEMI-owned concession in Nyakabingo. 
COPIMAR and other companies exported the remaining share of Wolfram (Yager 
2004). REDEMI operated processing facilities in Gatumba for Coltan production. 
Artisanal miners produced most of the Coltan produced domestically in Rwanda.  
In 2004, REDEMI operated eight concessions and received a small amount of 
production from independent traders who purchased minerals from small-scale 
miners (Garrett 2008). In total, REDEMI controlled 20 concessions although 12 were 
not in operation. By the end of 2005, only two concessions that were previously 
under operation remained under REDEMI control. Investments and joint ventures in 
the early 2000s were ways for Kagame to reward loyalists. For example, Simba 
Manasseh owned a local company named Pyramides.671 Manasseh’s company was 
assisted in developing a joint venture partnership with a Chinese Company to build a 
Coltan refinery in Western Rwanda. Manasseh became a representative for Rwandan 
mining companies and a member of the Value Addition Committee, set up in 2006. 
Other examples included Felicien Mutalikanwa who had managed SOGERMI, which 
was directly linked to minerals exported from RCD-Goma controlled mines 
(Cuvelier and Raeymaekers 2002). Mutalikanwa later became Chairman of 
                                                          
671 Manasseh was a prominent former RPF officer who was the first Chairman of Armée Patriotique 
Rwandaise F.C. – the RPF football team. Further, he operated as a mining exporter during the Coltan 
Rush years, working with Jean Pierre Munyandamutsa. 
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MINIMEX, Rwanda’s sole maize mill. These elites were rewarded with rents but the 
use of these rents was disciplined in line with Economic Nationalism.  
A flood of companies registered mining companies in the mid-2000s. The 
Rwanda National Innovation and Competitiveness Report listed 55 private sector 
companies in the sector in 2005. Companies in the minerals sector comprised 23 per 
cent of all companies operating in Rwanda (Temesgen et al. 2006). Most of these 
companies were small comptoirs who exported small quantities of minerals after 
buying them from artisanal miners. These companies benefited from the rapid 
privatisation that was prioritised ahead of the establishment of a mining law in 
2009.672 Many companies had no obligations to invest in exploration and operated in 
‘trade-and-export’ or direct extraction of minerals. However, most of the companies 
that received four-year licenses during this time left their concessions by 2012. 
“REDEMI had no capacity to mine and couldn’t exploit all key 
concessions. Privatising was the right thing in terms of getting 
finance but we didn’t get the best of investors. It was difficult 
because the mining sector was not known in Rwanda.”673 
By 2010, 38 large-scale mining licenses were granted to (almost entirely) 
foreign investors. These investors were from countries including South Africa, USA, 
Germany, Botswana, China and Russia. Most investors obtained vast concessions at 
low prices. The government retained shares in the two largest concessions, Gatumba 
and Rutongo. Joint ventures were established and two companies were created to 
operate these concessions – Gatumba Mining Concessions and Rutongo Mines Ltd. 
Between 2007 and 2011, registered investment stood at nearly 81.5 million USD.674  
The government struggled to force most private companies to comply with 
the mining law. Most of these companies based their business plans on trading first 
and investing in exploration thereafter. Others were simply there to raise the value of 
their company on the basis of survey reports and some were waiting for ‘a big 
discovery.’675 The government complained that many large companies did not respect 
the mining law e.g.  Natural Resources Development (NRD). NRD operated five 
                                                          
672 The new mining law required investors to engage in exploration before extraction. It entailed a 
prospecting permit (two years); followed by an exploration permit (maximum of four years); 
exploitation of a small mine permit (five years) OR exploitation of a big mine/concession (30 years). 
673 Interview, Biryabarema, April 2012. 
674 MINIRENA officials admit some of these investors never paid up the full amount. 
675 Interviews, foreign companies. Some companies did invest in exploration, including Tinco in 
Rutongo. 
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concessions and had 110 regular employees, with 1100 artisanal miners selling their 
production to the company (Garrett 2008).676 NRD was accused of wasting their land 
and being more interested in trading than extracting minerals from their own 
concessions.677 Since then, two different groups have contested ownership of NRD.678  
The government found it difficult to discipline investors. Biryabarema said: 
“We didn’t know the value of our minerals. We gave them on a first-come, first-
serve basis. Then we realised we didn’t want to just give away concessions without 
knowing the value of our mines.”679 ‘Undercapitalisation’ persisted in many 
concessions. The RPF government was in danger of repeating the mistakes of the 
colonial administration, which had failed to get companies to exploit the full 
potential of their concessions. Government officials complained that this was 
because of insufficient resources dedicated to the sector (through the budget) and 
insufficient capacity within government departments.680 Officials complained that 
many companies did not submit reports on time, did not meet their obligations and 
that they had inadequate power to punish these companies.681 For example, Bayview 
Group sold its concession to NRD without informing the government. The 
government was unable to react to this illegal sale for over a year.682 In 2014, this 
concession was sold to UK-based Balosero Alloys. Liberalisation occurred rapidly 
but was difficult to manage for the government. Such reforms reduced the possibility 
of rival domestic coalitions deriving rents from the minerals sector but these reforms 
also reduced the capacity of the dominant coalition to retain future rents.  
Funding gaps have plagued the sector.683 “In government documents, mining 
is always lost while it is always first in exports.”684 The minerals sector did not 
receive half the budgetary support that was initially promised between 2009 and 
2012. Only four out of 40 mining technicians were under 40 years old. Forty per cent 
                                                          
676 NRD defended this, stating it was the logical thing to do to obtain money to reinvest in concessions 
(Interview, Prosper Nnanika, Chief Geologist – NRD, January 2012). 
677 Accusation made at a mining sector working group meeting. Kigali, December 2011. 
678 In 2014, power struggles over the ownership of NRD continued (Mugisha 2014b). 
679 Interview, Biryabarema, February 2012. 
680 Funds to the mining sector comprised only 0.1 per cent of the national budget.  
681 Interviews, Biryabarema and Uwizeye. 
682 Interview, Uwizeye, May 2013. 
683 Donors were aware of funding deficits. “Michael pushes for funding to get geologists trained. They 
don’t have a critical mass of skills in the mining sector” (Interview, Lucy Fye – World Bank, 
December 2011). 
684 Interview, Imena, March 2012. 
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of mining technicians were over 57 in 2009 (MINIRENA 2010). In 2012, three 
senior geologists reached retirement age, making the situation even worse. 685 Many 
private companies also hired the few geologists that were working for the 
government, leaving the government with fewer geologists.686 Since 2012, the 
government has invested in developing Rwandan mining expertise. Around 50 
students were sent to study geology in the UK, India, Nigeria and other countries. 
They returned in 2015. Plans are in place to establish a Faculty of Geology and 
Mines in the University of Rwanda and a mining training centre for mineworkers.687 
Liberalisation was much quicker than the speed at which government capacity was 
strengthened.  
“Almost the entire surface area of the country is covered by 
licenses. It is a challenge to know if people are actually working. 
Those ones are the ‘guessers’ – by chance, if something erupts, 
then they’ll get advantages. We didn’t have clear standards at the 
time. Earlier, we were managing 40. Then we had 400 so quickly. 
But we adapted our system.”688 
 Liberalisation coincided with several positive developments. Most notably, 
production soared. The minerals sector accounted for a large share of national 
exports, amounting to about 30 per cent of national exports since 2007 (Figure 7.16). 
New mining sites have been developed. Wolfram production increased since 2006 
after investments from companies including Wolfram Bergbau, Pyramid 
International, Rwanda Allied Partners and Africa Primary Tungsten (APT). By 2011, 
21 companies and cooperatives were listed as producing Wolfram domestically. 
Coltan was produced by 44 companies and cooperatives, and Cassiterite was 
produced by 104 companies and cooperatives (Kanzira and Mukamurenzi 2012).689  
                                                          
685 The government retained the expertise of these individuals as part-time consultants (Interview, 
Uwizeye, May 2013). 
686 In 2013, government officials said there were five geologists left in the government. Out of which, 
three were either retiring or due to retire. 
687 Interview, Emmanuel Uwizeye, January 2015. 
688 Interview, Imena, January 2015. 
689 The bulk of exporters (at least 60-70 per cent) are reliant on small-scale miners for their 
production. They do not own concessions and only export small quantities of minerals. 
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Source: MINECOFIN 
Liberalisation also coincided with reduced theft from industrial mining sites. 
This was particularly noticeable in Rutongo – “Before Rutongo was privatised, they 
were producing 2-5 tonnes of Cassiterite a month. Now, it is about 100-120 tonnes of 
Cassiterite a month.”690 The reduced stealing was attributed (by government officials) 
to the presence of diligent investors rather than to negligent, incompetent or even 
corrupt REDEMI officials. The government took a lead in ‘cleaning up’ informal 
smuggling networks in Rutongo.691 However, the experience in Rutongo was 
different from experiences in the rest of Rwanda. There were increases in smuggling 
in smaller concessions (Perks 2013). Concessions were too vast to organise and 
manage efficiently and there were 434 active permits provided to private entities by 
2013. There were over 700 active permits in January 2015.692  
 Though ASM is the predominant form of mining in Rwanda, the government 
has identified a preference to move to professional industrial mining throughout 
Rwanda.693 To achieve such goals, the government will have to find investors who 
are willing to redevelop mining sites (and who the government trusts). In 2012, the 
minerals sector was listed alongside energy and ICT as key strategic sectors. Twenty-
one new Potential Target Areas (PTAs) were identified to attract new investors. 
However, investors were unwilling to invest without assurances on the potential of 
                                                          
690 Interview, Imena, February 2012. 
691 Interview, Mining Consultant, May 2012. 
692 Interview, Imena, January 2015. 
693 MINIRENA officials stated a preference for industrial mining but acknowledged difficulties in 
finding the ‘right’ investors. ASM is not perceived as “environmentally-friendly and industrial mining 
reduces accidents in mines. Lots of small-scale miners have underdeveloped machinery.” (Interview, 
Zephanie Niyonkoru, RDB, February 2012. 
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minerals, especially since there was insufficient exploration data to prove their 
existence. The mining law required investors to undertake exploration on 
concessions before beginning extraction. Though investors came in, very few were 
undertaking exploration and meeting all government demands.694 To remedy the 
situation, GMD acquired enough money to employ German-based Beack consultants 
to conduct exploration on four concessions.695 Until the government is able to invest 
more funds into understanding the full potential of mineral deposits, the government 
will struggle to dictate terms to potential investors.  
Taxation has been used to retain some control over incomes from its mineral 
resources. Such reforms work in line with the Africa Mining Vision (AMV), which 
was adopted at the African Union (AU) summit in 2009. The AMV focuses on 
creating more fiscal space and responsive taxation to allow African nations to use 
gains for beneficiation efforts, employment generation and infrastructure expansion 
in and outside the mine.696 Rwanda operated the highest royalty tax on minerals in 
East Africa in July 2013 – four per cent on ordinary minerals and six per cent on 
precious metals.697  
“The fact that we need royalty is real. Even investors, although 
they argue, understand its importance. In the philosophy of the law, 
you pay royalty because you have extracted a resource and it will 
never come back. It means something must be given to the owners 
of that resource and the owners are all Rwandese.”698 
After rapid privatisation and embracing liberalisation, the government 
adopted a stricter stance with investors. A new mining law was established in 2014, 
which demarcated access to land at 400 ha each, rather than the immense areas of 
land earlier designated to companies.699 Minister of State Imena is quoted: “each 
block will be independent – we will have the right to take any block the investor is 
not using” (Namata 2014). The new mining law also departs from the previous rigid 
                                                          
694 Interview, Uwizeye, January 2012. 
695 Beack’s research did not yield positive results. Another consultant said the government didn’t 
appreciate the research because Beack did not find any potential for mineral deposits in the 
concessions that were studied. “They only found anomalies” (Interview, May 2013, Kigali). 
696 Interview, Antonio Pedro, Director, UNECA, May 2012. Pedro led the formulation of the AMV.  
697 OTF suggestions ran counter to this. In 2009, OTF recommended the reduction of royalty taxes to 
assist investors. The shift in priorities from ‘assisting the investor’ to ‘shoring up government power’ 
shows that the government adapted its policies after privatisation reforms. 
698 Interview, Imena, January 2015. 
699 There will be a more flexible time span designated to holders of permits, with 30 years thought to 
be too long for medium-size mines and five years considered too short. 
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time spans that accompanied the granting of licenses. The previous law only allowed 
the government to grant five-year licenses or 30-year licenses. The government can 
now provide more flexible licenses depending on investors. The RPF narrative tags 
these reforms as ‘investor-friendly’. However, the government can use these reforms 
to increase its bargaining power vis-à-vis investors.700 
“New licenses will be allocated on the basis of the size of the 
deposit, the amount of investment capital, the technology to be 
used, the proposed duration of the project, value-addition strategies 
and the employment plan. License holders will have to meet 
conditions and will be in regular contact with the government. The 
Ministry will allocate these licenses.”701 
The example of the Gatumba Mining Concession (GMC) indicates how the 
government has improvised to discipline investors who were slow or rejected 
national priorities. GMC was a joint venture between a private company and the 
government. Production was low until 2012 in the Gatumba concession, which was 
among the largest in Rwanda (about 22,000 hectares). Investors claimed to have 
invested $12 million in mining equipment and training and installing processing 
plants. Government officials claimed the processing plants that GMC procured did 
not match the types of deposits in the concession. The company complained about 
‘vested interests’ and said that local officials incited residents to raise environmental 
complaints. Some argued that GMC was just “unlucky geologically.”702 In 2014, the 
government found that GMC no longer had the funds to extract minerals. GMC’s 
operations were then closed down (Mugisha 2014c, 2014d). The government carved 
up the concession into 20 smaller units and put these smaller units up for sale to 
other investors. 96 bids were received for these blocks and the bidding process was 
still ongoing in 2015.703 
The government was reluctant to facilitate accumulation strategies that ran 
counter to national priorities. It faced barriers in incentivising companies to invest in 
exploration. “If you are in South America, private companies would do exploration 
because they get massive returns. Here, the 3T market is small. It’s not a paradise for 
                                                          
700 In an interview with Imena in 2012, he stressed that rapid liberalisation was necessary to revitalise 
the sector. However, government capacity diminished as a result.  
701 Interview, Imena, January 2015. 
702 Interview, Philip Schutte, BGR Consultant, May 2013. 
703 Interview, Imena, January 2015. 
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exploration. The state needs to create more incentives.”704 The government preferred 
to build national champions (but had not found any it could trust). “They don’t want 
anyone else. They don’t trust foreigners here. But in the end, they aren’t able to find 
anyone with sufficient money to invest in the sector.”705 Local comptoirs find it 
difficult to compete with international comptoirs. “You must have running money to 
buy minerals. You need cash. The bank doesn’t always give loans either. Big 
companies can come in and dominate the sector.”706 
The government’s liberalisation reforms coincided with quantifiable results in 
export receipts and production surges. However, the government is now reliant on 
enacting legislation and maintaining disciplinary authority over private investors to 
ensure policies are geared to achieving priorities and some mineral wealth was 
retained domestically.  
7.9 Beneficiation – Achieving Ideological Goals of Self-Reliance 
 
“A lot has been changing lately. As a matter of principle, you can’t 
have an economy that gives away its natural resources without any 
money in return. We want to create employment on the ground by 
succeeding in value-addition. The key challenges here are energy, 
expertise, skill and scope.”707 
 Successful beneficiation is essential if the government is to make progress in 
achieving ideological goals of self-reliance In 2006, OTF reports circulated with the 
finding: If Rwanda could smelt all exported Cassiterite today, it would increase 
export revenue by 6 million USD (33 per cent increase) and for every additional 10 
per cent transformed of Cassiterite, revenue would rise by 1.3 million USD. 
Beneficiation helps to retain a larger share of revenues in the mineral value-chain 
within the country of origin. However, beneficiation has rarely been associated with 
success in Sub-Saharan Africa. Hausmann et al. (2008) highlight the experiences of 
South Africa, Zambia and Botswana as countries that attempted such policies. 
Hausmann and his colleagues argue that beneficiation experiments in South Africa 
were ill advised because resources could have been better spent on other sectors. The 
‘opportunity cost’ argument ignores the long-term benefits to be derived from 
                                                          
704 Interview, Schutte, May 2013. 
705 Interview, consultant, May 2013. 
706 Interview, Uwizeye, May 2013. 
707 Interview, Gatare, May 2012. 
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beneficiation. Any infant industry is likely to endure long periods of losses and 
protection before capturing long-term profits.  
Many countries with low volumes of production have faced challenges in 
guaranteeing supplies to make the operation of machinery feasible e.g. smelters.708 
Additionally, beneficiation alters the organisation of the domestic value-chain. The 
place of processors within the economy gains in importance. Often, the increased 
power of processors reduces the power of other actors within the sector. Some 
government officials attributed the failure of the domestic minerals sector in the 
1980s to the privileged position that was given to the smelter.709 Also, transition 
costs have to be negotiated to stabilise the elite bargain from organisational shifts in 
the value-chain that may result after successful beneficiation.  
In 2006, a Mining Industry Value Addition Committee was established to 
develop a value-addition strategy. The committee included representatives from 
OTF, the government and the private sector. Private sector representatives included 
Jean-Paul Higiro of APT, Simba Manasseh of Pyramides and David Bensusan of 
Eurotrade International. MINITERE had prioritised beneficiation processes and the 
committee was part of a process to get feedback from stakeholders within the 
industry. Initial targets stipulated that tin concentrate exports must be of greater than 
65 per cent Sn-content for the first six months. Later, tin exports would need to have 
99.99 per cent Sn-content in tin ingot form. Wolfram concentrate would have to be a 
minimum of 60 per cent Tungsten-content. Coltan would have to be either a 
minimum of 25 per cent Tantalum or 50 per cent Niobium and Tantalum. 
Detrimental consequences of such legislation included: a) decrease in investor 
attraction; b) reduction of average income to artisans and industry actors lower on the 
value-chain as it would reduce their bargaining power; c) centralisation of buying 
power in the hands of processors and the consolidation of their price-making power; 
d) alienation of current customer base; e) increased restrictions on business 
environment and reduction of flexibility; f) negative environmental effects of 
increased smelting.710 Foreign companies disagreed with these directions.711 In 2009, 
                                                          
708 Such machinery consumes large amounts of electricity. To operate such machinery, large volumes 
of production are required to make these units viable. 
709 Interviews, Uwizeye, May 2013; Imena, January 2015 
710 Internal MINITERE and OTF documents. 
711 OTF documents. 
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while processing was encouraged, the government did not apply rules stringently 
because new investors had to be encouraged to invest in the mining sector. Increases 
in concentration requirements were “managed very carefully” and “should not be 
enforced where private firms can prove that the price gaps are too low between the 
higher and lower concentrates” (MINIRENA 2010, 35). Few loyal national 
companies invested out of patriotism.712 
Despite the slow progress, nine processing facilities were established by 
2011. Plans were also in place to establish a Kigali Mineral Campus (KMC). KMC 
would be established to provide opportunities to diversify into higher value-addition 
activities. These activities included the provision of gem-cutting and design facilities 
to build a Rwandite brand, modelled on the success of Tanzanite. However, little 
progress was made in building facilities and reducing infrastructural constraints 
necessary to make value-addition a feasible activity for investors.  
A central priority was to make the tin smelter (that was built by SOMIRWA 
in the 1980s) operational again.713 In 2015, the smelter had made progress in passing 
the Conflict-Free Smelter test, which owners said (in 2013) was extremely 
unlikely.714 Obtaining clearance through these tests was initially perceived to be 
extremely difficult. Malaysia Smelting Company (MSC) went through a similar audit 
for the third time in 2013.715 Thirteen tantalum smelters had been awarded ‘conflict 
free’ status by August 2012, including Ninxia in China, which sourced minerals from 
Rwanda. Only one tin smelter had achieved this status by 2013 (UNSC 2012a).  
“We came here because of the tin smelter. We think it is good for 
the country. Now, we have got the green light to start production 
although we are still being monitored. But we still need to ensure 
production is continuous in order for smelting to be profitable… If 
it works, it will be the first Conflict-free tin smelter in Africa. 
When Dodd-Frank Act happened, things did not look good but 
they changed the protocol in 2013.”716 
In 2001, the government decided to put the smelter up for sale ahead of other 
REDEMI assets. Though the reference price was listed at 446 million RwF, the 
government accepted a price of 133 million RwF. The buyer made an additional 
                                                          
712 ROKA Rwanda was the only domestic company who processed minerals for a brief period. 
713 In 2013, Egyptain investors had expressed an interest in building a Wolfram smelter. 
714 Interview, Phoenix Metals, May 2013. 
715 Interview, Raphael Ritter de Zahony, Phoenix Metals, May 2013. 
716 Interview, Phoenix Metals, January 2015. 
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pledge that two billion RwF would be invested to renovate the company and expand 
the capacity of the smelter. European-based NMC Metallurgie (who later changed 
their name to Phoenix Metals) was granted control of the smelter.717 As promised, the 
company invested in the maintenance and repair of the factory. However, despite the 
efforts and investment put in by Phoenix, the smelter was not operational until 2015. 
Raphael Ritter de Zahony, the MD of Phoenix, justified the lack of activity by 
complaining about low, unreliable quantities available, the high cost and unreliable 
supply of electricity and the difficulty in finding buyers for Rwandan minerals. 
Zahony complained that institutional changes and government indecision regarding 
subsidising electricity have slowed down the pace of reforms.718 In 2013, discussions 
gathered pace in government circles to guarantee an assured supply (and a cheaper 
price) of electricity to Phoenix Metals (that had been discussed since 2006). The 
government feared that giving Phoenix an electricity subsidy would result in other 
companies in strategic sectors asking for similar benefits.719  
“It is very tough. If they have a power cut for more than one hour, 
they will lose a million dollars. Energy is a problem for us in 
Rwanda but we will do our best.”720 
The government also faces a political decision if it chooses to guarantee the 
supply of Cassiterite to the tin smelter. In 2014, Phoenix exported 20 per cent of 
Rwandan minerals, while MSA exported around 60 per cent.721 Given that trade-and-
export operations are liberalised, it would be difficult for Phoenix to make sure that 
enough Cassiterite production was supplied to the smelter while also ensuring the 
company made profits.722 Government officials were undecided about how best to 
tackle the issue since competition was perceived to be central to maintaining 
productivity and restricting monopolies.  
“Last year, we produced 400 and 500 tons of Cassiterite every 
month. If we keep that up, the plant should be fine. Of course, that 
number is not guaranteed. These companies are business entities. It 
is possible that they reach an agreement together. But of course, 
                                                          
717 Though Phoenix initially invested in Rwanda to operate the smelter, the company later became 
engaged in trade-and-export operations. 
718 Zahony mentioned Vincent Karega (now, High Commissioner in South Africa) tried to provide 
incentives to get the smelter working until he was moved as Minister of Infrastructure in 2009. 
719 Interview, Uwizeye, May 2013. 
720 Interview, Imena, January 2015. 
721 Interview, domestic investors and MINIRENA officials, January 2015. 
722 Interview, Phoenix, January 2015. 
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the government will have to take a decision. The smelter is 
important to us.”723 
Difficult decisions will have to be made if beneficiation strategies are to be 
facilitated. Phoenix has to be guaranteed a consistent supply of electricity and the 
smelter would have to be provided with a guaranteed supply of Cassiterite. 
Beneficiation efforts will demonstrate how the government navigates the 
contradictory priorities of maintaining a competitive environment and prioritising 
policies in line with achieving self-reliance.  
Rwanda has also prioritised production of non-T3 (tin, tungsten and tantalum) 
minerals – precious metals and gold. Gold was traditionally produced through 
domestic ASM practices but there are now investments in large-scale mining. Six 
foreign companies and two domestic companies have registered investment, with 
Dubai-based Precious Mining, committed to building a refinery plant by 2016. 
Company representatives were positive about the potential of deposits within their 
mines.724 Some companies have reported promising research findings e.g. Rogi 
Mining.725 Rogi Mining owned three properties including the 2,937 ha Miyove Gold 
Project. At least four companies had begun surface exploration for gold by 2012 and 
government officials were positive that gold deposits existed in ten separate sites.726 
However, production has not reached significant levels. Companies involved in gold 
exploration did not deliver on the investments they had promised.727 
OTF highlighted precious metals as a promising direction for the mineral 
sector. Some investment has been received. One investor was German-Rwandan 
Abdul Aziz Rudasigwa, owner of Sapphire Miners Cyangugu. He controlled several 
mining sites, with one 9800 ha concession. Rudasigwa echoed the government’s 
view that there was potential for sapphire, beryl and amethyst exploration. His 
company suffered from a lack of funds. He previously worked with a Thai investor 
who was no longer willing to commit more money to the project.728 Though the 
government prioritised investments in several spheres of value-addition, it faced 
                                                          
723 Interview, Imena, January 2015. 
724 Interview, Sacha Nshimye, Precious Mining, February 2012. 
725 “Samples showed a satisfactory trend and drilling had reached more than 150 metres underground 
in 2012” (Interview, Oleg Moiseev, Rogi Mining, May 2012). 
726 Interview, Kanzira Hildebrand, April 2012. 
727 Interview, Biryabarema, April 2012. 
728 Details in this paragraph are taken from two interviews. Interviews, Abdul Aziz Rudasigwa, 
February and March 2012. 
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difficulties in enticing investors to commit to such projects. It has also been difficult 
to enforce legislation in line with conditions specified in contracts.  
“At the ministry, it is very difficult for us. There are lots of 
changes and so many new investors. People are looking at the 
mining sector now and we cannot make the mistakes we made 
before. We have to deal with investors carefully. RDB helps us but 
all of this is very challenging.”729 
7.10 The Dodd-Frank Act – Selling Narratives and Cleaning up 
the Mining Sector 
 
 The work of advocacy groups, who propagated the ‘conflict minerals’ 
narrative, eventually contributed to the inclusion of Section 1502 in the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of July 2010. Section 1502 
directed the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to promulgate new 
disclosure rules for SEC-reporting companies that use “conflict minerals” originating 
in the DRC or adjoining countries. “Conflict minerals” included Coltan, Cassiterite, 
Gold, Wolframite or their derivatives. “Adjoining countries” included Angola, 
Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, 
Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. Section 1502 impacted global manufacturing chains 
for a variety of products including light bulbs, turbine engines, aircrafts, microchips 
and microprocessors, cell phones and nuclear reactors. In June 2014, companies 
disclosed details of their product supply chains to the SEC, which was celebrated as a 
“historic day” for victorious advocacy groups like the Enough Project (Biron 2014).  
Many buyers immediately shut down their supply networks in the region 
while others were careful to adhere to the guidelines of the Act by dealing only in 
tagged minerals. Very few companies on the international market were willing to 
purchase untagged Congolese minerals (UNSC 2013). An immediate result was 
reduced production in the Kivus and Maniema, as well as rising unemployment and 
increased poverty among those dependent on artisanal mining as their primary 
income (UNSC 2011). Seay (2012) claims that Section 1502 has had a negative 
effect on the livelihoods of Congolese miners.730 Rwanda took a lead in responding 
                                                          
729 Interview, MINIRENA, January 2015. 
730 There is a consensus around this view. See Vogel and Radley (2014). 
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to Section 1502, immediately embracing transparency initiatives.731 While refocusing 
its interests on the domestic minerals sector, respondents argued that Rwanda was 
treated unfairly and criticised the simplistic ‘conflict minerals’ narratives. 
“Not all minerals traded from the Congo were ‘conflict minerals’. 
Many people developed a variety of personal relationships with 
people across the border. It’s a matter of pride for Rwandans in the 
private sector and the government. We wanted to prove that we 
actually do have minerals.”732 
The Act required that any country exporting ‘conflict minerals’ would have to 
prove the origin of their commodities. However, no tagging system existed to help 
prove the origin of commodities. To fill the void, the International Tin Research 
Institute (ITRI), which worked on the implementation of a due diligence plan for the 
3T minerals, sponsored the ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative (iTSCi). iTSCi was 
supported by a working group including MSC, Thailand Smelting and Refining Co 
Ltd (Thaisarco-AMC) and Traxys Europe SA. The first project was piloted in South 
Kivu but was closed down because the DRC government imposed a mining 
suspension between September 2010 and March 2011. The iTSCi system included a 
chain of custody system through which mineral purchasers could collect all 
information on production and trade. The system involved two types of bar-coded 
tags: a mine tag and a negociant/processor tag. These tags were added to bags of 
minerals at two points of the supply chain i.e. extraction and processing. Tagging 
was also accompanied by detailed data collection in logbooks, which provided a 
record of the tagging process in adherence to OECD guidelines.  
By the end of 2013, 224 mining companies were participating in the iTSCi 
tagging system in Rwanda. Out of these companies, 53 mining companies began 
operations in Rwanda in 2013. The system was used on 638 sites, out of which 200 
sites were inactive or suspended from operations (ITRI 2013). April 1, 2011, had 
been set as the deadline for countries to fully adopt the mineral tagging system and 
Rwanda was easily ahead of any others.733 Cassiterite production rose considerably in 
                                                          
731 Kagame (2013b) stressed Rwanda’s readiness to embrace these initiatives. “When it came to 
mineral tagging, I don’t think there is any country in this whole region that is doing it the way we 
have been doing it. In fact, we might even be the only people who are doing it.” However, he argued 
that the ‘conflict minerals’ narrative was simplistic. “But, there are hundreds of millions, if not even 
billions of minerals, that move around this region by the way, benefiting and involving those countries 
that are behind putting these measures, whose clarity is not to be talked about.” 
732 Interview, Lydia Bwakira, ROKA Rwanda, March 2012. 
733 Interview, Joseph Mbaya, ITRI Rwanda, February 2012. 
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2011 – the year tagging began. Some attribute the increases in mineral exports from 
Rwanda as evidence that the government was attempting to clear its stocks.734 More 
Cassiterite was actually exported after April 2011 (Figure 7.13).735 Since the tagging 
system was still in its first year, it is likely that minerals from the DRC were mixed 
in the domestic supply chain.736 Some government officials argue that surges in 
mineral exports in 2011 and 2012 were the “fruits of regulation and reforms that 
were introduced four years before.”737 Regardless of where these minerals originated, 
the forced closing down of commercial networks in the DRC incentivised private 
operators to focus on the Rwandan minerals sector. 
“First when Kabila banned exports from the DRC in 2010/11 and 
then later with the tagging system, it pushed everyone to produce 
minerals in Rwanda.”738 
“The tagging system has a cost and a lot of bureaucracy with it. 
But the good thing is it makes people go into mining and think 
about trading less. No one can say now that Rwanda has no 
minerals.”739 
The RPF government has been lauded for its “growing commitment” to 
implementing the system (Channel Research 2013, 6). UNSC (2011) highlighted 
MSA and Phoenix Metals as comptoirs who had shown interest in implementation in 
the early stages. In November 2011, Rwanda mining authorities seized over 81 
tonnes of minerals along the Congolese border and returned these minerals to the 
Congolese government (UNSC 2012b). Even Global Witness (2013) admits that 
there has been progress, although it criticises the Rwandan government for a lack of 
‘political will’ to punish those found guilty of being involved in trading minerals 
from the DRC.740 Actions were taken against those guilty of subverting the tagging 
system. In March 2012, GMD banned four Rwandan mining companies for illegally 
tagging minerals and suspended APT – a prominent mining company.741 Jean Paul 
Higiro, President of APT, immediately resigned as President of the Rwanda Mining 
                                                          
734 Interviews, mining consultants. 
735 April 2011 was the deadline. Since ITRI took time to become functional, it remained much easier 
in initial months to transport Congolese minerals. 
736 Interview, Mining Consultant, May 2012. 
737 Interview, Imena, January 2015. 
738 Interview, Phoenix, January 2015. 
739 Interview, Foreign investor, January 2015. 
740 One mining consultant made similar claims. 
741 Interview, Mbaya. 
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Association (RMA).742 UNSC (2012) claims that GMD was complicit in the illegal 
tagging that had been carried out by APT. Government officials argue that measures 
continue to be taken to train government officials.743 Minerals from DRC and 
Burundi are still mixed at mining sites.744 In-country smuggling continues and illegal 
miners continue to work within concession (both under direct supervision of mining 
companies and against the wishes of mining companies).745 However, the 
enforcement of the tagging system has improved since it was established.746 
“The Minister of State is responsible to reinforce the ‘clarity’, 
which saves us a lot of burden from outside, and continues to allow 
us to benefit from our own resources that are confused for other 
resources.”747 
Meagre government capacity and insufficient external funding have inhibited 
the tagging system, showing that the government faces ‘capability traps’ because of 
the demands of fast-paced reforms (and donor demands). The number of GMD field 
agents has increased from 40 in 2011 to 96 in 2013. However, they have failed to log 
incidents and have not complied with basic traceability rules. The government has 
dismissed some of them (Channel Research 2013). To tackle capacity deficits, the 
RNRA (that was formed in 2011) has been reorganised.748 Biryabarema continues to 
head GMD, with a new Mines Inspection Unit in charge of traceability issues and a 
Traceability Coordinator supervising field agents. While the government has been 
forced to speed up the strengthening of capacity within GMD, many agents are hired 
without any training– “at one stage, they recruited 120 people in 2-3 weeks.”749 
Rwanda decided to lead the way in enforcing the iTSCi system in the region. 
However, this decision was made without sufficient investments in building up 
capacity to support the iTSCi system. ‘Cleaning up’ the sector has reduced potential 
smuggling.750 It has forced domestic actors to reduce reliance on trading minerals 
                                                          
742 The RMA was an association of Rwanda mining companies. 
743 Interview, John Kanyangira, April 2012. 
744 Interview, Mining Consultant, April 2012. 
745 Mining consultants, March-May 2012. 
746 Interviews, Cecile Colin, Joseph Mbaya, Philip Schutte and John Kanyangira. 
747 Kagame (2013b) 
748 Emmanuel Nkurunziza leads the RNRA. He was the former DG of the National Land Centre. 
749 Interview, Channel Research representative, February 2012. 
750 Smuggling has not been completely eradicated in the sector. “There are still a lot of illegal miners. 
Lots of random artisanal miners are digging and selling” (Interview, Schutte, May 2013). 
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from the Kivus. The iTSCi system has also forced miners to join cooperatives to find 
a market for their production.  
The government shifted some of the burden of financing the iTSCi system 
onto comptoirs and miners. Many domestic companies complained they had to make 
payments to the government and further payments to ITRI for maintenance costs of 
the system.751 These companies claimed that added costs cut into their already thin 
profit margins. An example of such a company was ROKA Rwanda. ROKA was the 
only domestic company to own one of the large concessions in 2011. ROKA also 
won the RDB Investor of the year 2011 award and was one of the few companies 
that immediately invested in processing.752 Recently, exports have been concentrated 
among foreign-owned companies with comparatively more financial resources. 
These foreign-owned companies included MSA, Phoenix Metals and Rwanda 
Rudniki.753 These three companies have dominated the trade-and-export node of the 
value-chain since 2011.754 Domestic mining companies operated in the sector but 
none are prominent.  
In rebuilding the minerals sector, the government publicly distinguished 
between its own production and re-exports, which had originated in neighbouring 
countries (Figures 7.17-7.18). In 2008, MINECOFIN began listing mineral re-
exports in official records. MINICOM had also begun registration of cross-border 
trade, which had not been recorded previously. The iTSCi system has assisted the 
formalisation of the minerals sector. Many middlemen have been forced out in the 
process, while others concentrate their efforts on attempts to infiltrate the tagging 
system.755 The Rwandan government chose to sacrifice the short-term gains of 
‘illegally’ trading minerals. In doing so, the government prioritised making Rwanda 
a future ‘hub’ for ‘legal’ exports and re-exports.   
 
                                                          
751 Interview, Emery Rubagenga and Augustin Rudahigwa, 2011. 
752 Interview, Emery Rubagenga, CEO – ROKA Global Resources, March 2011. 
753 Chris Huber is involved in this company. 
754 Interview, de Zahony, May 2012. 
755 Interview, Cecile Colin. 
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Source: MINECOFIN 
 
Source: MINECOFIN 
7.11 Conclusion – The Vulnerability of the Developmental 
Political Settlement 
 
The RPF government has shown an intention to counter the vulnerability to 
fluctuations in international prices (unlike preceding governments). It has expanded 
domestic mining to larger areas across Rwanda than ever before, while also 
enforcing some nationalistic policies (e.g. royalty taxes). It has actively intervened in 
the sector to ensure capital is managed and labour is organised in line with national 
priorities. These interventions have included exposing the sector to foreign expertise, 
providing incentives to capitalists to invest in line with national goals and making 
productive long-term decisions (by focusing on the domestic minerals sector and 
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cutting off ties with commercial networks in the DRC). Thus, policies in the sector 
can be likened to those followed by East Asian developmental states (Wade 1990). 
Retaining a Developmental Political Settlement depends on strengthening 
RPF narratives and retaining legitimacy among three constituencies.756 Foreign 
disapproval of Rwandan involvement in the DRC forced the government to refocus 
on the domestic mining sector.757 Embracing the tagging system helped the 
government to show that it adhered to donor demands while highlighting how 
Rwanda was unfairly singled out.758 The interests of individuals who profited from 
commercial networks in the DRC were threatened but disciplined in line with 
ideological goals of achieving self-reliance. Since 2012, threats from elites have also 
been negotiated. Refocusing on the domestic minerals sector was accompanied by 
the need to organise labour to new systems of accumulation and also resulted in the 
creation of employment opportunities. 
However, these policies are associated with vulnerabilities, which inhibit the 
government’s capacity to achieve its goals. The government faced difficulties after 
embracing rapid privatisation since it did not have the capacity to discipline such 
firms or use appropriate legislation to advance national priorities. ‘Capability traps’ 
plague the sector. The government’s over-ambitious targets are hamstrung by 
“institutional weakness and capacity gaps.”759 The government relies on selling its 
mineral exports through Dar-es-Salaam and companies have suffered because of 
theft along this route. Such problems have impacted the faith of international 
buyers.760 The government has also been reluctant to facilitate the accumulation 
strategies of specific investors. For several years, Phoenix’s investments have not 
been facilitated. FECOMIRWA, which provides training to many cooperatives, has 
also struggled because of a lack of funding. Evidence has also been presented that the 
government still struggles to organise labour to mining production despite policies 
geared to formalisation and organising miners into cooperatives. 
                                                          
756 “Above all else, Rwanda wants to keep a façade of cleanliness” (Interview, Mining Consultant, 
April 2012). 
757 Interview, Josiane Barabareho, President’s Office, Kigali, November 2011. 
758 The Ugandan government decided not to tag minerals because it sells all its minerals to China and 
India (Interview, John Kanyangira, GMD, April 2012). 
759 Interview, Schutte, May 2013. 
760 In 2013, buyers of Rwandan minerals lost confidence in some Rwanda-based companies when 11 
containers (containing minerals) departing Rwanda were stolen in Tanzania. Phoenix was among the 
comptoirs whose exports were stolen. Some buyers withdrew contracts and companies were forced to 
find new buyers (Interview, de Zahony, May 2013).   
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CHAPTER 8: EMULATING CEYLON TEA: 
MAINTAINING A DEVELOPMENTAL 
POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN THE 
RWANDAN TEA SECTOR 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter describes the evolution of the Rwandan tea sector, which was 
prioritised immediately after 1994. Since then, the RPF government has achieved 
some success in reducing its reliance on the Mombasa tea auction and diversifying to 
higher-quality teas. Reducing the amount of tea sold at the Mombasa auction works 
in line with ideological goals of achieving self-reliance. Though previous 
governments enjoyed healthy growth in the tea sector, few attempts were made to 
engage in value-addition. Ruling elites (during preceding governments) were more 
concerned with maximising short-term profits obtained from the sector, rather than 
developing long-term goals. The RPF government has dealt with the demands of 
“three constituencies” by developing narratives and promoting reforms that show its 
commitment to ideological goals of self-reliance. It has exhibited characteristics of a 
developmental state, identified by Wade (1990). The government has committed to 
productive investments in the sector (through distributing inputs, expanding tea 
acreage and leading value-addition exercises), provided incentives to companies 
engaging in some aspects of diversification (that would not have occurred without 
government intervention) and exposed the sector to international competition. 
The production of tea forces a reorganisation of class relations in society. The 
organisation of tea cultivation assigns bargaining power to processors (those with 
processing equipment) versus tea growers. Tea is processed immediately after it is 
plucked. It is then withered, rolled, graded and packed before shipment. Since these 
processes are usually highly mechanised, most tea estates hold one processing plant 
and retain a monopoly over tea-growing areas in a region. In addition, tea production 
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is extremely labour-intensive and requires continuous care throughout the year.761 
Thus, tea is one of the best-suited crops for centralised industrial production 
techniques (Paige 1975). Tea processors and owners of plantations assume the role of 
agrarian elites.762 The government (if interested in empowering these elites) attempts 
to secure a supply of labour for tea plantations and for facilitating the processing and 
marketing activities of tea processors. Governments and agrarian elites work 
together, in the name of development, often portraying that they are empowering 
‘small farmers’ along the way. However, these narratives of development repress the 
‘contradictions’ as such processes always depend on the exploitation of labour.  
 The Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA) is one example of a 
successful tea outgrower scheme.763 The KTDA’s share of national tea supply 
increased from six per cent in 1965 to 33 per cent in 1980. By 2010, the KTDA had 
598,000 small-scale out growers across 109,000 hectares (Oya 2012). However, 
processes of class formation and exploitation intensified through the formation of the 
KTDA. Between 1960 and 1972 in Kenya, Steeves identified three divisions within 
the dominant class: i) those who were non-resident, salaried and commercially 
based;764 ii) those who were resident and dependent on land; iii) those who were 
impaired in their further development by the limited size of their land. The KTDA’s 
organisational approach was based on a ‘one-acre ideal’ where plantings below the 
minimum of one acre were assumed to not be worth the farmer’s time and care 
(Leonard 1991, 127).765 Such requirements favoured the first two groups, reducing 
the power of the third group while creating opportunities for wage labour.766 
                                                          
761 Tea is a tree rather than a bush and must be constantly pruned to keep it growing outward to 
maximise its leaf area (rather than growing upward, which would maximise the trunk).  New tea 
leaves (or ‘flush’) must be picked within three days before they lose their flavour.  
762 Sometimes, the same individuals act as both tea processors and owners of plantation. 
763 The KTDA was established in 1960. It provides Kenyan farmers with a range of services 
connected to tea growing and operates domestic tea factories. KTDA registered growers, guaranteed 
their purchases and provided growers with planting material and technical assistance. Growers owned 
shares in factories and were represented on the KTDA board (Glover 1984, 1150). 
764 “These capitalist farmers emerged from a process of ‘straddling’ i.e. households of capitalist 
farmers combine agricultural enterprise with salaried employment in the public or large-scale non-
agricultural private sectors” (Sender and Smith 1990, 86). 
765 Rules such as these reflected the internal change that was brought about by intensifying 
engagement with the international market. Sender and Smith (1986, 2) write: “the object of analysis is 
internal change: even in societies where external forces played a significant role, it is not possible to 
determine their effects… unless the focus of the analysis is upon internal change, in particular upon 
changes in social relations of production.”  
766 In Tanzania, speeding up processes of rural class differentiation was less successful. Rather than 
focusing on policies derived from a ‘pro-peasant’ or ‘family farm’ perspective, policies aimed at 
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“Landless and migrant wage-earners had begun to appear as a distinct social 
formation” (Steeves 1978, 132). 
KTDA was transformed from an organisation of small-scale tea farmers in 
1964 to become “the world’s top producer of quality tea” (Chege 1998, 226).767 The 
KTDA’s success was attributed to institutional heritage, organisational acumen, 
buoyant international tea prices and individual leadership (Leonard 1991). However, 
politics also influenced this success. Many tea growers were Kikuyus from the 
Central Province and President Kenyatta’s political strategy was based on securing 
the prosperity of the Central Province (Kenyatta’s support base). Charles Karanja, 
the first General Manager of the KTDA, prioritised grower interests in the Central 
Province to fit Kenyatta’s political preferences (Leonard 1991). The KTDA was used 
“by the dominant fraction of the indigenous bourgeoisie to further its own moves into 
tea production” (Swainson 1977, 51). Foreign and local actors contested power 
within the KTDA. Foreign actors included the British-based Brook Bond Tea 
Company, which had controlled international marketing of tea since 1938. National 
actors comprised “petty-bourgeois factions within the Kenyan parliament” who 
pushed for decentralisation of the tea industry (Swainson 1977, 52).  
KTDA successfully developed narratives, which stressed the moral appeal of 
‘mutual gains’ for members. The RPF aims to mimic the success of the KTDA (both 
in terms of empowering ‘small farmers’ publicly, while concealing the speeding up 
of class formation in tea-growing areas). Of course, there were also benefits for 
members in terms of receiving better access to inputs, equipment and training. 
However, cooperative membership is restricted to those who could meet the 
minimum requirements needed for certification standards. Maintaining such 
certification standards is essential to break into niche markets. Thus, maintaining 
images of ‘mutual benefits’ associated with ‘cooperatives’ and that members are 
homogeneous groups of ‘small farmers’ is essential to achieving targets.  
Rwanda’s climate and geography is well suited to tea production. High 
altitude, steady rainfall and rich volcanic soils (in some tea-producing areas) give 
Rwanda an edge in the production of high-quality tea. Since the 1980s, Rwandan tea 
                                                                                                                                                                    
improving income levels of the rural poor must include the removal of constraints faced by capitalist 
farmers and an improvement of rural wage employment conditions (Sender and Smith 1990). 
767 Small-scale tea farmers refer to the first two groups Steeves identified. 
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has attracted premium prices at the Mombasa tea auctions. Tea is cultivated, 
harvested and exported throughout the year. Yearly highs are reached in April to 
June, while lows occur between September and November. Most of Rwandan tea 
production is processed by the Black CTC (crush, tear and curl) method. In 2011, 
Rwanda began producing orthodox, green, organic and specialty tea.768 Farmers 
pluck green leaves, which are transported to the factory before they are withered (or 
partially dried), cut (or rolled) and later fermented. During fermentation, the leaf 
develops flavour and a black colour. The tea is then dried to stop oxidation and then 
sorted. The final product of black-sorted tea is packed (according to specific grades) 
into paper sacks. Black CTC tea involves the rolling of tea between two rollers. The 
CTC process ends with small grains that are used mostly for tea bags. Orthodox 
Black tea, which is also produced in Rwanda, involves rolling tea against a cutting 
table, rather than two rollers. Orthodox teas are small curled tea leaves, which are 
generally used for high-quality loose teas. Bulk tea is transported for sale to the 
Mombasa auction or sold directly to foreign buyers. The processing of both orthodox 
and CTC teas is capital-intensive and requires a continuous supply of freshly plucked 
tea. Black CTC tea is more widely produced in East Africa because its production is 
more cost-efficient than the methods used to produce Orthodox tea (OCIR-Thé 
2006). 
 In Rwanda, each tea factory enjoys a monopoly (for the most part) over the 
supply of tea produced in specific areas. Tea growers are organised to produce tea in 
three ways: a) wageworkers are employed by the Bloque Industriel (BI) or Industrial 
Estate run by tea factories. BIs are situated adjoining the factory and owned by the 
factory owners; b) COOPTHEs (Tea cooperatives), which are blocks of large sizes 
owned by tea cooperatives. In COOPTHEs, land is consolidated and distributed by 
the government for the purpose of growing tea exclusively. Cooperatives are 
professionally managed and farmers own equal plots of land. Farmers employ both 
family labour and wage labour.;769 c) Thé Villageois (TV), which are small 
independent tea plots owned by farmers who have very small plots of land (official 
average of 0.25 ha).770 These farmers are organised into cooperatives, with the 
                                                          
768 The production of green (or unfermented) tea is much less complex. Tea leaves are heated by either 
steaming or roasting, then rolled or twisted and finally dried (Talbot 2002). 
769 Gisakura, Mulindi and Shagasha have COOPTHEs (Internal World Bank document). 
770 Interview, Anthony Butera, NAEB, October 2011. 
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cooperative charged with distributing fertilizers, providing access to credit, 
transporting tea leaves to the factory and maintaining roads. Of the 19 cooperatives 
listed in 2013, 16 were TVs and three were COOPTHEs. In 2013, TVs owned the 
most land under tea cultivation (57.1 per cent), followed by BIs (34 per cent) and 
COOPTHEs (8.9 per cent). 
BIs are usually under shared ownership between cooperatives and factories. 
However, owners of Mulindi and Shagasha (the first two factories built in Rwanda) 
do not own any of the land in the BI. In these factories, COOPTHEs have full 
ownership of the BI. Cooperatives comprise a variety of farmers who own different 
sizes of land. In 2013, the Rwandan tea sector comprised 12 tea factories – all under 
private ownership (although the government retained minority shares in some 
companies). Tea is more widely cultivated than before. 20,665 hectares were 
dedicated to the cultivation of tea in 2012, as compared to 12,869 ha in 2004 (60.5 
per cent increase). Factories directly employed over 70,000 people and employed 
thousands in casual wage labour (Gathani and Stoelinga 2013).  
 OCIR-Thé was established in 1974. OCIR-Thé acted as the government 
regulatory board in-charge of tea marketing and production. In 2011, OCIR-Thé, 
OCIR-Café and the Rwanda Horticulture Development Authority (RHODA) were 
merged to create the NAEB. Cooperatives formed a federation – Fédération 
Rwandaise des Coopératives de Théiculteurs (FERWACOTHE) – in 2000, which 
was legally recognised in 2007. Jean Munyemana established FERWACOTHE. In 
2014, he was still its President.771 FERWACOTHE comprised four member 
cooperative unions.772 In 2009, these unions comprised 14 primary cooperatives that 
served 31,000 households as their members (Mukarugwiza 2010).773 In 2011, 37,528 
tea growers were registered in the federation.774 FERWACOTHE’s main 
responsibilities include lobbying and advocating for better prices for green leaf tea, 
assisting in cheap access to fertilizers, improving access to transport to and from 
factories and advocating for farmers to be allowed to buy shares in privatised tea 
                                                          
771 Munyemana refers to himself as “a lifelong farmer” (Interview, Munyemana, May 2012). No other 
information was provided. He is the Chairman of the PSF’s Agricultural Chamber. 
772 Each union comprised three or four cooperatives (Interview, Venant Ngendahayo, 
FERWACOTHE, May 2012). 
773 All cooperatives have not joined the federation. 
774 Interview, Munyemana, President – FERWACOTHE, May 2012. 
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factories.775 The government intends for FERWACOTHE to perform a similar role in 
the sector as the KTDA did in Kenya.  
 Tea production has increased since independence. Tea is cultivated more 
widely, farmers produce better quality leaves and made tea attracts healthier prices 
compared to average prices at the Mombasa tea auction.776 Yield is still higher 
compared to the levels achieved by previous governments, reaching a peak in 2007 
before gradually falling (Figure 8.1). Yield gradually increased during the 1960s and 
1970s. However, as the area under tea cultivation increased and farmers were forced 
to produce tea, yield reduced in the early 1980s. As coffee prices fell, tea became 
more attractive for the government and farmers preceding 1994. Yield was steady till 
1993 before dropping, only recovering in 1998. The increases in yield since the 
1950s may also be influenced by an increase in prices. However, since 2008, despite 
increases in prices of tea exports, yield has decreased (Figure 8.2).777 Between 1997 
and 2004, average prices at the Mombasa tea auction were higher than prices 
attracted by Rwandan tea. Since 2004, Rwandan tea has been competitive with 
average prices at the Mombasa tea auction (Figure 8.3).  
 
Source: FAOSTAT 
                                                          
775 The low prices of tea leaves, the high cost of fertilizer and the lack of dividends from factories 
were listed as the primary concerns of farmers in a 2008 survey (Internal OTF documents). 
776 Made tea refers to black tea that is ready for export (after being processed in factories).  
777 This may be because of forced cultivation of tea as area under tea cultivation has increased. 
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Source: FAOSTAT and OCIR-Thé 
 
Source: OCIR-Thé and World Bank 
The RPF government aims to move into value-added tea, mimicking the 
successes of Sri Lankan government-supported projects around Ceylon tea.778 Boxes 
8.1-8.2 show the value-chains for the production of bulk tea and value-added tea in 
Rwanda. The government prioritises reducing the share of its tea production that is 
sold at the Mombasa tea auction. Instead, priorities include selling tea directly to 
foreign clients, diversifying into specialty teas and manufacturing single-origin 
packaged tea for distribution in the domestic and international markets. Though the 
government has achieved some success in value-addition, 70 per cent of Rwandan 
tea was still sold at the Mombasa auction in 2008. The government still experiences 
                                                          
778 Such projects were not prioritised in Kenya. 
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difficulties in organising labour to tea cultivation and building effective reciprocal 
control mechanisms with factory owners.  
 
 
As is expected of any government, the RPF government has ignored the 
contributions of preceding governments in making initial investments in the tea 
sector. Most factories were actually built by Hutu-led governments. Preceding 
governments used the tea sector as a way to empower agrarian elites (or even remove 
some elites from direct control of the military).779 During Kayibanda’s reign, 
troublesome military elites (Sabin Benda, Aloys Nsekalije and Kanyarengwe) were 
given positions at tea factories to move them out of powerful military positions 
                                                          
779 The RPF also empowers agrarian elites in similar ways. However, it does so while maintaining an 
image of embracing market-led reforms. Also, the government has empowered foreign agrarian elites 
(reluctantly), which previous governments did not (apart from US-owned SORWATHE). 
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(Green 2011). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, some of Habyarimana’s Gisenyi-
based elites were empowered through positions at OCIR-Thé and at tea factories. 
Rents from the tea sector were concentrated among Hutu power elites who were 
directly involved in the genocide.  
RPF narratives emphasise the importance of market-led reforms in the tea 
sector, feeding the image that the government operates in line with donor advice. In 
the tea sector, the government was reluctant to cede control to international 
companies who would be difficult to discipline in line with value-addition strategies. 
An ambitious attempt to package single-origin Rwandan tea for international markets 
was undertaken by locally owned Rwanda Mountain Tea (RMT) in partnership with 
the government. The government has prioritised selling tea factories to build 
effective business-state partnerships with loyal elites. Retaining loyalty has proven 
difficult for the government. In one case, a tea factory originally sold to a trusted 
elite was later sold to an international company (without the knowledge of the 
government). In another case, one trusted elite (Rujugiro) later sided with the RNC. 
Assets of the factory he owned were confiscated. Other domestic companies have not 
matched foreign-owned firms in achieving success in diversification because they 
have been unable to develop international contacts.  
This chapter also shows that the government (sometimes) struggles to provide 
an adequate supply of wage labourers to tea plantations. Sender and Smith’s (1990) 
study in Tanzania suggests that resistance to proletarianisation could be ascribed to 
intra-household power relations where women are forced to confine their labour to 
household production.780 In the tea sector in Rwanda, women often take on the work 
of plucking tea leaves.781 Despite the government’s policies to impose gender quotas 
on employment, work remains to counter patriarchal relationships at the household 
level (Nabalamba and Sennoga 2014). The government also failed to ensure wages 
were paid on time.782 Companies requested more assistance and incentives to expand 
production processes. Success in achieving value-addition strategies depends on 
managing these constraints and organising labour to tea production effectively.  
                                                          
780 This could be an area for future research. 
781 In a survey conducted in 1985 in Giciye commune, women comprised 19 per cent of the work 
force on tea plantations and performed the job of plucking tea leaves. This was the only form of off-
farm wage employment for women in the area (Von Braun et al. 1991). 
782 Interview, Venant Ngendahayo, FERWACOTHE, May 2012 
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There has been no academic research undertaken in the post-1994 Rwandan 
tea sector. Information in this chapter has been obtained primarily from interviews 
(with representatives from all tea companies and relevant government officials at 
NAEB and MINAGRI), government documents and documents shared by 
consultants and donors. Statistical data has been obtained directly from NAEB. Some 
historical data has been obtained from public databases. For the section on the 
history of the tea sector, details from existing academic work are used.  
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8A: Historical Background 
8.2 Tea during Kayibanda’s Reign 
 
The Belgian colonial administration did not cultivate tea in Rwanda. In 
hindsight, tea was recognised as the “ideal crop for Rwanda” with “42,000 acres of 
land, with an estimated productive capacity of 19,000 metric tonnes of tea potentially 
suitable for cultivation (with half of this land comprised of swamp and marshes)” 
(Nyrop et al. 1969, 158). Tea was introduced in Rwanda in the 1950s by some 
private settlers on an experimental basis. In 1957, acreage under tea was 
approximately 200 hectares and green leaves were processed in Uganda and Zaire 
(Von Braun et al. 1991). In the early 1960s, the European Development Fund (FED) 
carried out feasibility studies to expand tea production.783  
In 1961, the first plantations were established in Mulindi (which had their 
first yield three years later) and later in Cyangugu. A tea factory with the capacity to 
annually produce 800 tonnes of made tea was constructed in Mulindi in 1962.784 
Nine tea plantations were established in Rwanda by the late 1960s. Some of these 
plantations had been converted from marshlands; others were located on hills and 
were developed by establishing paysannats (planned agricultural settlements). In 
1966, the government had relocated 16,060 families on 24 paysannats (Nyrop et al. 
1969, 47) – some of which were used to organise tea cultivation.785  
The government lacked the expertise to manage these plantations and 
factories – Mulindi (located in Byumba) and Shagasha (located in Cyangugu). A 
German firm, AGRAR and Hydrotechnik, won a tender to manage these factories 
and the plantations.786 Production was largely undertaken by cooperatives, which 
were financed by the FED and supervised by AGRAR.787 AGRAR’s responsibilities 
were limited to establishing plantations and running the factory. The government and 
                                                          
783 The FED underwrote the cost of 11 studies on tea production by 1968 (Nyrop et al. 1969). 
784 The capacity of the factory was increased to 1200 tonnes by 2001. 
785 Only one per cent of these families was on tea paysannats. The bulk of the families – 78 per cent – 
were on coffee-growing paysannats. 
786 In 1967, two of the nine plantations were run by private planters, small-scale farmers comprised 
one plantation and the government owned one plantation. Five were run by European settlers (Nyrop 
et al. 1969). 
787 The FED committed investments worth 402.1 million RwF to tea projects in Rwanda by 1971 
(although nearly 100 million RwF had not been disbursed). AGRAR purchased tea at 9 RwF/kg, 
which was relatively generous considering unit costs should not have exceeded 4 RwF/kg (IMF 1973). 
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donors split the land into small plots for distribution to Rwandans who worked there 
(Voigt 2004). AGRAR then processed the tea in the two government-owned factories 
and sold the tea to companies in London.788 Elites owned tea plantations and had 
managerial positions in tea factories.789  
In 1963, Rwanda produced four metric tonnes of made tea. By 1967, 
production of tea had increased to 348 metric tonnes. By 1971, production was 1245 
metric tonnes. Despite these increases, the value of tea exports in 1971 remained 
below six per cent of total exports. Area under tea cultivation had increased from 285 
ha to 3085 ha in 1971. The quality of tea remained below that of other East African 
teas (IBRD 1968).  
 
Source: FAOSTAT 
8.3 Habyarimana and the Consolidation of the Agrarian Elite 
 
 Plans to build new factories were put in place during Kayibanda’s reign. Tea 
expansion resonated with Habyarimana’s racial egalitarian ideology, which 
emphasised the need for hardworking peasants to focus their efforts on producing 
export crops (coffee and tea) for the good of the nation (Verwimp 2006). Eight tea 
factories were built during Habyarimana’s reign – Pfunda, Gisakura, Gisovu, 
                                                          
788 AGRAR was first managed by Werner Voigt who set up the Mulindi plantations and factory and 
later similar operations in Cyangugu (Voigt 2004).  
789 Not all these posts were ways to appease elites. Sabin Benda was sent to manage the OCIR-Thé 
factory in Shagasha as a way to get Benda away from Kigali. Benda joined Habyarimana in mounting 
a successful coup in 1973. Aloys Nsekalije (who was also part of the same group) was also sent to 
head a tea factory. 
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Rubaya, Nyabihu, Kitabi and Mata. Plantations were also developed in the 
neighbouring areas around these factories. A factory was also constructed in 
partnership with American investors – SORWATHE. Production rose because of 
these investments. Yield showed steady improvements till 1977 before declining and 
picking up again. Till 1984, tea prices were healthy and investments paid dividends. 
Tea production nearly tripled in the first ten years of Habyarimana’s reign.  
 The total acreage devoted to tea cultivation increased from approximately 
285 ha in 1962 to 10,120 ha in 1984 (Von Braun et al. 199, 22). Some of this land 
was redeveloped from marshlands, forest land, cultivated land and pasture land 
(Verwimp 2011). Habyarimana’s tea expansion exercises (contradicting his speeches 
and his ‘egalitarian’ ideology) occurred at the cost of the population.790 
Expropriation of land was met with “hostility” in some places (Bart in Verwimp 
2011, 406). Some peasants complained that tea plantations claimed the most fertile 
tracts of lands (Pottier 1986, 211). In other places, dislocated farmers were 
compensated with “a higher proportion of tea-factory work” (Von Braun et al. 1991, 
82).791 Farmers were faced with a choice to cultivate tea or produce their own food 
(or food to be sold on the market). Habyarimana’s development project depended on 
farmers cultivating tea and wageworkers seeking work on tea plantations. Like in the 
coffee sector, Habyarimana’s ‘racial egalitarianism’ masked the coercive elements of 
the regime where resistance was suppressed.  
 Labour was organised by facilitating class differentiation in rural areas by the 
end of the 1980s.792 According to a 1988 survey, the 51 highest income households 
generated an average income of 253,000 RwF per year – 3.6 times the average of 
households outside this high-income group (Clay et al. 1997). These high-income 
households showed evidence of ‘straddling’ and 77 per cent of these households had 
a family member employed as a functionary or a small businessman (ibid). This 
showed evidence that an agrarian elite was created. Meanwhile, 47 per cent of all 
households surveyed indicated family members held off-farm employment, with 31 
per cent of all households employed as agricultural wage labourers on the farms of 
                                                          
790 Habyarimana’s peasant ideology prioritised national food security. However, “the production of 
export crops was only beneficial to the population as long as incomes from export crops were higher 
than incomes from food crops” (Verwimp 2006, 6).  
791 Von Braun et al. (1991) interviewed 32 households that were displaced in Gishwati in a second 
round of displacements for the Rubaya and Nyabihu tea factories in 1986.  
792 The 1988 survey administered questionnaires to 1,019 households (Clay et al. 1997). 
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their neighbours (ibid). This indicated increased rural differentiation, which may 
have been a source of grievances. Such findings tally with André and Platteau’s 
study (1998), which shows that inequality in rural areas was a source of grievances 
(but were not an independent cause of violence). 
 In the tea sector, the agrarian elite comprised those who owned tea 
plantations, held leadership posts at tea factories or were OCIR-Thé officers. While 
tea prices were high in the 1970s and the economy was vibrant, Habyarimana shared 
power among Northern elites (from Ruhengeri and Gisenyi). After the failed coup in 
1980, Habyarimana increasingly relied on the Gisenyi elite. Donor investments 
assisted the government in managing high operation costs in the sector.793 The tea 
sector was one of the few places where funding remained secure in the late 1980s. 
The guaranteed source of funding in the sector made it an ideal source of rents for 
the akazu. Verwimp (2001, 4) claims that “only the akazu really benefited from tea 
production.” Elites who held interests in the tea sectors included akazu members or 
perpetrators of the genocide e.g. Felicien Kabuga,794 Michel Bagaragaza,795 Alfred 
Musema,796 Denis Kamodoka797 and Juvénal Ndabirinzi798 (Des Forges 1999, 
Verwimp 2001). 
 Global tea and coffee prices began to fall in 1984 and 1985 respectively. 
When global prices of coffee and tea were high, the government paid a high producer 
price to farmers. The collapse of these prices forced the government to lower the 
farmgate price and reduce social services by 40 per cent (Verwimp 2003). Despite 
reduced prices, Habyarimana continued to force farmers to grow both coffee and tea 
on top of taxes and compulsory labour through umuganda. The government 
restricted fertilizer use to the production of cash crops (Verwimp 2002). Expansion 
of tea plantations continued. Several hundred households were removed from their 
land to develop new tea plantations around Mulindi and Gisovu (Verwimp 2003). 
Wages on tea plantations often covered only part of the nutritional needs of labourers 
                                                          
793 In 1989, the IFC approved a loan to SORWATHE (51 per cent owned by US investors). 
SORWATHE was responsible for 18 per cent of production in Rwanda at the time (EIU 1989). 
794 Kabuga owned tea plantations and other businesses. His daughter was married to Habyarimana’s 
son (Kagire 2012b). 
795 Bagaragaza was Head of OCIR-Thé. Bagaragaza also used his position to supervise drug 
trafficking (cannabis), which had developed under the control of the akazu in the 1980s (Braeckman 
1994, Storey 2001). Bagaragaza had earlier served as the Speaker of the National Assembly. 
796 Director of the Gisovu Tea Factory since 1994 
797 Director of the Kitabi Tea Factory 
798 Director of the Mata Tea Factory 
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(Verwimp 2002). Government-enforced discipline was met with resistance with 
farmers refusing to pay taxes or avoiding umuganda.799 Wageworkers also formed 
support bases for agrarian elites, with employment at tea plantations one of the few 
sources of wages (Des Forges 1999). Businessman Kabuga gained some of his 
popularity by offering employment to farmers on his plantations (Kagire 2012b). 
Kamodoka and Ndabarinzi led their employees at tea factories (most of whom were 
party supporters) in the first attacks in April 1994 in Rwamiko and Mudasomwa 
communes in Southern Province (Des Forges 1999).  
Tea was also prioritised in the late 1980s and early 1990s because the 
growing reputation of the quality of Rwandan tea began to fetch higher prices. 
Despite the global fall in tea prices, Rwandan tea drew comparatively high prices at 
the Mombasa tea auction between 1987 and 1993 (as compared to other African teas 
– Figure 8.5, 8.6). Rwandan tea enjoyed a healthy reputation because of the country’s 
high-quality soils. Tea production increased despite a reduction in prices (Figure 
8.7). Tea never rivalled coffee as the primary export during Habyarimana’s reign. In 
the early 1990s, tea export revenues were directly linked to funding violence. Egypt 
sold $6 million in arms to Rwanda in March 1992 (HRW 1994). Rwanda paid for 
some of these arms through a delivery of Rwandan tea, worth one million dollars, 
and a pledge of future tea harvests from the Mulindi plantation (ibid).800 
 
Source: OCIR-Thé 
                                                          
799 Tea expansion was resented by farmers since many farmers “on the land frontier were forced to 
move and ended up with smaller parcels” (Verwimp 2011, 416).  
800 In 1993, the Mulindi tea plantation was taken over by the RPF and the factory was not in operation. 
The Credit Lyonnais eventually took the hit and the company’s general manager was fired because of 
the losses (Prunier 1995).  
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Source: OCIR-Thé 
 
Source: World Bank, FAO and OCIR-Thé 
 Despite reduced tea prices, most factories had consistent increases in 
production in the 1980s and in some years during the 1990s (Figures 8.8-8.9). 
Increases occurred despite a proportion of the tea harvest being smuggled out of 
Rwanda for resale (EIU 1992b, 1994). Production in the Mulindi factory was the first 
affected by the tensions in the 1990s, with production in 1992 being less than half the 
production in 1991. In the following two years, the factory was not in operation and 
the tea crop in surrounding plantations was damaged. The RPF established its 
headquarters in Kigali at the Mulindi factory in 1993. National tea production only 
decreased by 8.5 per cent between 1992 and 1993, compared to a 28 per cent 
decrease in coffee production and a 33.5 per cent decrease in mineral production.801 
                                                          
801 Calculated from Official NAEB and OGMR data. 
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Even in 1994, Rwanda produced over 4000 metric tonnes of tea. Gisakura and 
Gisovu continued to produce tea in early 1994 (Figure 8.7-8.8). Musema, director of 
the Gisovu Tea Factory, also led early killings during the genocide – using Gisovu’s 
cars and trucks to transport Interahamwe to massacre sites (Verwimp 2004, 242). 
Many factories and plantations were destroyed in 1994. Some infrastructure was 
stolen. The Shagasha factory was dismantled and the machinery was taken to Zaire 
(EIU 1994).  
 
Source: OCIR-Thé 
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Source: OCIR-Thé 
8.4 SORWATHE (Société Rwandaise du Thé)  
 
 In the 1970s, the Kayibanda government explored the possibility of building 
a factory in Cyohoha in Northern Province. An experimental plot in Cyohoha swamp 
was drained and tea bushes were planted in the area. The government ran out of 
money before a factory could be built. In 1975, a joint-venture was established 
between Joe Wertheim’s US-based Tea Importers, Inc. (51 per cent) and the 
government (49 per cent), to build the factory.802 The IMF and the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation helped finance the factory.803 SORWATHE began producing 
tea in 1978. By 1982, the SORWATHE factory was only second in production to 
Mulindi. Between 1979 and 1989, production at SORWATHE nearly tripled. After 
1982, SORWATHE’s annual production was consistently more than the average of 
                                                          
802 The US Embassy was directly involved in these negotiations. “Habyarimana had instructed GoR 
officials to reach agreement (with Wertheim) since project was greatly needed and GoR must bear in 
mind its good relations with the US” (Wikileaks 2006). 
803 The FED and USAID also financed the project (Gathani and Stoelinga 2013). 
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OCIR-Thé factories and the average of OCIR-Thé’s original four factories (Mulindi, 
Shagasha, Pfunda and Gisakura). Production reduced between 1992 and 1994 as 
fighting surfaced near the tea factory.804
 
 SORWATHE employees maintained that Wertheim’s contributions 
influenced the transformation of the domestic tea sector. Cally Alles joined as the 
company’s technical director in 1978. He worked for SORWATHE in Rwanda from 
1978 to 1984. After working in Kenya and Burundi, he returned to Rwanda in 1996. 
Alles then managed SORWATHE until he retired in 2012. He then moved back to 
Sri Lanka where he served as Honorary Consul of Rwanda. Alles compared the 
Habyarimana and Kagame governments and detailed SORWATHE’s contribution: 
“Tea has come a long way. The former government was not 
professional at all. Those people were unqualified and did not 
know what to do. They weren’t interested at all in the population. 
These new guys are very dynamic, visionary even. This 
government tries hard to cooperate with us. The others wanted to 
make money and were not interested in private ownership. The old 
government had to drain swamps to get land because of the 
population pressure. They needed an investor and Joe Wertheim 
came in. With his investments, the tea sector developed.”805 
 Alles’ observations regarding the corruption of the last government must be 
considered while highlighting his close relationship with the RPF government. 
Nevertheless, Wertheim’s investments brought increasing revenues to the sector. The 
                                                          
804 During a visit to the USA, Kagame was warned by a State Department Desk Officer that the tea 
factory had American interests. The RPA “had come close to the tea plantation” in 1992 (Rudasingwa 
2013, 117).  
805 Interview, Cally Alles, SORWATHE, February 2012. Similar observations were made by a 
respondent who worked at OCIR-Cafe in the 1980s. “Coffee was not so bad. The most important 
people were in tea and there was easy money in tea” (Interview, NAEB Official, February 2012). 
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Habyarimana government was reluctant to open up the sector to other investors 
despite SORWATHE’s success. Donors did not force the government to privatise tea 
factories in the early 1990s despite the structural adjustment programme that was 
adopted in 1990.806 They were lenient with Habyarimana’s government, hoping that 
the economy would recover (Storey 2001). Donors continued to fund expansion 
within the tea sector, ignoring the consolidation of akazu interests in the tea sector. 
Elites concentrated rents from the sector among themselves. No long-term strategy 
was developed to counter the sector’s vulnerability to global price fluctuations. Little 
emphasis was placed on increasing productivity, technological advances or attracting 
new investments (considering SORWATHE’s success). Chapter 8B will demonstrate 
that the RPF government’s policies have been strikingly different.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
806 The structural adjustment programme included the privatisation and restructuring of some state 
companies, including a state-run printing press and a paper mill (Storey 1999). 
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Chapter 8B: Economic Nationalism in 
the Rwandan Tea Sector 
The RPF government has overseen an increase in both the volume and value 
of tea exports (Figure 8.11-8.12). NAEB has committed to distributing over 43,000 
seedlings by 2017, which could result in tea earnings doubling to almost $147 
million.807 RPF narratives depict improvements to have benefited farmers. 
Government officials argue that prioritising the formation of cooperatives and a 
federation, FECOMIRWA, are signals that such improvements have occurred.   
“Think about this tea you are buying in Tesco. The Rwandan 
farmer gets almost nothing as a percentage of that. Our President 
wants us to make sure that the Rwandan farmer gets the most 
money possible. That is what value-addition will enable us to do… 
Forming cooperatives and empowering these farmers makes this 
possible.”808 
RPF narratives emphasise the importance of privatisation in the sector’s 
revitalisation.  
“In tea, we were forced to do it first. But the government should 
not be in business. It is because of privatisation that technology has 
come and also efficiency. Without that, it would be difficult.”809 
“After 1994, the government was still putting together the basics. 
After 2000, the President pushed for economic development. At 
the centre of this is developing the private sector, promoting 
investment and exports. Look at the tea sector. We have almost 
privatised every factory. You can see how exports have improved. 
For us, we just have to build the right environment for investors. 
But we don’t stop there. We are always working for farmers. They 
are at the centre of the President’s plans… For us, value-addition is 
important to build a long-term strategy.”810  
                                                          
807 In 2013, the government had only distributed 53 per cent of the seedlings that was targeted at that 
stage of the plan. 
808 Interview, Office of the Prime Minister, February 2012. 
809 Interview, NAEB, November 2011. 
810 Interview, Clare Akamanzi, COO – RDB, November 2011. 
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Source: MINECOFIN 
 
Source: MINECOFIN 
These narratives do not portray an accurate picture of policies in the tea 
sector. Cooperatives work as an instrument to organise tea producers and to facilitate 
accumulation strategies. It is unlikely that profits obtained from tea exports are 
reaching vulnerable workers in the sector (of course, such conditions are not unique 
to Rwanda). The price of green leaves, though improving, was among the lowest in 
the region for most of the 2000s.811 Given high transport costs and low yields, 
factories depended on maintaining low wages to retain profits.812 Despite the unequal 
outcomes in the sector, tea expansion provided opportunities of wage employment at 
factories, plantations and farms.  
                                                          
811 Internal OTF document. Studies by OTF claimed that farmers would have to increase their average 
farm size from 0.25 ha to 0.5 ha to achieve targeted gains. However, studies recognised such 
expansion was “unlikely.” 
812 Internal OTF document. 
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Figure 8.11: Volume and Unit Value of Tea Exports
Volume of Tea Exports (kg) Value of Tea Exports (USD/kg)
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Figure 8.12: Total Value of Tea Exports (Million USD): 1996-
2014
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Privatisation has coincided with increases in production and quality at the tea 
sector (Figures 8.13-8.15). Privatisation has been strategic, along similar lines as 
Hibou’s (2006) ‘Privatisation of the State.’ The government preferred to sell these 
factories to loyal elites while recognising the importance of exposing the sector to 
international competition. However, this strategy has not worked as planned. Growth 
in the sector has been inhibited by the government’s difficulties in building effective 
reciprocal control mechanisms with factory owners.  
 
Source: OCIR-Thé 
 
Source: OCIR-Thé 
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Figure 8.13: Production by OCIR-Thé Factories (in kgs)
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Figure 8.14: Production of Privately owned Tea Companies (in 
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Source: OCIR-Thé 
As of 2012, the government no longer had majority ownership in any tea 
factory. All factories were attracting better prices (USD/kg) for their tea exports in 
2012 compared to 1998.813 Only three factories were attracting better prices on their 
tea exports than the average annual price at the Mombasa auction (Figure 8.16).814 
All factories (with the exception of SORWATHE) were exporting more volumes of 
tea in 2012 than in 1998 (Figure 8.17).815 All factories earned more revenue from tea 
exports in 2012 than they did in 1998 (Figure 8.18).816  
The government has managed to achieve some progress in value-addition. 
However, progress did not occur at the pace that was initially targeted. The 
government relied on national champions through an investment group (RMT) to 
pursue such strategies. Inadequate market research and branding led to the project’s 
failure. Domestic companies also struggled to match the success of foreign-owned 
companies in obtaining contracts through direct sales. The government failed to 
invest in marketing Rwanda tea, struggled to deal with infrastructural constraints and 
was only partially successful in facilitating those investors who expressed 
willingness to embrace value-addition strategies.  
                                                          
813 Nyabihu (183 per cent), Rubaya (166 per cent) and SORWATHE (154 per cent) had the sharpest 
increases in value (USD/kg). 
814 The three factories (Mulindi, Shagasha and Gisakura) that attracted comparatively lower prices 
were the last three factories to be privatised. 
815 SORWATHE produced less made tea in 2012 compared to 1998. It also packaged tea 
domestically, which affected the volume of tea exported. 
816 Nyabihu (87 per cent), Pfunda (85 per cent) and Rubaya (83 per cent) had the most significant 
increases in revenues between 1998 and 2012. 
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Source: OCIR-Thé 
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Source: OCIR-Thé 
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Source: OCIR-Thé 
8.6 Post-war Rehabilitation 
 
 During the war, most tea factories, plantations and tea bushes were damaged. 
Gisakura was among the few factories that were left untouched by the genocide. In 
1995, Pfunda, Rubaya, Gisovu and SORWATHE also produced and exported tea.817 
The European Commission invested in the rehabilitation of state-owned tea factories 
and plantations between 1994 and 1997. These investments contributed to the 
achievement of a historic high of nearly 15000 tonnes of tea exports in 1998. 
Government-owned factories suffered from low productivity, insufficient profits and 
low investment in processing capacity (despite favourable world prices) (IMF 2000). 
Meanwhile, privately owned SORWATHE generated significant profits in 1997-98 
(ibid). Production and exports rose primarily because of donor support. In particular, 
STABEX provided much-needed funds to assist government initiatives.  
                                                          
817 SORWATHE production was disrupted in 1995 after the company’s Assistant General Manager 
fled Rwanda because of threats over his impending arrest. He fled to Uganda in a SORWATHE-
owned car (Kantor et al. 2011). 
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In the late 1990s, the RPF government perceived tea as priority sector. 
Gradually, coffee prices recovered in 2004 and coffee regained its importance. 
Initially, tea was a source of diversification away from coffee. Between 2000 and 
2004, tea exports brought in more revenues than coffee exports.818 There were a 
number of reasons for this. Tea plantations were regenerated in the three years after 
the genocide.819  However, most coffee trees were old and there was limited financial 
assistance for the coffee sector in the 1990s. The government found it easier to 
facilitate the supply of labour for tea production because tea plantations were located 
close to tea factories. Coffee trees were dispersed across the country and production 
in the Northwest was affected because of conflict. Also, global tea prices were 
relatively steady in the late 1990s and early 2000s whereas coffee prices had fallen 
and were more volatile.  
 
Source: MINECOFIN 
By 2012, total acreage for tea cultivation had expanded to 22,025 hectares 
(up from 12,962 hectares in 2001). OCIR-Thé also invested in replanting damaged 
and old tea plantations. For example, 1200 hectares of tea were replanted in 2007 and 
15000 hectares were replanted in 2008 (MINAGRI 2008b). The expansion 
represented a 69.9 per cent increase from the area under tea cultivation in 2001.820 
During this time, the tea production units (including BI, cooperative land and TV) for 
most factories expanded. Only two tea production units (Mulindi and Shagasha) 
                                                          
818 Between 2000 and 2004, tea was also Rwanda’s main export (except for 2001 when minerals were 
the top export). Tea also outperformed coffee in 2009. 
819 Tea bushes require three years to mature. 
820 Author’s calculation. 
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reduced in size. These two units were the first two factories built, the last two 
factories to be privatised and the worst performing factories by unit value of tea 
exports. Three tea production units expanded by more than 30 per cent.821  
Nshili-Kivu was the first new factory constructed by the RPF government (in 
2008). Plantations for Nshili-Kivu were established in the early 1990s, with African 
Development Bank (AfDB) funding. Green leaf produced at the Nshili-Kivu 
plantations fed the Mata factory, accounting for nearly 30 per cent of Mata’s green 
tea supply (until the Nshili-Kivu factory was built). In the late 1990s, donors agreed 
to fund the project, with the stipulation that the factory would be under private 
control.822 Then-loyal local investor Rujugiro stepped in to invest in the construction 
of the factory.823 IFAD-sponsored PDCRE supported this investment.824 There were 
signs of reciprocity in this state-business partnership since the Nshili-Kivu 
plantations were situated on land that was best suited for tea production. However, 
Rujugiro later fell out with the government.  
The government initiated plans to build five more factories. Karongi was 
constructed in 2013. Mushubi and Gatare were nearly finished. To avoid pressure 
from donors to privatise these factories through a monitored process, the government 
encouraged local investors to build these factories on patriotic grounds.825 Two other 
factories, Muganza-Kivu and Rutsiro, were in the early planning stages. Rather than 
supporting the construction of factories, most donor projects such as PDCRE and 
PRICE focused most of its funds and efforts on strengthening cooperatives. Rwandan 
tea now attracts among the best prices at the Mombasa tea auction. Rwandan tea (on 
average) attracted the second-best prices in Africa at the Mombasa tea auction in 
2010, 2011 and 2012.826 Kitabi won the best tea in the black CTC tea category at the 
East Africa Tea Traders Association’s Second Africa Tea Convention in 2013. 
Gisovu won the third prize. SORWATHE won the best specialty tea in the green tea 
producer category (Gasore and Ngoboka 2013). 
                                                          
821 These factories were Nshili-Kivu (the youngest factory), Rubaya and Nyabihu (all under domestic 
private ownership). 
822 Internal OCIR-Thé documents 
823 Rujugiro’s assets including the Nshili-Kivu factory were seized in 2013. 
824 IFAD projects financed 40 per cent of the construction of new factories. Private sector owners 
contributed 60 per cent. (Interview, Alfred Mutebwa, April 2012). 
825 The Multi-Sector Investment Group built the Mushubi factory. 
826 NAEB data. 
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8.7 Organising Labour through Cooperatives: Retaining Loyalty 
and Minimising Resistance 
 
In the 1990s, the ‘new’ agrarian elite was “composed mainly of town 
dwellers owning large swathes of land in the rural areas” (Musahara and Huggins 
2005, 282). The government’s land policies allowed individuals to acquire large 
pieces of land at relatively low prices.827 After 1994, RPF elites were guilty of taking 
over large tracts of land in the Eastern Province (Musahara and Huggins 2005).828 
Kagame forced many of these senior RPF members to give up the land that they had 
acquired using “under-hand” methods (Kimenyi 2008).829 Agrarian elites bought 
land assets (within limits) but they had to use the land they received.  
“There is nothing worse for us than when someone does not use 
their land or make use of the opportunities that are given.”830 
Agrarian elites comprised primarily those who owned tea factories (and by 
extension, plantations within the tea factory unit). However, Rwandan policy has 
been modelled on the KTDA experiment, which empowered ‘smallholder’ farmers. 
Empowering such farmers came at the cost of moving some people off their land 
because such policies edged out those who could no longer maintain subsistence 
levels on smaller lots.831 Tea expansion also brought new opportunities for wage 
employment. Between 2001 and 2006, the proportion of Rwandans whose main job 
was agricultural wage labour increased from four per cent to eight per cent.832 
Wageworkers earned income by working on plantations and working on the land of 
smallholder farmers.833 Child labour was also common on some tea plantations.834 
The government surpressed stories about children being employed on tea plantations. 
                                                          
827 Detailed in Chapter 4. 
828 Des Forges (2006, 365) accused elites of coercing people to sell their land or paying people 
“pitiably small amounts of compensation.” See Pottier (2006).  
829 Rusagara, one of these elites, was allowed to leave Rwanda soon after. Others including Sam Kaka 
and Theoneste Shyaka fell from grace. 
830 Interview, Nziza, February 2012. 
831 This is recognised in interviews. Consultants acknowledged that such displacement occurred 
though they argued that the government compensated these individuals (Interview, Consultants, May 
2013). The government was aware of the ‘landless’ and believed that economic development would 
bring wage employment (Des Forges 2006). 
832 Internal PRICE document. 
833 Internal PRICE document. 
834 Children were also employed in casual wage work at CWS (Internal PRICE document). In three 
areas where surveys were conducted, children worked in tea growing activities: Nyaruguru (16 per 
cent); Nyamasheke (18 per cent) and Gicumbi (41 per cent) (Winrock International 2012). 
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Such stories undermined narratives that enabled the sale of single-origin Rwandan 
tea in niche markets.835 OTF surveys indicated that wages were comparatively low in 
the region. These low wages offset high electricity and transportation costs and 
enabled the tea industry to remain competitive.836  
Government policies were based on assumptions of a ‘typical’ tea farmer who 
held 0.25 hectares of land. The government estimated that such farmers received on 
average approximately $220 per year from a yield of 7,000 kg of green leaf per 
hectare at a price between 66 and 70 francs in 2007 (MINAGRI 2008b). A number of 
policies aimed at increasing the revenues of the ‘typical’ smallholder farmer. 
Between 2008 and 2020, yield was to be increased to 10,000 kg of green leaf per 
hectare through improving agricultural practices and fertilizer use. Rwanda did not 
meet its 2012 targets for yield. Yield had improved compared to the yield achieved 
by previous governments. However, yield is still behind Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda (Figure 8.20). The government planned to increase green leaf prices by 33 
per cent. Farmers have also been forced to grow tea in certain areas although only a 
minority (20 per cent) of 267 farmers polled by OTF said they would uproot their 
trees if allowed.  
 
Source: FAOSTAT 
                                                          
835 NAEB claimed efforts were made to eradicate the problem and that surveys exaggerated the 
numbers of children working in tea-growing areas because they were administered when children 
were on holiday (Tabaro 2012b). 
836 Transportation costs inhibited competition with Kenyan tea. “When you compete with Kenyan tea, 
you have already spent five times the transportation costs.” (Interview, Ephraim Turahirwa, RMT, 
April 2012). 
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Developing strategies that assumed groups of uniform Rwandan 
‘smallholders’ was problematic because it ignored differences among tea producers. 
The government expressed an interest in increasing average farm size in the tea 
sector to 0.5 ha.837  In Karongi (one of the target areas), land distribution varied 
considerably among farmers. National surveys showed that households that owned 
more than two hectares of land represented 7.2 per cent of total households polled; 
14.7 per cent of households owned between 1 and 1.9 hectares; 23.7 per cent of 
households which owned between 0.5 and 0.99 hectares; 30.7 per cent of households 
owned between 0.2 and 0.49 hectares of land and 23.1 per cent of households owned 
less than 0.19 hectares.838 Cooperative rules required that members own a minimum 
amount of land for tea to meet certification purposes.839 Given that many of these 
households could not join cooperatives as members, prioritising cooperatives 
actually worked as a way to promote rural class differentiation. COOPTHEs were 
larger units and already employed wage labour on their farms. Restricting the 
availability of services to farmers organised in TVs accentuated inequality between 
farmers with small plots of land. Cooperatives (especially COOPTHEs but also TVs) 
were often headed by those with the most land, those with the most expertise or those 
with powerful contacts.840  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
837 Government estimates indicate that farmers should have a minimum of 0.5 ha of land under tea 
production to be profitable (the same as the KTDA’s one-acre ideal). 
838 Confidential PRICE document.  
839 Interview, FERWACOTHE, May 2012. 
840 Comments made during interviews management at four private sector companies. Such claims 
were countered by Alfred Mutebwa of PRICE (Interview, April 2012). “People get elected on the 
basis of their goodwill in the community. Sometimes, you get a crook. But these people get elected 
because people think they are upright members.” 
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Table 8.1: Structure and Distribution of Tea Production Units 
Tea Factory Installed 
Capacity - 
2001 
(tonnes/yr) 
BI 
(ha; 
2001) 
Cooperatives 
(ha; 2001) 
TV 
(ha; 
2001) 
Total 
Acreage 
(2001) 
Total 
Acreage 
(2012) 
Mulindi 3200 0 867 1431 2298 1890 
SORWATHE 3200 261 0 880 1141 1221 
Rubaya 900 647 0 342 989 1316 
Nyabihu 900 627 0 31 658 917 
Pfunda 900 124 0 786 910 990 
Gisovu 1200 340 0 732 1072 1269 
Shagasha 1400 0 515 1063 1578 1561 
Gisakura 1400 357 608 330 1295 1418 
Kitabi 1200 350 0 650 1100 1398 
Mata 1200 595 0 361 956 1097 
Nshili-Kivu N/A 965 0 0 965 1473 
Total 15500 4268 1990 660 12962 14549 
Source: NAEB  
World Bank evaluations indicated that “for coffee and tea growers with 
limited land of less than 0.5 ha, there was a risk that expansion of coffee and tea 
production would be at the cost of food security.”841 The report also indicated that 
most tea growers had to rely on work at the farms of others to meet subsistence.842 
Despite the expansion of area under tea cultivation, there was still a shortage in green 
leaf production (Ishimwe 2013). To incentivise farmers to grow tea and to use better 
cultivation methods (to increase quality), the government established the National 
Tea Committee (NTC) to determine a new green leaf pricing system. It comprised 
private sector representatives, OCIR-Thé, FERWACOTHE and MINAGRI. Until 
recently, the farmers received a fixed, annually negotiated price. In 2004, farmers 
received 65.8 RwF/kg. Since then, prices increased to 96.6 RwF/kg in 2008 and 105 
RwF/kg in 2010. Of this amount, producers still had to pay 22 RwF for fertilizer, 
some producers also had to pay for labour and for transportation of green leaves to 
                                                          
841 Internal IFAD report. 
842 Ibid. 
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the factory, taxes and cooperative fee. In 2010, net income varied between 30 
RwF/kg and 36 RwF/kg. The net income of tea growers was 5.8-11.4 per cent of the 
made tea sale price. The tea growers’ share of made tea price was lower in Rwanda 
than in Tanzania (27 per cent) or Kenya (75 per cent).843 In 2012, Nyabihu farmers 
publicly voiced their concerns over lower-than-promised returns from tea harvests.844 
They claimed that RMT was not paying them in line with national prices. One RMT 
official claimed that farmers used to earn less than 80 Rwf per tea earlier but that in 
2013, after changes in the pricing system, farmers received over 150 Rwf.845 By 
2014, over 50,000 farmers earned between 123 Rwf/kg and 155 Rwf/kg on the tea 
they sold (Gasore 2014b). IFC (2014) claimed prices received by farmers (after 
changes in the pricing system) were at least 30 per cent of the international market 
price for tea and were linked to average prices at the Mombasa auction.846 Farmers 
also received bonuses of up to 10 per cent for quality, and reduced prices for inferior 
quality.847 Through such incentives, the government has tackled difficulties where 
“plucker wages were kept below the market rate leading to a shortage of pluckers, 
longer plucking rounds and lower leaf quality.” Factories were often under-utilised, 
resulting in losses in export revenues.848 
“The main challenge for tea is the price of tea leaves is too low. 
The price for tea leaves is fixed by the government. Our job (at 
FERWACOTHE and the cooperatives) is to bargain with NAEB to 
get a better price. But farmers complain a lot about the price. 
Sometimes, they also have to pay for fertilizer and for transporting 
tea to the factory.”849 
“It is our aim that eventually, farmers will receive at least 50 per 
cent of the international market price for tea.”850 
Tea cooperatives, like coffee cooperatives, were mismanaged. PRICE was 
charged with assisting FERWACOTHE management and in helping members 
increase productivity. Members were required to pay money to join cooperatives and 
to help fund cooperatives’ operation costs. Most members did not have a plot size of 
                                                          
843 PRICE estimates. 
844 Local newspaper. 
845 Interview, RMT, May 2013. 
846 This is part of an IFC-sponsored programme around green leaf pricing reform. The programme 
claims to have improved the incomes of more than 60,000 tea farmers by between 20 and 50 per cent 
(IFC 2014). 
847 Interview, NAEB, January 2015. 
848 World Bank document. 
849 Interview, Venant Ngendahayo, FERWACOTHE, May 2012. 
850 Interview, Bill Kayonga, NAEB, January 2015. 
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0.25 hectares (that was perceived to represent the average farmer). Instead, sizes of 
farms among members were diverse.851 PRICE studies indicated cooperatives had 
lower yields than the industrial blocs of factories. These cooperatives also used less 
fertilizer. Such findings indicate that cooperative management and the empowerment 
of ‘small farmers’ who led accumulation processes still faced difficulties.852 
The RPF strategy aims to mimic the images portrayed by the KTDA where 
small farmers are empowered through the strengthening of farmer cooperatives. In 
doing so, the government masks the processes of rural differentiation that are central 
to the revitalisation of the sector. Such processes forced workers to face short-term 
costs of displacement and landless labourers to work for low wages. Though there 
has been progress, there is still resistance to organising labour to tea cultivation.  
8.8 Cultivating Loyal Capital – Tea Sector Privatisation  
 
RPF narratives credit privatisation with progress. “After the war, factories 
were destroyed and the World Bank pushed the government to privatise. After the 
first investments, the whole tea sector has improved.”853 The positives of 
international ownership are recognised – the possibilities of developing direct sales 
contacts with international buyers, connections with international experts and the 
introduction of new technology to modernise agricultural practices and processing 
equipment. While the government acknowledges the importance of bringing in 
foreign expertise, it is not convinced that foreign investors would embrace value-
addition strategies (e.g. packaging single-origin tea, which would be competitive 
with their own teas abroad). Privatisation processes in tea factories show that the 
RPF government’s policies have been shaped by the competing demands of 
achieving self-reliance and embracing market-led reforms. 
Unlike in the coffee and mining sectors, the government has worked with a 
national champion (RMT, which owns five of the 12 factories) and also persuaded 
other local businessmen to buy factories. However, these local companies have 
struggled to build contacts to sell tea through direct sales. These companies have also 
                                                          
851 Interviews, FERWACOTHE, May 2012. Farmers had a wide range of plot sizes. However, most 
farmers had a plot size of around 0.2 ha (Interviews, April 2012). 
852 Data in this paragraph is taken from internal OTF and PRICE documents. 
853 Interview, Corneille Ntakirutimana, NAEB, March 2012. 
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failed with value-addition for reasons including the lack of expertise and insufficient 
knowledge of the global tea market. Despite the government’s lack of trust, some 
foreign companies (e.g. SORWATHE) have actually worked in line with national 
priorities, packaging tea for domestic consumption.854 The government focuses on 
finding the ‘right’ investor (including a foreign-owned company that enters a joint-
venture partnership with a local company or a charitable trust that agrees to sell 
assets to cooperatives at a later date).855 However, the accumulation strategies of 
these investors have not been facilitated effectively.  
 For donors, privatisation was perceived as the solution to the problems facing 
the tea sector (particularly the lack of capital investments in processing facilities at 
factories).856 Some government officials recognise that a combination of two 
approaches has been used.857  
“The privatisation policy is not just to sell these assets. It is not like 
Structural Adjustment Programmes. Here, when we privatise, we 
give certain conditions. The government also chooses lower bids 
when the prospects for growing the sector are well articulated. Part 
of it is working with cooperatives and vertical diversification. We 
also want companies that have expertise and a background in the 
sector. This is a government that says the private sector increases 
value. But that we also have to revisit offers where the private 
sector does not comply with the terms of reference.”858 
Beginning in 2003, the government publicly stated its intention to privatise 
all factories. Under initial plans, privatisation included the sale of a majority share of 
the BI to private investors. The government retained a minority share of the BI and 
distributed 10 per cent of shares to cooperatives. It was agreed that later, the 
government would sell its share to private investors or cooperatives.  
“The process was not transparent. There was a bidding process and 
then a technical process. The government had a lot of demands.”859  
Pfunda was the first factory to be sold and it went to a foreign investor. The 
government recognised the importance to learn from others before building national 
champions. Two factories – Mulindi and Pfunda – were put up for sale. Attempts to 
                                                          
854 SORWATHE’s owners are not large players in the international market unlike Yorkshire Tea and 
Mcleod Russell (who also own tea factories in Rwanda). 
855 Both such sales have occurred. 
856 Donors often view privatisation as a developmental panacea (Bayliss and Cramer 2001). 
857 Interview, Kanyankole - NAEB; Interview, Rurangwa - MINAGRI 
858 Interview, Gatare, May 2012. 
859 Interview, Representative – Pfunda Tea, November 2011. 
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privatise Mulindi failed because investors were unwilling to cede to government 
demands of committing to investments required to upgrade the factory. UK-based 
LAB International bought shares in the Pfunda Tea Estate for $1.06 million.860 Under 
the agreement, Pfunda held 55 per cent of the tea estate while the government 
retained 45 per cent (of which, 10 per cent was given to cooperatives). Later, Pfunda 
paid $668,906 to acquire a further 35 per cent of the state from the government. 
Cooperatives owned 10 per cent of the estate.  
“In 2004, the building was totally run-down. The administrative set 
up was the same. The fields had been butchered. Just by training 
farmers with better cultivation and agricultural practices, we’ve 
doubled production. We now have the capacity and are in a 
position to produce 3.5 million kg/day of Black Tea. The best 
we’ve done (till 2011) was 2.27 million kgs but in 2004, it was 
1.09 million kgs.”861 
After the sale of Pfunda, further privatisation reforms were debated. Donors 
and OTF emphasised that private companies were performing better than 
government-owned factories, highlighting that SORWATHE and Pfunda had 
performed better than government-owned factories. The yield in privately owned tea 
estates was consistently better than the yield in government-owned tea estates. 
SORWATHE’s yield had always outperformed the yield in government-owned tea 
estates since the 1980s. SORWATHE produced almost the same amount of made tea 
as Mulindi although the Mulindi tea unit was more than three times the size of 
SORWATHE. Private sector owners blamed “government inefficiency” for the poor 
performance of government units.862  
The SPU argued that privatisation would be a major threat to value-addition 
and was doubtful that farmers would benefit by way of increases in their revenue 
from privatised tea factories. The SPU publicly blamed privatised factories for 
engaging in cost-cutting exercises. At the Pfunda factory, SPU officials argued that 
“farmers were being credited for less green leaf than arrives in the factory and hence 
were making lower revenues than they were entitled to and that the cooperative was 
                                                          
860 Imporient is the parent company of LAB International.  
861 Interview, Amarpal Shaw, Pfunda Tea Company, November 2011. 
862 Claims made by nearly all representatives of privately owned tea factories. 
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being paid for. This discrepancy translated to differences of more than 9,000 RwF 
per annum.”863   
Rubaya and Nyabihu were the next tea estates to be privatised. In 2006, 90 
per cent of the shares of these factories were sold to RMT.864 The remaining 10 per 
cent was distributed to local tea cooperatives. In 2009, RMT acquired 60 per cent in 
the Kitabi Tea Estate. The government retained 30 per cent control of the tea estate 
and 10 per cent was owned by cooperatives. In 2011, RMT entered a 50/50 Joint 
Venture partnership with an Indian company, Jay Shree Tea and Industries (part of 
the Birla Group).865 Jay Shree and RMT created Tea Group Investment Company 
Ltd. and acquired a 60 per cent share in the Mata and Gisakura Tea estates. As with 
Kitabi, the government retained 30 per cent of the tea estate while 10 per cent was 
owned by cooperatives. By 2011, RMT had invested in five tea estates– making the 
company the largest private operator in the tea sector. In 2011, RMT exports 
comprised over 40 per cent of total tea exports and over 42 per cent of the total value 
of tea exports. The company’s owner, Egide Gatera, visited UK tea estates in the 
early 2000s to develop international contacts and learn from foreign firms.866 
Rujugiro’s Nshili factory had the same shareholding structure (60-30-10) as Mata, 
Gisakura and Kitabi.867 Jean Baptiste Mutangana invested in a new factory in 
Karongi, which began exporting tea in 2013.868 
 The sale of Rwandan tea factories attracted interest from foreign companies. 
One additional foreign investor was successful in acquiring a tea factory (but not 
through the government bidding process). In line with the standard shareholding 
                                                          
863 Internal OTF documents 
864 Gatera is the majority shareholder of RMT and Petrocom Ltd. Petrocom’s turnover in 2010/11 was 
$13 million (Gathani and Stoelinga 2013). Petrocom had three subsidiaries: a) Petrocom – an 
international transport company that transports fuel and other goods to and from ports in Tanzania and 
Kenya. Petrocom also invests in energy projects; b) Ufametal – a company that specialises in the 
production of metal construction materials. Ufametal’s turnover was approximately $8 million in 
2010/11 (Gathani and Stoelinga 2013); c) Kagugu Dairy Farm – a cattle farm comprising nearly 200 
cows and producing over 1600 L of milk per day. 
865 The former DG of RMT claimed Jay Shree’s Joint Venture happened after he received an email. 
The President of the company then personally visited Rwanda and signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with RMT (Interview, Nihal Bopearatchy, February 2012). 
866 Interview, Sanjay Kumar, then-Yorkshire tea, (now) Wood Family Trust, May 2013. 
867 Rujugiro had also invested in the Mushubi tea factory. However, both these assets have now been 
taken away since he fell out with the RPF in 2013. 
868 Mutangana was a founding member of RIG. He also owned hotels and apartment complexes and 
had interests in Burundi’s banking sector. MINALOC documents claimed that Mutangana was “slow” 
in constructing the factory. Mutangana also invested in the new Muganza-Kivu factory. The 
functioning of the factory was inhibited by the failure to construct roads and provide electricity. 
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agreement (60-30-10), the government sold the prized Gisovu tea estate for $2.4 
million to Olyana Holdings (a US-based Rwandan-owned company) in 2008. George 
Rubagumya led Olyana Holdings.869 A few months later, Rubagumya sold 75 per 
cent of Olyana Holdings to Borelli Tea Holdings (a subsidiary of McLeod Russell 
India) for $2.74 million.870 Rubagumya retained 25 per cent of Olyana Holdings for 
himself (although these shares were later acquired by Borelli). The government tried 
to cancel the sale of Gisovu. The deal was eventually confirmed in 2011.871 
“The tea industry is primitive in Rwanda in terms of technology. 
Rwanda, with its climate, has the potential to produce the best 
African tea easily. We always wanted to get involved here and 
jumped at the opportunity. We are doing our part – we invested a 
lot and we produce one of the best quality teas in East Africa. It 
was difficult to win the government’s trust but we are not 
interested in the kinds of value-addition the government wants.”872 
 Borelli was perceived as a ‘wrong’ investor by the government. However, 
charitable investor – Rwanda Tea Investments (RTI)873 – was an example of a ‘right’ 
investor. Many investors were surprised when RTI was granted control of the 
Mulindi and Shagasha factories in 2012.874 The Shagasha Tea Estate was granted to 
RTI (60 per cent), cooperatives (30 per cent) and the government (10 per cent). The 
Mulindi Tea Estate was granted to RTI (55 per cent) and farmers (45 per cent). RTI 
hired KTDA officials to act as managers at both factories. RTI aimed to gradually 
transfer its shares of these estates to the cooperatives within seven years. These tea 
units were the oldest and their cooperatives were the strongest in the sector.875 RTI 
worked along similar lines as the KTDA model, which gave smallholders full 
ownership of the tea factory unit. Under the terms of ownership, cooperatives would 
gradually be granted full control of the tea units.876 RTI’s involvement thus 
legitimised processes of accumulation and sped up processes of rural differentiation 
                                                          
869 Rubagumya previously served as the head of the Uganda Development Authority. 
870 Borelli representatives suggest Rubagumya sold the company “behind the government’s back.” 
871 The deal is likely to have gone through international arbitration. Borelli’s representatives at the 
Gisovu Tea Factory did not confirm this. 
872 Interview, Gisovu Tea Factory Representative, March 2012. 
873 The Wood Family Trust (WFT) and The Gatsby Foundation established RTI as a charitable 
company, investing $12 million to upgrade the Mulindi and Shagasha factories and plantations. 
874 Eight bids went in for Shagasha and seven bids went in for Mulindi. Many expected RMT or other 
local investors to win the bidding on these factories.  
875 These cooperatives were formed in the 1960s. Observations made by two private sector employees 
and one government official. 
876 In 2013, the cooperatives ‘elected’ the then-DG of NAEB, Kanyankole, to be their representative 
on the Board of Directors of these factories (Interview, WFT, May 2013). 
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in these tea units. RTI also committed to value-addition (and the companies were set 
to profit from WFT’s international contacts). Sanjay Kumar, WFT’s representative in 
Rwanda, previously worked at Taylors of Harrogate, and had several years of 
experience in the tea sector. 
“We have to get the factories up and running, train the farmers, get 
them a culture of planting, pruning properly and using fertilizer at 
the right times. Our plan is to move into direct sales. Later, we’ll 
move into packaging. We’ll take the pick of the quality and sell 
single-origin tea. It is very difficult to break into the market. But 
we can sell a story. There’s a lot of demand for niche tea (it’s a 
small two per cent of the market but its growing).”877 
 The government was protective about selling assets in the sector. 
Businessmen such as Gatera, Mutangana and Rujugiro were trusted with the 
responsibility of investing in one of Rwanda’s brightest sectors. When the 
government chose to entrust individuals with assets, it expected these individuals to 
remain loyal to the national cause. The government’s trust was betrayed (once by 
Rubagumya and once by Rujugiro). All private sector respondents were satisfied 
with the government’s response to some complaints.878 However, they complained 
that the government did not give enough incentives to companies to make value-
addition worthwhile.879 Strengthening the partnership between the government and 
factory owners will be central to attain future targets. 
8.9 Value-Addition in the Tea Sector  
 
“On average, Kenya produces over 350,000 metric tonnes of tea. 
Kenya earns between 250 million and 350 million USD out of tea. 
They are doing value-addition of say 1-2 per cent. Their strategy 
has been for the short-term and export earnings are still low. Sri 
Lanka produces roughly the same amount. They are doing value-
addition for about 35 per cent of what they produce. They are 
getting 960 million USD, maybe a billion. Value-addition is 
difficult but it is the only way to go.”880 
 While the government chose to mimic the way labour was organised in the 
Kenyan tea sector, officials were reluctant to stay dependent on international tea 
                                                          
877 Interview, Kumar, May 2013.  
878 At one stage, the government placed representatives at each tea factory. Alles of SORWATHE 
mentioned this to President Kagame at a public meeting. This policy was retracted immediately. 
879 Interviews, private sector representatives. 
880 Interview, Kanyankole, NAEB, May 2013. 
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prices like their Kenyan counterparts. Value-addition strategies contributed to the 
government’s goals around self-reliance. These strategies were a reaction to the 
oversupply, which was said to be occurring in the global tea industry and was 
predicted to lower international prices.881 Value-addition takes three forms: 
improving tea quality, beginning migration into premium teas such as orthodox, 
green and white teas and developing blended and packaged tea.  
High-quality, packaged tea and teas other than black CTC tea were 
unaffected by this ‘oversupply’. The tea sector, at the blending and packaging level, 
is characterised by oligopolistic control. Unilever and Tata Tea are among the 
biggest companies at this node of the value-chain. Both companies are integrated 
down the value-chain. These companies protected their position through investing in 
branding and heavy advertising. Tata Tea is an example of successful vertical 
diversification. Tata Tea took over Tetley, rather than breaking into core markets 
under the Tata brand name. Talbot (2002) suggests that successful integration within 
the tea sector has been rare and is likely to take place after the establishment of 
successful local production, followed by taking over a brand name in an established 
network. It was impossible for the Rwandan government to follow the lead of Tata 
since its domestic market was nowhere near that of India. 
 The ultimate ambition of the RPF government was to mimic the example of 
Ceylon tea. Ceylon Tea defied the odds to compete with successful companies such 
as Yorkshire Tea, Tata and Unilever through branding a single-origin tea from Sri 
Lanka. In the 1980s, the Export Development Board of Sri Lanka initiated the 
Custom Duty Rebate Scheme and Export Expansion Grant Scheme to promote value-
added tea exports. Under these schemes, part of the tea export tax was repaid and 
grants were provided for value-addition expansion programmes. In 1991, the Sri 
Lanka Tea Board (SLTB) initiated a support scheme for teabags and retail tea packet 
exporters. A tax-free incentive payment was provided based on the incremental gain 
from exporting tea bags and retail packets. The STLB’s Tea Promotion Bureau took 
sole responsibility for promoting Sri Lankan tea in international markets. Matching 
grants up to 50 per cent of expenses were provided for the promotion of brands that 
were partially or fully owned by Sri Lankan exporters. A lion logo was imprinted on 
all single-origin Sri Lankan tea. This logo denoted the country of origin and signalled 
                                                          
881 Global tea prices actually increased so initial forecasts were wrong. 
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the quality of Ceylon Tea. These schemes assisted in initiating value-addition 
strategies and the government later embraced broad-based liberalisation.882 
By 2010, value-added tea (in various forms) comprised nearly 35 per cent of 
the total quantity of tea exported from Sri Lanka (Herath and De Silva 2011). OTF 
estimated that 31 per cent of total tea production was sold in blended and packaged 
form while three per cent was sold in high value-added form such as tea bags or 
ready-to-drink bottles. More than half of total revenues were received from value-
added segments. 
Merrill Fernando established Dilmah Tea in 1995. Dilmah was among the 
companies that spearheaded packaging operations of single-origin tea. By 2003, it 
was the seventh largest tea packer in the world and had an annual turnover of value-
added tea worth $109 million. Partnering with successful firms such as these was 
crucial to achieving success on the value-added market. As Fernando suggests: 
“There are large differences between the bulk and the retail price… 
It was my wild dream – being the proprietor of my own brand of 
tea, which I wanted to make sure will be the best Ceylon tea in 
history.”883 
The government hoped Rwandan tea could achieve similar successes. Key to 
such goals was emphasising the uniqueness of the Rwanda story, as with ‘coffee 
karma’ (Zizek 2014).884 To do this, the government fed assumptions of ‘mutual 
benefits’ associated with cooperatives and concealed that accumulation strategies 
depended on the exploitation of workers. 
Direct Sales 
 
 After 1994, Rwandan tea gradually regained an image of producing high-
quality tea. OTF surveys indicated increased interest from European (61 per cent) 
and Asian buyers (60 per cent) in buying Rwandan tea directly from factories in 
2007 compared to 2003.885 However, the government failed to achieve targets of 
selling 50 per cent of domestically produced tea through direct sales (although 
                                                          
882 Some information in this paragraph is taken from Ganewatta et al. (2005) 
883 OTF Presentation, 2004 
884 One Swedish specialty importer said: “make it fair trade and organic because that’s a big issue for 
the European market right now. To have good stories behind the tea makes it easier for us to sell the 
tea” (OTF Presentation). 
885 Internal OTF documents 
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establishing contracts through direct sales must still be perceived as an achievement). 
In 2011, only 23 per cent of all tea exported was through direct sales. Four factories 
(Mulindi, Shagasha, Pfunda and SORWATHE) successfully sold tea via direct sales. 
In 2012, the share of tea sold through direct sales increased to 24 per cent. Gisovu 
was the only other factory that sold tea via direct sales.886  
 SORWATHE’s Joseph Wertheim offered to find buyers for all of Rwanda’s 
tea.887 However, the government was reluctant to cede control of the sector to a 
foreign investor. Local companies struggled to build contacts while foreign-owned 
companies only opted to sell a portion of their tea through direct sales.888 The 
government has not leveraged the high-quality image of Rwandan tea and the 
international contacts that have been developed.  
Diversifying to Specialty Teas 
 
Government officials and OTF emphasise the importance of shifting a large 
share of the country’s production to orthodox tea.  
“Producing organic teas – using organic fertilizers – would 
improve yields, reduce the cost of production and lift Rwanda into 
the specialty tea market where prices will continue to rise. The 
current prices for other diversified products prove this. Organic 
branded green teas receive US$63 per kilogram. White tea fetches 
as much as US$240 per kilogram. Orthodox tea (the result of a 
different processing technique) fetches a premium of 
approximately 75 per cent over CTC tea (almost all Rwandan teas) 
and organic orthodox approximately 600 per cent more. Organic 
tea is also good for the government and farmers.  The price of 
chemical fertilizer has risen 300 per cent since 2008. Land-locked 
Rwanda’s additional transport costs are twice those of Kenya.”889  
Diversifying into new teas involved altering the methods of production used 
by domestic factories. Producing new teas involved altering methods of cultivation. 
Despite the alterations that would accompany diversification into specialty teas, OTF 
studies projected that orthodox and green teas could provide premiums of up to 70 
                                                          
886 Of these, Pfunda exported all the tea they produced through direct sales. Mulindi (5 per cent), 
Shagasha (4 per cent), Gisovu (33 per cent) and SORWATHE (75 per cent) also sold tea through 
direct sales. 
887 Interview, Cally Alles, February 2012. 
888 Foreign investors disagreed with OTF’s findings that a market exists for single-origin specialty tea. 
For them, the investment required to brand such tea is not worth the risk (Interviews, Pfunda and 
Gisovu representatives). 
889 Alles (2010). Ashani Alles worked at OTF and later at SPU. 
347 
 
per cent above Black CTC teas. Managers of tea companies were not as enthusiastic 
about the prospects of orthodox tea. A foreign manager at RMT said: 
“As businessmen, we should be thinking about today. Switching to 
orthodox would have short-term costs. This would need more 
machinery and more space. Rwanda Mountain Tea produces 
mostly CTC but now we have had to make provisions for orthodox 
tea. This comes with a lot of other things – we need to double the 
crop, increase the field (but we are not sure if there is actually land 
for this or if there is a market).”890 
Another manager said: 
“The pet words here are ‘value-addition’ and ‘diversification’. 
They do put pressure to diversify into orthodox tea and green tea. 
Not one buyer for orthodox tea comes to the Mombasa auction. 
Rwanda’s total tea is a drop in the ocean. Why should we waste 
our small production on something that won’t sell?”891 
SORWATHE (despite being a foreign-owned company) led the way in 
diversification into specialty teas. In the early 2000s, SORWATHE began producing 
small quantities of orthodox, white and green teas. SORWATHE also built a tea 
factory exclusively for the production of orthodox and green tea. $2.2 million was 
invested in this factory. SORWATHE was the first company to get Fairtrade and 
International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) certification for its factories. 
The company also introduced organic growing practices (no use of pesticides or 
fertilizer) and was organic-certified in January 2012. SORWATHE also converted 
116 hectares of company-owned land for organic tea production. SORWATHE was 
different from other international companies. Wertheim’s interests in tea were not at 
the scale of Borelli or Imporient. Though SORWATHE was ‘foreign-owned’, it had 
a historical interest in the sector. Management of SORWATHE worked to rebuild the 
sector, alongside the government. Since then, several companies have followed 
SORWATHE’s lead, including RMT.  
The shift away from Black CTC tea was a risk for private investors. Such 
choices entailed short-term costs for companies who would have to jeopardise 
assured returns from exporting high-quality Black CTC tea. Additionally, Rwandan 
tea had not developed an ‘organic’ or ‘green’ tea brand. Managers at both domestic 
and foreign-owned firms doubted the success of this strategy. While only small 
                                                          
890 Royston Ebert, RMT, October 2011. 
891 Nihal Bopearatchy, formerly RMT, current Manager – Karongi Tea Company, November 2011. 
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quantities of tea were devoted to the production of ‘green’ and ‘orthodox’ tea, the 
government continued to pressure domestic companies (at least) to diversify into 
specialty teas. However, the government has failed to provide reciprocity to those 
firms who embraced value-addition strategies. The RPF expects companies to show 
loyalty. However, it has not done enough to socialise risks taken by these investors.  
Blending and Packaging Tea 
“In Rwanda, we get about two dollars for our tea. In some shops in 
Dubai, teas fetch about $20. What we want to do is capture as 
much of the difference as possible.”892 
 Manufacturing blended and packaged tea was the ultimate goal for the RPF 
government. Most forms of tea are blended and packed into two different forms of 
consumer products: tea bags and retail packets. Tea bags account for more than 90 
per cent of the total consumption in developed countries and the demand for retail 
packets is high in the Middle East (Ganewatta et al. 2005). The government’s 
strategy operated on the assumption that prices ranged from $7.50-$22/kg compared 
to roughly $2/kg paid at the Mombasa auction (MINAGRI 2008b). OTF surveys 
indicated that retailers, blenders and packers collected the bulk of profits in the tea 
value-chain. Only 10 per cent of revenues stayed in Rwanda and barely two per cent 
of the total revenues of tea bags were retained by farmers.893  
 OTF identified several examples that could be emulated by the Rwandan 
government. Melvin Marsh was a Kenyan company that packaged flavoured, spicy 
and herbal teas.  It exported 24 tonnes of packaged tea to the UK in 2003 and sold its 
tea at retail shops in the UK at $5.5/kg. Tanzania Tea Packers (owned by Tanzanian 
and British private investors) (TATEPA) was established in 1994 with a starting 
capital of $200,000 and made $700,000 profits by the end of 1995. TATEPA became 
a fully integrated company, which sold none of its tea in bulk.894 It developed 70 per 
cent market share in the domestic market in Tanzania, creating 13,000 jobs in the 
process. The company profited from a “wide distribution network”, a “protected 
market in Tanzania” with no foreign companies and successfully leveraged local 
expertise to target new opportunities in East and Southern Africa, the Middle East 
                                                          
892 Interview, Gihana-Mulenga, September 2011. 
893 OTF surveys 
894 In 2010, TATEPA was one of Tanzania’s leading tea firms. In 2010, sales exceeded $19 million 
and coffee worth $12 million was exported (Sutton and Olomi 2012). 
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and Eastern Europe.895 Another example was single-origin Castleton Tea from India, 
which fetched high prices in the retail market.896 OTF reports suggested that one 
Kenyan company (Equitea) failed because the company didn’t deliver products on 
time and it did not have “a clear market assessment of target clients, target countries 
and target distribution channels.” Unexpectedly high import barriers also hit Equitea. 
 In 2009, RMT (60 per cent) and OCIR-Thé (40 per cent) entered a joint-
venture partnership to create Rwanda Tea Packers (RTP).897 RTP promised to export 
10 per cent of total national production in value-added form. RTP decided to blend 
tea in Rwanda and outsource packaging to Dubai-based DTC teas. RTP was 
responsible for marketing the tea in Dubai. However, RTP failed to consider the high 
import duties on value-added teas. There were also difficulties in obtaining shelf 
space in supermarkets. A large share of tea that was produced and transported to 
Dubai was never sold.898 By April 2011, RTP operations in Dubai closed. Instead of 
emulating Sri Lanka, RTP fell into the same trap as Kenya’s Equitea. A large risk 
was undertaken without an understanding of the market that was being targeted. 
Branding and marketing of Rwandan tea was also not successful. Since then, RTP 
has shifted its focus to selling value-added products in African markets. RMT 
Chairman Anthony Butera (who was formerly DG of OCIR-Thé) said that RTP has 
learned from its mistakes in Dubai. After the failed experience in Dubai, RTP 
intended to concentrate on unexplored markets where the oligopolistic control of 
large firms was less obstructive.899 The failure of RTP is similar to the failure (to a 
lesser extent) of Bourbon Coffee. Both failed because of a lack of planning and 
market analysis. Competing with others within the same node of the value-chain 
required investments in branding and marketing.  
“RTP didn’t have knowledge of the market. It didn’t work because 
Dubai was just not the right market. There is an acknowledgement 
that we may need a strategic partner or that we may have to find 
                                                          
895 Information in this paragraph is taken from an OT presentation made in 2004. 
896 OTF highlighted Castleton as a success. However, Castleton rarely made profits. Castleton 
produced a very exotic tea in small amounts. While the tea attracted high prices, production was more 
a matter of pride than a matter of profits (Interview, Indian investor, February 2012). 
897 Originally, RMT held 40 per cent, Olyana Holdings held 40 per cent and OCIR-Thé held 20 per 
cent (Ngarambe 2009). However, after Olyana sold its stake in the Gisovu Tea Factory to Borelli 
Holdings, the ownership structure of RTP changed. RMT was an OTF idea and grew out of contacts 
with Dubai World (Interview, Ashani Alles, former OTF Consultant, May 2013). 
898 Interview, Butera, NAEB, November 2011. 
899 Interview, Butera, RMT, May 2012. 
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new markets. It will take time. I visited Dilmah in Sri Lanka and 
learned about the company’s story. When Dilmah started, it was a 
company with one tea bagging machine. Developed countries tried 
to sabotage them. What was helpful was the benefits given by the 
Sri Lankan government e.g. tax holidays, incentives. The 
government did intensive branding campaigns (nationally and 
internationally). Our attempts need to be deliberate and considered. 
Patience is also required. When we meet challenges, it doesn’t 
mean that we’ve failed. We shouldn’t lose heart, we just have to 
keep going.”900 
“Trial and Error is important. If it doesn’t yield results, we, as the 
government, always adjust. But the experience is important.”901 
 The government was warned that these ambitious attempts at value-addition 
would fail.902 In a country, which had few resources to waste, such investments could 
have been utilised to tackle other difficulties facing the tea sector. In 2001, 58 per 
cent of locally consumed tea was imported from neighbouring countries (Tanzania, 
Kenya, Burundi and Uganda). SORWATHE, Highland Tea and OCIR-Thé (in the 
form of loose tea or tea bags) produced tea for local consumption. By 2012, four 
domestic firms had begun packaging tea for domestic consumption (and some of this 
tea was exported). These companies included RTP, SORWATHE, Pfunda Tea 
Company and Highland Tea. RTP and SORWATHE also packaged green tea and 
specialty tea. Four domestic firms began packaging tea for domestic consumption 
and export. In 2012, local sales represented barely one per cent of total made tea 
production. Two foreign-owned companies (Pfunda and SORWATHE) captured 
most of the domestic market. A manager of one company said: 
“The Government has got value-addition in its head. When we did 
our study, value-addition came up as zero. You’ll never make 
money; you can try as much as you can. When I pack tea in 
Rwanda, the weight and volume is low. Transportation costs are 
extremely high. However, we add value for the domestic market 
because there is a small opportunity here. But it would be cheaper 
for me to send the tea in bulk from Rwanda and package it in 
London. The paper and packaging material in Rwanda is ten times 
the cost of what it is in Mombasa. If the government wants us to 
add value, they must give us more incentives.”903 
                                                          
900 Interview, Kanyankole, then-DG NAEB, May 2013. 
901 Interview, Majoro, May 2013. 
902 CVL was warned against expanding Bourbon’s operations abroad. OTF had used the example of 
Equitea in strategy meetings. 
903 Interview, Pfunda Tea Representative, November 2011. 
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 Dealing with such complaints and providing the right incentives required 
decisiveness among government officials and funds (both of which were lacking in 
the current government structure).904 Funds were also needed to build roads around 
tea factories and ensure firewood was provided to run these factories. Funds were 
also required for extension services to convince farmers to adopt appropriate 
production techniques: apply fertilizers, prune bushes when necessary and remain 
attentive to their crop throughout the year. Transport costs and the costs of packaging 
material were high compared to other countries in the region.905 The government also 
emphasised the need to improve training of tea tasters, which was an important 
ingredient of the Sri Lankan success story. A reliable supply of electricity was 
another source of concern for private sector companies. To reduce infrastructural 
constraints, local companies were often urged to invest their own money. Only the 
investment group – RMT – did this (with a loan from BRD). RMT invested $12 
million in partnership with Horizon in a 4 MW mini hydroelectric station. This 
power plant aimed to supply electricity to RMT-owned factories and the remainder 
would be channelled into the national grid. 
 The government recognised that Ceylon Tea story would be difficult to 
emulate until they increased production and invested in the branding of Rwandan tea. 
Companies continued to be encouraged to package tea.906  Embassies in the UK, the 
USA and Asia marketed single-origin Rwandan tea.907 The government has learned 
that it was important to study target markets before choices were made to enter those 
markets. It was also wary of the oligopolistic control larger companies had in 
international markets.  
“It is very difficult to break into this kind of a market. How can 
you invest so much in marketing when your tea isn’t even worth 
                                                          
904 Bureaucrats in managerial positions at NAEB have been victims of reshuffles. Shifting around 
personnel impacts the capacity of bureaucrats to develop long-term priorities for the sector, rather than 
be primarily concerned with meeting annual targets. Butera was removed from his position as head of 
the Tea Division at NAEB in 2012. Kanyankole, who had previously served as head of OCIR-The, 
OCIR-Café and later as DG of NAEB, was made CEO of BRD in 2013. 
905 Interview, Gisovu Tea Factory representative, March 2012. 
906 Kagame publicly encouraged investors again in 2013 (Mugisha 2013). Investors received tax 
exemptions when importing machinery for value-addition but investors claimed that the incentives 
provided by the government were not sufficient to make such initiatives profitable. 
907 Interviews, Butera, Patrick Gihana-Mulenga, Ndabarasa. Butera was dissatisfied with the 
government support for marketing Rwandan tea thus far. “They are doing it a bit but there should be 
more support and investments in marketing. In embassies in Europe, there should be shops and 
boutiques. Today, they only have gifts at embassies. The trade attachés are not doing enough.” 
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that much? They need to tell the consumers why they should buy 
Rwandan tea, what’s different. If you want to sell anything that 
makes sense, you have to get an international buyer interested. 
Rwanda can’t do the same subsidies as Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka took a 
long time to succeed and they had a lot more tea.”908 
 
8.10 Conclusion – The Vulnerability of the Developmental 
Political Settlement 
 
 Though value-addition efforts have been less successful in the tea sector as 
compared to the coffee sector, there have been increases in the production and 
quality of tea produced in Rwanda. The government has also shown its commitment 
to react against vulnerability posed by fluctuations in global tea prices. It has 
prioritised reducing its reliance on selling tea at the Mombasa Tea auction (with 
some success). Unlike during previous governments, the entire sector is currently in 
‘private’ hands and rents accrued from the sector are not being used for individual 
short-term interests. The RPF government has mobilised resources to tea production, 
using donor investments to regenerate the sector and expand area under tea 
cultivation, as well as distribute inputs to farmers. Privatisation processes have been 
managed, albeit with mixed results. Exposure to international markets has allowed 
the sector to make technological advancements. Though there is still some way to go 
until value-addition targets are achieved, the government’s behaviour in the sector 
meets Wade’s (1990) basic characterisation of East Asian developmental states. 
 Tea policies have been a product of the demands of three constituencies. 
Donors funded the regeneration of the sector immediately after the genocide and 
later pushed the government to privatise tea factories. However, reciprocal control 
mechanisms have still not been established effectively to promote priorities in the 
sector. One informal investment group – RMT – is a lead actor in the sector. RMT 
Factories exported 40.4 per cent of the total tea exports and received 42.8 per cent of 
total export receipts in 2012. Some of the individual investors used (Rujugiro and 
Mutangana) contributed to the liberation effort. Since then, many previously loyal 
economic elites have fallen out with the government or died (Chapter 4). There are 
very few local investors with whom the government has been able to effectively 
                                                          
908 Interview, Sanjay Kumar, WFT, May 2013. 
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develop partnerships. Though the government has provided some support to private 
companies, respondents from companies complained that not enough incentives were 
extended to make value-addition feasible. 
To organise labour and manage the “third constituency”, the government 
chose to model the sector on the example of the KTDA, which was perceived to 
successfully empower ‘small farmers’. Such claims fit into ideologically driven 
assumptions that efficient and egalitarian family-operated small farms provided an 
escape from poverty for the poorest rural Africans (Sender and Johnston 2004). The 
government has used such assumptions to mask processes of class formation in the 
sector, empowering farmers and plantation owners and ensuring a supply of 
wageworkers. Maintaining narratives that mystify exploitation are essential for 
Rwandan tea to tap into niche markets. Processes that occurred in Kenya are 
underway in Rwanda (although empowering FECOMIRWA has been slow). 
Cooperatives are also important in distributing inputs, assisting in training, 
advancing loans and assisting with transport of tea leaves to tea factories. There is 
evidence of substantial wage employment in the sector, with temporary workers 
comprising 80 per cent of those who harvested tea (with their contributions 
equivalent to that of nearly 4,476 permanent workers) (Nyamwasa 2008).  
The vulnerability faced by ruling elites has inhibited the government from 
building reciprocal control mechanisms with capitalists and advancing ambitious 
value-addition strategies. The need to embrace market-led reforms has also made 
attempts at managing privatisation processes difficult to control. Though the 
government has used cooperatives as ways to organise labour, changes in the green 
leaf price system reflect difficulties in incentivising farmers to continue producing 
tea (without coercion). As tea cultivation expands and the demands on NAEB to 
become self-sufficient increase, it will be increasingly difficult to discipline investors 
and enforce legislation while also effectively maintaining dialogue with the private 
sector to ensure policies are geared in line with national priorities. Maintaining a 
Developmental Political Settlement depends on appeasing and countering threats 
from three constituencies while continuing to prioritise ideological goals of self-
reliance (and value-addition in the tea sector). 
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION 
9.1 Vulnerability and the Developmental State in Rwanda 
 
In the introductory chapter, three dominant narratives were outlined about 
Rwanda – two of which portrayed Rwanda in a positive light. The flourishing of 
these narratives is a product of shared meanings of ‘development’ among different 
groups. Those who applaud the RPF government for its achievements over the last 
two decades perceive development as a product of economic growth and political 
stability. One group understands economic growth to be a result of market-led 
reforms. The other group stresses how the RPF has developed creative ways to 
intervene in the market and mimic the policies of East Asian development states (e.g. 
by using investment groups or in prioritising smallholder farming). Those who are 
critical of the RPF government stress the repressive environment in which it has 
achieved such stability. All these narratives hold moral appeals. However, rather than 
perceiving development as a ‘moral’ process, economic development must be 
understood to require the facilitation of accumulation processes necessary for 
structural transformation while organising labour to adopt appropriate production 
techniques. Ruling elites manage capital and use coercion to facilitate capitalist 
accumulation, while retaining legitimacy through developing narratives (as one way) 
to appease “three constituencies.” The existence of unequal outcomes and violence 
alongside successful economic development is consistent with the nature of capitalist 
accumulation.  
 The RPF government shares many characteristics with East Asian 
developmental states. Studies of the coffee, mining, tea and pyrethrum sectors have 
demonstrated that the government has made very high levels of productive 
investment, which contributed to adopting new production techniques. State 
intervention (or legislation and incentives) in these sectors has also contributed to 
value-addition. All sectors (except pyrethrum) have been exposed to international 
competition.909 Thus, it could be said that Rwanda shares basic characteristics of a 
developmental state, as identified by Wade (1990). 
                                                          
909 It could be said that the pyrethrum sector was also exposed to international competition because SC 
Johnson was closely involved in USAID programmes.  
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 Though the RPF government shares these characteristics with East Asian 
developmental states, its strategy is relatively unique among late developers. There 
has been limited growth in the manufacturing sector and the domestic banking sector 
has been liberalised. Instead, the RPF’s strategy relied on growth in the services 
sector and inducing productivity (and value-addition) gains in the agriculture sector. 
Chapters 1 and 2 show that such strategies have been embraced in an environment of 
severe inequality. However, there has been an emphasis on providing social services 
to the population and increasing financial inclusion. Such strategies are at odds with 
the policies of many developmental states, which prioritised the creation of job 
opportunities ahead of health and education alone.  
However, it must be maintained that the strategy is constantly evolving and 
the government reacts to shifting demands and threats. For example, there has been a 
renewed focus on creating employment after national surveys highlighted high 
underemployment. Though processes evolve, the utopian goal of ideology (self-
reliance) has remained the same. Elites remain committed to delivering economic 
self-reliance. This thesis does not question whether such a target can be achieved. 
Instead, it argues that the RPF government has made progress in increasing 
productivity and embracing value-addition, which contribute to achieving its 
ideological goal (self-reliance) and confront the vulnerability it has experienced.
 Chapter 1 shows that the RPF government is also subject to conditions of 
‘systemic vulnerability’ (Doner et al. 2005). ‘Systemic vulnerability’ is a necessary 
but insufficient condition for developmental impulses to be sustained. This thesis 
illustrates that while ‘systemic vulnerability’ has motivated ruling elites to commit to 
economic development, vulnerability resulting from needing to navigate the demands 
of three constituencies inhibits the capacity of ruling elites to achieve their goals. 
Appeasing donors by embracing market-led reforms has resulted in difficulties in 
retaining the capacity to discipline and monitor capitalist firms. Scarcity of 
government funds has further inhibited these goals. Frictions among elites are a 
source of threat to the dominant coalition and have also inhibited the government’s 
capacity to build effective reciprocal control mechanisms with loyal domestic 
capitalists (other than investment groups). Narratives of ‘pro-poor development’ and 
breaking into niche value-addition markets depend on the government mystifying the 
exploitation of workers and concealing evidence of control grabs in the sectors 
studied. After 2012, the government has also refocused its efforts on creating 
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employment opportunities for the population to tackle existing inequality. 
Difficulties in developing and protecting such narratives further highlight how 
vulnerability inhibits economic development. Chapters 2 and 4 show that the stability 
of the political settlement will depend on countering any possibility that rival elites 
may capitalise on grievances among the population (if they exist) to mount an 
effective challenge against Kagame’s rule. For Kagame to retain his position, the 
moral representation of his actions and of RPF rule (and his leading position within 
those narratives) must be protected against rivals who contest such narratives.   
After the Congo Wars, Kagame focused on consolidating his monopoly of 
violence and empowering elites on the basis of loyalty and a commitment to 
Economic Nationalism. Senior RPF cadres, who were potential rivals, were gradually 
sidelined. During this process, a rival coalition was established outside Rwanda. This 
rival coalition (the RNC) presents a dangerous threat to Kagame’s leadership. The 
RNC is led by estranged Tutsi elites, with some legitimacy (through being prominent 
leaders of the liberation effort). Any threat is unlikely to take the form of ethnic or 
class-based popular mobilisation. Any challenge from rivals must be justified 
through contesting the legitimacy of Kagame’s government. Kagame’s legitimacy is 
contested both within the country and internationally, as donors provide moral and 
economic support to the RPF government. The dominant coalition strengthens its 
narrative to ensure the ‘public’ loyalty of elites but uses violence to remind senior 
RPF cadres of its holding power.  
The Developmental Political Settlement is maintained because Kagame has 
convinced elites against contesting his authority because of the continued relevance 
of collective memories, which are sharpened by the salience of internal and external 
threats. Since many senior RPF cadres suffered from violent episodes previously and 
have shared refugee experiences, these memories are extremely relevant. To 
maintain political stability and to delegitimise the acts of rivals, Kagame has leaned 
on values central to RPF ideology that show a commitment to achieving self-reliance 
(e.g. discipline, anti-corruption and self-sacrifice). The RPF is a carrier of these 
values and because of Kagame’s leadership during the genocide and the years that 
followed, power within the hierarchy is distributed on the basis of perceived loyalty 
to these values and to Kagame himself.  
 Ruling elites in Rwanda use narratives, violence and rents to sustain systems 
of accumulation while countering threats by those who resist such systems. The three 
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sector chapters have shown how capital has been managed, while coercion and 
incentives have been used in organising labour. Though vulnerability forces elites to 
commit to economic development, it has also inhibited their capacity to deliver 
economic development.  
9.2 The Contributions of this Thesis 
 
 There has been very little previous academic research on the political 
settlement and its implications on Rwanda’s economic development. The major 
contribution of this research is to emphasise that the RPF government has pursued 
policies, which are similar to those pursued by East Asian developmental states. 
However, it has also embraced governance reforms, which have ensured its strategy 
is relatively unique among late developers. This thesis has also illustrated the 
vulnerability through which the Developmental Political Settlement is legitimised but 
also threatened. It demonstrates how ruling elites in Rwanda have tackled the 
challenges of late development while also illustrating the difficulties that have 
accompanied this process. Legitimacy is drawn from three constituencies – all of 
which threaten political stability and inhibit economic development. 
 This thesis has shown how RPF narratives of economic development have 
concealed the exploitation on which accumulation depends. Such conditions are not 
unique to Rwanda and were also common among East Asian developmental states. 
Recognising that such conditions exist is important because it helps show how 
ideological goals of self-reliance may be blocked.  
The RPF government has made progress. It is no small feat to have rebuilt the 
country so substantially after large scale violence. However, economic development 
is prioritised because of the collective experiences of vulnerability experienced by 
senior RPF cadres. The prioritisation of self-reliance is not ‘benevolent’. Instead, it 
masks the processes through which winners and losers contest for power behind 
ideology. Despite depicting itself to have ‘liberalised’ and empowered cooperatives, 
the RPF government has managed capital and organised labour (through a mixture of 
coercion and incentives).  
This thesis has developed a new way of looking at the political settlement. 
Albert Hirschman’s (1970) Exit-Voice-Loyalty framework is used to illustrate the 
dynamism of the political settlement and the difficulties associated with ensuring 
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loyal capital and labour are organised to appropriate systems of accumulation. 
Loyalty itself is transient. To sustain systems of accumulation, the government reacts 
to changes in its environment. Managing capital has been difficult given that the RPF 
government has had to embrace market-led reforms. Organising labour (loyalty) and 
minimising resistance (voice and exit) to appropriate production methods is essential 
to promote appropriate systems of accumulation. During this process, several elites 
have chosen to exit the dominant coalition and set up rival organisations (RNC). 
Developing and protecting narratives (backed up by coercion) is essential if systems 
of accumulation are to be promoted in line with achieving ideological goals of self-
reliance.  
9.3 Areas for Future Research 
 
 More research on the coffee, tea and mining sectors from a ‘bottom-up’ 
perspective would add to the findings in this thesis. Other studies on different sectors 
in Rwanda will show how the RPF government has managed capital and organised 
labour to appropriate systems of accumulation in those sectors. This thesis argues 
that each sector must be analysed on its own to develop a better understanding of the 
sources of vulnerability facing Rwanda’s Developmental Political Settlement. Such 
studies will help broaden our understanding of the instruments that have been used 
by ruling elites in Rwanda to manage three constituencies. 
 It is hoped that future research in Rwanda will also be undertaken on 
agriculture and mining wageworkers. The government has also begun to collect 
information on industrial wages. In 2011, the construction sector employed the most 
wageworkers in Rwanda and provided the maximum average annual wages (GoR 
2011). Such research has rarely been undertaken in Rwanda (one exception is 
Erlebach 2006). If research on rural livelihoods was undertaken, comparing wage 
employment at commercial farms (or industrial mines) versus that of smallholder 
farms, would help inform policymaking in Rwanda. 
 Future research on other African ‘developmental’ states will provide useful 
comparators for the findings in this thesis. An obvious example is Ethiopia. Meles’ 
economic policies have been an example for Rwanda. Meles’ exit from political 
power was accompanied by a peaceful transition (although he died). Like Rwanda 
(since 1994), Meles’ Ethiopia has also reduced its dependence on coffee exports 
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(from 62 per cent of total exports in 1991 to 38 per cent in 2012).910 However, 
Ethiopia has prioritised the manufacturing sector and it has not liberalised its 
financial sector to the same extent as Rwanda (Oqubay 2015). Other interesting 
examples would be Angola and Uganda (with similar roots in coffee dependence and 
shared experiences of vulnerability among ruling elites). One attempt (Jones et al. 
2013) at studying some of these countries (Ethiopia, Rwanda, Angola and Sudan) has 
not developed detailed findings. Their focus is on politics and ideology and only 
limited work has been undertaken on the political settlement or specific sectors in 
these countries. 
 This thesis has also explored positive stories of value-addition – which are 
rarely detailed in the commodity studies literature. Comparative studies of successful 
value-addition attempts in coffee sectors (Uganda, Ethiopia), tea sectors (Sri Lanka 
and Tanzania) and mining sectors will contribute to our understanding of how some 
governments have successfully intervened to promote value-addition.  
9.4 Considerations for Policymakers  
 
This research challenges the notion that war and violence (or the threat of 
violence) is directly opposed to development. Instead, “war shapes the social 
relations in which it is embedded” and “war is present beyond the war front and 
beyond wartime” (Barkawi 2011, 7). Beyond war, vulnerability is essential in 
motivating ruling elites to commit to economic development. The threat of violence 
plays an important role in determining if ruling elites will prioritise economic 
development, as it is important in political settlements based on a ‘politics of 
survival’ (Whitfield and Buur 2014). However, vulnerability is not sufficient to 
motivate ruling elites to commit to economic development. Instead, specific histories 
and ideologies of the parties who lead development must also be understood, as 
should the sources of friction among elites. The threat of violence has both positive 
and negative outcomes. While it can help bind a group of elites in a common 
economic or political purpose, it can also make the dominant coalition reluctant to 
empower elites who may later become a threat to their own power. On a related note, 
this thesis challenges the neoclassical tendency to view human behaviour in purely 
                                                          
910 Author’s calculations from EIU reports. 
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economic terms. Instead, it shows how economic motivations interact with emotional 
and ideological ones. 
This thesis has attempted to compare the RPF’s economic development 
strategy with East Asian developmental states. While it has argued that ruling elites 
are committed to economic development, the RPF has charted its own specific path 
and has been confronted by very specific challenges. Understanding how such states 
navigate the competing demands of three constituencies and develop policies while 
considering these demands is essential. States should not simply be named as 
‘developmental’. Instead, it would be more informative to illustrate how states have 
differed from other ‘developmental states’ and identify the difficulties associated 
with chosen strategies. The terrain in which late development is negotiated today is 
very different from the environment that faced East Asian late developers. 
Understanding how different governments have negotiated space to enact 
development on their own terms will broaden our understanding of contemporary 
challenges facing late developers. 
This thesis argues for the importance of developing a historical political 
economy approach to understanding what motivates political and economic policies. 
It is argued that such an approach shows us that there is no single development 
trajectory. Instead, each society is a product of its own history and the conflicts (and 
individual decisions) that accompany economic development. Ruling elites use 
prevailing understandings of social norms and morality to justify their public 
behaviour while contesting with rival elites for power. Explaining how class 
relations, ideology and intra-elite conflicts interact in determining economic policies 
contributes to better understandings of the challenges of late development. 
This thesis urges donors to avoid easy ‘moral’ assumptions, as evident in the 
competing narratives about Rwanda. Discussions about empowering vulnerable 
workers in society cannot begin unless the unequal outcomes associated with 
accumulation processes are acknowledged. Policymakers would be best served to 
focus on how the government can be facilitated to deliver on the redistributive 
demands required by the population and how the accumulation strategies of loyal 
investors can be facilitated so that wage employment can be provided for the 
population. Policymakers must be advised against assuming ‘mutual gains’ are 
associated with empowering cooperatives or assuming the fairness of privatisation 
and liberalisation processes. Also, proximate state-business relationships should not 
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be immediately tarred with corruption charges. Such relationships have been part of 
all successful examples of late development.  
Policy decisions should not come down to empowering one group at the cost 
of another. The threat of violence has a disciplinary effect on the dominant coalition 
but also weakens its capacity to deliver development. Donors must also understand 
the credibility and power they give to groups, elites and leaders who they support. 
The removal of this support is also a political act and forces a reconfiguration of 
domestic power relations. Imposing conditionalities and pressuring governments to 
behave in certain ways constrains government behaviour. Only through detailed 
understandings of how history, political economy and individual agency interact in 
specific contexts can donors make informed decisions about how governments can 
be pressured to make economic development a more socially agreeable process. 
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